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Volume Twelve 1959

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EDITORS:
T. F. TORRANCE, M.B.E., D.D., D.THEOL.
J. K. S. REID, B.D.

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ANALOGY[1]

by Professor JOHN McINTYRE

One of the major discoveries—it may be only a rediscovery—of recent theology has been the central place which analogy occupies in theological inquiry of all kinds. Our present task falls into three parts: (1) to indicate the different areas to which the problem of analogy seems to be relevant; (2) to discuss the origin of the interpretations of the nature of analogy which are gaining a certain acceptance today; and (3) finally, to estimate the use that may validly be made of the traditional analyses of analogy.

I

(*a*) It may only be a straw in the wind but it is significant that Ian Crombie in an essay on 'The Possibility of Theological Statements' in the recently published *Faith and Logic* says: '. . . we must believe in some kind of resemblance or analogy between, say, human and divine love.' Excerpted from its context, it is no very exciting affirmation: it has been said a thousand times over. But it is the context of the words that gives them significance for our purpose. The book, *Faith and Logic*, edited by Basil Mitchell, is a collection of essays written by Oxford philosophers who are also Christians. The discussion, of which these essays are the fruit, was carried on over the past ten years, and was concerned with the problems created for theology by the philosophy dominant in Oxford during the decade. Among the questions they faced were: 'How are theological statements to be verified?', 'What sort of arguments or observations tend to confirm or refute them?', 'How is it possible for man to know God?' (p. 7). Ian Crombie strongly advocates the conclusion that the clue to theological statements lies in the right understanding of the place occupied by analogy in them. Such analogy may take the form of the use in relation to God of such words as have meanings in ordinary contexts—love, anger, pity, and so on: or it may take the form of images

[1] This article appeared in French under the title 'L'analogie', in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, 1958 II.

and parables which, for all their anthropomorphic exterior, have a genuinely transcendent reference-range. Beginning at a point within the contemporary philosophical scene and remote from the traditional language of theology, Crombie finds his way to the question of analogy and makes it plain that future conversations with philosophical sceptics will have to be conducted in this area. It is an interesting fact, in this same connexion, that Austin Farrer, who also belonged to the group, should be so interested in the linguistic problems of modern philosophy and at the same time in the place of images and therefore of analogy in modern biblical-dogmatic thought. The double interest is by no means fortuitous if it really is the case that the problem of theological language is the problem of the kind of symbols we are to use, i.e. of our analogies.

(Incidentally, I am not sure but that a certain counter-offensive might be encouraged against the philosophical critics of theological statement on the basis of our renewed awareness of the place of analogy in theological statement. It would take the form of pointing out that the positivist's and the analyst's use of language is itself analogical, and that some of those analogies are not beyond reproach. For example, the older logical positivist verification principle was based on a completely analogical view of the nature of language—a contention still more obviously illustrated in the recent suggestion that human words are like arrows, deriving their meaning from the goal at which they are directed and from the purpose which they serve. In fact, this whole interest in the linguistic approach to philosophical problems and the ready use of the statements of ordinary people to solve the riddles of the universe serve only to bring analogy right into the heart of philosophical discourse, for ordinary discourse is notoriously analogical. On these terms, analogy should occupy chapter one of a modern logic instead of chapter fourteen as it did in the late Susan Stebbing's work.)

(*b*) What is true of the narrow apologetic front along which we meet the philosophers is much more clearly the case for the wider task of the Church in her missionary apologetic. In this area, 'relevance' seems almost to have replaced 'truth' as a criterion of permissible discourse. The only question which is often asked of a sermon or an address is: 'Was it relevant?', as

if either its truth were not worth considering, or its relevance constituted its truth. Sometimes I think that I would appreciate an address that claimed unashamedly to be 'irrelevant'. In any case, what is the origin of this cult of the relevant which has almost become a fetish? Is it a by-product of the interest in new implications of Christian belief for social, economic and political action? Or is it just a very British type of Existentialism? Be that as it may, the problem of relevance is the problem of analogy, the problem of discovering the figure, the image, even the parable, that will say to our generation what the *κήρυγμα* said to the first century Christians. However abandoned some people may be in the stunts which they invent to achieve relevance, and however concerned we are, on the other hand, to remain faithful to the witness of the Apostles and Prophets, nevertheless, whenever we preach or write to be understood of our contemporaries, we embark upon analogy as the medium not simply of relevance but also of comprehensibility. The bondage to the original writers and this obligation to discover the effective and faithful analogy—these form the members of the Cross which every preacher of the Gospel must carry. It is the former which saves the latter from becoming fantastic and exhibitionist; but the latter both saves the former from fossilisation and in so doing becomes the means whereby God guarantees *now* the truth of what happened *then.* In other words, analogy is woven into the very texture of Proclamation, and its presence there is not due to our inventiveness, but to God's will that it should be so.

(*c*) Such a review of the different areas within which the concept of analogy is to be found and its attendant problems observed, must include, albeit diffidently, a reference to the biblical subjects. There are the obvious examples, such as Vischer's extreme Christological interpretation of the Old Testament, where the analogy of Christ is employed to the alleged misconstruction of Old Testament meanings; or the typological and allegorical methods of exegesis, which show that to 'interpret Scripture by Scripture' is not, by itself, as it was never intended to be, a complete hermeneutical principle. But there are less obvious forms in which analogy operates: the application of the term 'unity' to the Bible as a whole—common practice nowadays in works on biblical theology—is

analogical, as soon becomes evident when people disagree about the nature of this unity and cite in support of their views the differing principal analogates which they intend by the term 'unity'. Any attempt to assign primacy to any single concept, such as that of the Covenant, or the ἔσχατον within one book or series of books, and to interpret the passages in which the concept does not occur in the light of this concept, is an instance of this same process. In fact, the history of biblical criticism is the story of the way in which one analogy has ousted another from this dominating role.

(*d*) It is in the province of systematic theology, perhaps, that the significance of analogy is best seen today. Two things may be said about it to begin with. First, it has become clear that analogy is a primary and central and not a secondary and peripheral problem both of theological subject-matter and of theological method. Whereas previously it was thought to be a topic to be discussed under the heading of 'knowledge of God, how related to knowledge of ordinary entities and persons', or again under that of 'the nature of man, how related to the Creator', it is now believed to apply to the whole of Christian subject-matter. It is as much present in Christology as in anthropology, in eschatology as in soteriology. So too, the analogical method is no longer confined to religious epistemology or to the rather contentious area of the Proofs of Divine Existence; it is seen to be equally in evidence in soteriology and in the doctrine of the Church, as in the theology of the Sacraments.

The second consideration that may be mentioned in connexion with the new awareness of the place of analogy in all Christian theological thought and subject-matter is that this awareness creates a new responsibility, namely, of being more conscious and deliberate both in our choice of our regulative concepts and—more important still—in our attitude to analogy. We know the name of him with whom we wrestle, and if this may have dire consequences, it also demands of us selective, responsible behaviour.

Several examples of such selectivity leap to mind. An older instance would be the so-called Sacramentalism, which regarded the relation of the creaturely elements to the Divine Presence in the Sacraments as the vivid expression of a truth

that held for the whole of life and the world. Dr Hodgson, in his account of the Doctrine of the Trinity, makes a very imaginative attempt to re-state the Doctrine in analogies drawn from our contemporary culture—from psychology and biochemistry. G. Aulén's conception of *Christus Victor*, however biblically based, becomes in his hands the analogy whereby he interprets and criticises post-biblical soteriologies; whereas Whitehead's concept of organism becomes the regulative analogy for L. S. Thornton's Christology. By their analogies shall ye know them. But perhaps the theme is best illustrated from Neo-Orthodox theology from the Christocentricism of Neo-Orthodox theology, and from the use particularly of the hypostatic union of the two natures in the Person of Jesus Christ as the basis of the description of the relation of the human to the divine in the Bible, and of the elements to the Body and Blood of Our Lord in the Sacrament. At the present time it has acquired outstanding importance in the use to which it has been put in the interpretation of the nature of the Church and of the function of the ministry within the Church.

Before leaving this first section of our study, with its all-too-hasty review of the areas in which analogy is visibly present in theology today, let me make the following comments.

(1) It will have been clear that the examples mentioned evince no single pattern, either of predication or inference. This variety is intended for two reasons. On the one hand, the history of the study of analogy abounds in instances of inflexible definitions of analogy which prevented their exponents from being aware of other forms of it. It is, therefore, a mistake to decide at the start what exactly analogy should be. We all have a sufficiently adequate working idea of it to know where to look for it and at least to say who the starters are likely to be, even if they do not all finish the course. On the other hand, language may be subsumed under *creative* human activities, and it is not improbable that such creativity will have produced new forms of analogy. This conclusion will be reinforced if we allow that language is both a function of socio-economic and political environment and a structure of logical patterns, and that these two interact upon each other. The creative use of language within the environment of the Church and in relation supremely to the Christian subject-matter makes it impossible

for us to close our definition of analogy at any one point in history—with Aristotle, with St. Aquinas, with—but you must supply your own third in the Triumvirate!

(2) Analogy has proved a most *productive* form of theological thought—particularly in two directions. First, it has had an integrative effect in that it has drawn together into close internal relation areas of theological subject-matter which were thought to be only externally and loosely connected. Many of the older text-books tended to regard the Christian doctrines like the articles in the Creeds—to be recited seriatim, the end not to be anticipated before it was actually reached. So it was that eschatology became a kind of postscript to the other doctrines. But when it is affirmed that the ἔσχατον is realised, and non-ultimate events are interpreted eschatologically, and particularly when these words are used in Bultmann's sense, then theology acquires a new integration—in fact, a kind of integration which it has not had in its whole history. Secondly, analogy has been productive in theological thought in that it has suggested new things to say on certain subjects. By using the analogy of the hypostatic union in reference to Scripture, or to the Church, we establish access to a whole new range of descriptions of these two subjects. Old problems are rejected as being unreal or superficial; new ones are created and fresh arguments arise. But, primarily, it is felt that the new analogy penetrates more profoundly to the heart of the matter in hand than does any of the others with which we had previously operated.

(3) The third point follows naturally from the second. In opening up a new range of possibilities, the analogy also exerts a controlling influence on the possibilities. It becomes determinative of the kind of thing we may say on the subject, and exclusive of the kind of thing we may not say. For that reason, many of our disagreements in theology are not differences over minutiae of exegesis or details of historical occurrence, so much as a radical conflict over the proper analogies to use in our exegesis or historical judgments. But this problem is deeper set for us than it was for most of our predecessors because of the integrative role played by analogy in our theological thought. If our analogies penetrate to the utmost reaches of our thinking, then disagreements are likely to happen over a wider range,

and, wherever they begin, to take us back, it may be by devious routes but certainly always, to the radical differences in analogy.

(4) So, we may add, analogy seems to have acquired a *normative* function in the present setting. Such a proposition is not simply a reaffirmation in other terms of the previous comment. What is meant by saying that analogy is determinative of what we say in theology is that because of the analogies we use, we say certain things, and in fact do not say other things. In affirming that analogy is normative, we take the further step of maintaining that what *we* say in the light of our analogy is right, and what we are prevented from saying is wrong. This normative function of analogy is a new one, and it is made possible largely because of the penetrative integration by analogy of most contemporary theological thought. It is, moreover, a most important function at the present time when there is so much confusion about the criterion of theological thought. Certain of our analogies, though we would claim for them no finality, have in a very pragmatic way established themselves in the office of criteria of theological truth. They have done so not primarily because they have enabled us to exclude 'heretical' views, but rather because they have opened up new ranges of possibility. Any criterion justifies itself, in the end, more by the kind of thing that it permits than by what it permits.

That, then, is the present position as I see it: a great looseness in the use of the term 'analogy', the ubiquity of analogy in a new way in our theological thought, and a normative function acquired in *a posteriori* fashion. These are the appearances which any full-blown doctrine of analogy must save. As a step in that direction, I propose now to look at a few traditional accounts of analogy; for however loosely now we use the term, it is one with a long history to it, and many shreds of that history still remain with it in the present situation. Besides, if it is the case, as my diagnosis suggests, that analogy has won for itself this central office in theological method, then part of the price of occupying this position is that it will have to submit to scrutiny from all sides.

2

To keep the discussion within manageable confines for

present purposes, I have chosen representatives of the Roman, the Reformed, the Neo-Orthodox and the philosophical views of analogy.

(1) The Roman position is set forth by J. F. Anderson in *The Bond of Being*. Like Penido, who wrote some eighteen years before him (1931), Anderson maintains that Thomas de Vio Cajetanus is a faithful interpreter of St. Thomas. We make our beginning from his classification of analogy, for it is desirable to have it before us for our later discussion.

(1.1) Analogy of inequality (or generic predication) occurs whenever entities or attributes participate to differing extents (unequally) in some generic or specific concept. It forms the metaphysical basis of philosophies so diverse as those of Plato and Spinoza, of Plotinus and F. H. Bradley. While it evinces one of the distinguishing marks of analogy, namely, unity among the analogates combining with difference, it is nevertheless basically a type of univocity, the predication of the *same* generic term (with one common intention) of the several members of the genus. It is really only a pseudo-analogy; but it is important to mention it because of the danger of interpreting the Thomistic metaphysic in Platonist terms.

(1.2) Analogy of proportion or attribution is applied to those entities which, while different in other respects, are the same in that they are all related, even by different relations to one identical thing. This one thing is predicated of them analogically. An example makes the point quite clear. The word 'healthy' may be predicated of diet, medicine, complexion or animal; and it has a slightly different meaning in each case, because each of the entities is differently related to it. The diet is healthy because it maintains the animal in good health; the medicine, because it restores its health; the complexion, because it is a sign of good health. It is the identical health of the animal that is referred to in each case and the predication of the term 'healthy' to these other entities is analogical. But the term 'health' is properly applied to the organism of the animal: here 'health' is formally realised. This is the prime analogate; the others are secondary. It may be pointed out that the relation in which each of the analogates stands (or is 'proportioned') to the single term may be one or other of the four types of causal relation.

The following are the properties of this type of analogy:

(1.2.1) The *principal* property of it is that the attribute assigned to the different analogates is realised formally only in the prime analogate and referred to the others only by *extrinsic denomination* from the former. The others receive only the common name from it. (1.2.2) The 'analogous formality' (Anderson, op. cit., p. 98)—'health' in the standard example—is numerically one, not logically or conceptually. The health in virtue of which the diet, medicine, etc., are said to be 'healthy' is one in number; the so-called 'healthy' analogates may be thought of as forming a class, instances of a universal, which is logically one. (1.2.3) The prime analogate must be included in the definitions of the secondary analogates, which only receive their analogous name through their extrinsic relation to it. (1.2.4) The common term, occurring in the plurality of relations, in which the analogates stand to it, has a different meaning in relation to the different analogates; but their common reference saves these meanings from being completely homonymous.

(1.3) Analogy of proportionality may most readily be understood from the Aristotelian example which St. Thomas uses—that of the term 'good'. Different things are said to be 'good' proportionately, not because of their dependence upon a first principle, or their extrinsic relation to a prime analogate, but in virtue of a goodness inherent in them. Thus, sight performs the same function in relation to the body as intelligence does to the soul. Sight is as good proportionately to the body as intelligence is to the soul. The structure of analogy of proportionality is A : B : : C : D. This form is preferable to the other mathematical form A/B = C/D. For when we substitute values for the symbols and have

$$\frac{\textit{God's Essence}}{\textit{God's Intelligence}} = \frac{\textit{Man's Essence}}{\textit{Man's Intelligence}}$$

we see the error of saying that God's Intelligence is determined by God's Essence *in the same way* as Man's Intelligence is determined by Man's Essence. The real intention is that as Man's Intelligence is determined by Man's Essence in a manner proper to humanity; so God's Intelligence is determined by God's Essence in a manner proper to Deity. In this analogy

the similarity lies not in the attributes of the terms, but in the relations that hold between them.

Anderson concludes his analysis of analogy in St. Thomas with the contention that analogy of proportionality is basic to St. Thomas' affirmation of 'analogy of being'. This analogy, alone of the three, is metaphysical, for only by means of it can a proper description be given of how things *are*. All things participate in being. 'But the act of existing of each and every thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the act of existing of each and every other thing' (Anderson, op. cit., p. 281). This situation can only be understood if we realise that the relations in which their essences stand to their acts of existing (their *esse*) are instances of analogy of proportionality. 'Analogy is the unique bond of being between everything that is' (ibid., p. 305). When he comes to deal with the statement that 'human essence is to human existence as Divine essence is to Divine existence', Anderson holds that the relation of essence to act of existing is that of potency to act, and that this distinction is the result of Creation (ibid., p. 309), in which God's effects are linked to Him as Agent by real relations of analogical similarity. Very interestingly, he finally holds that these relations cannot be of univocal identity, because 'God and the world are essentially diverse' (ibid.).

(2) The Reformed position is presented to us by Dr J. C. McLelland, in his exposition of Peter Martyr (*The Visible Words of God*). In his Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Peter Martyr expounds a theory of analogy which is substantially the same as Cajetan's intrepretation of St. Thomas (op. cit., p. 79), and he favours analogy of proportionality, with three differences. (2.1.1) In the first place, he rejects the *analogia entis*, the reason given by McLelland (p. 83) being that it is equivalent to 'a doctrine of ontological continuity between God and man'. (2.1.2) In the second place, he substitutes for the *analogia entis* the *unio hypostatica* of the natures in the Person of Jesus Christ as the relational analogue. The archetypal analogue, therefore, which is to be the basis of theological construction is not an innate part of man's being; it is given by God to man in the gracious event of the Incarnation, and, therefore, in the Person of Jesus Christ. (2.1.3) The relation between the archetype (*unio hypostatica*) and the *analogata*

which it enables us rightly to understand and interpret (e.g. the 'signs' in the Sacraments) is constituted by the Holy Spirit. It is in his use of the analogy of the Person of Christ to combat the errors of Transubstantiationism, and in the exegetical method which he evolved and was so anxious to distinguish from the allegorical and the typological methods, that Peter Martyr made his most distinctive contribution to the theology of the Reformation.

This form of the Christological analogy has come into so great contemporary vogue that it well merits further consideration.

(2.2.1) To begin with, the Christological analogy is not improved by what would seem to be an invalid criticism of the Thomastic *analogia entis*, namely, that it implies or is implied by 'a doctrine of ontological continuity between God and man'. This is a connexion which I confess I can not altogether follow, for the following reasons. (2.2.1.1) I should have thought that this sort of continuity was the very thing that was ruled out by the doctrine of analogy in at least two of its forms, and was possible only on one interpretation of analogy—that which St. Thomas would not accept anyway, the analogy of inequality. In a hierarchical metaphysic of the Platonist type, in which you ascend from particulars of sense through more and more general concepts to the Form of the Good, there is 'ontological continuity' from the lowest to the highest member of the structure. But in analogy of attribution, the fact is stressed that the secondary analogates are dependent for their being upon the prime analogate; they receive the attribute only by extrinsic denomination. Whereas, in analogy of proportionality what is stressed is that we have the kind of existence which is proportionate to our kind of being: which is, as far as I can see, a completely effective way of saying that we do not have the kind of being that God has. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the view that the concept of *analogia entis* commits Thomism to ontological continuity between God and man, arises for one or other of three reasons. First, because the phrase *analogia entis* is carelessly translated *similarity of being*, which is taken to mean that God's being is like, i.e. is identical with ours. Secondly, because Thomism is now interpreted through a haze of philosophical idealism which is closer to either Platonism or

Hegelianism than it is to genuine Thomism. Or thirdly, because as a consequence of its association with Aristotelianism, it is thought to be committed to identical views on how the world as we know it is produced by the ingression of Forms into ἡ ἄμορφη ὕλη, τὸ ἄπειρον, and how the whole of reality is to be regarded as consisting of one kind of being. (2.2.1.2) Analogy of proportionality is held in St. Thomas along with the doctrine of Creation, and this tends to enforce the conclusion that there is not ontological continuity between God and man. It is God's act of creation which establishes the *analogia entis* so that there can be no question of the *analogia entis* involving any denial of the fundamental distinction between Creator and creatures. In Anderson's words already quoted, 'God and the world are essentially diverse'. Of course, much is made by the critics of St. Thomas of the fact that he uses causal terminology when speaking of creation, and that therefore he places God on the same level as His effects, the whole order of nature. Not only am I not sure but that St. Thomas uses the term 'cause' of God in an analogical sense; but also he must be credited with saying many other things about God's relation to the created order which show that he does not think in terms of 'ontological continuity'. (2.2.1.3) In fact, if we interpret *analogia entis* in terms of analogy of proportionality, there is no reason why it should not be retained even when another interpretation is also supplied to proportionality. If, as I believe is the case, the *analogia entis* primarily refers to creation, then it is surely permissible to combine the two. Besides, even if you do take the *unio hypostatica* as the regulative form of the analogy of proportionality, you still have to face the problem of the kind of analogy that holds after creation and prior to redemption.

(2.2.2) The second comment that I should like to make on the substitution of the *unio hypostatica* as the prime analogate in place of the *analogia entis* (after the manner of Peter Martyr—J. C. McLelland) is that we must remember that when we have made the substitution, we still have only analogy and not univocity. This is precisely the point made by Principal John Baillie in his book *The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought* against L. S. Thornton's view of the Bible. Working with the analogy between the relation of the human nature to the Divine nature in the Person of Jesus Christ to the relation of the human and the

Divine in the Bible, Thornton forbids us to discriminate between the essence of Revelation and the sacred literature in which it is enshrined, and to sit in judgment dividing to what extent and in what degrees its various utterances are inspired. Dr Baillie replies that whereas the human nature of Christ is perfect, that of the biblical witnesses is not; and further, that if Thornton's view were correct, then Bibliolatry would be no more reprehensible than Christolatry. In fact, Dr Baillie's charge is that Thornton has forgotten that the *unio hypostatica* is applied only analogically to the Divine and human elements in the Bible. We might fairly add that the Roman Church commits precisely the same error in its doctrine of the Church. In this Divine—human institution, where we Protestants see the fallibility of the human members singly and in the group, Romans see a human element which has acquired the perfection of the human nature of our Lord. Add to a belief in this perfection, the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*, and the *Una Sancta* becomes the inescapable conclusion of any univocal use of the analogy of the *unio hypostatica* in relation to Christ and the Church.

My dilemma with the use of the analogy of the *unio hypostatica* is as follows. On the one hand, it proves to be a most effectively sharp theological tool when it is used as an analogy of inequality, the secondary analogates being regarded as particular instances of the prime analogate—in which case, however, analogy of proportionality is violated. On the other hand, when it is really treated as an analogy of proportionality, it tends to break in our hands, for it gives us no criterion for distinguishing the ways in which the secondary analogates resemble and differ from the primary.

(2.2.3) My third comment on this kind of analogy follows. It is that just as in St. Thomas analogy of proportionality requires to be taken with the doctrine of Creation; so in the Reformed use of the *unio hypostatica*, it is necessary that some indication of the relation of the prime analogate to the secondary analogates be given beyond that stated in the proportionality. The point is perfectly clear in symbolics. The formula A : B : : C : D is inadequate without some indication of how A is related to C and/or B to D. The use which L. S. Thornton makes of the analogy of the *unio hypostatica* in relation to the

Bible is vitiated, partly at least, by his failure to relate the human nature in Christ to the human element in the Bible. In other words, because the analogy of proportionality is an analogy of *relations*, it requires to be supplemented by some form of analogy which relates the *terms* of the analogy.

(3) Choosing Barth as the representative of the Neo-Orthodox position, I have confined myself to the *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, 2/1; for this is the *locus classicus* at which he relates himself to the traditional discussions of analogy and employs their terminology. He develops his own position by means of a critical exposition of Quenstedt (pp. 267ff). After rejecting, as we should expect, those interpretations of our language about God which regard it as either univocal or equivocal, Quenstedt agrees with St. Thomas that such language is analogical. Rather surprisingly, Quenstedt goes on to deny not only analogy of inequality, but also analogy of proportionality—no reasons being offered—and to affirm analogy of attribution. Before expounding Quenstedt's rather unusual conception of this type of analogy, Barth sketches in the background by means of quotations in which Quenstedt maintains that as God is essence and substance, so the creatures are properly (*proprie*) beings, essences and substances. 'God did not create *non-entia*' (p. 269). In analogy of attribution, according to Quenstedt, the application of the analogy to the secondary analogates is not made by *extrinsic* denomination but by *intrinsic* denomination, because the analogy properly belongs to the secondary analogates, even though they are dependent upon the primary.

Now Barth clearly is going to have very little trouble over this situation, and he shows no compunction about shooting a sitting bird. Not a feather is left. Quenstedt, the good Lutheran, shows in his other writings how well he knows the doctrine of forgiveness by grace alone; had he but extended this knowledge to his analysis of our knowledge of God, he would have seen that the analogy between God and man is not something that is ever *proper* to man and that the *attributio* is never *intrinseca* but always *extrinseca*. The creature is created into an analogue by virtue of an act of Divine grace, and never possesses this analogue in his own right. 'It is not a common *being* of God and man, which in the last resort properly establishes and maintains the fellowship between them both, but God's grace in our

redemption (p. 275). I feel that it is a pity that it is the phrase *analogia fidei* rather than *analogia gratiae* which has been popularised as the summary of Barth's position in this matter. The subjective nuances attaching to the word 'faith' open up the possibility that the *analogia fidei* is something created by our subjective act of faith; whereas it is because grace sets up the analogy that faith takes place.

Barth goes on to affirm that the presuppositions of Quenstedt's *attributio intrinseca* which are precisely those of Roman Catholicism, namely, the doctrine of *analogia entis*; whereas his *analogia gratiae* is founded upon the biblical view of the relationship of God to man. The *attributio intrinseca* is finally rejected because it conflicts with Scripture as the criterion of theological truth.

I agree that there is something improper about embarking upon a discussion of Barth's views of analogy in the context of so many other views; yet Barth's views must be kept in such a context if they are to be rightly understood. The following comments may be made.

(3.1.1) Barth, I should have thought quite unnecessarily, limits himself in the discussion by his acceptance of Quenstedt's account of analogy, an account which is defective in several respects. Quenstedt's preference for analogy of attribution over against other types of analogy is rather obscurely grounded. The form of *attributio* which he does accept is of such a kind as scarcely to merit the name, for it is really analogy of inequality. But most seriously of all, Quenstedt's neglect of analogy of proportionality has serious consequences for the accuracy of his presentation of the problem; for example, it leads him to ignore the place which proportionality occupies in Peter Martyr's thought.

(3.1.2) This delimitation of the area of analogy is not without its consequences for Barth's exposition. On the one hand, he defines his own position as one of analogy of attribution, but substitutes for the intrinsic denomination of Quenstedt the original extrinsic denomination which is the classical form of attribution. It is hard to believe that analogy of attribution really meets Barth's demands or in any way does justice to the full range of his theology. As you will recall, analogy of attribution has three properties in addition to extrinsic denomination: (i) the analogous formality (health) is numerically one,

not logically or conceptually; (ii) the prime analogate must be included in the definition of the secondary analogates; (iii) the common term has a different meaning in relation to the different analogates. The first two of these apply but the third does not. All the secondary analogates stand in the same relation to God in Christ—that of sinners who have come under His condemnation and are established in righteousness. Nor do I think that Barth really wishes to persist in saying that the application of, for example, righteousness to us is solely an extrinsic denomination. Admittedly it is ours only *in Him*, but if it remains always *äusserlich* and at no stage becomes *innerlich*, then we can but say that the purpose of salvation has been frustrated. On the other hand, then, the omission of the analogy of proportionality fails to do justice to Barth's own view of the matter. He seems to have rejected analogy of proportionality on the ground that the correspondence and agreement between God and man with which it deals is *calculable*; but this is just what those who employ this kind of analogy firmly disavow: it is *not* the analogy of mathematical proportion, A/B = C/D. This misunderstanding of proportionality refers only to the formal definition of the term; for in fact, Barth uses proportionality *passim*. In the passage before us (*K.D.* 2/1, pp. 267ff) he says explicitly that the relation set up between God and man in redemption, the gracious justification of sinners, is the analogy upon which all descriptions of God's relations to men are to be described, and by which they are to be judged. Here the normative function of analogy, mentioned earlier, is clearly evidenced. But surely the phrase *analogia gratiae* is an analogy of relations rather than an analogy of attributes, or of attribution. When we remember that the *analogia gratiae* is not confined to his critique of Quenstedt, but is the dominating theme of Barth's whole theology, penetrating into his analysis of all doctrines, then we realise both the universality of proportionality in his thought and the unwisdom of laying too much store by his express statements on the subjects. His speech bewrayeth him.

(3.1.3) I am, however, not entirely happy about Barth's dismissal of the *analogia entis*. This subject enters the discussion because of Barth's identification of Quenstedt's presuppositions with this doctrine. There are really two matters involved here:

the first, that of whether Quenstedt wishes to affirm that God's being and man's are identical; and the second, that of whether such a view necessarily represents St. Thomas. Concerning the first, it does seem to me that Quenstedt discerns the inadequacy of analogy of attribution in respect of extrinsic denomination, namely, that this analogy does not affirm anything of the internal nature of the secondary analogates; and further, that he wishes to emphasise that when God creates, He creates beings whose creation constitutes their being. He is endeavouring to find out how you speak of creatures who prior to salvation *are*, and in fact must *be* in order to be saved. On the other hand, as to whether it is fair to St. Thomas to say that the *analogia entis* means that God and man have a *common* being, I can only reply that this interpretation of analogy (analogy of inequality) is one which was rejected by St. Thomas and most Thomists. Once again it is Barth's neglect of proportionality which has created the problem.

(4) Before proceeding to the final section on the relation of the traditional analyses to the contemporary situation, I thought it important to mention certain aspects of analogy which philosophers have emphasised and are relevant to our present purpose. I am thinking at the moment of such people as J. S. Mill, W. E. Johnson, H. W. B. Joseph, Susan Stebbing, and so on.

Here weight is laid more upon analogical argument than upon analogical predication, but since a good case can be made out for the view that they differ only in the purposes which we intend analogy to serve and not in any basic structure, the information provided is helpful.

(4.1) For example, Susan Stebbing (*A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 250) quotes J. M. Keynes' distinction between positive and negative analogy. Given two objects S and N which resemble each other in respects $p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots p_n$ and differ from each other in respects $r_1, r_2, r_3, \ldots r_n$; then the former constitute the positive analogy and the latter the negative analogy. In this regard much of our present use of analogy is faulty. It does one or other of two things. Either it treats of analogy almost exclusively in terms of positive analogy, as if there were no negative analogy, and so gets wrong views of the Bible, the Church—and even of Being. Or it treats analogy as if it were

complete identity plus complete difference, the two capable of consideration in complete isolation from each other: one is taken and the other left. Whereas, in fact, to have analogy at all you must hold the negative and the positive analogy together—in suspension, as the chemists would say (to use an analogy!). A fuller examination, then, of the negative and the positive elements in our theological analogies seems to me to be a necessary next step. It may limit the range of our inductions but it ought to reinforce our conclusions.

(4.2) The strength of analogy, according to the philosophers, depends upon at least two considerations. (4.2.1) First, 'upon the character of the initial resemblances and upon the comprehensiveness of the properties which are asserted to be connected' (Stebbing, op. cit., p. 253). It becomes necessary, then, for valid argument, to increase as far as possible the known positive and negative analogy, on the assumption that thereby we ensure the enumeration of the *important* properties which are likely to affect the validity of the argument. (4.2.2) The second factor conditioning the strength of analogical argument is as follows: 'The more comprehensive the inferred properties are, the less likely is the conclusion to be true.' A principle such as this would rule out much of the more fanciful typological exegesis from the start. (4.2.3) But Stebbing adds an interesting remark that certain analogies, which, in themselves, are weak, nevertheless carry strong emotional or diverting overtones, may acquire power over our minds much beyond their proper validity. The very nature of theology makes us more susceptible to this type of failing and requires of us that we be ruthless in our examination of the analogies that we do use.

(4.3) Thirdly, a comment from J. S. Mill which I find to be most fruitful and salutary. It is to the effect that every competent inquirer will consider analogy 'as a mere guide post pointing out the direction in which more rigorous investigations should be prosecuted'. The remark does justice to the suggestive function of analogy in our thinking, to the way in which it opens up new vistas of possibility. But it does more: it reminds us that perhaps analogy plays only a penultimate role in theological thought; and in any case, definitely that we are too prone to allow analogical description to be a substitute for a more rigorously disciplined investigation of the subject.

3

Our third theme was to be the definition of the use to be made of the traditional schemes of analogy in our present theological task. Already the structure of such definition has begun to materialise; and it remains to articulate the several elements of it.

(1) The first fact which strikes us is that none of the standard interpretations of analogy by itself seems to be able to meet the complexity of our present-day understanding of our relations to God and even of our knowledge of God. We have seen how Barth, despite his overt allegiance to analogy of attribution, in fact is implicitly committed not only to a seriously modified form of this analogy, but also to another type of analogy which he explicitly rejects. Peter Martyr and his interpreter, J. C. McLelland, who favour analogy of proportionality and postulate the *unio hypostatica* as the prime analogate, nevertheless require some form of the analogy of attribution to relate the entities, as distinct from the relations, which form the terms in the proportionality. Even Anderson, the expositor of St. Thomas and Cajetan, who interprets the *analogia entis* in terms of proportionality, relies upon the doctrine of Creation to guarantee the structure of his metaphysic.

(2) If we wish to keep to the old-established ways, then it seems that it is some kind of combination of analogy of proportionality with analogy of attribution that is required. By analogy of proportionality we secure for God's gracious work in Jesus Christ the dominant place in our understanding both of God's relations to ourselves and of His nature. The *analogia gratiae* becomes the prime analogate, and all is interpreted proportionally thereto. But because *analogia gratiae* sets us in new relations, it also endows us with new being, and it is the norm of all the relations into which we enter. At that point analogy of attribution operates, to speak of the kind of righteousness, wisdom, truth, and so on, which may be ours, once we are 'found in Christ'; and to speak in such a way as to show that we are in no doubt about the sense in which they are 'ours'. Quenstedt's intrinsic denomination to which Barth so strongly objects becomes a real possibility—by God's grace.

(3) When we have qualified the traditional accounts of analogy in this almost excessively meticulous way, one wonders

whether the whole thing has not become so different from the tradition that it has ceased to be recognisable as analogy. One other point in this connexion disturbs me. We saw what happened to Quenstedt at the hands of Barth. He accepted certain verbal distinctions, logical definitions from Cajetan, only to be charged by Barth with the whole rotten metaphysic of medieval Roman Catholicism. 'All they that take the sword shall perish by the sword.' Can any of us adopt the Thomistic distinctions between the different varieties of analogy and escape the metaphysical consequences with which in St. Thomas and in all Roman Catholic theology the logical forms are indissolubly associated? What we want is this logic without that metaphysic, and I have the feeling that we may be crying for the moon.

(4) However, if we are not, and if it really is the case that analogy will be ever with us, then certain other warnings must be issued. (4.1) We must firmly remember that *all* of our knowledge of God cannot be analogical; otherwise we would not know that it was so. We have to have non-analogical knowledge with which to compare analogical and by which to judge its accuracy. Here J. S. Mill's word becomes extremely relevant: theological inquiry must accept as its goal the reduction of the area of analogical affirmation. (4.2) We must not err by seeking to impose upon analogy any too rigid structure. Otherwise it ceases to be analogy and becomes univocity. For this reason, we must keep an open mind on the many analogies with which contemporary biblical exposition and dogmatic assertion operate. (4.3) But this is not to say that one analogy is as good as any other. The philosophers have helped us to see that analogies must be carefully scrutinised for positive and negative content, and graded accordingly. But ultimately analogies establish themselves not by their conformity to the rubrics of medieval or modern logic, or yet to the requirements of an anti-metaphysical metaphysic, but by the living relation in which they stand to the living Word of God, to the worshipping and obedient community, and to the salvation of God's children.

THE CHURCH AND TRADITION[1] IN THE PRE-NICENE FATHERS

by The Rev. R. P. C. HANSON

I

There is an old tradition which can be traced back to the Middle Ages that the moon is made of green cheese. If we are to take as authentic all the traditions in all the old inns of England to the effect that Queen Elizabeth I slept a night in them, then we shall have to envisage that queen as spending most of her reign in bed. In other words, the word tradition is today used very loosely and vaguely, and there is such a thing as unreliable tradition as well as authentic tradition. These facts apply to tradition in the early Church as well as to other sorts of tradition. Indeed, we are sometimes tempted to ask whether there was such a thing as a consistent tradition of doctrine in the early Christian centuries, for some evidence suggests that there was not, or at any rate that 'the tradition of the Church', is not an easy phenomenon to identify in the early centuries. Justin Martyr, for instance, says that all orthodox Christians believe in a literal Kingdom of Christ which is to last on this earth in a restored Jerusalem for a thousand years.[2] Origen says that it was part of the Apostles' teaching that accounts of such a Kingdom should be allegorised.[3] Which of them is reproducing the tradition of the Church? Or (as seems to me most likely) are they both either exaggerating or mistaken and is neither reproducing it? Again, both Clement of Alexandria and Origen claim that the necessity of allegorising the Scriptures is part of the rule of faith.[4] The versions of this rule quoted twice by Irenaeus and three times by Tertullian[5] make no mention of this article, which is a typically Alexandrian one. Is it possible that these Alexandrians did not know the tradition

[1] This paper was originally given to the Anglo-Scandinavian Conference which met in Bâstadt, Sweden, in August 1957.

[2] *Dialogue*, 80.5, 81.4.

[3] *De Principiis*, II.11.2, 3; *Comm. on Matthew*, XVII.35; *De Oratione*, XXVII.13; *Comm. on Romans*, X.1.

[4] Clement, *Stromateis*, V.8, 14; VII.15, 16 (*P.G.* IX.84, 129, 528, 545). Origen, *Hom. on Genesis*, VI.3; *Hom. on Leviticus*, V.8; *Hom. on Numbers*, XXVII.2; *Hom. on Luke*, XVI (on Luke 2.34); *Hom. on Exodus*, V.1; *Hom. on Joshua*, XV.1, etc.

[5] Irenaeus *Adv. Haereses*, I.2, III.4. Tertullian, *De Praescr. Haer.*, 13.2-5; *De Virg. Vel.*, 1; *Adv. Praxean*, 2.

of the Church accurately? Tertullian shows a similar inaccuracy, or worse than inaccuracy, when in his two later versions of the rule of faith he omits the article concerning the Holy Spirit. He was of course by then a Montanist and believed that the Spirit was given fully only after the deaths of the Apostles. But did even Montanists hold themselves free to alter the tradition of the Church? Theophilus of Antioch, who as a Catholic bishop ought to have known what the tradition of the Church was, makes the incredible statement that Christians are called Christians because they are anointed with the oil of God, without mentioning the name of Christ in this, or in any other, part of his work.[1] Even if we confine the tradition of the Church solely to the function of interpreting Scripture, we have to face the uncomfortable fact that Porphyrius, the pagan opponent of Christianity, interpreted the kingdoms mentioned in the book of Daniel in a far sounder way than did Hippolytus, or than the interpretation of the subject which Jerome tells us was accepted in all the churches in his day.[2] 'The tradition of the Church' is therefore not a word to be used lightly.

If we take this word tradition first in a narrow and special sense we shall be able to dispose of part of our subject. Traditions in the sense of pieces of historical information or customs connected with Christian conduct or Christian worship independent of the Scriptures certainly were known in the early Church. Eusebius in the first few books of the *Ecclesiastical History* has collected several of them. Traditions such as these can be collected from almost all the fathers of the first three centuries. But nobody could seriously regard this sort of tradition, and none of the fathers, as far as I know, does seriously regard this, as a source of information having an authority on an equality with Scripture, first because it is unimportant and second because it is unreliable. It is interesting, for instance, to know something of the later life of James the brother of the Lord from Eusebius and to learn some picturesque incidents in the life of St. John from Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria; but these are no more than scraps of information, and it is never clear how much we can rely on them. Irenaeus, who tells us about St. John, also tells us that

[1] *Ad Autolycum*, I.12 (p. 84 in Bardy's ed.).
[2] Jerome, *Comm. on Daniel*, VII (*P.L.*, XXV.530).

our Lord was fifty years old during His ministry, and Eusebius who tells us of James also records the quite apocryphal letter of Christ to Abgar King of Edessa. Tertullian tells us as a piece of such early tradition that the evangelist, John the Apostle, was immersed in boiling oil in Rome and took no harm from it before being exiled to an island.[1] Origen says that the apostles practised the baptism of infants,[2] a fact which is certainly not recorded clearly in Scripture; but can we be sure that he is reproducing genuine tradition when he says so? We have only to look at the development and elaboration of ceremonies in the early history of the rite of baptism to see how easily customs can grow up and can be attributed in the course of time to a period earlier than their origin. When therefore Basil in his work *On The Holy Spirit* says that there are unwritten traditions governing such things as the use of the sign of the Cross, the posture for worship, and other similar practical details, which have come down from the Apostles,[3] we must not build on this statement any far-reaching conclusions. He is only following the widespread convention in the early Church of attributing to the Apostles any customs or practices whose origin went back beyond living memory in the time of the writer. Traditions, therefore, in the sense of pieces of information or customs independent of Scripture and alleged to derive from our Lord and His Apostles, may be interesting and even, some of them, authentic. But they inevitably suffer from the uncertainty from which all such oral tradition in the course of time invariably suffers. Indeed, it was precisely because the whole tradition of the Church was threatened with a lapse into such uncertainty that the New Testament was first written and later canonised. The three genuine examples of traditions such as these, the two sacraments of baptism and of the eucharist and the Christian ministry, must be regarded as a case apart. In themselves, and regarded purely as institutions, they tell us nothing definite about our Lord or His significance; they are trumpets that give uncertain sounds. It is only when they are illuminated by what the Bible has to tell us about them that they become bearers of authentic tradition. I need scarcely add that no baptismal nor eucharistic liturgy, and no information

[1] *De Praescr. Haer.*, 36. [2] *Comm. on Romans*, V.9.
[3] *De Spir. Sanct.*, 66, 67.

about the Christian ministry, deriving from a time earlier than the writing of the New Testament, survives.

The application of the same principle will exclude the modern Roman Catholic claim to possess a secret tradition of doctrine deriving independently of the Bible from our Lord and His Apostles. Not all Roman writers on this subject make this claim, or at any rate not all make it all the time. There are some who take the line of Newman, unsupported by any other argument, and regard tradition as simply the infallibly inspired development of a number of dogmas originally based on the Bible and the Bible alone; this school minimises the language of the Council of Trent upon this subject. But even the exponents of this school are apt at the end of their argument to fall back upon the suggestion that there *might* have been and there *could* have been doctrines unknown to the Scriptures but taught by our Lord and His Apostles and preserved through the centuries orally in the Church; and from there it is only a short step to saying that there *must* have been and there *were* such doctrines. *Facilis descensus Averni*! As well as these minimisers, however, there is also a school of maximisers within the Roman communion who boldly claim that all the doctrines today taught by the Roman Church were, in some form or other, believed and held in the Church from the earliest times. An extreme example of this is the Spanish bishop who not long ago declared that the Protestants in his country were pitifully inadequate in appealing to the Bible only. Spanish Catholics had the immense advantage, denied to the Protestants, of the tradition independent of Scripture deposited in Compostella by St. James!

This sort of claim, however, can be positively disproved from Patristic evidence. It is not often that we can demonstrate a negative from history. If I liked to believe, for instance, that Julius Caesar was corporeally assumed into heaven after his death, I would have a little historical evidence on my side and you could not positively demonstrate the falsity of this belief on historical grounds alone, though you might show that I was very foolish indeed to believe it. But fortunately in this particular case the claim to possess authentic secret doctrinal tradition can be demonstrated to be false from the evidence of these two writers who insist most firmly upon the authority,

even the authority independent of Scripture, of the rule of faith, Irenaeus and Tertullian. Irenaeus resents strongly the suggestion of the Gnostics that the Apostles omitted or reserved for a select audience any part of the teaching with which they had been entrusted and insists that the rule of faith of the Church of his day is the rule of faith of the Apostles, neither more nor less.[1] He twice quotes this rule of faith, which of course does not include any of the peculiarly Roman Catholic dogmas. Tertullian similarly insists with the greatest vehemence that what the Apostles taught was what the Church of his day teaches, neither more nor less; he argues at some length against the contention of the heretics that the Apostles knew the whole of Christian doctrine but kept some of it secret,[2] and, in order publicly to establish what Christian teaching is, he on three occasions quotes the rule of faith. None of these versions of the rule includes modern Roman doctrines or anything like them. We may therefore take it as definitely proved from historical evidence that the modern Roman Catholic conception of the existence from the earliest period of an authentic tradition of doctrine, independent of Scripture, orally transmitted in the Church, is an illusion, a figment. The solitary supporter among the fathers of such a theory is Clement of Alexandria, who did persuade himself, and endeavour to persuade others, that he had access to such a tradition. But his claim is so unconvincingly stated, and the examples of the doctrine alleged to be transmitted in this way are so embarrassing and compromising, that no Roman Catholic writers have attempted to profit by it. The most eminent writer upon this father, Montdesert, a learned Jesuit, to his great credit decisively rejects Clement's claim.

II

But this rule of faith is a phenomenon which is very important for the subject of the Church and tradition in the fathers. Scholars of the last century usually identified it uncritically with the creed, but almost all modern scholars who have studied the subject reject this view. Wherever we find examples of the rule of faith quoted (and there are two examples in

[1] *Adv. Haereses*, III.2, 3, 5.
[2] *De Praescr. Haer.*, 22-25.

Irenaeus, three in Tertullian and one in Origen[1]), the list includes articles which are never found in any pre-Nicene Creed, and exhibits a fulness and elaboration that cannot be reconciled with a credal statement. It is, in my opinion, more likely that the creed is a summary of the rule of faith than that the rule of faith is an elaboration of the creed. But what exactly *is* this rule of faith? Is it after all that much-sought Holy Grail, the tradition of the Church independent of the Bible? This is a view that has been put forward, and there is some evidence in its favour. Both Irenaeus and Tertullian claim that the rule of faith, as derived from the Apostles unimpaired, is a valid substitute for Scripture; Irenaeus says that the barbarian races who have become Christian cannot read the Scriptures because these have not been translated into their languages, but are sufficiently instructed from the rule of faith.[2] Tertullian in one of his works refuses altogether to argue with the heretics on the subject of Scripture, alleging that in the rule of faith, which because of its apostolic descent cannot be disparaged by the heretics, the Church has a perfectly sound alternative to Scripture.[3] Clement of Alexandria identifies the rule of faith with his secret tradition independent of Scripture.[4] Origen constantly declares that the Scriptures must be interpreted according to the rule of faith inherited from the Apostles.

I do not think that we have any right to impugn the argument of either Irenaeus or Tertullian on this subject. We have no reason to doubt that the rule of faith of their day *was* in its main substance inherited from the Apostles, though it had probably been elaborated and developed in the course of time more than these fathers imagined. And historically regarded it certainly *was* independent of the Scriptures, inasmuch as there was no point at which the Church had abandoned one form of rule and unanimously adopted a new form deliberately designed to agree with the Scriptures. But it seems to me that these admissions should not cause us concern and initiate heart-searching at the prospect of the reappearance of an extra-Scriptural tradition of doctrine. In the first place, all those who mention the rule of faith at all agree that its contents

[1] Origen, *De Principiis*, Preface, 4-10; the references in the other two fathers have already been given.

[2] *Adv. Haereses*, III.4.

[3] *De Praescr. Haer.*, 19, 20, 21.

[4] See my *Origen's Doctrine of Tradition*, Chapter IV.

are identical with Scripture and all when expounding it support it by an appeal to Scripture. Tertullian, who is the most vehement of all in appealing to the rule of faith, can say, 'The Scriptures are what we are from the beginning of what we are. We are from them. Originally nothing was other than what we are', and he can imagine Christ as saying, 'Once and for all I entrusted the Gospel and the teaching of the same rule to my apostles.'[1] Secondly, we know what the contents of the rule of faith were. Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen all quote it; their versions all derive from different churches, Irenaeus' probably from Asia Minor, Tertullian's from Rome, Origen's from Alexandria. Though they exhibit slight local variations, they are virtually the same. When we read them we realise that this rule cannot possibly be regarded as an extra-Scriptural tradition in any significant sense of the phrase. This is Scriptural doctrine loosely summarised into articles; that is all. Its independence of Scripture is purely a matter of historical pedigree.

The truth is that the rule of faith is, put in its simplest terms, what the Church preaches. If we consider that the Church from the very beginning preached its Gospel as we see the Church pictured in the Acts of the Apostles preaching, by word of mouth, in synagogue, in market-place, by riverside, on shipboard, we shall realise two necessary conclusions. First, that this preaching began before the New Testament was written, and long before it was canonised; and second that even when the New Testament was written it had no automatic power of preaching itself; put a copy of Nestlé's edition of the Greek New Testament into the market-place, and it does not behave like a gramophone; it has to be preached. The rule of faith of the Church is the faith as preached. It is a summary of how the Church presents its faith. Before the New Testament was written its sources outside the Old Testament were entirely oral. When the New Testament is written the process begins of the sources of the Church's rule of faith gradually becoming written. When the New Testament is widely recognised as authoritative the sources of the Church's rule of faith are now wholly written sources. But even then, historically regarded, the rule of faith is independent of Scripture; it is what the

[1] *De Praescr. Haer.*, 38.5, 44.9.

Church has been preaching in uninterrupted continuity from the beginning. But by now the material from which it constructs its preaching has become entirely written; it has been permanently recorded and precipitated into Scripture. If the original oral sources had not found their way into Scripture, then there is no evidence whatever that they survived at all, and to indulge in such a speculation is sheer fantasy. The study of the doctrine of tradition in the first three centuries is the study of precisely the operation of this process. Irenaeus stands at a point where it is still just possible to appeal to oral tradition in the place of written tradition as sound, though of course he does not reject the written tradition; on the contrary, he appeals to it at least a hundred times to a single appeal to written tradition. Tertullian can take the same line, but his deliberate distortion of the rule of faith in a Montanist sense is a warning of what can happen to a purely oral tradition. Clement of Alexandria's unconvincing attempt to appeal to an unwritten tradition is a plain sign that the day of unwritten tradition is over. And even he, like Tertullian, vastly prefers to appeal to the New Testament when he can. Origen has a profound respect for the rule of faith of the Church; he desires to teach the faith as a Churchman and as an orthodox Christian. But he never makes the least attempt to offer the rule of faith as an alternative to the Bible, as Irenaeus and Tertullian do. He never appeals to an unwritten tradition independent of the Bible, as Clement does. And on some subjects, such as the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, he encouraged his pupils to ignore or go beyond the rule of faith of the Church,[1] whereas he never suggests that they should go beyond the Bible. By the middle of the third century it was no longer possible to claim the rule of faith as an alternative to the Bible, because the period was well past at which a purely oral tradition could be trusted. The process of the formation of the canon is of course only another aspect of this same process of Scripture becoming the source of the rule of faith.

III

But the rule of faith, though it ceased to be an alternative

[1] *Comm. on John*, XIII.16,44; frag. on Exodus (*P.G.*, XII. 289); *Contra Celsum*, V.18, 19; *Comm. on Matthew*, XI.15, XVII.29.

to Scripture, always remained an interpretation of Scripture. Here, it seems to me, is the most significant aspect of it for our purpose. Even from the very beginning the Church must have interpreted its Gospel, as it preached, unless we are to make the unwarrantable assumption that the Church manufactured its own Gospel and controlled it rather than was controlled by it. Even to divide the inherited doctrine into articles, as the Church of Irenaeus' and Tertullian's and Origen's day apparently did, is to interpret it. As the Christian centuries unfolded and doctrine developed and heresy became more manifold and more definite, it became more and more obvious that what Christians were asked to believe in was not just the Bible, but the Bible interpreted by the Church. Even Origen, for all his passionate devotion to the Bible, admits this freely, with the reservation that he will sometimes recommend his pupils to ignore the Church's interpretation and adopt his own individual one. Here, it seems to me, we have the legitimate, indeed the only legitimate, use of this word 'tradition' in the process of determining the proper sources of Christian truth.

Here once more, and for the last time, the ghost of extra-Scriptural tradition rears its head. Daniélou has maintained that in its interpretation of Scripture the Church had access to a special tradition of typological treatment of Scripture which can be shown in some of its instances to derive from a very early period independently of Scripture; he conjectures, but admits that he cannot prove, that this type of interpretation comes originally from our Lord and His Apostles. This, he suggests, amounts to an unwritten tradition of doctrine independent of Scripture, and rescues from disappearance the Roman Catholic claim to rely legitimately upon such a tradition.[1] But a contention like this is obviously a precarious one, and if the Roman claim depends upon this evidence alone it is a forlorn hope indeed. In the first place, this sort of typological interpretation is well represented in the New Testament itself, so that, even though we may recover from the literature of the early Church some examples not to be found in the New Testament, it is not quite accurate to describe this sort of interpretation as independent of Scripture. In the second

[1] See his *Sacramentum Futuri*.

place, to prove from this evidence that the Church had such an original tradition is to prove too much, because it is not difficult to show that typological interpretation existed before Christianity and was not invented by Christ or Christians. The recently discovered literature of the Qumran community, and the remains of early Jewish liturgy, assure us that both typology and allegory (of a Palestinian and not a Philonic type) were well established in the first century B.C. Typology therefore, though it was of course used by Christians for their own purposes, was simply part of the literary inheritance of Judaism, just as apocalyptic was. To try to construct upon this phenomenon the massive weight of a genuine, reliable, original tradition of doctrine independent of Scripture is to build a house upon sand.

In short we must, in my opinion, accept two conclusions which are forced upon us by the life and literature of the Church of the first three centuries. First that the Church has the right to interpret Scripture in matters doctrinal, though it has no right to supplement it or modify it; the rule of faith of the Church is in fact the result of just such an interpretation of Scripture and so, of course, are the Ecumenical Creeds. Second that in thus interpreting Scripture the Church can rely on no fund of doctrine independent of Scripture, no secret or public unwritten tradition, but only the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the exercise of common sense and the rules of logic. No doubt this interpretation used many contributions from contemporary Judaism and later from contemporary Hellenism, but it did not embody any original doctrinal material from our Lord or from His Apostles. This interpretation of Scripture by the Church in the course of its development seems to me the only proper meaning to attach to the word 'tradition' in the use of the phrase 'the Church and tradition'. This was the situation at the end of the third century. The question of how the Church arrives at her interpretation of Scripture had been left unanswered; for instance, what organs have the right to determine the proper interpretation? The history of the fourth century went some way to answer this question, though the answer was, from the point of view of these who desire precision and definiteness, an unsatisfactory one. No pope, no council, no school of thought, emerged from the troubled and tangled history of the

fourth century as the unmistakable and authorised arbiter of the Bible. Only the slow verdict of history determined controversies, with no room left for infallibility in any organ of opinion. In this, as in all other human endeavours, the guidance of the Holy Spirit did not obviate the necessity of proceeding by the method of trial and error.

BAPTISM AND EVANGELISM

by PROFESSOR MARKUS BARTH

BAPTISM is confronted with evangelism in 1 Cor. 1.17: 'Christ did not send me to baptise but to evangelise.' This text seems to contradict the close connexion between both in Matt. 28.19: 'Make all gentiles disciples, baptising . . . and teaching them.' But certainly, both passages tend to say, like other baptism texts of the New Testament, that baptism is inferior to evangelism, serves evangelism, and will be performed wherever the Gospel is preached in obedience to Jesus Christ. Baptism is related to mission work and preaching as John the Baptist to Jesus Christ, or as the servant to the master. After Jesus Christ has come, the position of the servant is always and only behind and after the master. So baptism cannot rule, begin or replace evangelism, but it has a necessary function in its service.

What is this function of the baptism, which is administered wherever there have been and are Christian congregations? We shall (1) present a short analysis of the present situation, (2) draw attention to some features of New Testament baptismal passages, and (3) point out possible conclusions.

I. *Theoretical and practical denial of the evangelical character of baptism*

(1) In the Western churches, baptism has become, in teaching and in administration, an event or act of *pious* individual or collective, *egotism*. Since Augustine wrote his *Confessions*—misguided biblicism would trace his concern back to Elijah in the cave, to Jeremiah's 'religious individualism', and to Paul's 'existentialism'—the questions: 'How do I get a gracious God?' or 'How do I become certain of my salvation within the prison of my imbecile flesh?' have ruled the interpretation and shaped the form of baptism. Thus baptism is considered an event between God and the baptisand, a means of God's grace for the sinner. Baptism as an 'act of God', the mediating function of the Church, and the 'experience' of those baptised have found different emphasis in teaching and liturgy. High Church scholars and liberal Baptist orators may agree that baptism

serves one purpose: God is glorified (whether 'effectively', 'noetically', or 'emotionally') in the Church's baptism. But the benefit of baptism profits only or primarily the baptisand and those baptised beforehand. The 'world' of those who do not believe has no substantial place in this view of the 'sacrament'.

(2) But the world of matter has received, also under the influence of Augustine, an honorary place in many doctrines of baptism. The (neo-Platonic) *philosophic interest* in possibility and actuality of bridging the gap between the world of spirit (or ideas) and the realm of matter, has found an answer in the philosophic *and* in the Christian reference to 'word and sign'. A Christian 'principle of incarnation' offered a way of seeing in the 'elements', because of their connexion with the 'word', an effective means of grace for redemption and for faith. Not only man, but nature, matter, all creation was therefore declared virtually or actually sanctified by the use of water, bread and wine in the climax of worship. The miracle of the Spirit's victory over matter, an extension or re-presentation of incarnation or of the offering of Jesus Christ to God was and is celebrated in the sacraments—from the Baptist H. W. Robinson to Gregory Dix's successor E. L. Mascall. The mystery of 'incarnational' sacramentalism is so great that sometimes it displaces the preaching of Christ. If John the Baptist 'preached baptism' (Mark 1.4), why should not much more Christian instruction become and be instruction about the sacrament? There is evangelism involved in the advertisement of the deep and beautiful, comprehensive and effective symbolism of baptism. But a gracious and graceful natural process between the higher and the lower world, a truism about the dignity of symbol borrowed from the science of aesthetics, a subtle philosophical kind of Baalism, is thus substituted for the preaching of Christ crucified and risen. There is no reason for assuming that heathen or 'unchurched' people can be saved by believing in a scheme which is ultimately only one of many attempts to solve Western philosophy's impasse.

(3) Doctrine and celebration of baptism have been made subject to the idea of '*incorporation*' into the Church or/and into Jesus Christ. The 'legal' aspect of becoming a member of the chosen community by breaking with the world in a public act, and the 'mystical' aspect of becoming inserted into Christ's

body may have been artificially separated or artfully connected. It has happened that one of these aspects has been over-emphasised in catastrophic institutional or individualist fashion. But both incorporations are also found in perfect harmony wherever the Church is described as the sphere of Christ, of His grace, of His miracles, of His benefits. So baptism becomes an orderly and, at the same time, miraculous act of expansion and increase of what is sometimes called the mystical body of Christ. It not only indicates, but is, progress of the Kingdom, of the Church, the Gospel, the good cause, our mission work—whatever the nomenclature be. In either case the hidden and the visible emphasis is laid on the victory of the Church over the world. Whether the ecclesiastical victory (which is feasted upon in theory and practice of baptism) is a possible, a good, an evangelical way of teaching all nations, is another question.

(4) Baptism is often described, together with the Lord's Supper, as re-presentation and *actualisation* or as realisation and re-enactment of God's work. No serious harm is done as long as such clumsy and oscillating terms are meant to denote that God Father, Son and Spirit lives, that Jesus Christ's high-priestly service is not 'over', but that His sacrifice is once and for all, and that *Heilsgeschichte* did not end at Pentecost, or prove fallacious when the *parousia* did not come. Logically, semantically and actually, however, these concepts mean something different. They imply that God's, Christ's, the Spirit's sphere of activity is co-extensive with the Church's, that redemption becomes actual only if handled by the ordained minister or priest, that the sacramental (i.e. the preaching, baptising, communicating, serving) Church is somehow medium or channel of grace between God and the world—and even between God and her members. And worse than that: those concepts imply that the grace of God, the work and victory of Christ, is only a possibility, an offer, a kind of empty form, until it becomes full, actual, present, victorious in and through the Church. So the Church is made (like Mary as alleged co-redeemer in Roman teaching) the actual power station between God and man, on whose proper operation God depends as much as the world. A corresponding preaching of God and of His work will always have its summit or centre in a doctrine of the 'divine nature' or 'redemptive community' of the Church.

The Church preaches herself, evangelises for herself, and takes the honour for herself, despite all assertions to the contrary.

(5) Most Churches lay greatest emphasis upon the onceness of baptism. Some Churches insist upon specific forms and accessories (immersion; sign of cross; applications of salt, saliva, oil, laying on of hands). Some teaching on baptism emphasises the bodily contact, or the totalitarian nature, or the corporate character of the rite. Other (more recent) thinkers lift 'baptisma' high above the ordinance performed in the congregation and see in it the sum and expression of Christ's work, of the whole Gospel, of the Church's endowment with the Spirit, of the unity of the divided Churches, or of regeneration. In either case, baptism is a mystery which the Church believes and knows and has, an entrusted good which she respects and guards, a power which she teaches and practises. The Church is busy with herself when she teaches and administers baptism. And many Christians as well as non-Christians have reason to understand baptism like a magical act, or like an initiation ritual (*rite de passage*), or like a sort of kabbala. All these expressions of baptismal teaching and practice show how far baptism has become separated from evangelism.

II. *Biblical observations regarding the evangelical nature, meaning and form of baptism*

(1) Instead of choosing at random or according to denominational or other prejudices all kinds and sorts of Bible texts (that deal with circumcision, sealing, rebirth, enlightenment, appropriation, miracle, implantation, etc.) that may or may not contain a description of baptism, biblical inquiry must start from passages that do explicitly and primarily speak of baptism. Among these texts the pericopes of Jesus Christ's baptism deserve (and have found in the early Church and in recent years) special attention. *Jesus Christ's baptism* is not His entering into a sacred little circle of holy people; it is (*a*) an amazing step *out* of security and hiddenness, *into* the midst of the crowds that have to confess nothing else but sin, (*b*) a shameful, public, binding act by which He declares His solidarity with these sinners, (*c*) the conscious acceptance of and entering into the ministry of the Servant who lays down His life for the many.

This baptism is 'evangelic' in each one of its aspects. And this baptism is the only one which is, according to the New Testament, directly and immediately sanctioned by a royal declaration from the Father and by the gift of the Holy Spirit. It is probable that baptism 'into the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost' should be understood, within the context of Matthew's Gospel, as a baptism into Jesus' kind of uncompromising *way* to sinners, pledged *solidarity* with sinners, and *ministry* for sinners.

(2) The baptism which Jesus Christ insisted on receiving in the Jordan, and with which all canonical Gospels begin the description of the public ministry of Jesus (cf. Acts 1.22), is the *baptism of John*. This baptism was 'preached to Israel' (Acts 13.24; cf. John 1.31). The preaching, fasting, confessing, and praying which belonged to the essence of that baptism; the wilderness place chosen, and the dirty Jordan-water used for that baptism; perhaps also the phenomenological kinship of John's baptism with the beliefs and practices of other baptismal groups in or around the Jordan-valley—such features force the exegete to consider John's baptism as a form of prophetic protest against misused, misunderstood, ephemeral and far from perfect temple service, priesthood, purity ritual, atonement days. This baptism is not a new ritual, a super-ritual, a really effective ritual—but an almost secular protest against institutional, organised, mediating religion. Yet it is not spiritualism, moralism, or apocalyptic hope as such; it is the coming *Messiah*, and the judgment, righteousness, Spirit and forgiveness which *He* brings, the gathering of a people *He* will perform, which occupy the centre of John's preaching and practice. So it is the power of the Messiah to forgive sinners and to save for himself a remnant from disobedient Israel—and it is not the mystery of a 'new purification rite', or of 'initiation into the kingdom' which distinguishes John's message and baptism. The preaching of John shows, in agreement with Jesus' own baptism, that baptism is a public declaration of God's right over rebels, of His way to them, and of the way of repentance and hope in forgiveness as the people's only 'preparation' (cf. Luke 1.17, 76f, 7.29f). Christian baptism after the resurrection is essentially identical with John's baptism (Acts 2.38, 19.4-5; in the last passage the end quotation marks belong after verse 5, not

verse 4). The 'beginning of the Gospel' (Mark 1.1): John's baptism is described by the Evangelists not for the sake of history-of-religion-studies, but under the influence of Easter and Pentecost, and for evangelical instruction of the Christian Churches. In baptising, the Christian Church continues a ('sectarian') Jewish rite by which it declares its solidarity with Israel—with that Israel whose remnant has always to suffer under, but all the more to witness to, the 'wicked priests' of Pseudo-Israel.

(3) Except in the Gospel of John (where baptism is explained as a stage set for the purpose 'that Jesus be revealed', 1.31), baptism is mentioned in the New Testament only in so-called 'ethical' contexts. Baptism is not a 'liturgical rite', if liturgy is (falsely) understood to mean a holy interaction or effective mutual 'remembrance' between God and the worshipping community. Actually the Greek word 'liturgy' and the corresponding verb mean the fulfilment of a *public* service. Only he serves God, who serves Him 'publicly', i.e. in his life, attitude, conduct among Jews, Gentiles, Christians. But is not Christian baptism in 1 Peter 3 an antitype to the hasty flight of eight souls into the saving ark? Does it not make the baptised feel secure from the damnation that befalls the world? This egotistic understanding of baptism is neither the purpose of the reference to Noah and his Eight, nor of the context of 1 Peter. The point of comparison is only the fact that the 'righteous' and all the elect exiles have to suffer from, *and* thereby to 'bring message' to the spirits in prison, i.e. to the world in which they live. Baptism belongs to the mission of the Christians to 'shine like lights in the world' (cf. Phil. 2.15). Many passages describe or refer to baptism as the 'beginning' of that way of witness to the world. In Gal. 3.27 a metaphor defines it as the stepping into a ministry, comparable to the high priest's or a Roman official's 'investiture' with his official garb. Ultimately these 'ethical' explanations of baptism throughout the New Testament and John's Christological interest in baptism coincide: John's Gospel makes it very plain that only testimony to Christ before the many, and revelation of Christ to Israel, is the *raison d'être* of baptism.

(4) The form of investiture into the ministry of a witness is not a nice, uplifting ceremony, but an immersion in more or

less dirty water—'the pure water' of Heb. 10.22 (cf. Eph. 2.13 and 5.26; Titus 2.14 and 3.5) is Jesus Christ's blood or the word of the Cross. The investiture takes place before many witnesses (1 Tim. 6.12) and is accompanied by confession of sins. The ceremony as such was ridiculous (John was nicknamed 'The Dipper'!), shameful, *humiliating*. No biblical text describes descent *and ascent* as the essential visible and symbolic movements of baptiser and baptisand: no text speaks of baptism into death *and resurrection* (of Christ): only descent, only death, only confession of sin is immediately connected with baptism. This descent, and the confession of Spiritual deadness is certainly not a spiritual suicide. It is made in the trust that God will exalt the downcast; that the judge has also full power 'toward forgiveness'; that only 'through the resurrection' the 'prayer to God for a good conscience' makes sense (1 Peter 3.21f); that there is another impartation of life, 'baptism with the Spirit' (Mark 1.8; Acts 1.5; 2; 11.16; 1 Cor. 12.13). But when those baptised throw themselves at the feet and implore the mercy of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, then they do not separate themselves from the accursed world. But they confess in the midst of, and for sinful (maybe grinning, maybe blaspheming, maybe stone-throwing) men that God wants *all*, not the few only, to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth. A Christian's life will day by day be a witness to God's Fatherhood over all, Christ's death for all, the Spirit's promise to all. Baptism is the unique, necessary, public beginning, pledge, investiture into that ministry of witnesses.

(5) Baptism 'into Jesus Christ' is, in the Bible, baptism 'in regard to' (under proclamation, in the confession, as a testimony of and to) *the perfect work of Jesus Christ*. Jesus Christ's work and reign is neither a Platonic idea, nor an Aristotelian pure form, nor an offer or possibility, that still has to become present, real, actual in the realm of matter. So all men *are* dead because Jesus Christ has died for them (2 Cor. 5.14; Rom. 5.6ff); and all are called to receive life from the Spirit of the risen Lord—independent of baptism (Rom. 8.11). Baptism does not effect or guarantee death and resurrection with Christ; it is only (called) a 'burial with Christ' (Rom. 6.4; Col. 2.12). Its essence is a public attestation and proclamation (cf. 1 Cor. 11.26) of what has been and will be 'completed' by Jesus Christ. Now,

Jesus Christ is His own witness in all witness rendered to Him. So in baptism *He* testifies to what He, the exalted, makes of His work and reign—but He does it through specific acts of men. By piercing the hearts of men with the word (Acts 2.37, 16.14), by calling them to be baptised, by causing them 'to have themselves baptised' (note the 'middle' instead of passive form of the verb, found of all things in 1 Cor. 10.2; cf. Luke 3.7 Western texts), and by their confession before many witnesses—in all these events and acts God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit bears public testimony to Himself and to His right and power over *all* men. So baptism is an act of God's self-proclamation. In this act God's instrument of proclamation is the faith and the action of those baptised. If we ask to whom, for whose benefit the proclamation is made, we can only refer to the crowds around John the Baptist, to the multitudes that filled Jerusalem at the Festival 'of Weeks' (Pentecost), to the inhabitants of the world's capital, Rome, to the mobs and military and judges and rulers of 'Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, Bithynia'. Baptism, an act of God's self-proclamation, *is* an act of evangelism—or it is not that baptism of which the New Testament speaks.

III. *Conclusions*

(1) Concerning *the Bible and the Church.* While it is obvious that in theory and practice of baptism the Church always has intended to do what Jesus Christ has instituted; while since Augustine the deep thought and sincere devotion invested in doctrine and practice of the sacrament has developed many aspects of baptism in its relation to the word, to faith, to the Church, to salvation, to life, etc.—the 'evangelical' character of baptism has not been sufficiently elaborated. Because of this omission, philosophical, ecclesiastical, and individualistic elements, and the natural growth and development of the Church as an institution have overshadowed what the New Testament books have said in the time when they were written and what they still will say today.

(2) Concerning *the Reformation* of the Church. The unity and mission of the Churches in and outside the World Council of Churches can by no means suffer, when these Churches extend and apply the repentance (which is still attested in the baptism

they perform) to their doctrine and practice of baptism. A reformation in regard to baptism would have to recover in preaching, teaching, and liturgy that humble, public, and evangelical character which distinguishes baptism from mystery-cults, initiation-rites, circumcision and proselyte baptism. Such reformation would make it plain that precisely baptism is for every Christian essentially, not incidentally this: call and obligation and beginning to be an evangelist.

(3) Concerning *the Church and the world.* As long as the Churches refrain from authenticating their call to the world and their evangelistic enterprises by repentance and reformation of their innermost sanctuaries, they cannot expect anyone to take their talk seriously. 'Judgment must begin with the house of God.' Biblical baptism and authentic evangelism are inseparable. The world needs witnesses to 'God's love for the world' (John 3.16), not pharisees or saintly clubs.

(4) Concerning *the old and the young Churches.* On the mission-fields and among the young Churches, baptism has retained or recovered more of its genuine evangelical character than in the cathedrals, baptisteries and chapels of the West. Therefore the older Churches can only learn, by hearing and co-operating with the young Churches, how to disentangle baptism from typically Western patterns of world-view and sociological forms. Such disentanglement would force them to find a doctrine and form of baptism which would in itself be not an esoteric kabbala, but an evangelical action.

(5) Concerning *Christ and the Church.* There is nothing like the baptism of Jesus Christ for encouraging, comforting, directing and leading congregations to such forms and doctrines of baptism and evangelism that have promise. Baptism 'in the name of Jesus Christ' makes the Churches step out of their artificial seclusion from one another and from the world, makes them realise their solidarity with publicans and heathen, and stirs them to take up and to carry out their evangelistic mission.

THE ECUMENICAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH[1]

by The Rev. D.Dr Professor EDMUND SCHLINK

The Orthodox Church within the Soviet Union has so far made no direct contribution to the ecumenical work which has been done in the World Council of Churches since its constitution in 1948 and before that in the ecumenical movement which led up to its constitution. The political situation has so far prevented this—just as the autocephalous Orthodox Churches of the Balkans, which shared in the ecumenical work before the Second World War, have found it impossible to do so since they have been in the Communist sphere of influence. There is, to be sure, a negative contribution from the Moscow Patriarchate, namely the 'Resolution on the question of "The Ecumenical Movement and the Orthodox Church"', passed in July 1948 in connexion with the jubilee celebrations of the Russian Orthodox Church on the occasion of the fifth centenary of its independence,[2] and in accordance with this the refusal on 1st August 1948 of the invitation from the general secretariat of the World Council of Churches to participate in the Conference of Churches in Amsterdam.[3] In this connexion, however, it must be borne in mind that at that time and as a result of many years of isolation it was hardly possible for the Russian Orthodox Church to take an objective view of the World Council, inasmuch as the Council's understanding of itself before the Amsterdam Conference could in fact only be discerned imperfectly from written documents alone, and in particular the important Toronto declaration clarifying this understanding was not made until 1949.[4] It was thus possible for the false impression to arise that in the World Council Church unity was to be established on a social, economic and

[1] This article first appeared in *Kerygma und Dogma*, 4. Jahrgang, Heft 3, July 1958. It is here translated by Mr J. R. Wilkie, B.A., M.A., of Leeds University.

[2] *Dokumente der orthodoxen Kirchen zur ökumenischen Frage*, I: *Die Moskauer orthodoxe Konferenz vom Juli 1948*, ed. by the External Affairs Bureau of the Evangelical Church in Germany (Witten. n.d.); pp. 39ff; *Ecumenical Review*, I (1948-9), 189ff.

[3] *Dokumente*, p. 56f; *Ecumenical Review*, I, 188f.

[4] *Ecumenical Review*, III (1950-1), 53ff; cf. Peter Brunner, 'The Realism of the Holy Spirit', *Ecumenical Review*, III, 221ff.

political foundation while questions of unity of faith were suppressed, and at the same time that the acknowledgment, expressed in the 'Basis', of Jesus Christ as 'our God and Saviour' was to be used as a sufficient dogmatic foundation.

Even though there has been no direct positive ecumenical contribution so far from the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, yet in view of the last forty years we shall have to speak of a very significant indirect contribution in that the sufferings borne with great steadfastness of faith by Russian Orthodox Christians have attracted the attention of the rest of Christendom and have provided the background against which theologians and congregations of Russian émigrés have been able to present the essential nature of Russian Orthodoxy to western Christendom in an entirely new light. The Eastern Church and western Christendom had never been so alien to each other as at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the clearest symptoms of this being Harnack's well-known and very derogatory opinions, which had a great influence on the civilised western world. The fact that this opinion has changed profoundly stands to the credit of the Russian Church in particular. Separated from the rest of Christendom and oppressed by an atheistic power, it has by its suffering borne a most significant and in a strict sense ecumenical witness.

Meanwhile its situation has improved in many respects. In September 1943 it was allowed to fill the see of the Moscow Patriarch, which had been vacant since 1925, since 1944 it has been allowed to reopen its two theological academies and eight theological seminaries, and in recent years it has also been able, in accordance with general Soviet efforts to establish international contacts and cultural exchange, to renew its connexion with foreign churches. Thus it has been able to receive both the patriarchs of various Orthodox churches and delegations from non-Orthodox churches and also to return their visits. In this way it has come in contact with various member Churches of the World Council and has also obtained a more exact knowledge of its work than was possible before. In so doing, it has realised that the fundamental questions of Christian faith play a much more important part in the World Council than it had previously assumed, and it was strengthened in this impression by the preparatory work and reports of the Faith

and Order Conference at Lund in 1952 and of the Second World Conference of Churches at Evanston in 1954. The very theme, 'Christ the Hope of the World', made it clear that one of the quite crucial themes of the Eastern Churches with its strongly eschatological orientation was taken seriously here. Furthermore, the recent declaration of the executive committee of the Commission for International Affairs of the World Council of Churches on atomic tests and disarmament (27th July 1957)[1] has also lessened many political doubts which had previously existed. Thus the possibility is beginning to present itself that the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate will in future take part in ecumenical work.[2]

In the following pages I shall discuss the question of whether co-operation between the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the World Council of Churches is a genuine possibility and one worth striving for, and what can be expected from such co-operation. I shall attempt an answer against the background of impressions gained on a three weeks' stay in the Soviet Union[3] which allowed me to visit various centres of Orthodox Church life—mainly in Moscow and nearby Zagorsk, where the Moscow Theological Academy is housed in the famous old Trinity-St Sergius monastery, in Kiev and in Leningrad, the seat of the other Theological Academy—as well as the Lutheran congregations in Riga and Mitau [Yelgava]. Of course such a visit is much too short to grasp fully the complexity of the problems of Church life in the Soviet Union. But a number of observations and points of view did emerge which are not unimportant for questions of ecumenical co-operation.

Since in this case the ecclesiological and ecumenical considerations are in a peculiar way inseparable from ecclesiastical

[1] 'Atomic Tests and Disarmament', *Ecumenical Review*, X (1957-8), 70ff.

[2] After this article was written, a meeting took place on 7th-9th August 1958 at Utrecht between representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the World Council of Churches. A communiqué of the meeting, which was of a preliminary and exploratory nature (cf. section V, 3 and 4 below), appeared in *Ecumenical Review*, XI (1958-9), 79f.

[3] The journey was undertaken at the invitation of the Moscow Patriarchate, along with the President of the Evangelical Church in Westphalia, D. Wilm, the President of the External Affairs Bureau of the Evangelical Church in Germany, D. Wischmann, and Professors Iwand of Bonn and Vogel of Berlin, in agreement with the chairman of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany, Bishop D. Dibelius. It lasted from 26th March to 16th April 1958.

reality and since the west has most confused and contradictory ideas about the realities of the Church in the Soviet Union, it may seem justified to report concrete impressions in the following pages in more detail than is usual in a journal of systematic theology.

I

Having followed with the most intense sympathy and sorrow the history of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union in the last few decades as far as the incomplete and in part also unreliable news which penetrated to the west allowed, one could not help, on the journey to Moscow, being troubled especially by the anxious question: What is still left of the Russian Orthodox Church? The dominant impression, which kept growing in strength, was that the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union does not consist merely of ruins; it is alive! and indeed it is alive in spiritual power!

On our tour we took part in some twenty Orthodox Church services and also looked into several more Orthodox churches. The services were always well attended even on week-days, while on Sundays they were as a rule crowded. In the week-day services, it is true, we chiefly saw old women, but this picture changed on Sundays, in Holy Week and especially at Easter: here we also saw many men of different ages, many young mothers with their children, and adolescents. Most impressive was a Sunday in Zagorsk, where in the old Trinity-St. Sergius monastery service followed service in all the churches simultaneously from five a.m. on, where in one church alone two thousand men and woman received the sacrament and where at this time a total of over fifteen thousand Orthodox Christians had flocked together, some from long distances—and then, two weeks later, Easter in Moscow. During the whole of Easter Saturday, the streets of Moscow already seemed to have a different look; from all directions women flocked in with white bundles in which they brought Easter cakes with Easter eggs and a flower on the top to the church to have them blessed. There they stood in long queues, often far out into the street, until they moved up to the priest, who sprinkled the cakes with holy water. Afterwards they went to the picture of the burial of Christ, kissed it, prayed, crossed themselves and then returned home. Many had their children with them and were instructing

them in these actions in the church. Many remained in the church from as early as afternoon, in order to have a place in the Easter service at twelve o'clock midnight. Then the Easter services were so crowded that great masses of people were left standing in the streets; inside the church you could hear their prayers and hymns from outside during the pauses in the liturgy. In all the services a deeply moving sight was the expression of sincerest devotion on the faces of the congregation as they prayed and sang and the intensity of their participation in the service. In the Easter services the thunder of the answer 'He is risen indeed' was quite overwhelming—a thunder so elemental, breaking out again and again, as if it could not wait until the priest's cry of 'Christ is risen' had died away. What we found in the churches was a congregation with all the marks of a people's Church—a people's Church in the atheistic State.

Among the priests, monks and bishops we met on our journey, some of whom accompanied us for quite a long time, we got to know many excellent men who were very different indeed from the idea, long current in the west, of 'ignorant and power-seeking popes'. Many had already had a profession as doctors, engineers or even as masters in secondary schools until the Church was again given facilities for theological training and they had then been able to take up their studies—men who had proved themselves to be responsible in the world and who then, as the result of a deeply personal decision, took upon themselves the pastoral office, discharging it with impressive devotion to the liturgy and with sincere open-mindedness towards men. In this connexion we were struck by the fact that in spite of the separation of priest and congregation, which is emphasised by the iconostasis, both formed a worshipping unity in far greater measure than is usually the case in Roman Catholic services. One has the impression that the shepherd is standing in the midst of his flock rather than separate from it.

At the theological academies we found, to our delight, a young generation of resolute Christians, who listened intently to our lectures. Scholarly work is still being built up, as is inevitable after such a thorough-going interruption. There is still a lack of recent theological literature, only a small number of the new books published abroad in the last four decades is available. Training is especially concentrated on liturgical

observances. But research in biblical exegesis and patrology has begun again, and every future priest in the seminaries is required to have a knowledge of Greek and Latin, in the theological academies also of Hebrew and modern foreign languages—more, that is, than in many theological seminaries in America. In the last few years much propaganda has been made in the Russian press out of two theologians who had been trained at the theological academies after their reopening but who then fell into apostasy and as renegades came out publicly against the Church.[1] But I hardly think this can be taken as symptomatic; on the contrary, it is astonishing that with the pressure of state propaganda there have not been more cases of this kind.

The Church is obviously growing stronger, slowly but unmistakably. And this reconstruction is intimately connected with the fact that since 1943 it has again been possible to fill the see of the Moscow Patriarchate. It has often caused head-shaking in the west when representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church coming from the Soviet Union declared that their Church was free. For this freedom is, to be sure, only a very limited one. All the same, we must not simply put aside such declarations as Communist propaganda but rather consider how very important the Patriarch is for the Orthodox Church and that now for the first time since Peter the Great, after a period when the Church was purely a state Church, the Russian Church has again been given the opportunity—and that by the revolution—of electing a patriarch and thus of having again a supreme spiritual pastoral office. Moreover, the western visitor is struck by the fact that, as in the relationship between priest and congregation, the relationship between patriarchate and Church, in spite of a clearly ordered hierarchy, is of a different structure from that of mere superiority and inferiority. Superior and inferior are rather enclosed by the structure of the community, in much the same way as the Eastern Church as a whole understands its unity as community and does without an earthly monarchical head.

II

But of course, alongside the many very positive impressions

[1] Yevgraf Duluman and P. Darmansky.

of the intensity of Church life which we received, the limits within which this is achieved must not be overlooked. Many churches are still used as museums or even as workshops and the like. Thus, for example, none of the famous old churches in the Kremlin is available for public worship, neither is the famous cathedral of St. Basil. It is true that the old churches which have been turned into museums are in a good state of repair, as indeed the Russians have done excellent work in preserving historical buildings of any kind. But we also saw many churches falling into ruin. In Moscow only some fifty-five churches are available for public worship, and in Leningrad as few as fourteen. In proportion to the population this means that in Moscow one church is open for every hundred thousand inhabitants or so, in Leningrad for as many as two hundred thousand or more. On our drives through the countryside, there were often long distances where we saw no church in use. But then again, for example on the drive to Zagorsk, within eighty kilometres there were four village churches, to which the people flocked on Sunday mornings and many children were brought for baptism. As to the ratio of churches to population, it must of course be borne in mind that there are no pews in Orthodox churches, so that the people stand closely packed together and many more can find room than with us. Moreover, every Sunday several services are held one after the other until evening and there is also a daily service on week-days. And so I came to the conclusion that despite the small number of churches attendance at public worship in many places is not substantially smaller than in a secularised city of Western Europe.

A further crucial fact is that religious instruction of children is still not allowed, either in school or in Church premises. And so, apart from the training of theological students in the theological seminaries and academies, all religious instruction is given through the Church service itself and thus remains practice in liturgical piety to a far greater extent than is usual in the west. All the same, the result of this ban on religious instruction is that there has recently been more preaching in Church services than there used to be, and this may, in course of time, give the Orthodox Church a new understanding of the Reformation, which in contrast to the predominance of the liturgical and doxological factor arose from a need to proclaim

the Word of God. Otherwise Christian instruction is in the hands of mothers and grandmothers, most of whom are obviously taking their task of Christian education very seriously. But it is a natural consequence of this ban on religious instruction, which has been in force for a long time now, that part of the younger generation—probably quite a large part—is entirely estranged from the Church and knows scarcely anything about it. I often observed that the priests who accompanied our party on visits to the University or even to a factory were looked at by many people with eyes that lacked understanding, in much the same way as animals in the zoo are looked at by children seeing them for the first time in their lives. In the University I also noticed a group of students, men and women, who were obviously making fun of our companions. Even the cross which every priest wears on his breast was obviously quite unfamiliar to many young people.

Besides educational work, the Church is forbidden to undertake any organised work of Christian charity, such as maintaining Christian hospitals or social institutions. The call to acts of charity, of course, plays a large part in the Church's preaching, and many Christians, we were told, do take this responsibility very seriously. But the life of the Church at this important point is reduced to the initiative of individual Christians.

A further crucial point is that the Church has only very limited publishing facilities; for instance, it cannot announce its services in the press. Indeed attacks on the Church are made again and again at intervals in the press and on the wireless. Hence in Riga the Lutheran Church regarded it as a great improvement when for the first time for many years the arrival of our Evangelical delegation was announced by the newspapers again as an ecclesiastical occasion. The Church of the Patriarchate does indeed possess a journal, which appears regularly.[1] But it is at the same time the Church's organ for official regulations, news and congregational matters, and can in addition carry only a small number of scholarly essays and reviews of foreign theological books. So far it has not been possible to

[1] See the detailed report and the very instructive analyses by Roman Rössler, 'Das Journal des Moskauer Patriarchats als Spiegel kirchlicher Entwicklung in der Sowjetunion', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, New Series IV, 26-63.

print scholarly theological books again, and professors must make do with duplicated texts in their teaching. These limitations are all the more deeply felt because a great deal of educational literature of a scholarly and scientific kind appears in the U.S.S.R. and is bought up by the Russian people with their astonishing hunger for education. In the last few years anti-religious literature has also appeared again in enormous quantities in the book-shops.

The Church is permitted to express an opinion on social and political questions only in so far as it does not thereby come into conflict with the state's 'line'. In the west Christian groups have been free to criticise the atomic armament of their own governments or even, for example, to repudiate the military actions of their government during the Suez crisis; in contrast to this, a corresponding public expression of opinion by the Russian Orthodox Church opposing the atomic armament of the Soviet Union or, for example, the bloody suppression of freedom-loving Hungarian workers, peasants and students is unthinkable. But in spite of these restrictions it seems to me wrong to see in the Russian Church when it speaks of peace and seeks international contacts merely an organ of Soviet propaganda and politics. Rather the relationship is probably as follows. The Church here acts from its own interests, but can naturally only act where the interests of the state, differently motivated but running parallel to its own, give it free scope. In this connexion we must also bear in mind that the Russian Orthodox Church, being in the power of the centrally directed Communist news service, does not possess adequate prerequisites for forming its own political judgment. Many former public statements by the Moscow Patriarchate, e.g. the unusually harsh words on the alleged war-mongering of the Papacy,[1] or the condemnation of the alleged bacteriological warfare of the Americans in Korea,[2] can most probably be traced back to this lack of objective information.

All this means that the life of the Church is completely reduced to and concentrated in the Church service. All activity

[1] See the 'Resolution on the question of "The Vatican and the Orthodox Church" ' of 17th July 1948, *Dokumente*, pp. 35ff.

[2] See the report of the 'Conference of all Churches and Religious Communities in the U.S.S.R. for the Protection of Peace, 9th-12th May 1952' published by the Moscow Patriarchate.

beyond this would fall under the head of Church propaganda, which is still forbidden. Thus even the rejection of Marxist materialism (a rejection to which the Russian Orthodox Church has always adhered) cannot be expressed in public polemics or in missionary campaigns among the people. In spite of various ways in which the life of the Church has been made easier in the last fifteen years, it is still governed by the very unequal provisions of Article 124 of Stalin's constitution of 1936: 'Freedom for the conduct of *religious worship* and freedom for the conduct of *antireligious propaganda* is recognised for all citizens' [italics added]. It is obvious that a state which treats the Church in this way will not enjoy the confidence either of the west or the rest of Christendom.

III

The limitations I have mentioned are a serious hindrance in the life of the Church. For the Church's mission is to preach the Gospel to *all* men (i.e. to engage in 'propaganda') and bring God's overriding claims to bear even on the concrete problems of social and political action. No Church can allow a secular power to forbid it to do so. It is all the more remarkable that in the Soviet Union obviously no religious war is raging; rather Church and atheistic state live together in peace—and this despite recurring public campaigns of state-sponsored godless propaganda.

As to the state, a characteristic feature of this peace, apart from the alleviations mentioned above, is the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of November 1954, according to which priests are to be treated with respect, and the fact that in the last few years the patriarch and other leaders of the Orthodox Church have increasingly been invited to great state receptions. Thus we too were able again and again to observe that the representatives of the council for Russian Orthodox Church affairs on the ministerial council of the U.S.S.R. approached the representatives of the Church with respect, and we were assured by Church people that they were most attentive and helpful to the Church in many ways (e.g. in obtaining building materials, architects and workmen, in making journeys possible, etc.)

Accordingly the Church in its turn obviously shows complete

loyalty to the state. Not even in intimate conversation could any criticism of the system or any complaints be heard. On the contrary the technical, economic and scientific progress which had been achieved under the government since the war were often spoken of with appreciation. But the most remarkable thing for us was that Church people were completely silent about the period of persecution and even about the important restrictions which were still in force.

This peace seems puzzling at first, and indeed both as regards the attitude of the atheistic state and also—and even more so—as regards the Church. For both sides seem to be contradicting themselves.

How can the atheist state make peace with the Church while continuing to see in it an antiquated bourgeois survival, a pernicious opium? Is this not inconsistent?

It is inconsistent, and yet at the same time quite consistent, in that the Soviet method is to accommodate the realisation of Communist dogma elastically to the concrete demands of political reality. Thus Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 became the decisive turning-point[1] in the state's treatment of the Church. Now the state needed for its defence the united effort of the whole people and hence that of the Christians. In the war, moreover, it needed military aid from America, which, however, took offence at the oppression of the Church and demanded its cessation. The alleviations in Church life then continued after the war, since the Church had demonstrated its loyalty in the war and the devastated areas again required an undivided effort from everyone. Besides, after the war the Soviet state needed the continued existence of the Church as a proof to the world of its democratic attitude of mind. The Church's strictly limited opportunities for action cannot simply be understood as arising from the legal guarantee of freedom of conscience; for this guarantee already existed in Lenin's time and even during the worst of the religious persecutions. Rather the needs of the state at any particular time play the decisive

[1] For the following see: John Shelton Curtis, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950* (New York 1953); Roman Rössler, 'Entwicklung der sowjetischen Kirchenpolitik' in the miscellany, *Das Sowjetsystem in der heutigen Welt*, Schriften des Auslands- und Dolmetscherinstituts der Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, II (Munich 1956); Hildegard Schaeder, 'Die orthodoxe Kirche des Ostens', *Kirchliches Jahrbuch*, 1949; and the documentary report in *Kirchliches Jahrbuch*, 1956. Cf. also the careful current reports in the *Herder-Korrespondenz*.

part. This may, however, be true in an even deeper sense. The first generation of revolutionary fighters has vanished, the second has already almost gone. Since then much has been consolidated and also changed. This is perhaps clearest to the western observer with respect to the whole field of sex. In contrast to the beginning of the revolution the value of marriage and also, in part, of the family is again recognised. In other ways, too, and in spite of dogmatic atheism, one meets an ethos which strikes one as positively idealistic. Individual politicians may silently be beginning to note that the Church might be valued as a positive factor in this respect too. But I admit that one would have to have lived much longer in Russia to be clear about the change which is coming over Russian Communism.

A more difficult question to answer is how the Church can live in peace with an atheistic state which continues to restrict it.

Was this peace-making just a kind of 'inner emigration' into the only possibility of continuing to lead a hole-and-corner life within a totalitarian atheistic state? However much seems to speak in favour of this answer, I do not think it is the right one. It was not simply a question here of a tactical move, but rather —and more and more as time went on—of a conscientious Christian decision. As early as 1923, when facing death, Patriarch Tikhon, who had excommunicated the Bolshevists in 1918, regretted his anti-Soviet action and expressed his loyalty to the Soviet state; this declaration was not simply a tactical attempt to keep the peace and to save a Church threatened both by the state and by divisions and sects. Rather it was already a recognition of the Soviet power as a divine institution in the sense of Rom. 13. Even more clearly the later Patriarch Sergius in his famous circular letter of 29th July 1927 pointed out that 'there are for the Christian no chance happenings and that in what has taken place among us, as in all places and at all times, it is God's right hand at work, infallibly leading every people to the goal ordained for it'. So he called to Christians: 'Let us not forget our duty to be citizens of the Soviet Union, not only for fear of punishment but also for the sake of conscience' (Rom. 13.5).[1] This attitude may not at

[1] *Dokumente*, p. 63; full text (in English) in Matthew Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia* (New York 1956), pp. 161ff.

first have been accepted by all parts of the Church, but it prevailed in the Second World War, which in Russia is generally called 'the patriotic War'. Because we in the west generally underestimate the scale of the threat and of the intolerable sufferings to which the Russian people were exposed in those years, we also fail to recognise the extent to which the Russian people was welded together in its common defensive struggle. Some bishops and priests had at first seen in the armies of the Third Reich the liberators of the Church, but the atrocities of the SS soon made them recognise that they had only a choice between two godless powers, and they chose their menaced native land. In this action the Christian recognition of the Soviet state took on flesh and blood. In the west, too, we generally underestimate the vast devastation which the war left behind in western Russia. The fact that Christians took the healing of the wounds of war to be their own affair as well, supporting every effort of this kind made by the Soviet state and welcoming its successes, is not very surprising, for the Russians had learned not to place their hopes any longer on foreign intervention.

Furthermore this peace with the state, which involves for the Church renunciation of a Christian social order and indeed of any kind of independent claims of action in matters of law, social order and politics, must be understood in the light of the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church originates in Byzantium and later lived for centuries under the non-Christian rule of the Tartars and then in modern times under the Caesaropapistical rule of the Tsars. The Church's discharging of its responsibility for the state was thus, for considerable periods of its history, reduced almost exclusively to intercession. Consequently the Eastern Church, unlike western Christendom, has not worked out the problems of natural law systematically nor cast them in dogmatic formulae to guide and determine the Church's action.[1] To this extent an Orthodox church, by peacefully accepting an atheistic state, is not being untrue to its nature, as would be the case in a Roman or a Protestant church.

[1] The beginnings of a critical study of this aspect of Russian church history and of a transformation of the principle of 'symphony' between Church and state to correspond with the altered situation are to be found in the miscellany, *Kirche, Staat und Mensch, russisch-orthodoxe Studien* (Geneva 1927); see especially the contribution by Kartaschov, 'Die Kirche und der Staat', pp. 78ff.

But all this probably does not yet give the decisive reason why this peace does not mean for the Russian Orthodox Church the loss of its essential nature. The real reason why it was able to make this peace is probably to be found in the fact that, in the midst of all the restrictions imposed on the rest of the Church's life, its service of worship has remained unimpaired. The sacred liturgy is Orthodox without any alteration whatever. Its rich content drawn from the Bible and the early Church is not in the least diminished. Here not the smallest detail has been sacrificed. When we think of the central significance of the liturgy for the life of the Eastern Church, we shall not confuse the Russian Christians who accept the Soviet state with the 'Deutsche Christen' ('German Christians') of the Third Reich nor with many voices from Prague or Budapest which confuse the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of the world. For even if there is more preaching today in the Russian Orthodox Church than there once was, the liturgy has been fixed for centuries and, by continual repetition and with the vivid forcefulness of its *stichera*, *troparia*, *idiomela* and *canones*, it reminds the thoughts and senses so strongly of the great acts of salvation wrought by God in history that the temptation to hold a false theological doctrine of political history is greatly reduced. At the same time the Eastern Church lives more intensively than western Christendom in the eschatological expectation of the new creation, which has already begun in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The proclamation of the cosmic victory of the resurrection of Jesus Christ and the expectation of the coming Christ as the perfecter of the world is so dominating that the relation of believers to their oppressors is changed. Moreover, in these services God's great acts of creation, salvation and consummation are not only reported, proclaimed and awaited, but are continually praised in hymns; not only are prayers of thanks offered for these acts and prayers of supplication that the consummation may come but, more than in the services of western Christendom, God is worshipped in ever new doxologies. If we remember this, then it becomes understandable that those who take part in these services think the walls of the prison of this world transparent. In the worship of Him who has come and will come the earthly present fades away and the believer is taken up into the presence of the

heavenly glory. As the cosmic significance of Christ is proclaimed and praised in the Church service, in this paean of praise the coming new creation is already experienced as present. The service of worship is thus 'Heaven upon earth'. Whatever strict limits are set to the Church's life in the Soviet Union, the cosmic dimensions of the Orthodox service make believers forget these limits and give them a share in a victory which overcomes all adversaries. From here, too, the silence of Russian Christians about the period of persecution and about the distress which still exists today may be seen in a new light. This silence is probably grounded not only in the anxiety that such statements might be reported to the authorities, but also in the experience which the service of worship gives of the new creation which has begun in Christ's resurrection. The certainty of this victory of Christ gives inner peace and power, not to grumble and lament but rather to forgive, to love, to bless, to pray and to await as a result of it the inner conquest and transformation of one's adversaries.

In the light of this we can understand why the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and its congregations, even though its opportunities for action are very limited, does not give the impression of a clandestine Church. For in its public worship all the dimensions of the Church's life are concentrated and preserved; though they are hampered in their development, yet they are not dead or lost.

IV

In answering the question we asked at the beginning there is another matter of interest. How do the relations of the Russian Orthodox Church with other churches in the Soviet Union appear today? From my own observation I can report on its relations with the Evangelical Lutheran Church, and these can only be described as ecumenical in the best sense.

It would still not have been possible for the Lutheran Churches in the Latvian and Estonian Soviet Republics of their own accord to invite German Lutheran theologians to meet them. For our visit to the Lutheran Church in Riga we are indebted to the Church of the Patriarchate, which was most attentive in arranging for us to be in Riga just at the western Easter-time (we celebrated the Orthodox Easter a week later

in Moscow) and to observe Good Friday and Easter there along with our Lutheran brothers as guests of the Orthodox Archbishop. If one thinks back to the serious antagonism which existed in the last century and even at the beginning of this one in the Baltic provinces between the Orthodox and Lutheran Churches—an antagonism roused by the Tsarist policy of Russification, which the Orthodox Church misused against the indigenous Lutheran Church—then the atmosphere was quite changed. There is a truly fraternal concord between the two churches. Whether we and the Lutheran Archbishop with his deans and pastors were the guests of the Orthodox Archbishop or whether we and our Orthodox hosts were the guests of the Lutheran Archbishop, the fellowship was always, ecclesiastically and humanly, an equally happy one. Our joy at seeing our Latvian Lutheran brothers again was quite obviously also their joy, and when we preached at Easter in eight full Lutheran churches in Riga and Mitau [Yelgava],[1] they joined the Lutheran Archbishop and us in addressing these congregations with Easter words from the New Testament as words of greeting of our common faith. A most moving experience was the Easter service in the Cathedral at Riga, when President D. Wilm was privileged to preach to over four thousand people.

The welcome we received in the Orthodox churches themselves was also ecumenical in the best sense. Everywhere the bishops and priests greeted us in the services before the whole congregation as brothers in Christ, and each time we were allowed to say a word of spiritual greeting to the congregation. I shall never forget the great cordiality and joy with which these words were received by the people and how they were answered with exclamations of thanks and with benedictions, especially with the 'Peace be with you' of the Risen Christ. I have seldom experienced with such elemental force how the fellowship of faith and love breaks through the partitions be-

[1] The Lutheran Church in Latvia still gives the impression of a people's church. By the time the Russians occupied the Baltic states in accordance with the agreement between Stalin and Hitler, the period in which churches were closed by the Soviet government was over, and so most church buildings have been kept for public worship. The same is true of the Lutheran Church in Estonia, according to the statements of the Lutheran bishop of Reval [Tallin], whom we met in Riga. A great difficulty for both churches, however, is that since the Soviet occupation of the country they have lost their theological faculties in Dorpat [Tartu] and Riga and have so far been able to prepare their young pastors for ordination only in special courses.

tween the confessions. What we experienced was more than just Russian hospitality, which as such is already distinguished by its cordiality; it was ecumenical Christian fellowship. The receptions in the Patriarchate itself also took place in the same spirit of brotherly love. At the same time we encountered a lively interest in a more active ecclesiastical and theological exchange. In these and many other conversations which we had with members of the Orthodox Church there was also expressed again and again a longing for peace among nations and the hope that the peaceful community of Christians might have an influence on the peace of nations and states. This was, to be sure, in line with Soviet peace propaganda; yet the words of the Church were distinguished from this by their being determined by the peace which the Risen Christ gives to His people. Thus the self-righteous and threatening tone which is characteristic of political peace propaganda today was entirely lacking. We had the impression that here the Orthodox Church, though it was acting within the area of parallel state interests, was yet determining its actions on the basis of its own mission. This impression is strengthened by the fact that no political demands of any kind were made on us by any of the Church authorities. On the contrary we were given the opportunity—for which we are grateful—of being received both by the deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. Zorin, formerly ambassador in Bonn, and by State President Voroshilov's representative, State President Palezkis of Lithuania, and were able, very frankly and most emphatically, to draw attention to the oppression of the Church in the German Democratic Republic and its ominous political consequences.

It might now be asked whether this attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Lutheran Church is characteristic of its relations with other churches in general. No doubt there will be many differences in detail here; after all, no church has the same attitude to all confessions. Thus the Russian Baptists are obviously felt as being more remote than the Lutherans. Again, the Anglican Church with its episcopal succession (though this is not yet recognised)[1] is in many things closer than the Lutherans. On the other hand, however, in their historical

[1] *Dokumente*, p. 42f, and the very instructive official report, *Anglo-Russian Theological Conference, Moscow, July 1956*, ed. by H. M. Waddams (London 1957).

encounters with Lutheran piety since the days of Johann Arndt and August Hermann Francke[1] Russian Christians have again and again shown a particular openness to the Church of the Lutheran confession. Despite such differences it is very probably true of the present Patriarch Alexius that *in principle* he regards the bounds of the community of believers as wider than the bounds of the Orthodox Church. He has already expressed this in many earlier statements. Thus, on the occasion of an earlier visit by Evangelical theologians the Patriarch quoted the words of Metropolitan Platon from the eighteenth century: 'The dividing-walls between the confessions do not go right up to heaven', adding that we should look more at the inner core of the Christian faith than at the outward shell, and declared: 'I am convinced that Jesus Christ acknowledges as His own, i.e. as Christians, all those who believe in and obey Him. That is more than the Orthodox Church.'[2] As we were leaving he said: 'We are all children of one and the same father. As children love their father in different ways, so we love God in different ways. But he loves us all in the same way.'

V

Let us now try to answer the question with which we started: Is co-operation between the World Council of Churches and the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate a genuine possibility and one worth striving for? What might be expected from such co-operation?

1. Above and beyond all the matters we shall consider here stands the will of the Lord that all who believe in Him shall be one. The Church in its essence is the One Church. As God is the Three-in-One, so the Church is the one people of the one God, the one body of the one Christ and the one temple of the Holy Spirit. When this oneness is disfigured and obscured by divisions, Christians must leave no stone unturned to remove these divisions and to make this oneness in the Lord visible to the world.

[1] Johann Arndt (1555-1621), Lutheran writer of devotional works (*Vier Bücher vom wahren Christentum*, 1609), persecuted for his inclination to mysticism; August Hermann Francke (1663-1727), Lutheran theologian, professor of theology at Halle, leader of German Pietism, formed *Collegium orientale theologicum* as a link with Eastern Christianity.

[2] See report by Hildegard Schaeder in *Informationsblatt für die Gemeinden der niedersächsischen lutherischen Landeskirchen* for 2nd August 1954, No. 16.

The World Council of Churches is not in itself the one Church, but simply the institution for the meeting of the separate churches on their way to church unity. At the same time its constitution is so wide that it guarantees unlimited scope for the peculiar nature of each church and leaves each to decide for itself what contribution it will make in the ecumenical co-operative work for the understanding and realisation of unity. On the Orthodox side neither dogmatical nor canonical obstacles stand in the way of co-operation with the World Council. Indeed this is confirmed by the fact that several Orthodox churches have for years been members of the World Council.

2. If the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate should associate itself with the World Council of Churches, this would be a considerable strengthening of the other Orthodox churches already represented in it. This strengthening of the Eastern Church as a whole would doubtless be a great gain for all the member churches of the World Council and something to be most warmly welcomed. I shall confine myself to stating the most important reasons.

It is, of course, true that the Orthodox Church is very set in its dogma and therefore immovable in ecumenical discussions. But on the other hand it must be remembered that it has committed itself to far fewer dogmatic decisions than large parts of western Christendom. After the fixing of the trinitarian and christological dogmas it did not expressly define and proclaim any further dogmas. Thus the Eastern Church has no dogmatic decisions on problems of anthropology and the doctrine of grace, which have led to well-known divisions in the west. Because of this the Eastern Church, without sacrificing its own dogmatic commitments and yet in greater freedom than many western churches, can tackle and shed new light upon those dogmatic problems on which sharply opposing decisions have been taken in the west. Moreover, ecumenical discussion is of importance to us because the dogmas valid in the Eastern Church have been formulated within the structure of the doxology or at least have been determined by it and are therefore closer to the act of worship than many decisions taken in the history of western dogma.[1] Hence with its help many

[1] Cf. E. Schlink, 'Wandlungen im protestantischen Verständnis der Ostkirche', *Ökumenische Rundschau* (1957), pp. 153ff, and 'La Christologie de Chalcédoine dans le dialogue oecuménique', *Verbum Caro* (1958), pp. 23f.

opposing dogmatic decisions of western Christendom, in which theological thought has become separated from the act of preaching the gospel and of worship as a whole and, by being hedged about with philosophical problems and concepts, has involved itself in a process of rationalising and objectivising the opposition between God and man, may be reinterpreted, starting more strictly from the primary acts of worship and of missionary activity and from the basic structures of theological assertion which are operative in them.[1]

The Orthodox contribution can be just as important in questions of Church order as in questions of doctrine. Here too the Orthodox Church is generally regarded as particularly immovable. But it is to be noted that the canonical order of ecclesiastical offices has remained closely attached to the idea of community in the early Church, in such a way that there becomes visible here a profound contrast with the centralism of the Roman Church order and, on the other hand, an affinity with the Evangelical understanding of Church unity as community of Churches, even though it retains, in conformity with the Roman Church, the hierarchical order of the apostolic succession. In addition it becomes clear in the Church service that despite the opposition of ecclesiastical office and congregation both form a fellowship of action in worship in a higher degree and that the priesthood of the Church members weighs more heavily in this fellowship than is generally the case in the west.

For the ecumenical meeting of churches it is further of importance that as regards the problems of the bounds of the Church the Eastern Church has not committed itself dogmatically in the same way as the Roman Church. Within the great diversity of ecclesiological expositions by Orthodox theologians one does indeed find the most varied assertions about the bounds of the Church, from those which accept the Roman identification of legally constituted Church and body of Christ to those which understand the body of Christ as going beyond the bounds of the Orthodox Church to include all believers. But this very variety makes it clear that the Eastern

[1] Cf. my morphological reflections on questions of principle and method involved in the treatment of the ecumenical problem of the unity of dogmatic assertion, in the study, 'Die Struktur der dogmatischen Aussage als ökumenisches Problem', *Kerygma und Dogma* (1957), pp. 251-306.

Church cannot in principle be closed to a new ecumenical consideration of the unity and the bounds of the Church, though, to be sure, a definition of the Church as an invisible community of believers detached from the visible Church is out of the question—and rightly so. But even the canonical decrees on the bounds of the Church have again and again in Orthodoxy been treated at important points in a peculiarly flexible manner, apparently inconsistently and yet at the same time in accordance with the essential nature of the Church, inasmuch as in the canonical concept of *oikonomia* the activity of love is given scope to recognise other Christians and the ecclesiastical acts that have been accomplished in them outside the Orthodox Church.[1] Moreover the canonical decrees of the Eastern Church are, according to its own judgments, in part contradictory and historically obsolete.

A strengthening of the Eastern Church in the World Council of Churches might thus contribute in a decisive way to a loosening of the inflexible relationships between the Churches of western Christendom, especially between the Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of the Reformation. The Orthodox Church is in fact the indispensable third party in the meeting of the other two great blocs of Christendom, Protestantism and Catholicism. It has preserved with the fewest changes the substance and the structure of the early Church, on the basis of which the Roman Church then underwent a considerable further development and alteration, while the Reformers, on the other hand, beginning anew with the Scriptures, thought at the same time that they were going back to the fundamental decisions of the early Church and purifying them of later accretions. Even though we today see the historical differences between the primitive Christian congregation and the pre-medieval Church more sharply differentiated than in the sixteenth century, yet the meeting with the Eastern Church may help the divided parts of western Christendom to recognise anew what they believe in common. The Protestants in their discussion with Rome will recognise more clearly that in the Roman Church even today much matter which is derived from

[1] Cf. the important canonistical books by Hieronymus I Kotsonis, *ΠΡΟΒΛΗΜΑΤΑ ΤΗΣ 'ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑΣ* and *Η ΚΑΝΟΝΙΚΗ ΑΠΟΨΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΕΤΕΡΟΔΟΞΩΝ* (both Athens, 1957).

the early Church and cannot be given up is active among many later additions, whilst the Roman Church on the other hand must see the Reformation much more clearly than hitherto in association with the early Church and not in any way as the new foundation of a church. At the same time the meeting with the Eastern Church makes it clear to what an extent the characteristic themes and structure of Protestantism in its antithesis to Rome are yet determined by Rome—much more, indeed, than we generally realise. Thus new points of view emerge when we and the Roman Church together allow ourselves to be called in question by the Eastern Church.

Over and above all this the ecumenical contribution of the *Russian* Orthodox Church has a special value inasmuch as a church is here speaking which has come through unspeakable suffering and which has been thrown back by this period of suffering upon the core of the gospel in a more immediate way than many another church which has been spared such trials. Even if it is the same church as before, the experience of the last forty years cannot have passed over it without producing some effect. By being wrenched from all its positions of security, it must have realised anew the eschatological reality of the Church as the people of God travelling to its Lord—the existence of the Church 'in the world, but not of the world'.

3. But however desirable ecumenical co-operation with the Russian Orthodox Church is, we must at the same time see dispassionately the difficulties to be overcome on both sides in the process. Let us think first of the World Council of Churches itself.

It is, of course, not true, as the Roman side likes to assert, that the World Council is just a movement for unity within Protestantism. On the contrary, since its constitution in 1948 most Orthodox churches on this side of the Iron Curtain have belonged to it as members with full rights, and their co-operation has always been most warmly welcomed by the other churches of the World Council of Churches. The Orthodox churches in the World Council of Churches are held in high esteem. Nevertheless their contribution has not counted for as much in the work of the World Council of Churches as it deserved to on its merits, and the Orthodox representatives have often felt lonely and somewhat misunderstood. The

reason for this, on the one hand, may be that the number of their representatives, though it corresponds to the size of their churches, has been relatively small in comparison with the number of other church representatives. On the other hand, however, it is also because in the west Orthodoxy has not attracted the *theological* interest which it deserved. The Protestant member Churches of the World Council, even those communions which feel Orthodoxy to be remote, will have to concern themselves much more intensively and deeply with the theology and theological history of Orthodoxy, and the dogmatic question which is posed seriously and emphatically by Orthodoxy will have to be taken more seriously than in the past.

Furthermore, the World Council has often regarded the problems of Christian existence behind the Iron Curtain too lightly. It is true, it has always laid great stress on cultivating fellowship with the churches in the Communist sphere of influence where at all possible, and in doing so it has listened to many speeches by Czechoslovakian and Hungarian representatives even when they were saying things to the west which the west could not have found particularly pleasant to hear—indeed, even when this was done by a dubious confusion between Christian expectation of the Kingdom of God and Communist faith in progress. And yet, despite much personal sympathy with their brothers behind the Iron Curtain, member churches of the World Council—particularly the American ones—have not been sufficiently aware of the danger of identifying the existence of the Church with their own social order. But is the Lordship of Christ bound to the western democratic form of society? The World Council in its thinking will have to penetrate more deeply into the problems of Christian existence within quite different systems and recognise more clearly that churches within totalitarian state systems, despite oppression and considerable restrictions, may not be simply degenerate churches, but really and truly churches in the New Testament sense—the eschatological people of God, the body of Christ, the temple of the Holy Spirit. The World Council will have to think out the problems of the two kingdoms anew and remove from ecclesiological thought many naïve tendencies to make democratic thought absolute.

Moreover, the World Council must not forget that for years its membership has included Russian Orthodox Churches which severed their connexion with the Moscow Patriarchate in the course of the Russian Revolution and which so far have refused to submit to its authority again. We must reckon with the possibility of tension between the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on the one hand and the western European Russian Church owing allegiance to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople and the Orthodox churches in America on the other. In this case the World Council must not lessen in any way its interest in its old Russian Orthodox friends and fellow-workers, to whom it owes so much (I am thinking here especially of the important faculty of St. Sergius in Paris), or set them aside in favour of the very much larger Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. Rather these tensions in the ecumenical co-operative work will have to be borne in brotherly love until the churches directly concerned can remove them by themselves.

4. But the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate would also have to face tasks in ecumenical co-operation which would not be exactly easy. Since 1917 it has been almost completely cut off from the ecclesiastical and theological development of the rest of Christendom and hampered in its own theological research. In the last few years, it is true, reconstruction of theological work has been vigorously pursued, and efforts have been made to restore contact with foreign theological work. But this is not yet fully developed, foreign theological literature is only partly available, and there are still—understandably enough—no clear notions of the living, present reality of Church life and theological thought in the rest of the world. It is only beginning to be realised—with surprise—that, for example, considerable changes have taken place in continental Protestantism since Harnack's day and that the relations between Protestantism and the Eastern Church are no longer seen in the west in the same way as they were during the period of prevailing Liberalism. Thus the Russian Orthodox Church on entering into ecumenical work would at first come up against a bewildering profusion of impressions which did not correspond to ideas held hitherto. This requires a readiness and a strong desire to rid oneself of prejudices in the ecumenical meeting of

churches and to put oneself on a new path by carefully testing these impressions. At the same time it must not only reaffirm its heritage from the early Church, but must develop and apply it to the new questions of our age. The very things which it has inherited from Athanasius and Cyril in terms of the ideas of the first centuries it must now bring to bear on the problems and modes of thought of modern Christendom. But in ecumenical work, to reveal to others what one has received and to receive what has been given to others has always meant blessings and riches for all concerned.

The Russian Orthodox Church, both because of its conception of the Church and because of its history, will at first think it strange that the World Council puts such great stress on Christian responsibility for social and political questions and concerns itself so deeply with the problems raised, for example, by industrialisation, the social revolution in countries as yet undeveloped, the present position of women in the industrial process, the mixing of races, etc. It may not be easy at first for many Russian Orthodox theologians to regard these problems as the business of the Church and the ecumenical movement. But there can be no doubt that the Church has to preach the Gospel to men whose lives are involved in these problems today and that it must bring God's overriding claim to bear on the problems of the order of human society. The Church may, indeed, be prevented by a totalitarian state from carrying out this mission but no state can take this mission away from it. It cannot freely resolve to abandon the task of proclaiming God's command and promise to all men in the concrete situation of their real lives, whether they are willing to hear it or not. If the Russian Orthodox Church should resolve to give its assent to this ecumenical task and to take it upon itself in co-operation with the other Churches of the Ecumenical Council, it would in this respect, too, be able to make an important contribution and warn other members against being over-hasty in confusing the Lordship of Christ with a specific social order.

Now of course such narrow limits are set upon the Church in the Soviet Union as regards any statements on topical matters, especially in the social and political spheres, that its co-operation in this field of problems can only be a limited one. Moreover, within the Communist system one must always reckon

with the possibility that the state will try to bring the ecumenical contribution of the churches within its own sphere of influence and misuse it as a means of political propaganda. Difficult situations might arise here for the Russian Orthodox Church. At this point it will have to withstand resolutely all political compulsion of this kind if its ecumenical contribution is not to become untrustworthy and worthless. At the same time the World Council will have to make allowances for the limited opportunities for action by churches within the Communist system and not make excessive demands on them for decisions in this field.

5. All these difficulties must be seen dispassionately. But they need not prevent a beginning being made on ecumenical co-operation if both sides are resolved in advance to tackle these difficulties by working together. If this happens, there will presumably be a shift of emphasis at a number of points in the World Council.

By a strengthening of the representation of Orthodoxy, the churches concerned will become more clearly aware of the importance of the part played by praise (doxology) in the gathering for public worship and in Christian life generally. This would undoubtedly be a gain in the face of the one-sided stress on the I-Thou correlation of preaching in large areas of Continental Protestantism and in face of the danger of equally one-sided pious activism in the Anglo-American world. For only by starting from 'doxology' can one come to understand the creeds of the early Church and their ontological backgrounds.

A fuller participation by Orthodoxy would have the further consequence that questions of dogma and therefore of common faith were again set more firmly in the centre of ecumenical work than has been the case in recent years. Even if it seems easier to attain unity in matters of Christian ethics and especially in ethical action itself than in questions of faith, yet the real decision for the unity of the Church is undeniably concerned with the question of faith and hence of confession of faith, of dogma. If by the weight of the Orthodox Church, the work of the 'Commission on Faith and Order' were greatly intensified, that too would undoubtedly be a gain for the World Council.

On the other hand a strengthening of Orthodoxy will restrain an excessive bustle and love of passing resolutions in the social and political sphere—especially as the Church behind the Iron Curtain is limited in the freedom with which it can express its opinions in this sphere. To be sure, the World Council must not impose silence on itself in the great questions of justice in the co-existence of nations, races and individuals. If it did, it would be denying the all-embracing task which the Lord has given to the Church. Despite this, however, looking back on the years that have gone, we shall have to ask critically to what extent the political statements of the World Council of Churches were specifically a witness of the Church and to what extent they only expressed what a reasonable man in the free world would have said even without the faith. If the problems involved in ecumenical contributions to world politics were thought out anew by member churches together, that too would certainly be a gain, even if as a result political statements showed greater restraint in future. For if there arises between the churches in east and west a living spiritual fellowship in faith, in hope, in brotherly love and in continuous prayer, the existence of such a fellowship is already in itself a factor of primary importance in world politics, inasmuch as here in the midst of this distracted world is a place of peace—of peace which is not of this world but which has the power to change the hearts of men in this world.

DEUTERONOMY AND THE PROPHETIC ATTITUDE TO SACRIFICE

by The Rev. Professor ROBERT DOBBIE

It has long been a matter of debate whether the prophetic strictures upon sacrifice implied total repudiation of the cult, or only condemnation of its abuses and perversions. An attempt will be made in this article to summarise the scholarly judgments on one aspect of this problem, and to assess their value. The thesis to be considered is that Deuteronomy preserves a true or reliable deposit of prophetic religion, and therefore a dependable interpretation of the prophetic attitude to sacrifice.

Four main arguments have been employed in defence of the argument that Deuteronomy demonstrates prophetic moderatism.

I

The *first* argument is to the effect that Deuteronomy did not regard the prophets as inflexibly opposed to the sacrifical cult. Piepenbring contends that prophecy before the exile ascribed some value to external worship.[1] Guillaume argues that 'Deuteronomy was promulagated to put the ideals of the prophets into practice. . . . It is all but incredible that the Deuteronomic generation should have so misunderstood the meaning of the prophets whose teaching they endeavoured to carry into effect.'[2] Rowley writes: 'If *ex hypothesi* the Book of Deuteronomy reflects the teachings of the eighth-century prophets, it might be supposed that its authors would have understood those teachings, and that therefore its recognition of the legitimate place of a purified and regulated sacrificial cultus . . . reflects the like recognition of the eighth-century prophets.'[3]

This claim, however, is not above suspicion.

1. It may not be too readily assumed that Deuteronomy

[1] C. Piepenbring, *OT Theology*, New York, 1913, pp. 184-5.
[2] A. Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination*, London, 1938, p. 375.
[3] H. H. Rowley, *Bulletin of John Rylands Library*, 29, 1945-6, p. 336.

derives exclusively or pre-eminently from prophetic circles, or represents fundamentally a 'prophetic reform programme'. G. von Rad[1] asks pertinently: 'Is it seriously possible to consider the prophets of any description as the representatives of the traditions which Deuteronomy brought to life again? . . . The prophetic element in Deuteronomy is no stream of tradition, the contents of which can be precisely determined and defined: it is rather of the nature of a general religious trend found more or less everywhere in Deuteronomy. . . . The prophetic contribution to Deuteronomy is at its clearest relatively in the picture of Moses. When the author of Deuteronomy represented Moses as the ideal man of God, the category and conceptions which lay to hand were those derived from the prophetic movements dominant in the time. . . . The prophetic in Deuteronomy is merely a form of expression, and a means of making the book's claim to be Mosaic, real.' This thesis von Rad[2] further supports by pointing out that in the Deuteronomic assessment of the monarchy, the criterion employed is much more priestly than prophetic, because 'it is predominantly cultic sins which he [the Deuteronomist] mentions', especially in 2 Kings 17ff. This priestly element is perhaps more explicitly recognised by Merx,[3] who regarded Deuteronomy positively as a priestly writing, and by König,[4] who maintains that Deuteronomy arose within priestly circles which were entrusted with the transmission of the law, but were addicted to prophetic thoughts. König supports his argument by reference to the growing friendship between priest and prophet in Jerusalem since Samaria fell in 722 B.C., which resulted in a disposition to accept sacrifice as a means of fulfilling the moral and religious ideals they inherited. Further, he insists that the evaluation of the sacrificial offering in Deut. 12.6ff as something divine and prophetic conflicts with Isaiah's question in Isa. 1.12f: 'Who hath required this at your hands?', a claim which, he continues, is not disproved by Huldah's recognition of the law of Deuteronomy (2 Kings 22.16) or the mention of the prophets (2 Kings

[1] G. von Rad, *Studies in Deuteronomy*, tr. Stalker, S.C.M. Press, 1948, p. 69.
[2] ibid., p. 77.
[3] A. Merx, quoted by A. Lods, *The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism*, tr. Hooke, 1937, p. 149.
[4] Ed. König, *Das Deuteronomium*, Leipzig, 1917, p. 51.

23.2). Hence in spite of the emphatic claims of many scholars,[1] it is not possible to accept without demur the thesis that Deuteronomy faithfully reflects the position of the eighth-century prophets and derives exclusively from prophetic schools.

2. Rapprochement between priest and prophet does not necessarily involve identity of theology or religion, or the ability of either to discern the basic postulates of the other. In 1912 Welch[2] ascribed to the priestly mind a 'fundamental failure to grasp the essence of the prophetic thought', even although he later argued in favour of association between these groups.[3] It is possible that in virtue of this priestly limitation of insight, the Deuteronomist, in Marti's[4] phrase, 'did not follow the true intentions of the prophet' when the cult was reformed, or, as Hänel[5] maintains, adapted prophetic teaching in a way the prophet would have held to be impossible. Thus, for instance, the restriction of worship to a single sanctuary, which most scholars regard as a fundamental aim of Deuteronomy, does not prove prophetic endorsement of sacrifice. Lods[6] stoutly contends that the priests inspired the Josianic reform, and stood to gain most from it in terms of prestige, income, and power. They would therefore naturally oppose any judgment which made suspect this shrine, in respect of its apparatus or its personnel or its function. Its retention therefore may merely indicate priestly loyalty to it, and may imply priestly moderation of prophetic opposition to it. Further, personal relationships between priests and prophets,[7] as in the priestly antagonism to Jeremiah, and elsewhere in the Old Testament, suggest more than temperamental or professional animosity: they rather seem to derive from mutually exclusive conceptions of religion. It is possible therefore that in so far as Deuteronomy is sacerdotal in its presuppositions, its interests and its aims, it may not legitimately be viewed as an accurate protrayal of the prophetic mind.

[1] cf. the references in König, op. cit., pp. 52ff, and Steuernagel, *Das Deuteronomium*, Göttingen, 1923, p. 15.

[2] A. C. Welch, *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom*, Edinburgh, 1912, p. 237.

[3] A. C. Welch, *Prophet and Priest in old Israel*, London, 1936, pp. 72-73, 76-77, 85, 144.

[4] K. Marti, *Geschichte des israelitischen Religion*, Strasbourg, 1907, p. 183.

[5] D. J. Hänel, *Die Religion der Heiligkeit*, Gütersloh, 1931, p. 258.

[6] Lods, op. cit., p. 149.

[7] cf. P. Volz, *Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie*, 14, 1937, pp. 63-85, especially p. 70; also T. J. Meek, *Hebrew Origins*, Toronto, 1950, pp. 179-80.

3. It is not legitimate to regard the moral maturity of Deuteronomy as only possible in consequence of the preaching of the eighth-century prophets. That their ethical influence was considerable, is not open to doubt. H. Wheeler Robinson[1] neatly correlates the moral conception of Jehovah in Deuteronomy, the moral nature of His Providence, of His relation to Israel, and of His demands upon humanity, with like emphasis in the prophets. But the ethical tradition of Israel did not begin with these announcers of divine purpose. Amos[2] and Jeremiah[3] imply a long-standing moral inheritance among their people: the J document[4] bears worthy witness to such a norm: not less does E[5]: and, in particular, in view of its relevance to the Deuteronomic principles applied by Josiah to the worship of his day, moral criticism of sanctuary worship is not by any means confined to the prophets. It was expressed at different times by Asa[6] and Jehoshaphat,[7] the kings, and Jehoiada,[8] the high priest, and their reforms were respectively supported by priests and kings. However it does not follow that the retention of sacrifice on a refined basis in Deuteronomy represents a prophetic legacy: it may represent the impact on sensitive priestly or royal minds of a traditional ethic, characterised by desert austerity. This might be especially true, in so far as the centralisation of worship at the Jerusalem sanctuary[9] was an earnest attempt to cleanse the cult from the perversions and abominations which came into vogue with the submission of Ahaz to Assyria,[10] symbolised in his adoption of an Assyrian altar in the Jerusalem temple, and which found expression in the worship of the host of heaven,[11] with altars on the Temple roof for star-worship,[12] incense altars,[13] the provision of prostitutes,[14] the sacrifice of children,[15] the worship of the sun,[16] and

[1] H. W. Robinson, *Deuteronomy and Joshua*, Century Bible, Edinburgh, 1911, pp. 33-34. [2] Amos 5.25. [3] Jer. 7.22, 6.16.

[4] J, [5] E } cf. H. G. Mitchell, *The Ethics of the OT*, Chicago, 1912, pp. 19ff, 44ff, 53ff, 63ff, 102ff, 152. J. M. P. Smith, *The Moral Life of the Hebrews*, Chicago, 1923, pp. 1-70. N. W. Porteous, 'The Basis of the Ethical Teaching of the Prophets', in *Studies in OT Prophecy*, pp. 154-6.

[6] Asa: 1 Kings 15.11-13. [7] Jehoshaphat: 1 Kings 22.46.
[8] Jehoiada: 2 Kings 11.17ff. [9] Deut. 12; 2 Kings 22-23.
[10] 2 Kings 16.10-16. [11] Deut. 4.19, 17.3; 2 Kings 23.4-6.
[12] Amos 5.26. [13] Jer. 6.20, 41.5; 2 Kings 16.4.
[14] 1 Kings 14.24, 15.12, 22.46; 2 Kings 23.7; Deut. 23.18-19.
[15] 1 Kings 11.7; 2 Kings 16.3, 21.6, 23.10; Jer. 7.31, 32.35; Ezek. 20.26, 31; 2 Chron. 33.6; Deut. 12.29-31.
[16] 2 Kings 23.5, 11; Deut. 4.19, 17.3.

resort to necromancy and teraphim,[1] all of which characterised the long reign of Manasseh. The revolt against these corruptions may be explicable in terms of loyalty to a traditional piety which these anomalies violated.

4. It must be borne in mind that the prophetic attitude to sacrifice and to reform may be seen in Jeremiah,[2] who at first supported the amelioration which Josiah's programme sought to accomplish, but later revised his judgment and altered his attitude concerning it. Apart from the relevant fact that he came to see that reform derived from Scripture could not change the hearts of his people, it may be suggested that he became convinced that reform *per se* was ineffective because it could only affect the periphery of religion, and could not radically change its centre. In so far then as he represents his prophetic forebears, it may be maintained that Deuteronomy, 'by the very fact of reforming the Temple worship',[3] acknowledged its faith in reform rather than in conversion or repentance, and justified as essential and necessary a worship to which the prophets had unanimously denied 'value and efficacy'.[3]

II

The *second* argument in support of the view that Deuteronomy endorses prophetic moderation in respect of sacrifice, is particularly maintained by W. P. Paterson.[4] It is to the effect that Deuteronomy *develops* the prophetic religion, incorporating sacrifice in a national faith which yet conceded priority to morality and inward piety. This thesis would require to maintain itself against the view that the prophets did not include sacrifice within their conception of religion: and, if this latter supposition were true, would be in danger of juxtaposing or blending anomalous or even incommensurable elements of faith. Scholars have opposed the view that the eighth-century prophets and Jeremiah were prepared to accept sacrifice within the orbit of true religion on *five* grounds.

[1] 1 Sam. 28.3-25; Isa. 8.19; Deut. 18.11.

[2] H. H. Rowley, *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy*, Edinburgh, 1950, art. 'The Prophet Jeremiah and the Book of Deuteronomy'. Cf. O. Procksch, *Geschichtsbetrachtung und geschichtliche Überlieferung bei den vorexilischen Propheten*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 70-92; and J. Skinner, *Prophecy and Religion*, C.U.P., 1922, pp. 89-138.

[3] Lods, op. cit., pp. 150-1.

[4] W. P. Paterson, *Hastings Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. IV, pp. 335-6.

1. It is contended that no prophetic commendation of sacrifice occurs among the eighth-century prophets and Jeremiah. Snaith[1] insists that they have no word in its favour; Volz[2] that Yahweh, according to the prophetic mind, makes no cultic demands, and requires no reform of its practice; W. Robertson Smith[3] that before Ezekiel no place could be found in prophetic theology for priestly services or ritual; and Köhler[4] that, until Ezekiel, the cult was not a subject of Revelation.

2. It is maintained that the prophetic indictment of sacrifice is determined by the fact that it involves a fundamentally wrong conception of *God*. This objection assumes five different forms.

(*a*) God becomes conceived as requiring sacrifice before He will dispense His favours, whereas, in point of fact, His primary and inexorable demands are moral, not ceremonial.[5]

(*b*) Sacrifice represents a magical ethos, and therefore implies a God who is amenable to magical manipulation. Such a God loses personal status and becomes a thing.[6]

(*c*) Sacrifice in the judgment of Volz[7] presupposes an enclosed God, who, because he is bound by altar, temple, and ritual, lacks initiative and freedom.[7] In similar vein, it is suggested that sacrifice is wrong in principle to the prophetic mind, because it involves a futile attempt to 'presence' God.[8] Deity is thus reduced to an entity which can be localised impersonally or materialised: it loses power to address the creature as a moral and spiritual subject. The distance between God and

[1] N. H. Snaith, *Mercy and Sacrifice*, London, 1953, p. 88; and art. 'The Prophets and Sacrifice and Salvation', *Expository Times*, 1946-7; p. 152.

[2] Volz, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

[3] W. R. Smith, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, Edinburgh, 1881, p. 288.

[4] L. Köhler, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, Tübingen, 1936, p. 183, and virtually all section 52.

[5] J. Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade*, München, 1905, p. 112. Marti, op. cit., p. 182. W. R. Smith, op. cit., pp. 286-8. G. B. Gray, *Sacrifice in the Old Testament*, 1922, ch. III. G. F. Moore, *Encyclopedia Biblica*, London, 1907, vol. IV, section 48, pp. 4221-2. T. H. Robinson, *Prophecy and the Prophets*, London, 1923, p. 85. H. P. Smith, *Old Testament History*, Edinburgh, 1903, pp. 213-4.

[6] R. Kittel, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, Band 2, Stuttgart, 1925, p. 327, n. 1. G. Hölscher, *Geschichte der israelitischen und jüdischen Religion*, Giessen, 1922, pp. 28-29. B. Duhm, *Israels Propheten*, Tübingen, 1922, p. 117. W. Eichrodt, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, Leipzig, 1933, Band I, p. 193. R. B. Y. Scott, *The Relevance of the Prophets*, New York, 1947, pp. 136-8.

[7] Volz, op. cit., p. 76. S. A. Cook, *The Old Testament*, 1936, p. 75.

[8] Eichrodt, op. cit., p. 195.

man is annihilated, and the sense of divine judgment is lost.

(*d*) On the other hand, sacrifice is interpreted by Hänel[1] as the necessary consequence of an excessively transcendent God, who needs this medium to make Him apprehensible or perceptible to men. This would militate against the basic prophetic presupposition of God's approach to man, and their awareness of Him, in His Word.

(*e*) It is insisted by G. F. Moore[2] that a deity who receives sacrificial overtures becomes like sinners who imagine that their offerings can procure pardon, and can therefore sever the strict moral connexion between sin and punishment.

3. The prophets are regarded as opposed to sacrifice because it involves a wrong idea of *salvation.*

(*a*) Sacrifice is construed as unacceptable to prophetic minds because it represents a *technical* as distinct from a *moral* condition of salvation. It is thus an *opus operatum*,[3] an approved means of securing propitiation and reconciliation,[4] or expiation.[5] It implies, that is, a trust in things, not in God. Such technical or impersonal means of salvation omit consideration of the motive or the moral quality of the worshippers who offer sacrifice. But while such sacrifice was offensive to the prophet because it involved a confusion between moral and ritual commands, to the priests and the people, Hoschander[6] insists, it was unthinkable that men who were morally corrupt should be forced to abandon the observance of all ceremonial duties, which *per se* were effective for atonement and a sign of repentance. The priests believed that the rejection of the sacrifices of immoral people would sever the bond between Jehovah and His folk: thus the worshippers would be driven to serve other gods. To preserve Jehovah's worship they therefore ignored iniquity, and sanctioned sacrifice because it gave reminder of the covenant. But to the prophets such repudiation of the moral conditions of salvation was unpardonably perverse.

[1] Hänel, op. cit., p. 288. [2] Moore, op. cit., p. 4222.

[3] Ed. König, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, Stuttgart, 1923, p. 100. Cf. N. W. Porteous, 'Prophet and Priest in Israel', *Expository Times*, LXII, 1950-1, p. 9; and Rowley, *Expository Times*, LVIII, 1946-7, pp. 305-7.

[4] Gray, op. cit., p. 89. O. C. Whitehouse, *Peake's Commentary*, p. 99. O. Procksch, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, Gütersloh, 1950, pp. 159-60. W. A. L. Elmslie, *How came our Faith?*, C.U.P., 1948, p. 260.

[5] Hänel, op. cit., pp. 298-9.

[6] J. Hoschander, *The Priests and the Prophets*, New York, 1938, pp. 72-73.

(*b*) Sacrifice to the prophet was reprehensible according to Loehr[1] because it represented a sacramental mediation of salvation, not by principles of righteousness and contrition, but by a communication, within a sub-personal ethos, of symbol and ceremony, whereas the prophets according to Loehr stripped religion of everything sensual.

(*c*) Eichrodt[2] contends that sacrifice and the cult falsified the true concept of salvation by stressing merit and a form of mysticism, apart from humble obedience. The cult, however, is not acceptable as a performance to God, or as an assured approach to divine life, because Jehovah's majesty excludes both. Nor from sacrificial performance, according to Marti, can true knowledge of God derive.

4. Prophetic opposition to sacrifice is interpreted in terms of the erroneous conception of *religion* which it implies. Apart from the view that true religion needs no sacrifice, this claim is advanced on three grounds.

(*a*) Sacrifice belongs to the category of the primitive holy. This embraces the worshipper in a fellowship with the divine in which, according to Volz[3] and Procksch,[4] he enters upon a condition of holiness. This represents an ethos or dimension which is *sui generis*, in which place and time and technique are holy, but nothing corresponds intrinsically to rational or moral realities. Religion thus becomes participation in an enactment of a sub-personal character, which is yet regarded as transcending personal relationships, and their spiritual determinants.

(*b*) To this objection, Volz[5] rightly adds the criticism that focal to sacrificial procedure is the priestly function of mediation which implies that no worshipper is able to make personal contact with God. Such mediation constitutes a denial of religious experience as it is construed in terms of the awareness of the constraint of the divine word, and response to its summons. It would deny the personal approach of God to man, the sense of irresistible vocation, and the consciousness of imminent divine judgment, all of which are necessary constituents of the prophetic experience of God. The prophets claim to stand

[1] M. Loehr, *A History of Religion in the Old Testament*, London, 1936, p. 119.
[2] Eichrodt, op. cit., p. 194. Cf. Lods, op. cit., p. 69.
[3] Volz, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
[4] Procksch, *Theologie des AT*, pp. 531-2.
[5] Volz, op. cit., p. 73.

in the inner council of God, and to be informed of His purposes.[1]

(*c*) Sacrifice conceived as a gift falsifies religion. It is, according to G. B. Gray,[2] a means of gratification to the offerer. When a gift-theory of sacrifice operates, religion lacks all sense of sin. This may be, as Köhler[3] and Hyatt[4] argue, because sacrifice before the exile was mainly one of 'unbowed heads', or natural joy, or because, according to Stade,[5] no one would venture to approach an angry God with sacrifice. If religion did need such offering of gifts, they would, in any case, belong to deity, even though, as Eichrodt[6] maintains, when they were dedicated to Jehovah, they enabled the offerer to belong to a new life-sphere and share the divine life.

5. The prophetic mind is further opposed to sacrifice when it conflicts with *morality*.[7] It was, in fact, liable to be adopted as a surrogate for morality. It represented an alien intrusion from Canaanite or Semitic sources,[8] and intrinsically partook of the natural worship they expressed. In particular, it involved, as an integral part of its execution, sacred prostitution, especially in fertility rites and solar worship. C. J. Cadoux[9] adds that while sacrifice might express sincere worship, even in the sacrifice of children, it was condemned by the prophets because it violated the rights of the victim. Hence it was acutely felt that the cult was a moral hindrance: priest and altar constituted a moral danger (Amos 5.4-5): the cult itself was sin (Amos 4.4), and was devoid of moral effect because it covered and indeed sponsored sin (Jer. 7.10f).

From this survey of judgments concerning the prophetic attitude to sacrifice, as it was regarded as establishing in Deuteronomy a legacy of national religion, we may conclude

[1] Jer. 23.18.

[2] Gray, op. cit., ibid.

[3] Köhler, op. cit., p. 174.

[4] J. P. Hyatt, *Prophetic Religion*, New York, 1947, p. 125.

[5] B. Stade, *Biblische Theologie des alten Testaments*, Tübingen, 1905, p. 160.

[6] Eichrodt, op. cit., p. 72.

[7] A. B. Davidson, *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. IV, p. 119b. G. F. Moore, op. cit., pp. 4221-2. W. O. E. Oesterley, *Sacrifices in Ancient Israel*, 1937, p. 201. Guillaume, op. cit., p. 376. Hyatt, op. cit., p. 126. Porteous, *Record and Revelation*, Oxford, 1938, pp. 236-7.

[8] H. Gunkel, *Die Propheten*, Göttingen, 1917, pp. 84-85. J. Pedersen, *Israel*, III-IV, 1940, p. 299. Oesterley and Robinson, *Hebrew Religion*, S.P.C.K., 1940, pp. 231-2. Rowley, *The Unity of the Bible*, London, 1953, p. 31; where see other references. Lods, 'Israel from its beginnings to the middle of the VIIIth Century', *E.T.*, 1932, p. 281. Guillaume, op. cit., p. 381. Oesterley, art. 'Early Hebrew Religious Festivals', in *Myth and Ritual*, ed. Hooke, 1933.

[9] C. J. Cadoux, *Expository Times*, 1946-7, LVIII, p. 44a.

that it is difficult on the basis of any one of the arguments, to justify the idea of prophetic moderatism. The prophets seem to have opposed the sacrificial cult in terms of some principle, not in terms of abuse: their objection is to the *Weltanschauung* it involves, not to the excess or lack of moderation it exhibits. This rejection in principle seems indeed to be a rejection of 'ritual as something half mystical, half magical, an advance in fact of much greater import than the condemnation of this or that practice more or less incompatible with reason or morality'.[1] But it must also be suggested that the distinction between sacrifice *per se*, and sacrifice in its results, is false to the Hebrew mind. As the word for sin is used also for the guilt and the punishment which sin involves, indicating a necessary and inescapable sequence of consequences from the basic iniquity, so to the Hebrew, sacrifice would demonstrate its real character in its effects: the results are an essential part of the sacrifice itself.

III

The *third* argument from Deuteronomy is presented mainly by G. B. Gray.[2] It is to the effect that Deuteronomy *regulated* sacrifice, not mentioning מנחה or קרבן because the idea of gift recedes as a result of prophetic preaching. Driver[3] acknowledged that Deuteronomy 'takes for granted . . . the ceremonial observances current at this time', and 'upon occasion regulates' them. Welch[4] substantially agrees with this point of view, in his assertion that 'the Deuteronomic legislation as to sacrifice was sure to result in a diminution of its amount, and in a lessening of its importance'. In addition, Gray[2] maintains that religious festivals became associated with redemptive acts of Yahweh in the history of his people, and are detached in meaning from the natural seasons which gave them birth. This negative and positive metamorphosis which Gray envisages as the result of prophetic utterance may however be questioned.

1. It is doubtful if a reference to either מנחה or קרבן is legitimate in this connexion. H. Wheeler Robinson,[5] for

[1] Lods, *The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism*, p. 69.
[2] Gray, op. cit., ibid. For a different deduction, cf. Welch, *Kings and Prophets of Israel*, London, 1952, p. 182.
[3] S. R. Driver, 'Deuteronomy', *ICC*, Edinburgh, 1895, p. xxx.
[4] Welch, *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom*, p. 225.
[5] H. W. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 38ff.

instance, contends that in the period prior to Deuteronomy, Burnt-offering and Peace-offering are found in Israel (Exod. 20.24; cf. Exod. 24.5): that D adds the Heave-offering (Deut. 12.6, 17): and P adds מנחה (Lev. 2.1), חטאת (Lev. 5.1-6) and אשם (Lev. 5.14-16). Further קרבן became in P the technical term for an offering. Hence it is not cogent to sustain an argument for regulation of sacrifices in Deuteronomy by reference to practices which emerge only in a later generation.

2. It may be argued that the Hebrew mind would not make a basic distinction between the offering of gifts and the offering of oneself, inasmuch as H. W. Robinson[1] maintains that Hebrew action is fundamentally representative. Welch[2] thus finds in the prophets the view 'that Jehovah does not claim much for himself except a grateful and obedient heart, and accepts the offerings as the evidence of that gratitude'. From this point of view it would be necessary to impugn Gray's conception of gift sacrifice, and to suggest that its regulation might lead to deficient consecration. But, more fundamentally, it is probable that the prophetic indictment of normal sacrificial procedure related—as already proposed—to its false theological presuppositions: and this Gray himself admits in his acknowledgment that while most worshippers in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. in Israel stressed the propitiatory and expiatory value of sacrifice, to the prophets propitiation and expiation could be secured only by well-doing: one's past could not be undone by sacrifice. From this standpoint, the psychological argument on the basis of Hebrew representative thinking must be disavowed in favour of a sterner moral judgment.

3. It is doubtful whether Deuteronomic *regulation* of sacrifice, therefore, does represent the prophetic judgment or interest. No evidence exists to suggest that the prophets were concerned to regulate *sacrifice*; even a condemnation of abuses attendant upon sacrifice would involve only a regulation of its moral concomitants, not a regulation of sacrifice itself. It is perhaps more possible that a Deuteronomic regulation of sacrifice could be explained in terms of a reaction against prophetic absolutism in respect of it.

4. The association of religious festivals with national events

[1] H. W. Robinson, *Journal of Theological Studies*, XLIII, 1942, art. 'Hebrew sacrifices and prophetic symbolism', pp. 135ff. [2] Welch, op. cit., p. 226.

in which Jehovah delivered His people, parallel to the increasing veneration paid to Jerusalem after its deliverance from Sennacherib in 701 B.C.,[1] is not rashly to be connected with the classical prophets. Indeed, one of the major contributions made by them to the religion and theology of their time was their questioning of the supposedly irrefragable link between Jehovah and His people, their denial that, irrespective of moral realities, He was their God, and they His elect nation, their fearless assessment of the national past by explicit ethical canons, their affirmation that Jehovah could survive without them, and that His attitude to contemporary history was to be expressed in their impending doom.[2] It would seem, then, that a policy of nationalising the natural feasts would be spurned in favour of a more rigorous moral evaluation of them, even to the point of condemnation and exclusion. It is true that prophets do figure in Hebrew history in connexion with the endorsement of national policy, but they assume that the called nation, rather than divine righteousness, is their ultimate norm.[3] It is thus possible to ascribe to them such nationalising of natural festivals as Deuteronomy exhibits. But it is also possible that this nationalising represents part of the resurgence of patriotism which found expression in Hezekiah's largely abortive attempt at centralisation,[4] and in the removal by Josiah[5] of all the signs of political subordination to Assyria. The purified, centralised worship in the capital thus had a political significance: and this too, so far as it involved prophetic stimulus, would be due more to the nationalist than to the moral and spiritual prophets who since Amos had conceived of the nation only within the ambit of a moral Providence.

IV

The *fourth* argument, on the basis of Deuteronomy, in support of the view that the prophets did not elect to extirpate the sacrificial system root and branch, is represented by W. P. Paterson,[6] Heinisch,[7] and Graham and May.[8] Paterson calls

[1] 2 Kings 19.36.

[2] Amos 3.2, 5.18-24, 7.7; Hosea 1.4, 5, 2.20; Isa. 2.12, 5.14, 26, 9.11, 12, 13.6, 9; Mic. 6.8; Zeph. 1.15, 16, 2.1-3; Jer. 1.13, 25.15-18; cf. 29.5-7, 46.7-12.

[3] 1 Kings 22.6. [4] 2 Kings 18.4-7. [5] 2 Kings 23.1-28.

[6] Paterson, op. cit., p. 335b.

[7] Heinisch, *Theologie des alten Testaments*, Bonn, 1940, pp. 196-7.

[8] Graham and May, *Culture and Conscience*, 1936, p. 215.

attention to the actual reforms advocated by the prophets, including e.g. prohibition of sacrifice to other gods (Hos. 11.2; Jer. 11.12), or to sacred animals (Ezek. 8.10), and the ban on the offering of human life (Ezek. 20.13). Heinisch points to Isaiah's endorsement of Hezekiah's reform, and Jeremiah's initial attitude to that of Josiah; and maintains that the prophets sought to establish the work of Moses who regulated the cult. Similarly Graham and May contend that the prophets regenerated the cult.

To this thesis, however, it seems legitimate to offer a threefold objection.

1. The validity of Heinisch's reasoning would seem to be impugned by his judgment or assumption that sacrifice was ordained by divine decree in the beginning of time. The fact that this is the view-point of J does not make it true.

2. Sponsorship of reform is not necessarily inconsistent with radical repudiation of sacrifice. It is possible that reform was the only practical amendment available to the prophets in their situation, and could be construed as a contribution to the end they sought: but it is also possible that reform was not within their domain, for prophets do not appear as coadjutors of Asa and Jehoshaphat and Jehoiada in earlier days. Further, the reforms quoted by Paterson are not strictly speaking reforms: they constitute abolitions of absolute evils whose perpetration denies basic and final principles of religion and morality: their protests here do not relate to abuse or excess but to essential character: they involve the cult in itself, as an offence to Jehovah and a violation of his ways.

3. It is necessary to assess this argument of Paterson, respecting reform sponsored by the prophets, by reference to the ultimate truths and concepts in the light of which they define and determine their own religion. These are צדקה or p. 75 and משפט in them all,[1] חסד[2] in Hosea, √אמן and אמונה in Isaiah,[3] and שוב[4] in Jeremiah. None of these ideals can

[1] צדקה or p. 75 Amos 5.7, 24, 6.12; Hos. 10.12; Isa. 1.21, 26, 5.7, 16, 23, 10.22, 11.4, 5, 16.5, 26.9, 10, 28.17, 32.1, 16, 17, 33.5; Mic. 6.5, 7.9; Jer. 4.2, 9.23, 23.5, 33.15, 51.10.
משפט Amos 5.7, 15, 24, 6.12; Hos. 2.21, 10.4, 12.7; Isa. 1.17, 21, 27, 4.4, 5.7, 16, 9.6, 16.5, 26.8, 9, 32.1, 16, 33.5; Jer. 4.2, 5.1, 7.5 9.23, 21.12, 22.3, 15, 23.5, 33.15.
[2] Hos. 2.21, 4.1, 6.6, 10.12. [3] Isa. 1.21, 26, 8.2, 11.5, 25.1.
[4] Jer. 3.7, 10, 14, 18.8, 23.22, 26.3, 34.15, 44.5.

be realised by reform, though they may be a dynamic cause of reform, so that recognition of reform on the part of these prophets must yield in importance to appreciation of these constituents of true religion. By the implications of these norms the prophetic attitude to sacrifice may be more shrewdly gauged.

V

The attitude of Deuteronomy to sacrifice and the cult is largely explicable without reference to the great prophets.

1. The prohibition of Canaanite and Assyrian worship, and the metamorphosis of Canaanite agricultural festivals by reference to historic Israelite crises, are alike intelligible in terms of a growth of Hebrew nationalism, sponsored primarily by the monarchs. An indispensable mark of such political independence would be a severance from the official or characteristic worship of other nations.

2. It is significant that in many instances the condemnation of cult or sacrifice is determined by the fact that they were connected with other gods than Yahweh. This is so concerning graven images in Deut. 7.5 and 25, the host of heaven in Deut. 17.3, altars, pillars etc., in Deut. 7.5 and 12.3, places of worship on mountain and hill or under green trees in 12.2, divination, soothsaying, wizardry, necromancy, resort to charms or incantations in 18.9-14, the sacrifice of children to a fire-god in 18.10. At other times the Deuteronomic indictment is aimed at the evil itself, as it is in 4.15-18, 4.25, 5.8, 27.15 with regard to graven images, and in 4.19 concerning the host of heaven. In no instance, however, is the criterion of judgment specifically ethical, no mention being made, for instance, of any moral offence associated with the worship in question.

3. Deuteronomy frequently employs the non-prophetic canon of 'the clean', according to which it condemns the consumption of blood in 12.16-27, of abominable things in 14.3-21, resort to mourning customs in 14.1, and a policy of mingling in ploughing, sowing, and weaving, in 22.5, 9-11. This non-rational, sub-moral criterion represents a fundamental contradiction to the standards used by the prophets of the eighth century and Jeremiah. It cannot therefore be employed as a proof of prophetic influence on Deuteronomy. Particularly

in respect of the command to exterminate the earlier inhabitants of Canaan does the Deuteronomic concept of contamination present, from the prophetic standpoint, a moral anomaly (Deut. 20.16, 17).

VI

It would thus seem defensible that Deuteronomy cannot be cited as relevant or convincing evidence for the thesis that the eighth century prophets and Jeremiah were concerned only to mitigate the excesses which accompanied contemporary sacrifice, and did not attack the fundamental structure and function of the cult itself. Not only does it lack a fully articulated concept of a cult, apart from its stress on the celebration of historical commemorations in a spirit of joy, and the formulation of severe penalties for infidelity, but its ethos suggests at times a complete unawareness of the prophetic mind, and of the categories which govern its pronouncements.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Lambeth Conference—1958. S.P.C.K., London. 7s. 6d.

The Lambeth Conference, held in July of last year, was attended by 350 bishops, 89 of them from the United States, one (an Englishman) from China, and four from Japan. There were none, of course, from any country of Europe; but most of the other great areas of the globe were represented. The Conference is held once in ten years. Since the men who attend it hold positions of leadership and responsibility in the sections of the Anglican Communion which they represent, the report of the Conference deserves careful study by all who are concerned for the Christian good of the world; and there is much in it for which the people of all Churches should be grateful.

'Lambeth' is not an authoritative body, but consultative and inspirational. The findings of the Conference, with the relevant reports on which the findings are based, are given to the world in a volume of some 230 pages. All this material will provide discussion for the Anglican Church for years to come and vitally affect decisions in the various autonomous churches. But in themselves the Resolutions have no binding authority on these churches. Indeed one of the uncertainties about the Anglican Church for those outside it is to discover precisely what is the seat of final authority in it.

The report opens with an 'Encyclical Letter to the Faithful in Jesus Christ', and its aim is to bring out that *reconciliation* is the keynote of all the reports and resolutions—a reconciliation which has its sole and sufficient source in the Word of God, and which has to be worked out in Society, though the home and family, in wider social relationship, and among the nations—and in a specially urgent way in the whole Church of God. Then come the Resolutions and the Reports out of which the Resolutions emerge—the work of five main committees; but it is made clear that the committees which prepared these reports are alone held to be responsible for them, the Conference as a whole being responsible only for the agreed Resolutions.

'Lambeth' has done well to give the first place to a report on 'The Holy Bible: its Authority and Message'. This section takes account of the contemporary revival in biblical studies, and urges the members of the Church to share in this rediscovery of the Bible. The influence of biblical scholarship on the question of the authority of the Bible is wisely assessed, and so is the relationship of the truth of the Bible to truth which comes in other fields of study; and from this follows the urgent appeal for more and better expository

preaching. The pages on 'the drama of the Bible', despite that title, lack sparkle and warmth—but it is not easy to introduce these qualities into so compressed a document.

This review has to pass by the section on 'Progress in the Anglican Communion', though that section is full of material to interest and to encourage—especially on subjects like modern missionary strategy and recruiting and training the Church's ministry. It has to be noted, also, that the Conference was unable to secure agreement on the Church's attitude to nuclear weapons in war, the majority being prepared to accept them as a regrettable necessity in view of the world situation, while a minority pressed for their total renunciation as contrary to our Lord's teaching. The closing report on 'The Family in Contemporary Society' is in some ways the best part of the book. There 'Lambeth' records a big advance on earlier pronouncements on birth control—but this is only a small part of the Church's emphatic teaching on the many-sided subject of marriage and the Christian family.

It is almost certain that the part of the report that has been most eagerly waited for is that on Church unity. From a very comprehensive chapter, we select only what is said about the Joint Report on Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches. In Scotland the animated discussion of this subject has been made more complicated and confused by the Lambeth findings, and there are three points in particular where these findings are likely to be unwelcome in the non-episcopal Churches.

On one hand, it is said that 'the Anglican churches ought to be ready to recognise the Presbyterian churches as true parts of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church, and that the Spiritual effectiveness of their ministerial orders ought not to be implicitly or explicitly questioned'. But, on the other hand, it is said that the root of the Anglican difficulty about general inter-communion is 'that Anglicans conscientiously hold that the celebrant of the Eucharist should have been ordained by a bishop standing in the historic succession'. Non-Anglican churches would be unanimous in their belief that this antithesis is sharp enough to amount to a contradiction. Over against all that is implied in being a true part of the one Church and the spiritual effectiveness of other ministerial orders is set the mode of the ordination of the celebrant, as in itself something so big and vital as to justify exclusion from the Lord's Table. This seems to come very near to identifying catholicity with one type of Church order—which is precisely what the Joint Report did not do, for its basic recommendations of mutual assimilation are incompatible with such a claim. The Anglican Church has to be reminded that the report entitled 'Doctrine in the Church

of England' declares that 'no one particular system is to be taken as being of necessity constitutive of the fundamental idea of the Church' and also that leading Anglican scholars have denied 'as unbiblical, unhistorical and unanglican, any particular interpretation of the episcopate which would automatically unchurch any part of the Body that for historical reasons has failed to preserve it'. Looking to the future, what is needed is to find an agreed method of authorising the ministry, in a larger fellowship into which existing ministries would enter without difference or distinction.

Churches should not look upon each other as defectively constituted, except in the sense that Schism has brought its inherent defectiveness to all. The way forward can only be by an approach on equal terms, and by a mutual readiness to find an honourable and adventurous way out of long entrenched positions. On the immediate subject of inter-communion, it should be recalled that Archbishop Temple never sought to interpret the Anglican difficulty about it primarily in terms of the ordination of the celebrant. His view was that it is 'Schism which forbids inter-communion', and that both parties are in Schism. He did not believe that there is a special kind of grace obtainable through sacraments administered by episcopally-ordained ministers—'it seems to me manifest upon the page of history that the gift is offered through non-episcopal ministries, and received, and to deny that would be to adopt a conception of God that is not fully Christian'. Dr Temple held that it is not only the Lord's Table, but the Lord's Body, or at least the main visible sign of the oneness of the Body of Christ, and that it is a Spiritual mockery to pretend that we are one when in fact we are not, but are organised as separate bodies in some sort of rivalry. This view may raise its own difficulties, but it is at least more discussible than the view which is expressed in the Lambeth report.

The second suggestion in the Lambeth report that will hardly win its way in Scotland is that the General Assembly, in all matters affecting doctrine, should ultimately function in three sections, voting separately—bishops, presbyters, and elders—any decision in doctrine requiring the concurrence of all three groups, and each having in effect a veto on the other two. The world has no happy memories of the use of the veto in other fields. This might lead to interminable delay and obstruction. It has been a long-standing element in the Anglican tradition that matters of doctrine and constitution be settled by clergy only, often by bishops only, whereas the Presbyterian tradition has taken the risk of giving equal authority in these matters to elders and ministers, on the ground of their essential togetherness in the body of Christ. Doubtless one of the big difficulties in the Joint Report from the Anglican side is its

requirement that lay persons be associated with the clergy in such a way as to have authority, and not just to be associated in an advisory or consultative capacity. If there is an 'historic episcopate' going back to the second century, there is also an 'historic presbyterate' with roots at least as far back in history. The Joint Report wisely declined to claim any exclusive divine right for either.

The third point to be noted is that 'relations between the Church of Scotland and the Episcopal Church in Scotland should be settled by negotiations between these two churches before relations between the Church of England and the Presbyterian Churches are carried further'. This is the opposite procedure to that envisaged in the Joint Report. As a practicable step, it does not appear welcome—for two reasons. The same basic issues would arise in such negotiations and they have to be settled in the larger setting. The Episcopal Church in Scotland could not be expected to contemplate a settlement which would disrupt its relations in the Anglican fold.

It is clear enough that the way is long and hard. The word 'ultimately' which has been in the recent negotiations all the time has its full meaning. The gulf of four centuries is not easily bridged. There is no simple, swift, one-sided solution to a complex problem. No church can or ought to renounce its history. But every church has to be vigilant to see that loyalty to the past does not become imprisonment in the past. With patience and forbearance, seeking opportunities to meet together for prayer and discussion, with a sincere willingness to search for truth, in honest recognition that full truth does not lie on either side, in mutual respect for conviction, with a mind open to lessons to be learned from younger churches, and with a continual mindfulness that God wills something better for the Church than it at present shows, we might all together range ourselves behind John Calvin in his letter to Archbishop Cramner (who died at the stake for the Reformed faith)—'Among the greatest evils of our time must be counted the fact that the churches are so disunited. So far as I am concerned, if I can do anything to help, I shall not hesitate to cross ten oceans to serve this cause.'

GEORGE S. GUNN

John White, C.H., D.D., LL.D. By AUGUSTUS MUIR. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1958. 42s.

TWICE Moderator of the General Assembly! It is true that at the end of the sixteenth century Sir John Erskine of Dun, Superintendent of Angus and Mearns, presided over more than one General Assembly, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the same minister occupied the Moderator's Chair in more than one General Assembly, notably Alexander Henderson. Last century,

however, only one minister was called twice to the Moderatorship, namely Principal Duncan Macfarlan in 1819 and in 1843. Now, after more than half of our century has passed, John White alone has had this distinction, being Moderator in the Auld Kirk General Assembly of 1925, and Moderator at the Union Assembly of 1929. This has happened, moreover, in an epoch when the Moderator's office has been enlarged in significance, responsibility and public interest. Of itself, this fact is witness to this churchman's greatness, and the fascinating and competent biography which has come from the pen of Augustus Muir presents John White as the outstanding Scottish churchman of the first half of the twentieth century, whose biography is the story of the Church of Scotland through these years.

A Parish Minister

For an understanding of the ethos of the Church of Scotland, it is important to notice that this great churchman was throughout his active ministerial service, a parish minister. Since the Union of the Churches, the appointment of Moderators has been three parish ministers to two others out of every five, but in the thirty years before 1929 only one out of every six moderators came from the ranks of others than parish ministers. It may be that this excellent biography will recall our church to a fresh valuation of the parochial ministry as the essential office in the Church of God, a tradition which the Scottish Church has to contribute to eccumenical thinking today.

Many will share my appreciation that the biographer is at such pains to let us see the parish minister as well as the church leader in John White. If there are those whose early impression of this churchman is the remote one of an almost merciless ecclesiastical debater, let them turn and read about the humanity, the kindliness, the humour and the exemplary pastoral oversight of the parish minister of Shettleston, South Leith and Glasgow Barony.

In this connexion Augustus Muir is particularly to be commended for the insight into his subject's character which he has gleaned from the memories and comments of John White's former assistants, one of whom, John R. Spence, described his old 'bishop' as 'a great friend, a great minister, a great leader'. What these assistants say is also significant for the ethos of the Scottish Church, where for many decades, and still today when the subject has a more explicit place in the teaching of our divinity halls, the most effective pastoral training of our ministers is carried out by their 'bishops' (as they are often affectionately called) who grasp their opportunity of training student-assistants and probationers. John White, we are told, 'always chose a young man that he thought would be able to put

up with John White! Possessing these qualities in varying degree, his assistants were men of different types, but they had one thing in common: all had loyalty and respect for the man who took them by the hand and taught them their rudiments. To them it was an experience without price. Throughout his ministry, John White had more than forty assistants, and they formed a fraternity that was closer than any link of sentiment made at school or college.'

In 1901, this zealous parish minister, then in his middle thirties, launched a campaign in his congregation at Shettleston to win the whole community for the Church, saying: 'We need warm, loving missionary hearts. We need a love that will seek out and find those who are living away from Christ's Church and show them that the Church is yearning for them.' The author makes the very relevant comment that the motto on the banner of this parish crusade might have been 'tell Shettleston', an early prototype of 'Tell Scotland'.

It is one of the great inspirations of John White's life and example that none of the tasks and responsibilities which the Church at large heaped upon his able shoulders, ever deflected him from his primary task in his own parish. Memorable in this regard were his endeavours in the great city parish of the Barony of Glasgow. When in 1817, he returned to the Barony pulpit from a period of active service as Chaplain with the Cameronians in France, he energetically urged his people to a renewal of their Christian life and witness, introducing a Resolution Card which all his people were urged to sign, each as 'a baptised member of Christ'.

Church Union

It was John White, the parish minister, who had the right as well as the spiritual competence and leadership to be John White, the Apostle of Church Union. The Free Church of Scotland was twenty-four years old when John White was born. When he died sixteen years short of a century later, the Free and United Presbyterian Churches had gone forward from their marriage of convenience in 1900 to the nobler decision of a reunited Church of Scotland in 1929, and further by 1951, the Church of Scotland was a fully committed member of the modern ecumenical movement, entering upon a third series of Conversations with the Anglican churches. In all these remarkable unity movements, John White played his part. The notes of one of his speeches at the University of Glasgow reveal how his mind worked from his student days:

> 'A disunited, disorganised Church—a Christendom with hostile factions—cannot conquer the heart and mind of the world. Unity was never more urgent than at the present hour, when the Church is at the beginning of one of the most searching trials it

has ever undergone. An irresistible stream of events is rushing us into a new Age. A like problem faced the Church with the coming of the printing-press—and again with the advent of the New Learning in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. . . . And in this world of ours it is only a reunited Church that can hold the people.'

The long-involved and intricate negotiations which led up to the Union of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church in October 1929 are presented in a remarkably interesting and readable form, and form a most valuable historical record. Some of the very troubled inter-church relations within Scotland towards the close of the nineteenth century, referred to in this book, including the bitter Disestablishment campaigns, rather sordid in retrospect, might have suggested that what did in fact take place in 1929 was quite outwith the bounds of practical possibility. But vision and patience on the part of such as John White overcame the obstacles. There is an interesting comment in 1911 about avoiding the danger 'of going faster than the country will allow', an ever relevant thought for advocates of church reunion.

The Kirk's Patrimony

One of the still unresolved questions raised by John White's part in the architecture of the 1929 Union is whether or not he really sacrificed the Church's ancient patrimony, notably embodied in the teinds, in order to placate United Free intransigence. The vehemence of the almost truculent insistence by United Free opinion on the separation of the Scottish Church's endowments from a supposedly too close connexion with the land and the State makes almost incredible reading today within a reunited church, where the national recognition of religion is taken as almost an axiom. It may be that the Church of Scotland Property and Endowments Act, 1925, was the only possible road to union at the time, and there can be no question about the energy, patience and vision with which it was promoted and secured by John White.

The writer of this biography seems to have a very shrewd grasp of the results of that Act of Parliament, commenting:

'If any churchman at that time could have looked three decades into the future, he would have been in little doubt about who had gained by the institution of a fixed stipend derived from the land. Warnings had indeed been given in the committee by those who, from the start, had feared that the Church was running the risk of financial loss in establishing a stipend that did not rise, as did stipends from teinds, with increases in the cost of living. . . . Those who uttered warnings were silenced by the reminder that

the opinion of a great economic expert had been accepted. And so stipend and the cost of living were divorced; and because of that decree absolute, the Church of Scotland was later to be deprived each year of a quarter of a million sterling of her ancient patrimony.'

Did the Shettleston Case, 1895-1900, colour John White's whole later attitude to the Church's ancient patrimony? The very resounding success of his conflict with the heritors in his first parish may, it seems to me, have turned to ashes in his mouth, and left him less of a believer in an Established Church than was, for instance, Thomas Chalmers. The National Recognition of Religion became the slogan of the pre-1929 Union negotiations, and John White never seemed to stress what some would hold with a fresh conviction today that the first charge upon a Christian land's basic resource, its land, is the provision of the ordinances of the Christian faith. But that is now an echo of 'old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago', and the reunited Church of Scotland has to face the demands of its twentieth-century tasks, deprived of its ancient inheritance, commuted into a fixed and wholly inadequate sum of money.

The Declaratory Articles

The earlier legislation which paved the way to Union, resulting in the Church of Scotland Act, 1921, showed John White at his best. The 'might-have-been' church historian in him must be behind the drafting of the 'Articles Declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual'. The opponents in his own Church were more formidable in this sphere, including such outstanding churchmen as James Cooper and Arthur Wotherspoon, of whom John White remarked: 'I resent more than I can say the posing of Cooper and Wotherspoon as guardians of the "Faith once delivered", as if we are all indifferent about it.'

Much of the discussion here centred on the nature of spiritual freedom, and it revealed John White's considerable qualities as a theologian. After nearly forty years, experience has confirmed the rightness of his judgment about the Declaratory Articles. 'Anything in the existing relation of the Church to the State that limits the spiritual freedom of the Church is rendered inoperative by the Articles.'

This part of John White's service to the Church of his fathers is important to recollect when other events and attitudes tend to make one question his theological sensitivity. Ecclesiastical statesmanship was the great arrow in his quiver when he approached the 'United Frees' on behalf of the 'Auld Kirk', but it was less effective

for the approaches that the post-1929 Church of Scotland has made towards the Anglican churches. He played his part in responding to the first tentative approaches by Dr Lang in 1930, writing: 'I need hardly say that it would be a unique privilege and a very great pleasure to me as minister of the Barony, if the first step towards giving fuller expression to the friendly relations existing between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland should be taken when a son of the Barony is Primate.'

John White took part as Joint Chairman in the Conversations of 1932-4 which produced 'Things Believed in Common' and 'Things that might be Undertaken in Common'. But clearly it was with Presbyterian misgivings and an uncompromising antipathy to the extremer Anglo-catholic point of view that Dr White took part in the brief Conversations of 1950-1, which proposed theological conversations directed towards a long-term policy. It is very doubtful if John White with his essentially ecclesiastical approach to so many issues could have happily engaged in or substantially contributed to the kind of discussions held between 1954 and 1957, resulting in the controversial but historic Joint Report on Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches.

We are still too close to the post-war epoch to evaluate John White's whole part in Scottish Church leadership until his death in 1951, but this outstanding biography provides a record, which will actually grow in value with the passing of the years, of his part in the inception of National Church Extension, in the interdenominational handling of Church-building licences, and in the Govan Case. The carefully devised and detailed XXIst chapter on this last topic presents a quite fascinating picture of the two best-known Scottish Churchmen of our times, John White and George MacLeod, his junior by some thirty years.

The Author's Achievement

Augustus Muir is to be warmly congratulated on his splendid achievement, which, it may be, could only have come from a son of the Scottish Manse who had taken in the atmosphere and ethos of the Kirk with his mother's milk! No author could be more extensive and courteous in his acknowledgments, and not only does this reveal the staggeringly wide field his researches have surveyed, but it shows a grace of outlook most refreshing in these rather graceless times.

This volume will take its place on my own shelves beside the three treasured biographies of Randall Davidson, Cosmo Gordon Lang and William Temple, which together tell the story of the Church of England over the first half of the twentieth century—

the very years in the story of the Church of Scotland covered by Augustus Muir's study of John White.

In some ways, Augustus Muir's work has most affinities with J. G. Lockhart's account of Lang, being also the work of a layman and a man of letters. Augustus Muir, however, answers more of our perplexities over the character of John White than Lockhart answers in regard to the enigmatic character of Lang. The present volume lacks something of the monumental quality of Dr Bell's account of Randall Davidson, but it is a much better digested chronicle than is Ironmonger's William Temple. A weakness in the presentation is the absence of sufficient dating. Dr Bell's device of the age of his archbishop and the year in question being printed at the top of each double page could have been usefully adopted.

A great and moving biographical study has been added to the records of Scotland's Church, and we can all endorse the words which conclude H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester's laudatory Foreword to Augustus Muir's study of John White: 'That he was a man of fine gifts of mind and heart was plain for all to see, and to them he added good humour and kindliness. Scotland and Scotland's National Church may indeed be proud to have nurtured such a one.'

R. Stuart Louden

A Study in Ethical Theory. By D. M. MacKinnon. A. and C. Black. London. Pp. 280. 21s.

This book by the Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen will be welcomed by all who are concerned about the present situation in moral philosophy and the relation of ethics to religion. The author describes it as 'an attempt to study different styles of argument concerning the foundations of morality by methods sometimes analytic and sometimes historical. It is informed by a desire to bring out the ways in which the problem (or problems) of the possibility of metaphysics impinges on moral reflection, the way we think we should live, choose, act' (Preface, v). To this end Professor MacKinnon examines three representative theories, the utilitarian, the Kantian, and the ethics of Butler, but his method is far removed from the usual exposition, summary and conclusion. He is as it were questioning each in turn in order to discover the why and wherefore of its attitude to metaphysics, for each of these theories has in its own significantly different way rejected metaphysical knowledge and in so doing disclosed an attitude to religious belief. There is an unusual and distinctive quality in this book. Professor MacKinnon himself remarks that what he has to offer at the end are suggestions rather than conclusions, and not necessarily new at that, but he does in a modest way

claim some originality for the perspective. The reader will of course find that the perspective is the secret of this book's illuminating quality. No one could have attempted it unless he commanded both Professor MacKinnon's range of knowledge and certain properties of his style which enable him to select and generalise with the minimum of abstractness and, at the same time, to draw upon an unusually fertile source of language when a complex and delicate issue calls for precise expression. Unfortunately the perspective cannot be communicated in a review as it is inseparable in this case from the author's selection from his sources; and perhaps one should mention that a fairly intimate acquaintance with these sources is assumed on the part of the reader. It would not be a very arduous task, however, to re-read the short ethical treatises of Mill and of Kant and to return to Butler's sermons, and it would be very much worth doing so in connexion with this book which does seem to contain (or suggest) an answer—the only satisfying one I know—to one at least of the outstanding contemporary problems of ethics and religion.

We are most of us familiar with the fact that moral philosophy is at present in a confused state and that this is due in part at least to the impact of the contemporary movement of logical analysis upon the traditional theory. This movement may in fact be taken as the most recent example of the denial of metaphysical meaning, in this case carried to its logical extreme of reducing ethics to a study of the language of morals and value judgments to matters of personal preference. In a sympathetic but effective criticism Professor MacKinnon points out that the contemporary analysts are following a line that cannot possibly be fruitful in the long run. Moral philosophy has always been concerned with 'a conversation at two levels' and, no matter how a philosopher resolves to confine his reflections to the strictly logical, abstract and linguistic level, he never does succeed in doing so: 'when one comes to look at examples of what one would naturally call trying to master the logic of a particular sort of discourse, in all sorts of unexpected ways one finds the enterprise passing over into the defence of a particular way of life' (p. 20). A secular humanism is the best one may expect; usually, as he suggests, the outcome is some form of behaviourism. To speak, for example, of the 'inner' life as a mere logical construction from the 'outer' is not only to disregard the whole inward experience and value of a genuine effort of will; it is also to dismiss as meaningless what Professor MacKinnon thinks is the most fundamental as well as the most pervasive issue in moral philosophy, and one which along with that of ethics and religion runs throughout this book—the issue between an 'ethics of motives' and an 'ethics of conse-

quences'. Otherwise only occasional explicit references are made to the contemporary analysts; but, in another sense, the whole argument of the book is addressed to the contemporary situation in philosophy and to what seems to be characteristic of our times—the growing tendency to 'free' ethics from any dependency on religion and to invoke in defence of this procedure moral standards of undeniable depth and universality.

It will surprise some readers to find Professor MacKinnon insisting that Kant's theory lends itself even more readily than utilitarianism to the detachment of ethics from religion. 'At first sight it is easy to suppose that Kant's austere morality is a necessary ally of a religious view of the world; nothing could be further from the truth, and it must be said that the practical importance of Kant's contribution here to the ethical debates of ordinary men is found more in the severity of the shock he administers than in the enlightenment he immediately brings!' (p. 100). The utilitarian philosophers rejected metaphysics largely because they regarded any kind of otherworldly preoccupation as a frustrating distraction from man's proper task of promoting the welfare of mankind. 'It belongs to the deepest insight of the utilitarians to see the attempted metaphysical grounding of Ethics as at once logically inadmissible and, where the promotion of human happiness is at issue, sterile and even destructive' (p. 62). They embraced what Professor MacKinnon terms 'the sovereignty of fact' with all its implications of a future science of conduct and looked upon metaphysical justifications as a retreat for those who plead good intentions and the intrinsic worth of motives in defence of externally barren actions. Kant's theory, on the other hand, with its rejection of consequences as a test of the moral worth of action, stands in sharpest possible contrast to the utilitarian view and, above and beyond all theories of ethics, it appears to sustain and defend the integrity of the inward life; yet Kant shares with the utilitarians 'a metaphysical agnosticism' no less explicit, though fulfilling a quite different function. In an eloquent defence of the Categorical Imperative, Professor MacKinnon argues persuasively that it is in this very agnosticism that Kant lays the foundation of his doctrines of the freedom and dignity of our moral reason and the autonomy of the moral principle. 'The criticism of metaphysics is in fact the criticism of the claims of all those spurious absolutes which would rob us of our freedom as rational beings, in which our ultimate dignity is found' (p. 211).

Has Kant defined the frontiers of morality too rigidly? Professor MacKinnon suggests in a later chapter that he may have done so, but we must not assume this till the fullest possible weight has been given to two further considerations. When a conflict arises between

loyalty or obedience to religious and political institutions on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the individual to be guided by what is seen to be the clear command of duty, do we not then recognise the appeal to conscience as indeed an ultimate? And again, one can point to the incomparable power of the Kantian concepts freedom and human dignity, 'when injected into a political philosophy' to provide a basis for resistance to tyrannies whether or not people share a common religious faith. The Christian thinker will no doubt affirm a different basis for these values, but if he cannot, in so doing, somehow reconcile the unconditional claim of the moral 'ought', upon which rests the authority of conscience, with the acceptance by faith of the authority of God, is he not faced with the question whether there are separate sources of morality and religion.

'Receptivity', to use Professor MacKinnon's term, which includes the essential religious attitudes of faith, hope, patient waiting upon God, dependence on grace and subjection of the will, is as integral to religion as the effort of will and the freedom to perform are to morality. All that Kant will allow is that 'religious belief confers on those who hold it a kind of assurance that the changes and chances of this fleeting life, the accidents and disasters to which inheritance and environment alike expose us shall not have the last word' (p. 102).

When contrasted in such terms, morality and religion seem to stand opposed in a tension of opposites; and certainly one of the lessons of this book is that there is no direct or logical progression from our moral concepts to religious belief, and this is seen all the more clearly when we go to the utmost in recognising the peculiar and absolute claims of each upon us. These claims are alike in this, that neither can be referred to a mere aspect or domain of life and neither can ever be satisfied with less than the totality of our human nature. But if this last term is taken seriously, and for Professor MacKinnon it is the key-word for this problem, then it will appear that Kant, impressive and abiding as his defence of the primacy of the practical reason is, has in fact defined the moral task too rigidly.

The discussion of Butler is in many ways the most interesting in this book. In making conscience the supreme authority of our nature, Butler has kinship with Kant, but unlike Kant he demands a constant appeal to experience, insisting that conscience must learn its task by learning to attend, not only to human nature as a whole, but to our nature in its complexity and detail. Like Kant he is clearly on the side of an 'ethics of motives', yet he takes the utilitarian doctrine so seriously as almost to make it one of the principles of our nature. As Professor MacKinnon rightly insists, Butler's theory is one of extraordinary complexity with seeming inconsistencies which

every student of Butler finds it so hard to reconcile. One explanation is that human nature and human life are like that, and perhaps no internally consistent theory of ethics will ever be possible. The question is really a very important one for it suggests that when moral philosophy does attempt its proper task of reflecting on how life ought to be lived in the light of this idea of 'wholeness' and does not forget the complexities and detail, it must reach a point where metaphysics inevitably 'impinges on moral reflection' and religion 'interweaves' with morality. Butler himself remarks in Sermon VI that it is in our nature as a whole that we find the 'voice of God within us' (not in conscience alone as is often said of him). Professor MacKinnon finds in Butler a central obscurity concerning the source of moral authority. His problem was to reconcile the authority of experience (conscience as the law of our many-sided human nature) and the authority of God. There is also in Butler, as in Kant and the utilitarians, an agnosticism which, unlike theirs, is religious in temper rather than philosophical and it lies in the fact that Butler found no solution of this problem. None the less Butler 'points us in the right direction' for 'he is concerned that our actual experience shall have proper authority over us, that we shall learn from *experience*', but his empiricism 'is over-arched by belief in the reality of God' (p. 199). Consider for example Butler's treatment of the passion of resentment and the moral duty of forgiving our enemies. We learn from experience that this duty involves attending to the place of this passion within our complex human nature, attending to the variety of circumstances in which it is aroused and to the claims that honesty and truth make upon us in our efforts to cope with it. There is, however, one final circumstance that can alter the whole perspective. The reader must be referred to the passage at the end of Sermon IX and to Professor MacKinnon's analysis of it (p. 253), as the case might be regarded as a crucial one for his interpretation of the involvement of moral and religious experience. When a man reflects on the moral duty of forgiveness 'in the solitariness of death', does not a new dimension enter into experience as something given and revealed, deepening and even transforming the moral duty and informing it with a new kind of authority? Had Butler worked out a more complete theory of ethics, the indications which lie within these by no means untypical cases might have led him to a more explicit solution of his problem of the authority of experience and of God. 'Butler's faith in God is revealed by the intense reverence for human nature that pervades his ethical writings, by his preoccupation with the problem, which he never finally resolves, of a proper and valid conception of experience as at once revealing to us the unsuspected richness and com-

plexity of our existence, and yet compelling us to acknowledge frontiers which we must not pass' (p. 196). In another context Professor MacKinnon speaks of an 'interweaving' of religion and morality as characteristic of Butler's thought, and this term suggests that these 'frontiers' are impossible to define in clear-cut concepts. The interweaving is analogous rather to the permeation of one kind of atmosphere by another and is experienced in proportion as we take our many-sided human nature seriously and wrestle with it in detail but always with respect to it as a whole.

In dwelling mainly upon Professor MacKinnon's discussion of Kant, Butler and the utilitarians, this review may well have done violence to the author's perspective and his concluding chapters. But interesting and suggestive as these chapters are, it does seem to me that the chief lesson of this book, so necessary to emphasise at the present time, lies in his sustained insistence upon what moral philosophy is and that if it will but pursue its task, though it may start without religious or metaphysical presuppositions, it cannot in the end escape the kind of involvement that we can trace, for example, in such a philosopher as Butler. And furthermore, we may think of these three fundamental theories as representative of the frequently conflicting tendencies within human nature, forming as it were a dialectic of life, inasmuch as we find ourselves now at one extreme, now at another, at moments when the sheer priority of duty resists all other claims and moments when the utilitarian's zest for the betterment of society seems right and wholesome in contrast with the religious man's sometimes anxious preoccupation with his own inward life. But if this thought of the 'wholeness' of our nature is held in view (broken and impaired as it is in actual living), it opens up possibilities of reconciliation of what is diverse and contradictory on another level than that of moral philosophy. 'The good for man can be no narrower than human nature; and it might be thought that one implication of the traditional doctrine of the Body of Christ was that the burden of that nature as a whole was too great for any one man to bear' (p. 224).

The last quotation indicates the kind of impact that historical and revealed religion may make upon morality. 'Where receptivity enters into morality, there the frontier is passed between autonomy and heteronomy. Men no longer carry the moral law within them, as the form which they must impose upon the manifold stirrings of their desires; they have to await the deliverances of extraneous insight' (257). This receptivity is most fully exemplified in the saint and the apostle. Professor MacKinnon includes in his final chapter a study of Paul's second Epistle to the Corinthians. There we see how the insight of faith as a new creative power can itself become a

categorical imperative, creating in us a new freedom, yet preserving our essentially human nature. 'The saint ever bears a human image.'

Hardly any reference has been made in this review to the discussions of freedom and political philosophy and only brief reference to the comments on contemporary analytic philosophy. The two former discussions are an extension of the lines of thought developed out of the study of the three theories of ethics and are an essential part of the unity of the book. It is more difficult to say the same of Professor MacKinnon's efforts to translate his thought into the language of the analysts; but whatever its influence may be upon those whose draft of experience is so different from his own, it is safe to say that all who are seriously perplexed about the foundations of ethics and the frontiers of ethics and religion will be most grateful for this book. R. D. MacLennan

The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology. By George S. Hendry. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. 12s. 6d.

These five lectures originally given at various institutions by Professor Hendry of Princeton constitute a most valuable contribution to the study of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, a doctrine the neglect of which has often been rightly deplored. The first deals with 'The Holy Spirit and Christ', and contains, as indeed do all the chapters, a careful exegesis of the biblical material affecting its subject. The author compares the Johannine view which presents the relation of the Spirit to Christ chiefly in terms of continuation with the Pauline view which presents the Christian's experience of the Spirit as the complement to the fact of Christ. These views are themselves complementary, and in neither of them is there any reference to any work of the Holy Spirit apart from Christ. The New Testament does indeed refer to the activity of the Spirit before the incarnation, but this activity is related to Christ prophetically or proleptically.

In the second chapter, dealing with 'The Holy Spirit and God', Professor Hendry, having shown the Trinitarian pattern which underlies many passages in the New Testament, proceeds to criticise the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed for the marked inadequacy of its references to the Spirit. Yet it is doubtful whether the *filioque* clause is the best way of remedying that defect and safeguarding the doctrine of the close connexion between Christ and the Spirit. Both the acceptance and the rejection of this clause lead to such difficulties that we must deem the question to be wrongly posed. The *filioque* clause solves some immediate problems about salvation, but raises grave difficulties when extended to the operations of the Trinity in creation. In particular Barth's defence of it would imply

that 'the external operations of the Trinity are not only undivided—they have become indistinguishable'.

The next chapter, on 'The Holy Spirit and the Church' brings us to somewhat more familiar ground, a contrast of the views of the Church held by Roman Catholics (with Anglo-Catholics), the Protestant Reformation, and Spiritualist Enthusiasts. The first of these views implies that the Holy Spirit is not given to the Church, but canalised alongside it, whereas the truth is that the unity of the Spirit forms the *esse* of the Church and the charismatic diversity belongs to its *bene esse*. Thus the Protestant Reformation view rightly stresses the abiding polarity of Christ and His Church; it is the Holy Spirit, not the apostolate, which is the Vicar of Christ. The account of Enthusiasm and some incidental reflections on the much-discussed phrase 'the extension of the Incarnation' are also of interest. Romanists and Anglo-Catholics will very likely complain that they have been misrepresented, but Professor Hendry's case is very convincing, and at the very least requires a serious answer. The whole chapter should be of great value to the work which the Faith and Order Movement is doing on the doctrine of Christ and the Church.

The section on 'The Holy Spirit and the Word' considers the doctrine of the inner witness of the Holy Spirit, and concludes that mechanical doctrines of inspiration cannot be reconciled with the personality of the Holy Spirit.

The positive account of the doctrine deals very adequately with the question of the relation of the Church to Scripture, another most important matter in Catholic-Protestant discussion. The view taken here may well have a reconciling influence.

Lastly comes an account of the most neglected of all the aspects of this doctrine, the relation of the Holy Spirit to the spirit in man. Here the treatment of Augustine (who 'made the mistake of equating indispensable with irresistible') and of Barth is of great interest. He explains why evangelical thinkers so often think it necessary to hold a dichotomous anthropology; but they are mistaken; the existence of a created spirit in man is not in conflict with the sufficiency of grace alone.

How this is worked out is one of the many things the reader must discover for himself, for this bare summary of a book which again and again clamours for extended quotation cannot give an adequate impression of its stimulating quality. Its thesis, that this neglected doctrine lies at the heart of many traditional theological problems, is fully sustained. The book not only repays careful study, but may very well lead to further advances in this important field.

A. Raymond George

The Christian Message and Myth. By L. Malevez, S.J. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. 25s.

In 1950 the late Pope Pius XII gave guidance for Roman Catholic theologians in his encyclical letter, *Humani Generis*. While this encyclical condemns attempts to restate Christian doctrine in terms of modern philosophies, it acknowledges that those who make such attempts may have praiseworthy motives, in so far as they are seeking to let the Christian message be heard among those who have drifted from the Church. And while Catholic theologians are recalled to the traditional philosophy of their Church, it is also admitted that this philosophy can be improved and that the new movements of thought should be carefully studied, since they contain elements of truth.

In the spirit of this encyclical, a number of Catholic theologians have in recent years paid attention to the theology of Rudolf Bultmann. They have indeed rejected his conclusions, but their examination of his teaching has been notably thorough and fair-minded. Outstanding among these studies of Bultmann is the work of Father L. Malevez, Professor at the Jesuit College of Saint Albert, Louvain, and his book is now made available to English-speaking readers in a translation by Olive Wyon.

As an exposition of Bultmann's thought, Father Malevez's book is quite admirable. In a brief compass, he sets forth very clearly the principles of demythologising and existential interpretation, and the philosophical presuppositions on which they are based. Of special value here is his distinction between what he calls 'subjective' and 'objective' interpretations of demythologising. While noting that Bultmann has expressed himself very ambiguously, Father Malevez thinks that those critics who take demythologising to imply a subjectivising of the Christian message are wrong. He himself believes that Bultmann recognises the objective character of God's acts in Christ, and that this objective element in his thought has come out more strongly in his more recent essays. In stressing the objective interpretation of demythologising, Father Malevez expresses his belief 'that Bultmann's thought and his theology do more justice to the fact of Christianity than other critics would admit' (p. 116).

This book is of interest for its criticisms as well as for its exposition. Karl Barth complained that in Bultmann christology is swallowed up in soteriology, and this is the line of criticism which Father Malevez chiefly develops. He says that 'in the traditional interpretation, christology, without being separated from soteriology, and remaining in close and vital connection with it, did in some way or another precede it, and was indeed its founder' (p. 78). But in Bultmann, he claims, 'we are no longer confronted either by the

ontological reality or the spiritual presence of the ever-living Christ . . . all that concerns us is the message of which He is the instrument' (p. 124). A way of life, of which Christ is the exemplar, is substituted for the believer's attachment to the living Christ Himself. 'How', asks Father Malevez, 'can the Christian reader of Bultmann help exclaiming in his surprise: "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him"?' (p. 117).

The author criticises also the anthropological bias of Bultmann's thought. 'The Bible', he says, 'is not primarily a treatise on anthropology: its whole aim is the knowledge of God and the contemplation of God' (p. 157). But Bultmann's theology is strangely silent about the God whom we are urged to worship. 'There is nothing about His nature or attributes; nothing remains of the doctrine of the Trinity' (p. 156).

As a result of such criticisms, Father Malevez concludes that Bultmann's demythologising means a severe impoverishment of the Christian faith. But although the conclusion is negative, enough has been said to show that the author has approached his subject in a scholarly and dispassionate fashion. His book is to be welcomed not only as a valuable contribution to the demythologising controversy but as an example of the fruitful discussion which is possible between Catholic and Protestant theologians.

The French edition of this work appeared in 1954, and since that date the literature on demythologising has multiplied. The English edition has been enhanced and brought up to date by the addition, as an appendix, of a long essay translated by Bernard Noble. In this essay, Father Malevez discusses the relation of philosophy to biblical exegesis in the light of recent controversy, and in particular draws an instructive contrast between the views of Barth and Bultmann on this subject. JOHN MACQUARRIE

Christentum und Judentum im ersten und zweiten Jahrhundert. By L. GOPPELT. C. Bertelsmann Verlag, Gütersloh, 1954. DM. 28.

PROFESSOR GOPPELT has undertaken a quite tremendous task, which, be it said at once, he has completed with a very notable degree of success. Specialisation is today inevitable in every field, and even within the four traditional disciplines of the theological curriculum the tendency is towards concentration upon one particular aspect, or even one single book; but it is one of the dangers of specialisation that the individual scholar tends to become so completely engrossed in the study of one particular tree that he never sees the wood as a whole, while on the other hand the non-specialist is bewildered by a ceaseless flow of books and articles of a highly technical character, with which he has neither time nor resources to keep pace. It is

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therefore important that periodically someone should take the necessary time and trouble to present a comprehensive picture, so that the specialist on the one hand may be brought abreast of other developments in his own main field, and possibly prompted to a reconsideration of some of his own ideas in the light of wider knowledge, and on the other hand the ordinary minister or the theological student may obtain a satisfactory conspectus of the current trends of scholarship.

This Goppelt has undertaken, and it is safe to say that his book will prove a mine of information for any who are concerned with the study of the New Testament or of primitive Christianity. Taking as his main theme the relation of the Church and Judaism, he has divided the work into four main sections: Jesus and Judaism, the emergence of the Church from Israel, the varied relationships at the end of the apostolic age and in the 'early catholic' period, and finally the development of the catholic norm. The stage is set for the book proper in two introductory chapters, of which the first will be especially welcome to readers outside Germany since, in a review of earlier research, it traces the academic pedigree of the various modern German schools, and thereby gives an important insight into their background and methods of approach. The second of these chapters is devoted to Judaism in the time of Jesus, and the whole book is rounded off by a summary of the results of the study.

The British reader who scans the bibliography might be led at first sight to think that for Goppelt nothing of significance has appeared in English since Jackson and Lake's *Beginnings of Christianity*, but this would be a superficial judgment. The only recent British book in the bibliography is admittedly Kilpatrick's *Origins of the Gospel according to St. Matthew*, but Dodd's *Bible and the Greeks* and Davies' *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* both appear in the footnotes. What is surprising, in view of the thorough documentation, is that so far as the reviewer has observed there is not a single reference to T. W. Manson. Here it may be noted in passing that Kilpatrick's name is misspelt in the footnotes (although not in the bibliography), as is the title of Goodenough's *By Light, Light.* Some comments on the Speech of Stephen call to mind W. Manson's *Epistle to the Hebrews*, but this book is not mentioned and Hebrews is discussed apart much later, as written between A.D. 80 and 90 to a group within the Church at Rome.

These, however, are minor points. The British reader can readily compare the current views of British scholarship with those which Goppelt here presents, and a conspectus on this scale of the whole range of international scholarship would be too much to expect. The one really unsatisfactory feature of the book is the index, which

must rank high among nightmares for the proof-reader. Confined to New Testament passages, it presents on three pages a solid mass of figures separated only by colons and semi-colons, which does not make for ease of reference. Such a book as this deserves, indeed demands, a better index. The reviewer has resolved to ignore this register, and rely instead on the table of contents, fortunately reasonably detailed, and on the many excellent cross-references in the footnotes.

It is not of course to be expected that everything in a book of so wide a range will command unqualified approval, but the points which are still in debate are generally noted, with references to the relevant literature, and over and over again one finds some new prospect, some new insight or suggestion. The Dead Sea sect, for example, is placed between the Damascus community and the Essenes of Philo and Josephus: it has contacts with both, but is identical with neither, being less ritualistic than the Damascus sect and less syncretistic than the Essene (p. 27). The Essene *Weltanschauung*, again, is basically Gnostic (in Jonas' *religionsgeschichtliche* sense), that of the Damascus sect apocalyptic, while that of the scrolls is a combination of Gnosticism and Apocalyptic in which the kinship between the two becomes visible (p. 131, n. 4). Not all perhaps will agree, but the subject might well be more closely investigated.

As Goppelt notes, the discovery of the scrolls has raised again the old hypothesis of the Essene origin of Christianity, but on this he rightly says that in point of fact the scrolls only confirm the view that the 'dualistic-gnostic' elements in early Christianity, especially in the Johannine literature, have roots already in Palestinian Judaism (p. 35). The Fourth Gospel indeed is acutely seen in distinction from Gnosticism, in that Gnosticism sets Jesus over against the synthesis of Old Testament and Judaism, whereas John sets Him *with* the OT in antithesis to Judaism (p. 257). Here it may perhaps be permissible to suggest that Jonas' definition of Gnosticism is in fact too wide: the differences to which Jonas himself has drawn attention between Christianity on the one hand and Gnosticism on the other surely preclude our lumping both together under the same rubric. It is now fully time for a greater degree of precision in the use of this and similar terms.

It is unfortunately out of the question to deal in detail with the many points of interest raised by this book. It must suffice to give a rapid survey of the main line of approach. Galatians is the only letter against an effort to subject the Church to the Law, the opposition at Corinth coming not from legalistic but from 'Gnostic' Judaism. The contrast between the earlier and the later situations becomes clear from comparison of Galatians and Colossians: in the

one we have a legalistic, in the other a syncretistic Judaism. The syncretistic type of Judaism indeed played a part in the origins of Gnosticism to which too little attention has been paid, but the system of Simon Magus is essentially independent of Christianity although it arose on Jewish soil. A weakening of the Gospel in the Apostolic Fathers (on which reference might have been made to T. F. Torrance's *Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers*) is accompanied by a new and stronger attack of Gnosticism upon the Church. In the third main section, the longest in the book, the ground is divided geographically; after introductory sections on the situation of the Church generally and on that of Judaism, Goppelt considers successively Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Rome and Asia Minor, taking full account both of the orthodox and the Gnostic traditions in Christianity and working in the several books of the New Testament and of early Christian literature at the appropriate points. The final section is also subdivided, and deals with Marcion, the Valentinians (with an appendix on Celsus on the relation of Christianity and Judaism) and Justin Martyr, concluding with a discussion of the ultimate solution found in the pages of such as Irenaeus and Tertullian.

As already indicated, there are points which may be called in question, but even where one resolves to differ this is still a book from which one may learn. It may be warmly commended as an absorbing introduction into a fascinating and important field.

R. McL. Wilson

Η ΚΑΙΝΗ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ. Second Edition (with Revised Critical Apparatus). Edited by G. D. Kilpatrick. British and Foreign Bible Society, London, 1958. Pp. xxviii + 787. 8s. 6d.

To celebrate another milestone in its useful history, the British and Foreign Bible Society has produced this new edition of the Greek New Testament. The editor is the Dean Ireland's Professor of Exegesis of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford who has already given us many valuable critical studies of textual problems and is therefore fully at home in his difficult task.

The Society's first departure from publication of the Received Text was at its Centenary in 1904 and now it has produced its own Second Edition in connexion with its 150th Anniversary. This production is fully worthy of the event, for it is of convenient size, and yet contains a large amount of new information not previously included even in the large 'New Tischendorf' nor yet found in Souter. It will not only be useful to translators, but, at the very modest price of 8s. 6d. for the cloth-bound edition, will doubtless enjoy the same popularity among students as did its predecessor.

The text largely follows that of the 1904 edition based on Tischendorf, WH and Weiss. Minor changes are explained in the Introduction.

The apparatus has been considerably extended. It seeks to give a fuller coverage of the work of British and American scholars during the last half-century and also 'it is intended to give a selection of the important variant readings including all readings of moment which may be original, those which are characteristic of the main types of text (such as the Western text), and other readings of special interest'. Students will be glad to have the readings of many of the Papyri, especially of P 45, P 46 and P 47 (Chester Beatty) and of much of the recently discovered P 66 (Bodmer) of the Fourth Gospel, so readily available to them. A fuller citation of manuscript support for variant readings is now given, including the evidence of the Versions which has been brought up to date.

In its extended form the apparatus is adequate for most ordinary study and yet it is simpler to use than Tischendorf and also than that to be found in comparable current editions. The explanatory notes to the apparatus are full enough to be readily followed even by novices in Textual Criticism. For the sake of completeness, a note seems called for to cover the symbol 2059s employed in the Apocalypse and apparently intended to indicate the readings of this minuscule as reported in Schmid's *Studien zur Geschichte des griechischen Apokalypse-Textes*.

The Preface and Introduction make two promises which must not go unnoticed. The long overdue revival of interest in the textual side of New Testament study, which seems now to be getting under way, should receive an added stimulus from the indication of 'subsequent editions . . . planned to embody the latest developments in the field of textual criticism'. The second promise is that of a small handbook 'to give more details . . . about the text of the New Testament and about the use of this Edition'. The need for the first part of such a handbook is made evident by the age of most of the current text-books (practically all those quoted on p. xxii are more than twenty years old—some a lot more). In the second part, one hopes that fuller details may be given about the minuscules used in the apparatus. Gregory's lists and Nestle supralinear are comparatively inaccessible, and the giving of fuller information would serve to correct the impression of much earlier writing and would make it clear that many of them no longer deserve to be relegated to the role of Cinderellas. It would be useful also to have an expansion of the information given about the Versions on pp. xiv-xvi.

The Oxford University Press is to be congratulated on the pleasing format of both text and apparatus. A fairly careful survey

has revealed only one evident misprint where the falling out of a '1' gives us a printed edition dating from '904'!

This volume is to be heartily commended to all readers of the *Journal* who are already familiar with the Greek New Testament, and it is clearly the number one tool for those who want to be more conversant with it.

IAN A. MOIR

Studies in the Fourth Gospel. Edited by F. L. CROSS. A. R. Mowbray and Co., London, 1957. 12s. 6d.

Secretum meum mihi. In spite of the constant stream of commentaries by distinguished authors, the Fourth Gospel guards its secret well. There will probably never be a time when scholarly minds will not feel themselves challenged to grapple anew with its problems both historical and theological, and future generations will still in the end confess themselves baffled by its mystery. Sir Edwyn Hoskyns once depicted the Fourth Gospel stirring almost angrily beneath the fingers of its commentators and discomfiting their most careful verdicts. But though this is the fate appointed, there can be no shirking of the task; and every fresh insight must claim attention.

Accordingly, the book before us—the outcome of the fourth 'Theology and Ministry Convention' at Christ Church, Oxford—is to be gladly welcomed. It can be said at once that it more than maintains the high standard set by its predecessor *Studies in Ephesians*. A composite work of this kind is always liable to appear somewhat desultory and disjointed; but here the nine contributors are a worthy team and have achieved a remarkable degree of unity. Divergences of opinion indeed occur. Thus Dr G. D. Kilpatrick, dealing with the religious background of the Fourth Gospel, almost completely disallows the influence of the *Hermetica*, which Professor C. H. Dodd in his *Interpretation* used as one of his main tools. The paper by J. N. Sanders on the identification of the beloved disciple puts forward the daring and ingenious hypothesis that 'the disciple whom Jesus ἠγάπα' was Lazarus, and that the 'other disciple ὃν ἐφίλει' was John the Elder, who had been a disciple of the Lord. Most readers will probably feel that it is putting it mildly to admit (as Sanders does) that this theory is highly speculative. But at least a case can be made out for holding, as Dr Ernest Evans does in an interesting linguistic study, that ἀγαπᾶν and φιλεῖν in this Gospel (e.g. in our Lord's three questions and Peter's three answers at 21.15ff) are to be distinguished. Following a different line, T. H. L. Parker illustrates the extent to which the Johannine writings have shaped Barth's mature theology—John 1.14 being, according to Barth, the central statement of the New Testament. G. L. Phillips, discussing

the concepts of faith and vision, shows that there is a rising scale from βλέπειν, through θεωρεῖν and ὁρᾶν, to πιστεύειν. In a striking study on 'Repentance and the New Birth', C. J. Barker points out how close the Fourth Gospel lies to the facts of pastoral experience. Why is it that so often sacramental grace appears ineffective? Why do so many clergy have to lament the difficulty of awakening any awareness of spiritual reality and life eternal in some at least of those committed to their charge? Describing the Fourth Gospel as 'an act of contemplation', Barnabas Lindars uses the method made familiar by Austin Farrer (e.g. in *A Study in St. Mark*) to show how cyclic repetition—as, for example, in the triad of Theological Statement, Sign, Witness—controls the main structure of the Gospel. No book on this Gospel would be complete without a study of the doctrine of eternal life: and this U. E. Simon has very adequately supplied. But of the nine contributions one is so outstanding that it must receive special notice—Professor C. H. Dodd's treatment of the Prologue and Christian Worship.

Worship may be defined as the acknowledgment by man of the glory of God; and for Christians this glory is manifested in the person of Christ. Clearly, then, the Fourth Gospel must have a special relevance to the framework and content of worship, for it is precisely this glory which is its theme. It is the *motif* of the prologue, in which the whole contents of the Gospel are mirrored and epitomised. Indeed, every episode in the Gospel, from the miracle at Cana to the final sign of the lifting up of the Son of Man, might be taken as a commentary on John 1.14: 'the Logos became flesh . . . and we beheld his glory.'

John uses Logos with a deliberate awareness of its wealth of significance as embodying two distinct modes of thought and levels of meaning. In the incarnation, the ultimate structure of reality was revealed and the purpose of the eternal mind found expression: so, at any rate, a Greek might understand 1.14, and accordingly find laid upon him the obligation of a λογικὴ λατρεία, a worship involving all the powers of his mind. But on the other side and more significantly, the Hebrew *dabhar* connotes not only word and speech but event and act, datable and concrete and demanding response. It must follow that worship can never stop short in contemplation, but must find its true fulfilment in obedience. The evangelist sees this mystery of the incarnation present at every point in the activity of Jesus, and particularly in the sacrifice on Calvary. Here is the glory of God. Hence Christian worship must always be a returning to the incarnate life and above all to the death on the Cross. It is in the setting forth of the memorials of the passion that true worship begins: and it is well to remind ourselves that we can never rightly

'show forth His death' without associating ourselves with the whole historic process that culminated in that event.

Not, indeed, that the glory of God in nature and the cosmos is not to awaken religious awe and call forth the Church's praise: the prologue itself hymns the work of God in creation. But if this is the circumference of our adoration, it is because at the centre there stand the grace and the truth made manifest once for all in the life and death of the incarnate Word: from that hour, all created things are seen as sacramental signs of the God whom Christ revealed, and all history is to be understood in the light of the pattern there disclosed. That pattern is one of judgment and renewal. 'Now is the judgment of this world'—this, for John, is the meaning of the crucifixion; and it must be central whenever the worshipping Church gathers round the Table of the Lord. And as beyond the Cross stands the resurrection, so the fact of judgment in the House of God leads on to renewal, life from the dead.

Professor Dodd in this notable essay has certainly made out his case that there is a direct line between the theology of the Fourth Gospel and the shape of the Christian liturgy. One question only I would raise. In stressing that Christian worship is orientated towards the incarnate life of Christ, and above all towards His death on the Cross, has Dr Dodd done adequate justice to that communion with the risen, living Lord which is the heart of the Sacrament and the very life of worship? It is certain that such communion through the Spirit is one of the evangelist's leading themes. It is in this continual intercourse with Jesus that eternal life consists. And if the worshipping Church has in the Sacrament a memorial of the passion, it has also so much more. For here the risen and ascended Christ comes again to His own, saying 'Peace be unto you', making the disciples glad to see the Lord, breathing on them the Holy Ghost, and commissioning them to be His witnesses to the end: 'As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you.'

JAMES S. STEWART

Quellen zur Geschichte des christl. Gottesdienstes. By JOACHIM BECKMANN. Carl Bertelsmann Verlag, Gütersloh, 1956. Pp. 316. DM. 25.

IN our era when the interest in liturgy is growing so rapidly it is very important that this should be checked and controlled by careful study of the classical liturgies both of the ancient and of the modern Church. That is important for Roman Christians who need to allow the ancient liturgies to bear critically upon their innovations and aberrations for their cleansing, but it is no less important for Evangelical Christians if they are to be prevented from

going the same way as Rome through allowing the animistic piety of the natural man to determine their ways of worship. The Roman Mass and Italian opera are supreme illustrations of romantic self-expression, but that is not what divine worship is meant to be; but even Evangelical Churches are often unduly concerned about their own self-expression in worship; that is, more concerned with the offering of themselves and their emotions to God rather than with the divinely provided oblation made on their behalf in Jesus Christ. Hence it is important that students should be encouraged to undertake a theological and historico-comparative study of the classical liturgies in order to relate them to the basic issues of the Gospel. The great merit of the ancient liturgies and the liturgies of the Reformation is that they were made to point beyond themselves to participation in the divinely-provided approach of God to man in which He lifts man up to share with Him in His own divine life and love. Too frequently modern usage gives the liturgical patterns a subtle shape which aligns them to deeply-seated elements of Pelagian and adoptionist heresy. That is often apparent in Tractarian worship for example, as in the rampant liturgism of some American Free Churches.

Handbooks are therefore to be encouraged, in which the principal liturgies of the historical Churches are set down together in historical order in their original texts, with brief bibliographies and notes, making them available for work in seminars or private study. In providing such a source-book Dr Beckmann has rendered admirable service, especially now that the older source-books are not readily obtainable. This work is restricted to the history of the Eucharistic liturgy. All the important texts from the early centuries, the Gallican, Mozarabic, and Roman documents, and the classical liturgies of the Churches of the Reformation, together with some nineteenth-century reconstructions, are given. Greek and French texts are also provided with a German translation in the appendix. This is a work that might well be given an English edition with suitable changes in bibliographical notes and in appropriate translation, but even as it stands it provides a very useful collection for English-speaking students. The Greek texts require to be checked, and corrected in places.

THOMAS F. TORRANCE

Sacraments and Worship. Liturgy and Doctrinal Development of Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist. Edited with commentary by PAUL F. PALMER, S.J. Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1957. Pp. 336. 15s.

The Sunday Sermons of the Great Fathers. Vol. II. From the First Sunday in Lent to the Sunday after the Ascension. Translated

and edited by M. F. Toal. Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1958. Pp. 469. Pocket edition 17s. 6d., Library edition 36s.

Both these works are beautifully produced pocket editions designed to send Christians back to the historical documents and writings that have played a great part in shaping the doctrines of the Church. Both are Roman Catholic productions, and the presentation is inevitably biased by the Roman outlook, but they will be nonetheless valuable and usable in other Communions. The first work (volume I in a projected series on 'Sources of Christian Theology') is divided up into four parts under the headings, The Early Rites of Initiation, The Early Eucharistic Liturgies, The Sacramental System, The Eucharist as a Sacrament, and The Eucharist as a Sacrifice. It has been very well thought out and put together and is particularly useful for studying the development of Roman doctrine.

But we must take exception to it on two main scores. (1) The selection is distinctly lacking in scientific objectivity. I refer not only to the omission of passages of great importance from Irenaeus or Augustine or Theorodoret or Gelasius etc. which tell potently against the later Roman notions, but to the arbitrary truncation of passages. A notable instance of the latter is the citating of the important papyrus of Dêr Balyzeh on the Eucharist. Not only is the citation inexact, for words and phrases are omitted without admission, but eight lines from III recto have been cut off which are indispensable for the spiritual interpretation of the whole, no doubt because they make it perfectly clear that no transubstantiation can be read into the text. The same prejudiced handling of texts is apparent in citations made from Luther and Calvin, where care is taken to choose only citations that appear to give justification for the Roman misinterpretation of their views. (2) The comments that accompany the selections are inevitably from the Roman point of view—one cannot object to that in a Roman book, but when they go so far as to say that the radical teaching of the Quakers on the Sacraments brings the teaching of the Reformation to its logical close, this is a bit of sheer nonsense which even fair-minded Romans will resent.

The second volume does not lend itself to such criticism, for it does not lay itself open to the same temptations. Here we are given a remarkable selection from the sermons of the great Fathers suitable for devotional reading, and also for sermon-preparation by those engaged in preaching week by week throughout the Christian year. For each Sunday or Feast Day there is given the Gospel of the Day, following the Roman lectionary, and after that the parallel passages from other Gospels, where such passages exist. In every case these

are followed by an exposition of the Gospel from the *Catena Aurea* of St. Thomas Aquinas, which in turn is followed by a selection of sermons on the Gospel. St Augustine once said that it was through reading the *orationes* rather than their *opuscula* that one could best understand the early Fathers. It would also be true to say that unless one steeps oneself in the *sermones* of the great Fathers one cannot reach a true understanding of their *opera*. He who will read and study these sermons will certainly get a new insight into the beauty and spirituality of patristic teaching at its best.

THOMAS F. TORRANCE

Rembrandt and the Gospel. By W. A. VISSER 'T HOOFT. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. 25s.

RELIGIOUS art in Europe by the end of the seventeenth century had entered the period of rapid decline that has continued to our own day. The Counter Reformation's response to the Lutheran and Calvinist movements had been a prolific art production, in general theatrically passionate and didactic, but in time this settled into an art intent on conserving the past and, later, even intent on adopting the stylistic characteristics of the past. No greater contrast to it could be imagined than Rembrandt's work and the message of freedom, artistic and interpretative, it brings with it. His was a development that moved from an early baroque exuberance to the profoundly mystical character of the late works which encouraged Neumann to suggest an affinity with Jacob Boehme.

Dr 't Hooft has cut across the attitude to art popular today and has concentrated his attention not on making yet another evaluation of Rembrandt as an artist, or aesthetic appreciation of his work, but on assessing the nature of his gifts as an interpreter of the Bible and tracing the specific sources of his subject matter and the circumstances and background of his religious life. The mere recital of the chapter headings will give a good idea of the scope of the book—Rembrandt's Pilgrimage, The Painter and the Bible, Christ in Rembrandt's Work, The Virgin Mary in Rembrandt's Work, The Miracle of Christmas, A Sermon: The Hundred Guilder Print, Rembrandt and the Church, Rembrandt's Friends in the Last Period of His Life, Rembrandt's Message. These are followed by copious and very valuable notes to the text and by thirty-two illustrations.

Dr 't Hooft does not conceal his sadness that Protestantism has not acknowledged Rembrandt's art and his style as being particularly in sympathy with the character of its faith and on the contrary 'has received baroque art with open arms' unaware 'of the basic contradiction between this art and the foundations of its own faith'. But Art, to those sensitive to its intrinsic values as against its bald sub-

ject-matter, does not sustain sectarianism. Ruskin found himself in the position of delighting in works that had sprung from Roman Catholicism and felt a sense almost of guilt in his enjoyment of them and their liturgical associations. One of the lessons that we have learnt through him and other late nineteenth century writers on aesthetics is that for the artist form and content are inseparable, and in religious art it would seem particularly necessary for the spectator to develop an inclusive tolerance in the matter of content and its interpretation. Rembrandt's works based on religious themes are cautionary in this respect. To quarrel about Mennonite or Reform motivation or the traces of Roman Catholic iconography seems pointless. Far more significant is the fact that the only two books mentioned in the 1656 inventory of Rembrandt's possessions were Josephus' *History of the Jews* and the Bible, and as Dr 't Hooft writes 'it is perfectly possible that he understood these themes not in a "denominational" but in a purely historical manner' (which naturally does not discount his profoundly humanitarian and deeply religious consciousness).

On the whole Dr 't Hooft has avoided the temptation to read into Rembrandt's religious work a clear indication of denominational persuasion. From all evidence it would seem that Rembrandt through his deep study of the Bible and the free spirit of inquiry in which he found himself able to approach it and his equally deep concern for the human predicament, developed a truly global sympathy. We can be sure that Roman Catholic, Mennonite, Jew, and Calvinist would have been received by him in his studio with equal humility and understanding. Through his own life's suffering he had learnt to accept God's love as all pervasive and truly universal. Dr 't Hooft in bringing his study to a close writes 'In this sense only is it possible to speak of Rembrandt's Protestantism. He was Protestant, because he became more and more deeply absorbed in the biblical testimony, because he interpreted the gospel in the light of this very Gospel, without calling in the assistance of any classical or humanist ideal, and because he did not attempt to force the paradox of the cross into human dimensions. And yet his art cannot really be classified in any system. It is too personal for that. Nor has it produced a school. The fact that Rembrandt in the second half of his life—consciously or unconsciously—protested against the official Roman Catholic art of his time, does not mean that his style can be termed a "Protestant" or a "Calvinist" style.'

This is a very stimulating study of a specialised aspect of Rembrandt's art and certainly adds to our appreciation of his stature as the greatest interpreter of the Bible in the history of Art.

MAURICE DE SAUMEREZ

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Rev. Professor T. F. TORRANCE
Rev. Professor J. K. S. REID

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Editors:

Rev. Prof. T. F. Torrance, M.B.E., D.D., D.Theol.,
21 South Oswald Road, Edinburgh, 9 (Telephone 46114)

Rev. Prof. J. K. S. Reid, D.D.,
44 Headingley Mount, Leeds, 6 (Telephone 56853)

Consulting Editors:

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THE SERVANT LORD AND HIS SERVANT PEOPLE

by The Rev. LEWIS S. MUDGE

The 'themes' of church conferences are often no more than umbrellas which, if they conveniently gather together the business to be discussed, also tend to shelter the discussions too effectively from sunlight and storms. Fortunately, the more cloying slogans are generally short-lived, and therefore harmless. Truth will out in the long run even if it does not appear at a given ecumenical meeting. On the other hand, if a conference theme does express a biblical truth uncommonly well, the fact that the meeting is soon over may render that insight quite prematurely out of fashion. Perhaps it is no service to a really good idea for it to be made the watchword of an international conference. Yet there is the possibility that time, place and thinking may coalesce in such a way that the insights of a congress may become a permanent gain for Christian thought.

Presbyterians and others have every right to turn such suspicious, yet hopeful, thoughts toward the theme which the World Presbyterian Alliance has chosen for its 18th General Council this summer in Sao Paulo, Brazil. 'The Servant Lord and His Servant People' is obviously a carefully drawn formulation. But what are its chances of leading the Reformed churches to a vital discussion of the issues facing the Church? What are its chances of promoting Christian truth now and later, rather than acting to confuse the issue with words which have only a temporary usefulness?

The hypothesis of this article is that the power of a theme to open our eyes and press us forward depends not on the publicity programme connected with it but on the extent to which it is a thought-galvanising window into biblical revelation for our day. If it is the latter, then there is no need for people to remember the exact form of words, or even the name of the organisation that set up the meeting. The New Testament itself, speaking to a Church newly sensitised to apprehend *this* aspect of its message, carries the programme forward. The question we need to ask, then, is not: how catchy and alliterative is this

theme? but: how deeply does it penetrate into the thought of the Bible? How truly will the thought underlying it body itself forth in the New Testament when the carefully selected, though human, words chosen to express it are forgotten?

Probed from this perspective, the Alliance theme stands up well. But critical readers will want the point proved, as far as can be, from the exegetical standpoint. This article is intended to indicate some of the exegetical considerations that led to the choice of the Sao Paulo theme, and to suggest some paths that further research might take.

I

Any survey of the vast literature on the Suffering Servant must reach the conclusion that the servant motif is pervasive in the Bible, and unquestionably Christologically important. Yet a closer reading of the literature will indicate that no biblical category is as confusing as this one when it comes to specifying how, exactly, the motif fits into the structure of scriptural thought. As a whole, our interest is particularly in the New Testament evidence. Is the servant theme to be classified there as a messianic title, or merely as a prophetic illustration? Is Jesus Himself responsible for the New Testament use of it, or is this primarily the work of the early Church? And what *is* the New Testament usage? The references are surprisingly vague. One might indeed ask the question, 'What are we talking about when we speak of the servant motif? Do we mean the use of a given Hebrew word, or of one or more Greek words? Or do we mean an idea or circle of ideas? Or do we mean references to a certain set of passages in Isaiah—themselves not certainly delimited?'

Literature which devotes itself to answering such questions is remarkably sparse. One must mention T. W. Manson's *The Servant Messiah*, and L. L. Carpenter's *Primitive Christian Application of the Doctrine of the Servant*, along with the interesting treatment of the subject that appears in Lohmeyer's monograph, *Gottesknecht und Davidsohn*. There are also the studies of individual Greek terms in the *Wörterbuch*, the most notable of which, on *pais*, by Zimmerli and Jeremias, has appeared in English as a separate volume, *The Servant of God*. A useful independent word study is at hand also in Brandt, *Dienst und*

Dienen im Neuen Testament. But this virtually completes the list of books, of which the writer is aware, which dwell substantially on the New Testament problem. Very useful references to the subject, of course, appear in a host of other volumes. Among the most useful are W. Manson's *Jesus the Messiah*, and the various writings of Vincent Taylor, including his latest, *The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching.* And one must not forget certain sections in H. Wheeler Robinsons' *The Cross of the Servant.* But a book which does justice to the significance of the servant theme in New Testament thought as a whole has yet to appear.[1]

In spite of the difficulty of this problem from the technical standpoint, it is impossible to escape a very powerful impression that the servant motif is central to the New Testament message. Many scholars have offered this opinion. The most recent, and perhaps the most important is Oscar Cullmann who, in his *Christologie des Neuen Testaments*, puts the matter very strongly. For him, the servant motif is the classical expression of what Jesus meant in the New Testament age as the one in whose earthly work and in whose sacrificial death the whole *Heilsgeschichte* comes to its central point (p. 80). Cullmann's general impression furnishes us with a text. Our task, therefore, is to ask whether this impression can be defended. The best way to begin is to weigh the impression against the case that has been made on the other side.

First of all, two facts are evident about the biblical materials for all to see. The first fact is that the allusions to the servant motif in the New Testament are surprisingly few in number and vague in their actual reference to the Isaianic poems. And not only that, but in the Gospels, where the most important

[1] A new work, *Jesus and the Servant*, by Morna D. Hooker (S.P.C.K., 1959) has come to the writer's attention since this article was set in type. Miss Hooker argues that Isaiah 53 makes no doctrinal contribution to New Testament Christology above and beyond the general New Testament use of the whole Old Testament servant motif. There is, Miss Hooker claims, no 'servant figure' in either the Old Testament or other Jewish writings with which Jesus could have been 'identified'. Rather the meaning of the 'servant songs' is one with the pattern of suffering and exaltation characteristic of Israel's history, as that pattern is interpreted by the prophets. The writer is warmly appreciative of Miss Hooker's careful study, and especially of the progress she makes toward showing the connexion of the servant motif with the history of God's people interpreted as *kerygma*; he cannot quite agree, however, with her systematic elimination of Isaiah 53 from a position of doctrinal influence in the New Testament apart from a few late passages, i.e. in 1 Peter.

references are found, the passages in question often occur in strata which the form critics ascribe to the secondary reflection of the early Church. The second fact is that very little use of the servant Christology is apparently made in the later development of New Testament theology. In particular, we do not find it—at least in its original form—on Greek soil. As Jeremias puts it, 'The title *pais theou* was at no time on Gentile Christian territory an accepted designation of the Messiah (it is not found in Paul); the titles *kyrios*, *christos*, *huios tou theou* were there preferred' (*The Servant of God*, p. 84).

With these data in mind, scholars such as F. C. Burkitt in *Christian Beginnings*, W. Bousset in *Kyrios Christos*, the editors of *The Beginnings of Christianity* (F. J. Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake), and such contemporary writers as W. G. Kümmel, in *Promise and Fulfilment*, have tended to play down the importance of the servant motif. Instead of the full-blown servant Christology of which Cullmann speaks, they have seen in the New Testament references to suffering and humiliation the rather embarrassed attempt of the Hellenistic Church to construct a credible account of the ministry of the Son of Man in the light of the crucifixion. Isa. 53 is used only to the extent that it is useful in constructing sayings which make sense of the passion. This usage may be very minimal indeed, as Foakes-Jackson and Lake would have it, and this may explain the vague and scattered character of the references to the servant songs in the Gospels. Moreover, this theory also explains the absence of a later and more developed 'servant Christology'. There never was any true servant Christology, these writers in effect argue, for there was no need of one. Once a coherent life of Jesus had been constructed, there was no need of using Isa. 53 further for theological purposes.

It is worth noticing how consistent this sceptical position is. It insists that there is no clear reference to the Suffering Servant in the early strata of the Gospels, and that Isa. 53 cannot then have had any influence on the mind and action of Jesus. It accounts for the defection of the disciples at the time of the crucifixion by insisting that the eleven could not have been in any way prepared for the fate of their Master. The later disappearance of references to Isa. 53 is explained by making the contribution of this passage to New Testament thinking

purely mechanical. The influence of the servant motif upon the New Testament is localised and encapsulated at a single point: the very earliest rationalisations of a Christian community on which Hellenistic influences were increasingly being brought to bear.

One cannot but feel dissatisfied with this. Indeed, Bousset himself finds it remarkable that the influence of Isa. 53 upon the Christian imagination was so momentary and so slight (*Kyrios Christos*, pp. 69-72). There are many points at which the judgment of these sceptical writers might be attacked. The form critics may not be correct about the historical stratum of certain sayings in the Gospels. There is always the question of why the early Church, if it was determined to inject an artificial motif into the accounts of Christ's ministry, did not do so more definitely and clearly. But all such considerations—convincing as they may be—are matters of exegetical method and personal judgment.

The point at which the detractors of the servant Christology are really vulnerable is in the fact that they are involved in a gratuitous presupposition about what the 'servant motif' means, and how it is used. They assume that the question the Church tries to answer is always: how can it be explained that the Messiah, the Son of Man, had to suffer? This is indeed the way the question would have presented itself to both Jews and Greeks outside the Church. And it is the form in which we habitually pose the question today when examining the development of the messianic consciousness of Israel. We assume that we are dealing with the juncture of two previously incompatible ideas: messiahship and suffering. But there is very little evidence in those texts which may contain references to the Isaianic servant songs that the problem looked at all this way to the apostolic community itself. The servant motif, in brief, is not used in the manner which the sceptical hypothesis requires. In fact, we may go on to say something else. The assumption that 'servant' passages appear only where the stock question of reconciling messiahship with suffering is raised, greatly narrows our vision of the possible influence of the servant songs on the Gospel text. Not only may there be references to the servant conception in contexts where other motives are at work, but servant passages other than Isa. 53

(the only one in which the servant's suffering is particularly emphasised) come into view. Once we shake off the quite unjustified critical assumption that everything may be traced to the early community and its intellectual difficulties, a whole new world of interpretation opens up. The possibility that Jesus Himself may have had something to do with the introduction of the servant theme into Christian thought is immediately revived.

What impressions do we get if we examine the various allusions to the servant idea as they are? Repeatedly, we find that the messiahship of Jesus is expressed so naturally and integrally in servant language that the servant motif itself is made to express the full implications of divine Lordship. From the earliest moment to which we can trace references to the servant songs, the ideas of messiahship and service are already perfectly fused. The Gospels do not speak of a Messiah who must, under the circumstances, suffer. They speak of a Messiah whose service to God is broader than suffering, whose service is *the substance of his messiahship*. To paraphrase William Manson, the servant motif is itself a phase of the messianic idea; the phase appropriate to Jesus' own place in the *Heilsgeschichte* (cf. op. cit., p. 174).

This interpretation is in harmony with the fact that nowhere in the Gospels is Servant of God used as a title to be placed alongside other possible messianic titles. As William Manson has pointed out (ibid., p. 111), the servant motif is always a 'predicate', and, one might add, an inseparable one. That is to say, the servant motif is always used to specify what Jesus has in mind when one of the recognised messianic titles is used. Mark 10.45 is typical: 'For the Son of man also came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.' Although this prediction of the passion—with its parallels and other similar passages—is one of the chief pieces of evidence for those who trace the whole matter to the early Church, no saying could be less appropriate for the purpose the critics suggest. Service and suffering is not an idea rudely juxtaposed with the doctrine of the triumphant, heavenly Son of Man. It is made an inseparable qualification of the Son of Man idea. It is remarkable, too, how often the servant motif is used in connexion with the verb 'to come', an expression having quasi-

technical status in the language of messianism. This again implies that service and suffering is not defined as the temporary vicissitude which a heavenly being meets during his earthly sojourn. To say that 'the Son of man *came* . . . to serve . . .' is to connect this service integrally with the Messiah's essential eschatological function, and to suggest that the Messiah is always in some sense a servant both in heaven and on earth.

The scope of a short article will not permit detailed treatment of many similar passages. The same pattern of thought, however, is clearly present in the Synoptic accounts of Christ's baptism, where, quite apart from the importance of this incident for understanding the attitude of the Church to the 'coming' of the Messiah, we find the ideas of messiahship and service inextricably intertwined in the combined reference to Ps. 2.7 and Isa. 42.1 of the words, 'Thou art my beloved son (*pais*); with thee I am well pleased.' Again, a similar collocation of thought appears in the account of Jesus' appearance in the synagogue at Nazareth, in which He reads Isa. 61.1-2, a passage listed by many scholars among the servant songs: 'The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because the Lord has anointed me to bring good tidings to the afflicted; he has sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to those who are bound. . . .'

But perhaps the most notable and unmistakable example of all is the Johannine presentation of the washing of the disciples' feet: 'Jesus, knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, and that he had come from God and was going to God, rose from supper, laid aside his garments, and girded himself with a towel. Then he poured water into a basin, and began to wash the disciples' feet, and to wipe them with the towel with which he was girded' (John 13.3-5). All the elements are here. The footwashing is recounted as the act of Him who 'had come from God and was going to God'. It is thus precisely a messianic act. No theological backtracking is needed to connect an idea of the Suffering Servant with an idea of the Messiah. This *is* the Messiah in action 'in the form of a servant'.

The result of this very brief survey is to suggest that there *is* ground for giving the servant motif a central position in the primitive Christology and to suggest that Cullmann's im-

pression is precisely right. In the broadest sense, the service of the Son of Man is His coming into history. It is His part in the *Heilsgeschichte* taken as a whole. The 'form of a servant' may not be a temporary vesture at all, but only that aspect of His eternal messiahship that is most appropriately brought out in our present epoch. Hence the formulation of the first part of the theme for Sao Paulo is an appropriate one: 'The Servant Lord. . . .' What is expressed in these words is not merely a dramatic contrast, and not merely the paradox of grace. It is the proclamation of the Christian message in the form of a pregnant image which can once again grip the imagination of men, as it did in the life and death of the Servant Himself.

II

On the basis of our present knowledge of the history of the New Testament text, the question of how much of the servant Christology is to be ascribed to Jesus and how much to the early Church is impossible to answer. Nor is it theologically very important to try to find out. If the remarks we have made about the meaning of the servant figure in early Christian thought are close to the truth, we must credit at least *some* contribution to the process to both Jesus and his followers. To ascribe everything to the primitive community, as we have seen, is to interpret the servant texts with unjustifiable shallowness and artificiality. Yet to say that Jesus himself interpreted His messianic mission in servant terms is not to say that the servant motif did not pose a definite theological problem in the primitive Church. It was one thing for the disciples to have grasped the significance of a Servant-Messiah. It was quite another for them to work out the terms of their own existence as a Servant People.

The argument, then, that since the disciples fled in confusion at the time of the crucifixion, Jesus could not have spoken of His ministry in servant terms, falls to the ground. The servant sayings were not intended to prepare the disciples in a practical way for the Master's death. They were intended to state the nature and meaning of His messiahship. Hence, with the crucifixion, the problem of interpreting the servant Christology was just beginning. That Christology now had to live in the fabric of the messianic community.

We must start by insisting that the existence of this messianic community was, in principle, included in the servant *kerygma* from the beginning. The Messiah was, by definition, the supreme exemplification of the existence of Israel in world history. (The *ebedh* material from which the kerygmatic imagery is drawn clearly has both individual and communal significance.) To proclaim the Messiah was to proclaim the messianic people as well. Not that the people was to be identified with the Messiah, but that the two were included in the same continuous act of God. Paul expresses this point very clearly in 2 Cor. 4.5: 'For what we preach is not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord, with *ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake.*' Here both 'Christ' and 'ourselves' are direct objects of the verb 'we preach'.

Thus there is some kind of a carry-over in the servant motif from Christology to ecclesiology. How is this understood in theological terms? Certain passages in the Gospels express the relation between the Messiah and His people in terms of a kind of repetition of form. The disciples are asked, for example, whether they can share the baptism with which Christ is to be baptised. There is an analogy between the service of the Messiah and the service of His people. Yet it is also clear that this form is not to be repeated in any one-dimensional way. Nowhere is it suggested that the disciples should have exposed themselves to execution on Golgotha with their Lord. The Church does not occupy Christ's unique place in the *Heilsgeschichte*. The people of God must work out the meaning of *its* service in terms of *its* distinctive role in the history of salvation. There is, therefore, room in the servant motif both for saying that the Church shares and continues Christ's work, and for saying that Christ's work uniquely and vicariously makes the work of the Church possible.

The earliest evidence we have of reflection by the primitive community on its own nature appears in the opening chapters of Acts. It is extremely significant that the basis of this reflection is a view of the history of God's actions in which the servant Christology plays a central part. The well-known *pais* Christology of Acts 3.12-26 and 4.23-30 is cast precisely in the role of furnishing a historical-eschatological background for the Church's self-understanding. 'Men of Israel,' Peter says, 'why

do you stare at us, as though by our own power or piety we had made him walk?' There follows a rapid history of Israel culminating in the crucifixion and followed by a call to repentence. The whole is anchored between two references to the *pais theou*, Jesus (vv. 13 and 26). It is because the apostolic community takes part in this salvation history, and knows Him who is Lord over it, that the acts of healing in Solomon's porch are possible.

Acts 4.23-30 is a further instance of the same complex of thought. The whole of salvation history is again sketched in as background to the life of the Church. The *pais* Christology is explicitly connected with the messianic hope of Israel by way of a quotation from Ps. 2 (v. 25), and by the phrase 'thy holy servant Jesus, whom thou didst anoint' (v. 27). Yet this passage marks a development over the *pais* passage in Acts 3 in that it is even more concerned to establish an organic connexion between the servant role of Jesus and the life of His people. The strong community concern of the passage is indicated at the outset: 'When they were released they went to their friends . . .' (v. 23). Further, there are two very significant innovations in the use of language here which are worth our attention. In the first place, the word *pais* is now applied to David (v. 25) as well as to Christ. In effect, this is to give the *pais* Christology a firmer grounding in the history of Israel: to say in a new way that Christ and His people are theologically inseparable, and to prepare in schematic form for more precise applications of the servant motif to the life of the New Israel, the Church. The second innovation is the use of a word which can be translated 'servant' to apply to the apostolic community itself, the word *doulos* (v. 29). This is the beginning of a most important process by which the New Testament writers broaden the servant motif in order to use it in connexion with various aspects of the Christian life.

The word *pais* is used in the New Testament only to refer to Jesus (Matt. 12.18 in addition to the above), and—by extension of the messianic idea through the line of salvation history—to David (Luke 1.69; Acts 4.45) and to Israel (Luke 1.54). Christians are never called *paides theou*, nor is the Church itself ever specifically designated a *pais*. But it is against the background of the *pais* christology, linked as it is with the whole history of God's dealing with Israel, that the New Testament

writers use a number of other words to relate the servant motif to specific situations: words such as *doulos*, *diakonia*, *leitourgia*, *latreia*, *huperetes*. *Doulos*, for example, is used very often to speak of Christians in terms of their individual careers in such contexts as Rom. 1.1, Phil. 1.1 and so on. *Leitourgia*, with its sacrificial background, often designates the cost to the individual of relating himself meaningfully to the Christian community, as in 2 Cor. 9.12, Phil. 2.17 and 30. *Latreia*, most notably in Rom. 12.1, has a similar meaning, with a special emphasis on the contrast between the world and the Church. *Diakonia* is used mainly in contexts dealing with discipline within the existing community in passages such as Acts 6, Mark 10.45 and parallels, and seems to reflect the idea of mutuality in service by using a conception that has a definite eucharistic flavour. *Hyperetes*, finally, appears to have the fascinating meaning of one who is grasped by God's word for some special mission, as in Luke 1.2, and 1 Cor. 3.5.

By the use of such terms, the messianic actions of Jesus are carried over dynamically into the life of the Church, while undergoing changes appropriate to the fact that the Church is not to be identified with Christ, but has its own place in salvation history. In interpreting these various Greek words, we must then remember the matrix out of which they come. The relation of these terms to the Isaianic *ebedh* is certainly not by way of direct philological equivalence. Nor is it due to the influence of the Septuagint. Apart from *pais*, only *doulos* is significant among the Septuagint translations of *ebedh*. The relation is the result of the dynamic fact that they are used in a living community in attempt to specify the relation of that community to the work of a Messiah understood in *ebedh* terms.

We are not surprised, either, to find that the circle is completed when some of these terms that came into prominence in community situations are eventually applied to Christ. This is no doubt true of *diakonia* and its cognates in Mark 10.45, Luke 18.27 and Matt. 20.28, and of *leitourgia* and its cognates in Heb. 8.6. In one most important passage, which we will discuss later, *doulos* appears to be used this way. The servant Christology grows along with the growing development of the servant community.

If all this is true, we can see how false it is to say that the *ebedh Yahweh* Christology makes no impact on the later development of New Testament thought. It is true that the word *pais*, as applied to Christ, rapidly disappears. But in the use of this word, we are seeing only the basic, fundamental, kerygmatic image of messiahship as it was expressed by Christ and understood by the apostolic fellowship. With that point established, the thinking of the Church moves on to a fuller expression of what it means to be a messianic people. Yet its thinking still moves within a Servant Lord-Servant People complex.

For this movement, some new conceptual equipment is needed. Christology and ecclesiology can only proceed along these lines if the Church finds a terminology for denoting the concrete reality that has entered into the world with God's Messiah, in such a way that the participation of the Church in that reality is made manifest, and in such a way that the servant character of the Messiah and His Church is clearly indicated. Such a terminology, it may be proposed, is provided by St. Paul in his image of the 'body of Christ'. Both the need for such a figure, and its appropriateness for the use suggested are evident upon a moment's reflection. In addition, a few less well known facts about the use of the term *soma* in Paul, and its background in the Septuagint, will make this appropriateness even more evident.

Soma in Paul without exception denotes a kind of neutral, though living, continuum in which various positive or negative influences may act. *Soma* never stands alone, nor is it ever, except in one doubtful instance, the subject of a sentence. The word is always the direct or indirect object of a verb or preposition.[1] Thus such expressions as 'the body of Christ' and 'the body of this death' are common in Paul, and suggest clearly that the body may serve either God's purposes or some other purposes depending on the way it is oriented. When we add to this the interesting fact that in the Septuagint *soma* can mean a person who is a servant or slave,[2] and that in the book of Job the word is supplied by the Septuagint translators where there is no Hebrew equivalent in contexts apparently having

[1] cf. Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. 1, p. 197.

[2] cf. Gen. 36.6; Tobit 10.10. 2 Macc. 8.11, and also, on this whole question, Kendrick Grobel, '*Soma* as "self, person" in the Septuagint', in *Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolph Bultmann*, Alfred Töplemann, Berlin, 1954, p. 52.

to do with suffering brought on by the will of God,[1] the usefulness of the term for carrying out a theological extension of the servant motif jumps into immediate prominence. It may be proposed, indeed, that this is the fundamental need which lies behind Paul's use of the word.

It is not surprising, either, that this theological extension of the servant motif would have been Paul's work. As the one Apostle who had not been part of the apostolic circle from the beginning, Paul would naturally have seen the theological presuppositions and assumptions of the apostolic community in a way that the original eleven could not. He would unquestionably have been interested in thinking out the meaning of the Servant Lord-Servant People motif for the life of the individual, and for questions of life and death; and equally unquestionably he would later have been concerned for applying this thinking directly to problems of church organisation. Both concerns are found most prominently in Paul's use of *soma*. Perhaps the origin of his thinking is betrayed in 1 Cor. 15. The first eleven verses of the chapter describe Paul's relation (through the Damascus Road experience in which Christ and the Church are already dynamically identified) to the basic *kerygma* of the apostolic community—a kerygma expressed here most clearly in terms of the servant motif: 'Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures. . . .' The remainder of the chapter seeks to understand the meaning of this *kerygma* for the problem of personal resurrection that both Paul and the Corinthians found most pressing. And just here the breadth of the servant motif as the early Church understands it becomes clear. God does not only let his Servant die for man's sins. He raises his Servant up to newness of life. So it is in the *soma* we share with our fellow Christians. If it is indeed the body of Christ that we share, God raises us up in Christ's own resurrection. The Servant Lord rules in the heavens.

A movement from the basic kerygmatic servant theme to a use of the *soma* figure is equally evident in Paul's handling of the problem of church organisation. Here our basic text is Rom. 12: 'I appeal to you therefore, brethren, by the mercies

[1] cf. the handling by the Septuagint Translators of the Massoretic text at Ps. 39.6; Job 6.4, 33.24, 40.32, and the references to 'my servant Job' in ch. 42.

of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship' (v. 1). Again the individual Christian is implored to allow himself to be grafted into the continuity of the Servant Lord and His Servant People (ch. 9-11), and the result in this case is that a Christian's service is articulated in accordance with his place and function in the 'one body' which has 'many members'. The introduction to this Pauline reflection, with all its momentous ecclesiological consequences, is expressed in terms of service and sacrifice (*latreia*). The respective parts of Christ and his people in this total work are their true service, and all of this comes to a specific focus in the communal relations to which Paul then turns his attention.

It may be conjectured that thinking of this sort lies behind the 'Christological hymn' of Phil. 2.5-11, whether or not Paul is its author. It must not be overlooked that the 'hymn' itself is set in the context of a discussion about the life of the Church, and that in the chapter as a whole, we thus have precisely the same pattern of thought as that of which we have been speaking: the basic kerygmatic utterance around which is built a theology of the messianic people. The proclamation of Christ is never complete unless both the Messiah and His people are included. Our special interest in this passage is of course aroused by the unique use of the word *doulos* in v. 7. Nowhere else in the New Testament is it used of Christ Himself. As we have seen, it is generally employed by the early Church to characterise the service of the individual Christian. Yet we need not be surprised, for *doulos* translates *ebedh* no less than 327 times in the Septuagint. Of course, the expression is 'the form of a servant', so that *doulos* falls short of being made a messianic title in the strict sense. The word is used—just as so many of the servant terms in the Gospels are used—to describe a specific mode or form in which the significance of the Messiah appears. In this case, the stress appears to be on the utter identification of the Messiah with the lot of mankind, bound down as man is to ignorance, temptation and mortality. But the reference of Phil. 2 to the servant Christology does not depend on this one word *doulos*, but on the form and structure of the whole passage. The 'hymn' in its entirety reflects the kerygmatic image of which we have been speaking. The *whole* of

the descent, humiliation, suffering, death, ressurection and exaltation of the Son of Man is his 'service'. So it is that the full significance of *doulos* is the meaning the word gains from being taken up into a wider context. 'Slavery' to human conditions is transformed into divine 'sonship'. By implication, something similar may be the destiny, in Christ, of the *douleia* of our own humanity.

III

These suggestions must suffice to indicate the place which the servant figure may possibly have in the structure of New Testament thought. If what has been said is near the truth, the implications for a revitalisation of theology—and Reformed theology in particular—may be very considerable. Some of these implications may be briefly listed: not in such a way as to conclude a discussion, but to open one.

Jeremias remarks that *pais* disappears as a Christological term from the devotional language of the patristic Church after the fifth century (op. cit., p. 84). It is not too much to say that it has been generally overlooked in Christological usage ever since. Bishop Stephen Neill in his recent book *Who is Jesus Christ?* proposes that 'the explanation' is probably to be found in the fuller understanding of the meaning of the resurrection that came to the Church as it lived in fellowship with the risen Jesus. 'There must be no turning back from this experience to that which the disciples had had before the resurrection' (op. cit., p. 53). This may be a true assessment of the inclination to spiritualise the faith that has marked Christian thought in all ages, but one may wonder whether it is theologically sound. The servant Christology of the New Testament is surely more than a reflection of the experience which the disciples had had before the resurrection. The evidence presented in this article at least suggests the appropriateness of the servant Christology for Christ risen and ascended, as well as for Christ in the flesh. It suggests that because Christ takes manhood with Him to the right hand of God, the 'form of a servant' becomes a permanent part of Godhead. It may even be that this terminology can be applied equally well to Christ pre-existent.

Surely this is no place for dogmatism, and it must be admitted that explicit scriptural evidence for such assertions is

hard to come by. Nonetheless, such passages as Luke 24.30-31 ('He took the bread . . . and gave it to them. And their eyes were opened . . .') and 1 John 4.2 ('Every spirit which confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God . . .') seem to point in this direction. It is heartening indeed to find that the greatest expositors of our time, notably Karl Barth, have reached the conclusion that the servant Christology points toward an essential and unchanging aspect of the Christian doctrine of God.

If so, we are in the presence of a most interesting avenue of approach to the whole question of mythology and meaning in the Bible. From the standpoint of the servant figure, there can be no separation between the cosmic descent and ascent of God, and the life of his people through history. It is not a question of relating the one to the other by some sort of philosophical schematism. The two are proclaimed as one thing. To preach God's people is to preach the Messiah and vice versa. God's power is revealed by, and is materially (somatically) present in, their servant life. Moreover, the Suffering Servant is then the Lord of history, and God's people, by their participation in his work, have the key to the meaning of events now and for ever.

There is material here for recovering the majesty of the heritage of Calvin and the other reformers, and also for deepening that heritage where it has been shortsighted. Without the slightest degree depreciating God's sovereignty, we may perhaps be led to say that man can share the cosmic service in which God's sovereignty is revealed on this earth. Without in any way dulling the cutting edge of the doctrine of sin, we may come to see how God can transform the meaning of our human slavery by wrapping it in a garment of His encompassing purpose. The whole of human culture, religious and otherwise, indeed may become open to us in a new way when we grasp the fact that God once knelt at man's feet to point him and his works toward a destiny in heaven. Unquestionably, these are some of the consequences which Karl Barth has in mind in *The Humanity of God* when he writes, 'If Calvin had only carried his thoughts further on this subject, as far in his Christology as in his doctrines of God and of predestination, and in his ethics! Geneva would not have become such a gloomy matter!' (pp. 26-27).

PROPHETS AND PREACHERS[1]

by The Rev. ERNEST BEST

In discussions on the ministry those who claim to belong to the more 'catholic' branch of the Church, often say that their ministry is priestly whereas that of the 'reformed' tradition is prophetic.[2] The representatives of the latter are usually happy to accept this as an accurate description of their own ministry, but go on to point out that the 'catholic' ministry is not really priestly, arguing that, since there is one priest, Jesus Christ, who has already offered the one necessary sacrifice, there is no longer need of other sacrifices, or priests to offer them. With the validity of that argument we are not at present concerned; we are concerned, though, to inquire in what sense the Reformed minister may be described as a successor to the prophets, or, to put it another way, what is prophetic preaching? Since the word 'prophet' occurs in Scripture and since we claim that our faith is biblical, it is incumbent on us to examine the conception of the prophetic office as found in Scripture. Since the prophets of the Old Covenant and those of the New are not necessarily the same it is necessary to divide our inquiry; we consider first the prophets of the Old Testament.

1. *The Old Testament*[3]

The word 'prophet' suggests primarily the great canonical prophets, but these are by no means the only prophets in the Old Testament. The canonical prophets both succeed others who are termed prophets and stand alongside groups who are also described by this name. Samuel, who is called a prophet,

[1] First delivered as opening lecture to session 1956-57 in Austin Theological Seminary, Texas.

[2] This phrase, while not explicitly used, underlies Dr Hebert's discussion of the difference between episcopal and non-episcopal ministries in *The Form of the Church*, pp. 119ff. Cf. A. M. Ramsey, *The Gospel and the Catholic Church* (2nd edn.), p. 219.

[3] Adequate references and a survey of recent discussion of the place and work of the prophets are given by O. Eissfeldt in his article, 'The Prophetic Literature' in *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, ed. H. H. Rowley, pp. 115-61; and by H. H. Rowley, 'The Nature of Old Testament Prophecy in the Light of Recent Study', *Harvard Theological Review*, XXXVIII (1945), 1-38, reprinted in his volume of essays, *The Servant of the Lord*, pp. 89-128. On prophets and prophecy within and without Israel, before and after Christ, there is a full collection of evidence in E. Fascher, *ΠΡΟΦΗΤΗΣ*.

is also named a 'seer' (1 Sam. 9.9). Gad the prophet is described as the 'seer' of David. Throughout the course of OT history there would appear to have existed this class of people, who like Samuel, were able to divine the unknown and who were consulted by others in their need[1]; some, as Gad, may have been retained as consultants at the palace. The canonical prophets continually denounce at least some of these as false prophets. Prior to the writing prophets, and perhaps for a time continuous with them, there were also bands of wandering prophets, probably connected in some way with the cultus.[2] Elisha controlled such bands (2 Kings 2.15-18, 4.1, 38-41); Saul became a member of one for a time (1 Sam. 10.10-13). Their prophetic activity seems to have been ecstatic[3] and they lived together in groups, never apparently operating as individuals.

How, then, do we distinguish the prophet, in whose succession the preacher is said to stand, among the many whom the Old Testament terms 'prophet'? The prophets of these varying types had auditory and visual experiences in connexion with their prophecies; the seers had their visions (Isa. 28.7, 29.10; Ezek. 7.26, 13.3; Mic. 3.5, 6); but so also do the recognised prophets (1 Sam. 3.15; 2 Sam. 7.17; Isa. 6.1ff; Num. 12.6); in so far as Ezekiel speaks against the delusive visions of the seers he may be regarded as holding that true visions have a place in the experience of the genuine prophet (13.1ff). Probably also all types of prophets fell into ecstasy in a manner similar to the bands of prophets.[4] We cannot therefore make the distinction between the true and false prophet one of the mode of experience. We might, however, make it one of inspiration: it is in the true prophet that the Holy Spirit works. In the Old Testament we find that the Spirit came down from time to time on particular men and moved them to accomplish great tasks (Judges 6.34, 14.5, 6). Amongst such inspired men were the prophets. Saul after his anointing by Samuel prophesies

[1] Mic. 3.5-7; Isa. 28.7, 30.10; Ezek. 13.1ff, 7.26.

[2] cf. articles of note 3, p. 129. Also A. R. Johnson, *The Cultic Prophet in Ancient Israel*; H. H. Rowley, 'Ritual and the Hebrew Prophets', *Journal of Semitic Studies*, I (1956), 338-60.

[3] cf. J. Pedersen, *Israel*, III-IV, pp. 107ff.

[4] In addition to the articles cited in note 3, p. 129, see also Harold Knight, *The Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness*, and N. W. Porteous, 'Prophecy' in *Record and Revelation*, ed. H. W. Robinson, pp. 224ff.

charismatically when he encounters the band of prophets (1 Sam. 10.10); the Spirit which was with Elijah rests on Elisha (2 Kings 2). Externally the inspiration produced by the Spirit bore resemblance to the ecstasy of the false prophet and for this reason most of the canonical prophets seem to have laid little stress on their filling by the Spirit; the major exception is Ezekiel. We might then define the prophet as someone possessed by the Spirit; this, however, is too wide a definition since there were many charismatics other than prophets, e.g. Gideon (Judges 6.34) or Bezalel, the craftsman to whom was entrusted the artistic work of the Tabernacle (Exod. 31.3); among the Rabbis the Spirit is regarded almost exclusively as the Spirit of Prophecy and Inspiration,[1] but this is not so of the Old Testament, nor of the Dead Sea Scrolls (e.g. 1QH 16.9, 12, 7.6f; 1QS 4.21).

We can then look neither to the mode of experience nor to inspiration by the Holy Spirit as that which truly characterises genuine Old Testament prophecy and distinguishes it from all other activity; and our concern is necessarily with genuine prophecy, since no one has any desire to equate the preacher with the ecstatic or seer. Sometimes, however, the prophet is regarded as one who is under the compulsion of a message which he must utter:

> The lion has roared;
> Who will not fear?
> The Lord God has spoken;
> Who can but prophesy? (Amos 3.8; cf. Jer. 20.7ff)[2]

But it is not only the prophet who feels compulsion. Every creative artist feels a like urge to express himself. The difference between the compulsion of the prophet and the poet lies in the nature of what is crying out to be uttered and in its source; it is God who speaks directly through the prophet and gives him His Word. The distinction of prophecy from other activities lies then in its source and content; the prophet is different from other men because he stands in a different relationship to God. The question we must ask then concerns what, under God, the prophet is doing when he prophesies. Two distinct answers are sometimes given to this question: one, that he 'forthtells' the

[1] Strack-Billerbeck, II, 126ff.
[2] Scriptural quotations throughout are taken from the RSV.

Word of God; the other, that he 'foretells'. Was the prophet a man of God who saw more clearly than others God's contemporary dealings with the nations or did he foresee the future? These are often posed as exclusive alternatives but they are not necessarily so.

There would appear in fact to have been three functions which the prophet fulfilled in the economy of salvation. Salvation as conceived in the Old Testament is historical.[1] However, God's activity in history cannot be tied down in the Old Testament to one particular moment: at the time of Isaiah, say, He had acted before Isaiah lived, He acted contemporaneously with Isaiah, and He was to act long after Isaiah was dead. The prophet thus stands in a threefold relationship to God's work—concerned with what God has done, with what God is doing, and with what God will do. When, in fact, we examine the canonical prophets we find them taken up with these three aspects of God's activity.

They continually point back to what God has done in the past, especially as seen in the Exodus; they take up that past redeeming act and show how the Israel of their day is related to it. As for instance when Isaiah says,

> And there will be a highway from Assyria for the remnant which is left of his people, as there was for Israel when they came up from the land of Egypt (11.16; cf. Jer. 11.1-5; Hos. 2.15),

he is basing his present faith for Israel on what God did in the Exodus.

But the prophet is also concerned to show that what is happening in his own day to Israel is equally a part of the redemptive process—not merely that God is behind it, but that He is behind it with a redemptive purpose. When Hosea proclaims the tragedy that is to fall on the Northern Kingdom he sees it, not only as the rightful punishment of God on an erring people, but also, since he does not regard it as the end of hope for them, as a part of the process of their redemption; God will again take Israel to wife.

> In that day, says the Lord, you will call me, 'My husband'; and no longer will you call me, 'My Baal' . . . And I will betroth you to me for ever. (2.16, 19)

[1] cf. E. Brunner, *Revelation and Reason*, pp. 84ff.

When again Jeremiah in his day shows that the destruction of Jerusalem is punishment on the city and its people because they have ignored the covenant, and when moreover he speaks of a new covenant, he is able to regard that destruction as part of the larger plan of redemption. This, in fact, brings us to the third part of the prophet's office.

The prophet predicts the future. It is not necessary to conceive of prediction in the narrow sense of the giving of time and place in an exact manner; in so far as the prophet sees that at the time of his speaking God's purpose is not complete as regards Israel and, and this 'and' is important, indicates in some way how that purpose will be made complete, he is predicting the future and recounting God's future activity. That the prophets did do this requires no detailed proof; it is sufficient to mention the hope of the Messiah or the doctrine of the remnant. Continually the prophets point in such ways to God's future redemptive activity indicating how it will take place. This also carries the implication of the incompleteness of God's redemptive activity at the time of the prophet. The most obvious test of true prophecy which Scripture offers is that of its fulfilment:

> When a prophet speaks in the name of the Lord, if the word does not come to pass or come true, that is a word which the Lord has not spoken; the prophet has spoken it presumptuously, you need not be afraid of him. (Deut. 18.22; cf. Jer. 28.5-9; Ezek. 33.30-33; 1 Kings 22.28)

If prophecy is only forthtelling this test would not be relevant. The future nature of prophecy, however, is seen most clearly from the position of the New Testament writer. When Matthew uses his formula, 'Then was fulfilled what was spoken by the prophet . . .' (2.17 etc.); when Peter writes, 'The prophets who prophesied of the grace that was to be yours' (1 Pet. 1.10); when Stephen defies his persecutors, 'And they [their forefathers] killed those who announced beforehand the coming of the Righteous One, whom you have now betrayed and murdered' (Acts 7.52); or when Paul argues, 'But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from law, although the law and the prophets bear witness to it' (Rom. 3.21), they all have in mind this 'foretelling' by the prophets of God's activity in Christ.

So far we have proceeded solely upon the assumption that God's redemptive activity toward man is to be conceived as his actions. But this is only one way of considering revelation. God may be regarded equally well as revealing Himself through the words of the prophets; so revelation may be considered under a verbal aspect. These two aspects of word and act are complementary; exclusive stress on either results in heresy; emphasis on revelation as taking place only in historical actions leads ultimately to a denial of the inspiration of Scripture; emphasis on revelation as purely verbal elevates the words of Scripture into formal propositions of truth. (Both aspects of the matter are, of course, covered by the Hebrew word *dabhar*.)

Considering revelation from the point of view of 'words' we again detect a threefold relationship of the prophet to it. In his prophesying the prophet is revealing the truth of God, giving new content of revelation in what is his own present time. With certain of the prophets it is possible to associate key-thoughts concerning God and his purposes for Israel—thoughts which before the Prophet's time were but dimly realised but which from his time onward came to be accepted as part of the revelation of God: with Amos we associate the thought of the justice of God; with Hosea that of His steadfast love; with Proto-Isaiah His holiness. In each of these there is a deepening understanding of God (which He Himself imparts and which the prophet does not discover by his religious genius) and of his dealings with men. 'The prophet did not expound and apply the message of a written scripture or an inherited tradition, even though he stood in a living succession of prophets who shared largely the same religious and ethical convictions. He was speaking on behalf of a God who had indeed, revealed himself to the fathers, but who now had something *new* to say.'[1]

The prophets also build on past revelation; thus Deutero-Isaiah assumes the holiness of God, as seen in Proto-Isaiah, and proceeds therefrom to the conception of God as Saviour and Redeemer.[2] In so doing he deepens the old idea by its new

[1] R. B. Y. Scott, 'Is Preaching Prophecy?', *Canadian Journal of Theology*, I (1955), 11-18.

[2] 'Isaiah of Jerusalem was the first to make this term central in Israel's religion, and Second Isaiah is plainly dependent on him . . . in Second Isaiah the concep-

associations. We may illustrate this from the Exodus, the most significant event in the history of Israel. Did the prophets merely expound this in the terms of their own day, drawing from it new light for their hearers (the problem of communication!)? The Exodus sets out a God who delivers a people from slavery and enters into a special relationship of protection towards, and loyalty from, it. But it would be wrong to conceive Israel's faith in terms of what actually took place at Sinai. This has been successively re-interpreted in the different strata of the Pentateuch and in the prophets; and these re-interpretations are more than logical deductions from the original event. Thus Deutero-Isaiah phrases his message in redemptive terminology drawn from the Exodus event, but what he taught was not merely a development of what happened in the Exodus. The Exodus was redemption from physical slavery; Deutero-Isaiah writes:

> I have swept away your transgressions like a cloud,
> and your sins like mist;
> return to me, for I have redeemed you, (44.22)

where the redemption terminology is applied to sin. That the bondage of Egypt represents the bondage of sin, and that the God who redeems from Pharaoh represents the God who redeems from Satan, may seem obvious to us, but it is not a deduction from the fact of the Exodus.[1] The development whereby the God who redeems from physical bondage is seen to be the God who redeems from sin is as much a part of revelation as the original action of the Exodus. The prophets do not thus merely exegete but, inspired by the Holy Spirit, re-interpret so that *new* meaning appears.

Thirdly, the prophets recognise an incompleteness in the revelation which they themselves utter: Jeremiah in his teaching that there will be a time in the Day of the New Covenant when all men will know the Lord, implies that there is as yet a deficiency in knowledge; Isaiah in his Messianic prophecy speaks of the Messiah possessing the Spirit of wisdom and under-

tion is combined with others, most notably with Redeemer.' (Cf. 41.14, 54.5 etc.) James F. Muilenberg, *Interpreter's Bible*, V, p. 400.

[1] 'It is manifest that the thought of God as saving did not rest at the point where it began in the Exodus. There He saved Israel from her bondage, and from the lash of the taskmaster. But in the prophetic teaching He was seeking to save her from herself.' H. H. Rowley, *The Faith of Israel*, p. 64.

standing, of counsel and might, of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord—these things are not yet. No prophet thinks that he has the whole truth and that God has no further light to give to men. This, of course, is much clearer to us than it can ever have been in the Old Testament period because we possess the fuller revelation of the New Testament. Thus again we find the threefold movement: the prophet takes up the old revelation and applies it to the present situation; he gives under God something new; and by the incompleteness of his own revelation he implies that God has yet further 'words' to speak.

Consequently the prophet is in his prophesying related to past, present and future.

2. *The Prophet of the Old Testament and the Preacher*

Since the preacher stands on this side of Jesus Christ it is necessary to see what difference this creates between him and the Old Testament prophet.

The further redeeming action of God to which the prophets looked has now taken place in Jesus Christ. The Word to which the prophets bore witness has Himself become flesh and in Jesus Christ God is seen, and so seen that we do not require further or supplementary revelations. What work is now left to the prophet? He can no longer point forward to God's intervention by the Messiah to redeem His people since God has intervened[1]; he can no longer point to his own words nor to the actions of God taking place before his eyes as revealing something new, not already contained in germ at least in what has happened in Jesus Christ. He can no longer be himself regarded as a part of the redemption which God achieves, as he was in the days of the Old Covenant; he stands now not within but outside the process of redemption—for the process is complete. He may still regard the revelation, historically past, in Jesus Christ and make it relevant to his own situation. He will not expect the Spirit to lead him to utter new truths, nor can he bear witness to the incompleteness of the truth as already revealed; the Spirit can only lead him to

[1] The New Testament prophet is, of course, related to the eschatological expectation. But in so far as eschatology is realised and the coming of the End determined by what happened in Christ, his eschatological prophecy is purged of a future redemptive element.

the truth which is Jesus Christ; but he may still take up the Word of Scripture and apply it to his own day, finding perhaps new depths in it, but never anything uniquely new.

But this may well suggest too narrow a view of the prophet's relationship to past revelation and of the preacher's to the revelation that is in Jesus Christ. The preacher does not merely take up dead events of the past and relate them to the present, nor expound dead words to make them relevant to present conditions; nor does he merely proclaim the crucified and risen Lord. Through the preacher's words the hearer meets the living Lord, who is the crucified and risen Lord, either in salvation or judgment. The preacher does not preach about the Word, but he preaches the Word, who is Jesus Christ. Thus in his preaching men are confronted not only with challenging statements but with Jesus Christ. In this sense preaching is a sacrament in which there is an encounter with the Lord, and not just a remembering of Him. As in Scripture we meet the Lord of Scripture so also we do in the sermon; we do not just hear about Him; we hear Him.

Now it may be argued here that this is essentially what the prophet did—he led men to encounter the living God in judgment and salvation. While this is true, yet it is not the same as in the case of the preacher. The people of the Old Testament met the living God through the prophet but they did not know Him as the crucified and risen Lord. He is, perhaps, the holy and merciful God who had redeemed from Egypt, but He is not to them the God who has redeemed in Jesus Christ from a bondage not of the whip but of sin. If they had so encountered him in the prophets there would have been no need of Jesus Christ. Between the preacher or prophet of the years before Christ and the preacher of A.D. 100 there stands the Cross and Resurrection; between the preacher of A.D. 100 and the preacher of A.D. 1957 there stands—nothing. The relationship of the Christian to his Lord today is precisely the same as that of the Christian of A.D. 100—but not the same as that of the Israelite of 500 B.C.

We might put this another way. If we base the New Testament on redemption through the Cross and Resurrection and the Old Testament on the redemption in the Exodus yet there is a real difference. Luther and the Reformation add

nothing to the New Testament redemption, but without the history of Israel, which includes the prophets, the God of the Exodus remains the God of Battles. But in the history of Israel the God of Battles becomes the God who redeems through suffering. It is as if between Exodus and Calvary a two-dimensional picture became three-dimensional. In the prophets we see the outlines of the third dimension appearing, a depth in the picture that was not previously there; in Christ the three-dimensional picture becomes complete. The prophets are not an elucidation of what is essentially present in the Exodus in the same way as Chalcedon is an elucidation of the New Testament witness or Luther's *Commentary on Romans* an elucidation of Scripture. The preacher can be eliminated from the message he proclaims—indeed the faithful preacher disappears from the preaching; but the prophet can never be eliminated from the message; he himself is a part of God's redemptive activity. Hence the preacher of today is essentially different from the prophet of the Old Testament.

It is possible to present this argument in a purely formal manner in the terms of the initial statement with which this paper began. There it was argued that since Jesus Christ is Himself the Priest, fulfilling the Levitical priesthood, there cannot be, in the full sense of the word, a priesthood today: in that the ministry lacks an atoning sacrifice to offer it is deficient in priesthood. But if Christ has fulfilled the office of Priest, he has also fulfilled the office of Prophet; then if we deny the term priest to the minister are we not forced by the logic of our argument to deny the term prophet to him also? If we use the term 'priest' of the ministry in a very attenuated sense, are we not forced to use the term 'prophet' in an equally attenuated sense? If we deny the term 'priest' to the catholic as a description of his ministry, are we not compelled to relinquish the term 'prophet' as a description of our own?

Logically all these arguments might seem good, but when we examine the New Testament we discover that, whereas we do not find the word 'priest' used of a particular group within the Church, we do find that 'prophet' is so used. We must proceed then to ask what the New Testament means by the term 'prophet' applied to particular people within the Church.

3. *The Prophet in the New Testament*

Here we are necessarily concerned both with the Greek[1] and Hebrew background to the usage of the word 'prophet'. Prophetic activity was known among the Greeks, though *mantis* is used much more frequently than *prophetes* to describe those who exercise it: *prophetes* is relatively rare. The world of that day was filled with a burning curiosity to know what the future held, and it was believed possible to learn it by taking omens and listening to the ecstatic utterances of oracles, of which the most famous was that at Delphi. Divine inspiration was not dissociated from such prophecy, it being popularly understood as the source of the prophet's knowledge.[2] Such prophecy, though concerned with the future, was not concerned with it in the redemptive sense in which we have seen the canonical prophets to be concerned.

Within the Old Testament we have, as we saw earlier, a twofold stream of prophecy. Alongside the canonical prophets there were others who were termed prophets, and to the ordinary Israelite were probably indistinguishable from the former. We find evidence of this prophetic class, which is a continuation of the ecstatics, cultic prophets and seers of the time of Samuel, in most of the later Old Testament books. In Jeremiah they appear as one class among the leaders of the people alongside kings, princes and priests (4.9, 2.26, 8.1); in the time of Nehemiah prophets of this type collaborated with Tobiah and Sanballat (Neh. 6.7, 14); Zechariah found himself opposed to them (13.2-6); they are sometimes depicted as the chroniclers of the histories of the kings (1 Chron. 29.29; 2 Chron. 9.29).[3] These prophets received their messages through vision, dream and auditory experience. When they were consulted they practised their trade and answered the questions directed to them. Their advice was taken both on public (some were attached to the court) and on private matters. They did not speak only when the Lord laid the burden of His Word upon them, as the canonical prophets.[4] Like the prophets of Hellenism they were not concerned with

[1] On prophecy in the non-Jewish world cf. Fascher, op. cit., pp. 1-100, 190-209; Edwyn Bevan, *Seers and Sibyls*; H. A. Guy, *New Testament Prophecy*, pp. 119ff.

[2] cf. Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum*, 432ff; *De Pythiae oraculis*, 414ff.

[3] cf. also Ezek. 13, 14; Deut. 13.1ff, 18.9ff; Amos 7.14f.

[4] cf. Fascher, op. cit., pp. 149, 150.

God's redemption of Israel, and in many cases withstood the canonical prophets who were. Yet it would be incorrect to describe them simply as false prophets. In so far as they opposed the canonical prophets they might be so described; but many of them continued to ply their trade alongside the canonical prophets fulfilling a different function from the latter. Since the Old Testament continues to refer to them as prophets we can hardly deny them this term. We can regard them as another stream of prophecy—though it is a very mixed stream—and those within it performed different functions as ecstatics, court seers, private seers, both in support of and opposed to the canonical prophets. It must be emphasised that this distinction is much more apparent to us than it ever would have been to a contemporary Israelite.

By the beginnings of the Rabbinic period prophecy of all types was dying out—at least in name. Official teaching held that the days of prophecy were over, but that they would return (on the basis of Joel 2.28ff etc.). Correspondingly the Spirit was no longer present to inspire Israel; only the echoing remnant of the Bath Qol remained.[1] But the vacuum left by the end of prophecy had to be filled in some way or other, and in its place apocalypticism appeared. The writings of this movement, stemming from the period of the Maccabean revolt onwards, are a mixture of both the streams of prophecy in earlier Israel; there is an interest in the future for the sake of knowing what is going to happen—the element of divination (it is remarkable how little the canonical prophets of the Old Testament are interested in precise dates); but at the same time the whole is governed by an overruling belief that God is working out a purpose and that the End is connected with that purpose to the redemption of Israel. In this connexion it is interesting to observe that what we call the 'Apocalypse', John, its author, calls 'prophecy' (Rev. 1.3, 22.7, 10, 18, 19).

Contemporary with the birth and ministry of Jesus came another outburst of prophecy of the same type as that of the canonical prophets. Zechariah (Luke 1.67), Simeon (Luke 2.25ff)[2] and Anna (Luke 2.36) all prophesy concerning redemp-

[1] Strack-Billerbeck, I, pp. 125ff; II, pp. 615f; Büchsel, *Der Geist im Neuen Testament*, pp. 121ff; W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, pp. 177ff.

[2] Observe how he is described as filled with the Spirit; the return of the Spirit

tion in the Messiah. More significantly, John the Baptist is to be regarded as a prophet; Luke after his elaborate dating at the beginning of his third chapter says, in almost certain imitation of the Old Testament prophets, 'the word of God came to John' (3.2); the common people described him as a prophet (Mark 11.32; Matt. 14.5); Jesus called him a prophet and more than a prophet (Matt. 11.9; Luke 7.26). These all prophesy in bearing witness to the redemptive purpose of God and saying 'here it is'; the only sense in which they differ from the canonical prophets lies in that the latter said, 'It is coming'; these say, 'It is here in Jesus of Nazareth.' The future element remains in so far as they do not see the end but only the beginning of the ministry.

In a number of passages our Lord is Himself set out as 'prophet'. He is thus described by the crowd (Mark 8.28; Luke 9.8; Matt. 21.11, 46). He appears to set Himself within the series of prophets (Luke 4.23ff; Mark 6.4; Luke 13.33). In the Gospel of John Jesus is put forth as the 'Prophet' (6.14, 7.40ff; cf. 4.19, 9.17), the fulfilment of the promise of Deut. 18.15. This conception is taken up in early Christian writings and Jesus is described as the true prophet over against the false prophets of pagan faiths.[1]

When we turn more directly to the period after Christ we encounter immediately the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost. If the Rabbinic teachings and the Apocalyptic writings are to be accepted as giving in any degree a true picture, Judaism expected that in the last days there would be a great outpouring of the Spirit and a return of prophecy as foretold by Joel.[2] On the Day of Pentecost Peter quotes this very prophecy of Joel as being fulfilled there and then:

> And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit on all flesh; your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your young men shall see visions. Even upon the menservants and the maidservants in those days, I will pour out my spirit. (2.28f)

is, according to Jewish teaching, closely connected with the return of prophecy; cf. notes 1, p. 131, and 1, p. 140.

[1] cf. Fascher, op. cit. pp. 205-9.

[2] cf. note 1, p. 140, and see also E. C. Rust, *Nature and Man in Biblical Thought*, pp. 136ff. The Qumran community would appear to have had a like eschatological expectation in respect of the Spirit, e.g. 1QS 4.21; cf. 1QSb 2.24, 5.25; 1QS 9.3.

This prophecy speaks of the pouring out of the Spirit and of the revival of prophecy. It is not surprising then that we should find prophets in the early Church or that the great range of new abilities which the first Christians found at their fingertips, as healers, prophets, etc., should be ascribed to gifts of the Spirit. We have no need to discuss all those gifts, but only one, viz. prophecy.

The Spirit at Pentecost is not poured out on the disciples alone but is promised to all who repent and believe (Acts 2.38), and the early Church is best characterised as a Church of the Spirit. The strict interpretation of Joel 2.28 would suggest that everyone in the Church should have the gift of prophecy, and at first there does not seem to have been an exact class of prophets; at different times different people prophesied. But long before the end of the first century we find the emergence of such a definite class. In the Church at Corinth, as described in Paul's first letter, this process would appear to have been in progress; on the one hand the possibility remains open that anyone may prophesy, in so far as Paul urges his readers to desire prophecy rather than glossolalia (14.5, 12.31a, 14.1, 39)[1]; on the other hand there are also those within the Church who are looked upon as prophets and are so called (12.28, 14.29, 32)[2]; similarly the picture of the Church as the Body of Christ implies that while each member has a gift all do not, and cannot, have the same gift, and so prophecy is restricted to a few (12.14-19, 29).[3]

Definite evidence of a class of prophets is seen in other parts of the New Testament. There is constant reference in the Book of Acts to 'prophets', often linked with teachers:

> Now in the Church at Antioch there were prophets and teachers, Barnabas, Symeon who was called Niger, Lucius of Cyrene, Manaen a member of the court of Herod the Tetrarch, and Saul. (13.1; cf. 11.27, 15.32, 21.10)

The fact that they are enumerated by name implies the existence of a definite class. In his Ephesian letter Paul makes

[1] cf. H. F. v. Campenhausen, *Kirchliches Amt und geistliche Vollmacht*, pp. 65ff.

[2] In 14.31 the first 'all' refers to 'all the prophets' and the second and third occurrences of the word to 'all the congregation'; cf. H. Greeven, 'Propheten, Lehrer, Vorsteher bei Paulus', *ZNW*, XLIV (1952), 5, 6.

[3] On the place of the prophets in the Corinthian congregation, see especially Greeven, op. cit., pp. 3-15; Guy, op. cit., pp. 104ff.

three references to prophets; twice he enumerates them alongside the Apostles as having a special place in the Church (2.20, 3.5) and once he places them in a general list of Church officers (4.11; cf. Rev. 18.20); since we would hold these others to form definite groups we cannot deny this of the prophets. The existence of 'false prophets' implies that of true prophets (1 John 4.1; Rev. 2.20 etc.); in the Gospels the disciples are warned against such false prophets (Matt. 7.15; Mark 13.22).[1] Moving outside the sphere of the New Testament we discover a great deal of instruction concerning the proper attitude of the Church to prophets in the Didache (11.1ff); they are again paralleled with Apostles and teachers; the statement of methods to distinguish false and true prophets implies that there was a class of wondering prophets who might visit a Church and of whose genuineness the Church must be certain (11.3ff).[2]

We see, consequently, that the outburst of spiritual activity beginning at Pentecost soon produced a definite class of prophets, who may be considered an order of ministry within the early Church. We have now to inquire into the work of these prophets. What role did they fulfil in the primitive Church?

It cannot be gainsaid that there was inherent in their work an element of prediction; this is most obvious in the prophecies of Agabus in which he foretold the famine in Jerusalem (Acts 11.27f), and what would happen to Paul whenever he would go up there (21.10f). In like manner Paul writes of the prophet as giving a revelation:

> Let two or three prophets speak, and let the others weigh what is said. If a revelation is made to another sitting by, let the first be silent. (1 Cor. 14.29f)[3]

As already pointed out, John the Seer speaks of his work as that of prophecy (Rev. 1.3, 10.11 etc.), and yet it is most decidedly a disclosure of what is to be, not now as in the case of Agabus of the immediate future, but of the ultimate con-

[1] It is irrelevant whether these are regarded as genuine sayings of Jesus or not; they reflect the conditions of the early Church. They would not have retained their position in the tradition if they had not done so.

[2] We do not by any means accept the distinction that Harnack made between a charismatic and an official ministry.

[3] cf. v. 26 where by process of elimination 'revelation' must also apply to the prophet; tongues and interpretation apply to those who speak in tongues and those who interpret them (cf. v. 27f); hymns are to be connected with v. 15f; lessons are the work of teachers (12.28).

summation. It is in this connexion that false prophets are mentioned in the Little Apocalypse (Mark 13.22), implying the connexion of prophecy with apocalypticism. Paul himself seemed to have exercised the prophetic gift at times in this way (1 Thess. 3.4[1]; 1 Cor. 15.51f). The visions of Hermas would probably have been classed by the early Church as prophecy.

In the New Testament the revelation given through the prophet was also concerned with new steps to be taken in the ordering of the Church. Barnabas and Saul were set aside for their missionary labours on the instructions of the Holy Spirit acting through prophets and teachers (Acts 13.1-3); Timothy was appointed to his office in the Church according to the guiding of the Spirit through prophets (1 Tim. 1.18, cf. 4.14).[2]

A wider element than prediction is also seen in Eph. 3.5, 6,

> the mystery . . . has now been revealed to his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit; that is, how the Gentiles are fellow heirs, members of the same body, and partakers of the promise in Christ Jesus through the Gospel. (cf. Col. 1.26; Rom. 16.25f)

This is not prediction but the revelation of something not yet perfectly understood. Presumably Paul is referring to such incidents as Peter's vision at Joppa (Acts 10.9ff), which led him to preach to and baptise Cornelius the Gentile, and the command at his own conversion to go to the Gentiles (Acts 26.16ff; Gal. 1.12). Yet in his Epistle to the Romans Paul labours throughout to show that on the basis of the Old Testament revelation there is a place in the Church for both Jew and Gentile. A special revelation opened his mind to a truth which was already implied in the Old Testament and in the coming of Jesus. Inspired sayings transmitted by the prophets, if there were such, were applications of the truth as already revealed in the life and teaching of our Lord rather than fresh revelations supplementing what was given therein. Paul's revelation about the inclusion of the Gentiles in the Church may be considered under this heading. We cannot be sure, however, that the prophets ever actually did as the Form-Critics suggest they did;

[1] Particularly interesting is 1 Thess. 4.15-17; there is no known 'word of the Lord' corresponding to what Paul says here; the use of the phrase may indicate that what follows came to Paul through prophetic mediation. The words of v. 18 seem to indicate the end of a quotation.

[2] T. M. Lindsay, *The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries*, p. 96f, suggests that it lay originally with the prophet, and not the priest, to pronounce forgiveness in the early Church.

there is no evidence in early Christianity that the prophets passed on sayings of the exalted Lord. If this did happen their work in so doing must be elevated to a level with that of the writers of the New Testament themselves. This raises a serious question: What is the function of the New Testament writers in the economy of salvation? If full revelation is given in Jesus Christ all we should need would be a record of His life and death, etc; why then do we count the writings of Paul, which come after the historical event and do not bear direct witness to it, as inspired Scripture? Do they add new revelation or do they just explicate the revelation already present? It is impossible now to discuss this, but two relevant matters may be stressed for our present purpose: (1) in his writings Paul exercised a function higher than that of the New Testament prophet; he was an Apostle and not a prophet only; (2) no preacher today would claim to occupy the same position *vis-à-vis* revelation as the Apostle Paul.

To sum up, the New Testament prophet was concerned in the prediction of future events, including the End, in the ordering of the Church, especially where new ventures were involved, and possibly also in receiving revelations which made clear truth that was already implied in the coming of Jesus Christ.

Perhaps it may be thought that we have overestimated the element of prediction in New Testament prophecy and that the prophet really was someone who preached in our sense. That this is not so is obvious once we recollect the way in which the New Testament writers (and Judaism generally) regarded the prophets of the Old Testament. To them they were essentially foretellers and their predictions were fulfilled in Jesus Christ, i.e., for them a primary element in prophecy is prediction. They also found prediction closely associated with the non-canonical prophets of the Old Testament and with the seers and prophets of the Hellenistic world. It would be surprising if when they used the term 'prophet' they did not immediately think of the revelation of the future. The New Testament prophets stand therefore in the second stream (the non-canonical) of prophecy which we found in the Old Testament. But they are never regarded as being in opposition to the religion of the Apostles nor as false prophets.

So far we have considered what the prophet said. But to

what purpose does he prophesy? He is not a crystal-gazer who will tell you where you have mislaid your glasses. His prophecy is given for the upbuilding of the Church (Eph. 4.11-13; 1 Cor. 14.3). Not even the purpose of John in writing Revelation was merely to enlighten his readers on the signs preceding the End, or on the exact date or means of the End; he wrote to sustain his readers in a time of persecution and trial. The revelation he gave of signs, etc., was the means to that, but it itself was not the main purpose. Consequently we find Paul describing the prophet's function in these terms:

> He who prophesies speaks to men for their upbuilding and encouragement and consolation. . . . You [addressing the prophets] can all prophesy one by one, so that all may learn and all be encouraged. (1 Cor. 14.3, 31)

When after the Apostolic Council in Jerusalem the messengers, who were themselves prophets, bring the decrees to Antioch, they are said to have 'exhorted the brethren with many words and strengthened them' (Acts 15.32). The gift of tongues serves no evangelical purpose; outsiders would only consider the possessors mad. But the gift of prophecy leads to conversion; for the prophet sees the secrets of men's hearts (1 Cor. 14.22-25). More is meant here in the context of prophecy as revelation than general denunciation of sin, some of which might hit its target and some not; probably Paul intends us to understand something similar to the process in which Jesus was able to lay bare the inner life of the woman at the well of Samaria in making reference to her marital status (John 4.16ff). We cannot then here make the easy equation that prophecy equals evangelical preaching. But in so convicting the unbeliever the Church is built up—not in numbers only; are not the saints built up and do they not rejoice, as the angels in heaven, when a sinner repents? In the Didache the prophet fulfils another function seemingly unconnected with the preceding: when he is not present the Eucharist is administered with liturgical prayers but when he is present he leads the people in whatsoever prayer he desires (Did. 10.7). The implication may be that in prayer the prophet seems to be carried away; we have already seen the connexion of prophecy and ecstasy, which was general in the Near East. Yet we cannot suppose the prophet to be in any way so ecstatic that his mind no longer controls him; for this is just the point of contrast between prophet and

glossolalialist; the latter was wholly carried away and did not speak with the mind as the former did (1 Cor. 14.14ff).[1]

If prophecy is distinguished from glossolalia by rational utterance and the purpose of edification, wherein is it to be distinguished from teaching, which is also rational and edifying (Eph. 4.11-13)? In the list of offices given both in Ephesians and in 1 Corinthians the teacher is included but as seemingly less important than the prophet. It is impossible to enter now on a detailed discussion of the place of the teacher in the early Church, but briefly he may be said to have been responsible for the handing on of tradition and its explanation, whether that tradition be the Words of the Lord, narrative concerning Him, or confessional statements.[2] Such a definition must not be used to press the distinction that C. H. Dodd has drawn between Kerygma and Didache.[3] The sermon can be called teaching even when it is an evangelical address resulting in conversion.[4] The teacher of the early Church was not a teacher in our fashion. This should preserve us from too easily making the glib equation 'preacher = prophet' and 'teacher (in our sense) = teacher (of the early Church)'. Nor can we confound teacher and prophet; Swete is wholly wrong when he says that 'the prophets seem to have been in fact to a great extent the teaching ministry of the primitive Church'.[5] The teacher worked with material already known and made it relevant to his hearers' needs; the prophet's utterance cannot be dissociated from the impartation of knowledge which did not come there and then by rational thinking.

How then shall we relate the prophets of the New Testament and those of the Old Testament? Obviously both are connected with the disclosure of what is unknown and with the upbuilding of the People of God. The canonical prophet of the Old Testament had a position within God's plan of redemption and in his revelation advanced that plan; the prophet of the New Testament stands outside God's plan and

[1] If there is an ecstatic element in the New Testament prophet this would connect him again with prophecy in Old Testament days and in the Hellenistic world.

[2] cf. Greeven, op. cit., pp. 18-24; Guy, op. cit., p. 116f; Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 103ff.

[3] *The Apostolic Preaching.*

[4] 'Then the proconsul believed, when he saw what had occurred, for he was astonished at the teaching of the Lord' (Acts 13.12; cf. 5.21). We would have used the word 'preaching' in place of 'teaching'.

[5] *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, p. 377.

bears witness to it; his revelation is not a factor in the completion of the plan but assists in its application to men; he discloses God's continual working in history as he seeks to bring men into the redemption which God has *already* created. Thus the New Testament prophet is not the successor to the Old Testament canonical prophet, but stands within the wider stream of prophecy in the Old Testament. We might object that the early Church should have chosen another word than prophet to describe this New Testament office since it is not the same as that of the Old Testament canonical prophet. For us the word 'prophet' primarily connotes the canonical prophet. To the Christian of that day when 'prophecy' of many kinds was an element of culture the word was a natural one to use to describe the New Testament office. In one place in the New Testament the Greek sage Epimenides is termed a prophet (Titus 1.12; cf. Luke 22.64). In addition there was the connexion of prophecy with apocalypticism and the existence of the prophecy of Joel (2.28ff) that there would be prophets in the last days; if prophets were foretold, then prophets there must be.

As we have already indicated, the prophetic ministry continued beyond the days of the New Testament. In the Didache the prophets are a definite order. Throughout the second century we find reference to the existence of the prophetic gift in the Church. Polycarp is described as a prophet.[1] Ignatius seems on occasion to have burst out into prophetic speech during worship.[2] Hermas distinguishes between true and false prophets.[3] Justin Martyr writes: 'For the prophetic gifts remain with us even to the present time'[4]; and Irenaeus: 'In like manner we hear many brethren in the Church who possess prophetic gifts.'[5] Origen speaks of the perception of the future as a *charisma* of the Spirit.[6] Yet by the end of the second century, and certainly by the middle of the third, all such references have virtually disappeared.[7] This may be attributed

[1] *Mart.* 16.2. [2] *Phil.* 7. [3] *Mand.* 11.7ff.

[4] *Dial. Trypho*, 82 (cf. 39, 87). It is interesting to observe that Justin continues by virtually equating the prophets of the New Testament with the canonical prophets.

[5] *Adv. haer.*, 5.6.1; cf. 2.32.4, 'Others have foreknowledge of things to come: they see visions, and utter prophetic expressions.' [6] *Contra Celsum*, 1.46.

[7] In the reference in the Muratorian Canon to Hermas it is said that the number of the prophets is complete, and that therefore Hermas cannot be read

to a number of causes: the increasing institutionalism of the Church; the growth of the canon, outside which there could be no inspired speech; the tendency to turn Christianity into a religion of morality. But probably the most important factor in its disappearance was its abuse in Montanism. Montanus and his associated prophetesses not only concerned themselves with prediction but also entered deeply into matters of dogma for which they claimed divine inspiration[1]; Montanus may have gone so far as to claim that he was himself the Paraclete. At the same time he described his inspiration in terms very similar to those in use in the pagan world to describe divine inspiration, e.g. he spoke of himself as a lyre on which God played.[2] In consequence the Montanist prophets were denounced as false prophets; but their Church continued to exist; this naturally made it difficult for those within the catholic Church who might claim the prophetic gift; they ran the danger of being classed as Montanists and so excommunicated. Whatever the cause or causes, the prophetic movement died out in Christianity and the office of prophet disappeared.

4. *Conclusion*

We must now return to our initial discussion—the Christian preacher as prophet. We have seen that he cannot be equated with the Old Testament prophet because unlike him he stands after Jesus Christ and not before. The New Testament prophet and the Old Testament prophet are not the same; may we then equate the New Testament prophet and the preacher? To recall briefly the office of the New Testament prophet will suffice to show that this again is not a true equation. The New Testament and early Christian prophet disclosed the yet unknown future; he gave the Church guidance at important

among them. This implies that on the one hand the Montanist prophets are not on a level with Scripture and should not be heeded, and on the other that Hermas is a prophet, though not of the standing of the canonical prophets. Cf. B. H. Streeter, *The Primitive Church*, p. 212f.

[1] Campenhausen, op. cit., pp. 205ff, argues that there was no doctrinal innovation with Montanism; he would lay stress rather on the ecstatic nature of Montanist prophecy, alleging that it was for this reason that it was attacked by the catholic Church; but in so far as there was a fresh outpouring doctrinal differences were introduced. Campenhausen also argues interestingly (pp. 195ff) that Paul was fighting against a legalistic or Judaistic Christianity, which really had no place for the Spirit, and therefore the danger of ecstatic prophecy was not obvious to him.

[2] Epiph., *Haer.*, 48.4.1. Cf. Plutarch, *De defectu oraculorum*, 436f (48); *Odes Solomon*, 6.1, 2.

moments; he received revelations of important truth. Is this how the preacher of today fulfils his office? If this is not so, we need to be very careful in the use of the word prophecy to describe our preaching. It is interesting to observe that nowhere in our English New Testament does the English word 'preaching' translate the Greek word *propheteuein*. It is the equivalent generally of *kerussein* or a compound of *aggellein*, both of which carry the implication of telling something, which though it may not be known to the hearers, yet is already a completed fact. The teller reports something which has happened, but not necessarily in his own experience; he is an announcer or proclaimer. The Old Testament prophet was himself a part of the message he gave; the New Testament prophet looks, at least in part, to the future and discloses something that has not yet happened; the preacher proclaims and makes relevant past fact. It is well that we should preserve this important distinction between 'proclamation' and 'prophecy'.

There is a residual question for the Presbyterian who believes that his system of Church order reproduces that of the New Testament. A question may be put—though it would require another paper to attempt an answer to it. It is this: If there was an order of prophets in the first two centuries, why has it disappeared? If our pattern of ministry is the same as that of the first two centuries, should we not still possess it? Calvin would answer that certain ministries which appeared in the early Church, and of which the prophetic is one and the pastoral is not one, were exceptional and never intended for the permanent ordering of the Church (*Inst.*, 4.3.4). He qualifies this by adding: 'The Lord . . . still occasionally raises them when the necessity of the times requires.' That, however, is not to identify the prophetic and preaching offices. Indeed Calvin very carefully distinguishes between these two offices, in that he includes both (the pastor is the preacher) in his list of offices in the Church. Today we are witnessing a revival of the healing ministry, which though appearing often in crude and sensationalist ways, yet is also exercised genuinely by a few within the Church, acting for the most part quietly and without the blaze of publicity. Is there a place or a need for the revival of the New Testament prophetic ministry? Those who claim to be prophetic preachers should seriously consider this question.

A RECONSIDERATION OF THE DIACONATE

by J. M. ROSS

THE Report on 'Relations between the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches' has given rise to much discussion of the Episcopate; but it may not be unprofitable if some study were to be given, in the churches of both traditions, to the true nature of the diaconate, especially as the Report invites the Anglican churches to consider setting apart lay persons for some measure of pastoral responsibility for their fellow-Christians, 'possibly through a reform of the diaconate'.[1]

I. The Primitive Diaconate

Both Presbyterians and Anglicans claim that their Church polities are founded upon Scripture; and where Scripture is silent or gives no clear guidance Anglicans at least attach considerable importance to the practice of the immediately succeeding ages of the Church. The first step, therefore, in any fresh study of the diaconate is to consider again the evidence of the New Testament and the primitive Church.[2] This is all the more necessary in that nearly all accounts of the diaconate until quite recent times have been vitiated by starting with the Seven of Acts 6 and assuming that the office of deacon developed out of the functions exercised by Stephen, Philip, Prochorus, and the others. This has given rise to much unprofitable and needless controversy.[3] St. Luke does not call them deacons. On the contrary, at Acts 21.8 he rather pointedly abstains from calling Philip a deacon, describing him instead as 'the evangelist, who was one of the Seven'. The Seven are not identified with the diaconate anywhere else in Scripture, or by

[1] *Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches*, 1957, section 3.

[2] A recent study of the New Testament evidence by Professor C. F. D. Moule and of the patristic period by the Rev. R. P. Symonds will be found in *Theology* for November 1955 (vol. lviii, pp. 405-14).

[3] Presbyterian controversialists have argued that deacons were instituted for charitable purposes only, and must not preach or baptise. Anglican apologists, e.g. Whitgift and Hooker, replied that of the seven deacons Stephen and Philip preached and Philip baptised. The Presbyterians, e.g. Cartwright, retorted that Stephen's defence in Acts 7 was not preaching but apologetics, and that Philip preached and baptised, not *qua* deacon, but *qua* evangelist.

any subsequent writer until the end of the second century.[1] Therefore Acts 6 is a false starting-point for any study of the diaconate. St. Luke may have thought of the Seven as the prototype of the diaconate, just as he may have thought of the Twelve as the protype of the presbyter-bishops; but the story is relevant for the present purpose only as an illustration of the importance of appointing separate officials to deal with administrative matters and set the presbyters free for prayer and the ministry of the word.

The only evidence for the office of deacon in the New Testament is to be found in Phil. 1.1 and 1 Tim. 3.8-13. The first of these passages merely mentions the existence of deacons at Philippi without any indication of their functions. The second passage gives the qualifications requisite in deacons, and a comparison with the qualifications for a bishop (verses 2-7; cf. Titus 1.6-9) gives a general but not very precise idea of their respective functions. All that can be said is that while the deacons were expected, like the bishop, to govern, to visit, and to handle money, they were not expected, as the bishop was, to give hospitality or to teach or preach. It is not clear whether the γυναῖκες of 1 Tim. 3.11 were deaconesses or the wives of deacons; whichever be the case, they were apparently expected to administer charity. It is uncertain whether Phoebe (Rom. 16.1) held the formal office of deaconess or was merely a helper in the Church at Cenchreae.

Where so little light is to be had from Scripture, the subsequent evidence takes on a special importance. According to Justin,[2] the deacons distributed the elements to those present at the Eucharist, and afterwards took portions to absent members. The only reference in Ignatius to the office of deacon that gives any idea of the deacon's functions is his statement[3] that 'the deacons, being deacons of the mysteries of Jesus Christ, must in every way be acceptable to everyone; for they are not deacons of food and drink, but servants of the Church of God'. These words are tantalisingly vague, but seem to imply that the

[1] The first such writer is Irenaeus, who (*Adv. Haer.* I.xxvi.3) describes Nicolaus as one of the seven deacons. Clement of Alexandria in his parallel accounts of Nicolaus (*Strom.* II.20 and III.4) makes no such identification.

[2] *Apol.* I.65.5, 67.5.

[3] *Trall.* 2. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς διακόνους ὄντας μυστηρίων Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον πᾶσιν ἀρέσκειν. οὐ γὰρ βρωμάτων καὶ ποτῶν εἰσὶν διάκονοι, ἀλλ' ἐκκλησίας θεοῦ ὑπηρέται.

duties of deacons were liturgical as well as charitable; and with this the details in Justin agree. This is all that is known about the second-century deacon.

For the third and fourth centuries we have much fuller information.[1] The duties of deacons in this period may be classified as follows:

(*a*) *Liturgical*: keeping order during divine service, leading the prayers of the people, reading the Gospel, receiving the offerings and presenting them to the presbyter, serving the eucharistic elements (or at least the cup) to the communicants, and dismissing the people at the end of the service. With the bishop's permission, deacons could if need be administer baptism and absolve penitents.

(*b*) *Educational*: if no presbyter were available, deacons could read the homilies of the fathers, and some were licensed by the bishop to preach; deacons were also employed in teaching catechumens.

(*c*) *Charitable*: the deacons reported necessitous cases to the bishop and acted as his almoners in the distribution of charity; they also visited the sick and clothed and buried the dead.

(*d*) *Administrative*: the deacons not only secured orderly behaviour in church, but were expected to keep an eye on the congregation at all times and report misdemeanours to the bishop; the deacons were responsible for the altar and its utensils, and doubtless[2] also for church property in general; they sometimes (as also did presbyters) attended General Councils as proxies or attendants to bishops, and also sometimes served on provincial and consistorial synods.

Some of these duties were also performed from the earliest times by *deaconesses*: visiting of the sick, acting as doorkeeper (presumably of the women's entrance), keeping order among the women in church, assisting at the baptism of women, catechising candidates (presumably female candidates) for baptism, and acting as sponsors for exposed children.

Two features of the early deacon should be specially noted:

(1) The great diversity of his functions. It is arguable that the primary functions of a deacon were liturgical and that (*b*) (*c*) and (*d*) developed out of (*a*); but this is only one out of several possible hypotheses.

(2) In the second and third centuries deacons were mostly paid whole-time officials, while the presbyters were mostly part-timers maintaining themselves by a secular occupation. Even the most zealous of ecclesiastical antiquarians would hardly wish to restore that feature of the primitive Church at the present day.

[1] The evidence is set out in full in Bingham, *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, II.xx.3-18. Little needs to be added except Hippolytus's *Apostolic Tradition*. For deaconesses see Bingham, II.xxii, and for archdeacons II.xxi.

[2] So Dom Gregory Dix understands the original sense of Hippolytus, *Ap. Trad.* ix.3.

There is no certain evidence of the office of *Archdeacon* before the fourth century. His original duties were:

(*a*) *Liturgical*: to assist the bishop at the altar and to apportion the duties at church services among the deacons, subdeacons, etc.

(*b*) *Educational*: to assist the bishop in preaching.

(*c*) *Charitable and Administrative*: to act as the treasurer of the charitable and other funds of the diocese; if authorised by the bishop, to direct the deacons in the distribution of charity; and to censure the deacons for misbehaviour and if necessary excommunicate them.

II. The Needs of the Present Day

Great social changes have taken place in the present century, and these have not been without effect on the ministry of the Church. The principal effects may be summarised under four heads. (1) The social prestige of the clergy has declined. (2) Church life requires much organisation: it is no longer enough that people should simply come to church on Sundays to be taught. (One has only to compare the type of church building thought adequate, both centrally and locally, a hundred years ago with those required today.) (3) The development of the Welfare State has meant that there is now little scope for charitable relief within the Church, but much for co-operation in good works with the secular authorities. (4) As fewer candidates offer themselves for the professional ministry, more of the minister's work must be shouldered by laymen.

In this situation, the clergy in all churches today are exposed to two great dangers: on the one hand, of carrying such a burden of administrative or social work that they give inadequate attention to prayer and the ministry of the word; on the other hand, of failure to relate worship and preaching to the realities of the modern world. In Scotland as well as in England there is a

pressing need to discover methods of evangelism which will effectively bridge the gap dividing very large numbers of those who work in industry from the faith and worship of the Church as expressed in our normal parochial life. To thousands of those men and women the Christian gospel is largely unintelligible; and what they do understand of it seems to have little direct bearing on the concerns of their daily life.[1]

[1] Report of Joint Committee of Canterbury Convocation on proposed Canon 83 (secular occupations of clergy) (1955), p. 4.

There is therefore special need at the present time of church helpers or διάκονοι who will join with the clergy in church administration, give social service to the community in the name of the Church, and assist the clergy in teaching and preaching.

III. A Reformed Diaconate for Presbyterianism

For the purposes described in the preceding section there lies for the Presbyterian Churches an instrument ready to hand in the eldership, which already to a large extent corresponds in practice to the primitive diaconate.

In the Reformed Church in the sixteenth century the eldership was distinguished from the diaconate partly for practical reasons, partly owing to a misinterpretation of Scripture. There was a practical need, at least on the Continent, for two distinct types of assistant to the ministers of the Word and Sacraments: (*a*) Seniors or Elders who would see that godly discipline was maintained in the parish, and (*b*) distributors of the Church's charity to the poor. The existence of distinct offices for these two purposes was deduced from Rom. 12.8 and 1 Cor. 12.28; the references there to governing were assumed to relate to the eldership and the references to distribution, mercy and help were assumed to relate to the diaconate. This superstructure is probably more than these texts will bear, because the Apostle in both places is speaking of the exercise of different spiritual gifts (χαρίσματα), not of a distinction of ecclesiastical offices. Howbeit, having found in these texts a distinction of offices, the Reformers proceeded to identify the disciplinary seniors with the supposed 'ruling elders' of 1 Tim. 5.17,[1] and the distributors of charity with the Seven of Acts 6.

This pattern of elders and deacons was introduced into Scotland in the sixteenth century. To the deacons was assigned by the first Book of Discipline (1561) the gathering of alms and their distribution to the poor, and the providing for the sick and impotent. These functions were expanded in the Second Book of Discipline (1581) into the more general statement that 'their office and power is to receive and to distribute the whole

[1] Here also the interpretation would seem to be more than can safely be supported by this much-disputed text, which is more probably a plea for extra financial support for those presbyters who are good at presiding, e.g. at public worship.

ecclesiastical goods unto them unto whom they are appointed'. The office of deacon, however, faded away in Scotland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because it was the duty of the heritors (landowners) of the parish to provide and maintain the church property, and the elders could conveniently care for the poor. The diaconate was revived by the Free Church in 1843, and that is why in some congregations of the Church of Scotland today financial affairs are managed by a 'Deacons' Court'. The system is similar in the Presbyterian Church of England.

In both Scotland and England the elder corresponds more effectively to the Scriptural and primitive deacon than does the modern deacon, whose duties are concerned only with finance and property. It is the elders who distribute the elements at the Lord's Supper, visit the congregation, assist in teaching, attend the synods, and share the discipline and administration of the Church with the ministers.

Presbyterians make a point of basing their church order on Scripture. But the New Testament discloses no office of 'elder' between those of presbyter and deacon, nor any distinction of office within the presbyterate.[1] It would therefore be more in accordance with Scripture if it were recognised that the New Testament basis for the eldership is the diaconate. If this were recognised it would be logical to rename the elders 'deacons'. This would no doubt be objected to on the ground that it appeared to debase the eldership; actually it would enhance it, because it would give the office for the first time a real Scriptural foundation and identify it with one of the three traditional orders of ministry.

If the Presbyterian elder were conceived of as a true deacon, his functions could be restated under the four headings given in section I above and provision could be made for three kinds of deacon, none of whom would necessarily perform all four kinds of function.

(1) The existing elders would, as at present, be occupied mainly with (*a*) and (*b*) (liturgical and administrative functions) but those who had capacity and opportunity would be concerned also with (*b*) (teaching, e.g. in Bible classes) and (*c*)

[1] The question is examined in detail in the author's booklet *What is an Elder?* (obtainable from Presbyterian Book Room, 86 Tavistock Place, London W.C.1).

(social work). There is perhaps room for the undertaking by elders of a greater share of liturgical work. That they should read the Scriptures would only be a revival of the old custom by which elders read from the 'laitron' (lectern) while the congregation were assembling, a purpose now served by organ music. And if the 'House Church' becomes a common feature of Scottish church life, elders may well be called upon to assist the ministers by conducting services in houses.

(2) Probationers or Licentiates for the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments could also be regarded as deacons, being ordained to the diaconate for preaching purposes only. They would not administer the Sacraments and would not take part in the government of the Church unless duly appointed to a Kirk Session. They might be termed 'preaching deacons', the ordinary deacons being 'ruling deacons' (on the analogy of the existing term 'ruling elder').

(3) Lay Readers (in England Lay Preachers) might also be ordained as 'Preaching deacons', but distinguished in some way from the probationers for the Ministry.

The Presbyterian hierarchy of church courts would seem to make the office of archdeacon unnecessary.

IV. A Reformed Diaconate for the Anglican Churches

The Church of England has no office serving all the needs of the present day as indicated at the end of section II above. It is for consideration whether that church could not provide such an office, and at the same time come closer to the primitive Church, by an extension of the diaconate.

According to the Ordinals of the Church of England and the Episcopal Church in Scotland (the two are identical on this point) the duties of a deacon are:

(*a*) *Liturgical*: 'to assist the Priest in Divine Service, and especially when he ministereth the Holy Communion, and to help him in the distribution thereof; and to read the Holy Scriptures and Homilies in the Church'; also 'in the absence of the Priest to baptise infants'.

(*b*) *Educational*: 'to instruct the youth in the Catechism . . . and to preach, if he be admitted thereto by the Bishop.'

(*c*) *Charitable*: to give information about the poor and needy to the incumbent, 'where provision is so made'. (Apparently the deacon has no duty to administer charity or collect funds, but only to give information; but in any case this item has long been a dead letter.)

In practice the deacon's duties are confined to (*a*) and (*b*). This covers only a part of the primitive deacon's functions. If the Anglican Churches are to have a third order of ministry corresponding effectively to the primitive diaconate, one way of achieving this would be to ordain to the diaconate men who will take an active part in the administration of the Church's affairs and in the service of the community; others might also be so ordained who specialise in liturgical and teaching activities.

A Presbyterian writer can only make tentative suggestions in this field, but the following offices seem, to an outsider at least, to be among those which might be considered for inclusion in an enlarged diaconate.

(i) *Churchwardens*. Their canonical duties consist principally in the provision of requisites for Divine Service, allocation of seats in church, maintenance of order during worship, supervision of morals, and collection and disposal of alms. All these functions were performed by deacons in primitive times. If churchwardens become deacons, sidesmen (who are now, in effect, churchwardens' assistants) should be subdeacons.

(ii) *Parochial Church Councillors* form, no doubt, too large a body for inclusion in the diaconate, and many of them hold office only for a short period; but the functions of a Parochial Church Council are to a great extent functions of the primitive diaconate.

(iii) If *lay members of the Church Assembly* were ordained to the diaconate, this would have the added advantage of facilitating the assimilation of the Church Assembly and the Convocations.

(iv) *Readers* could be ordained to the diaconate for preaching purposes, like their Presbyterian counterparts. This would, incidentally, overcome the unaptness of the term 'reader'. In the early Church the *lector* held the fourth of the five 'minor orders', but unlike the modern Reader his duties were confined to the reading of the Scriptures.

(v) *Diocesan Chancellors* had no counterpart in primitive times, but might be considered for ordination to the diaconate as permanent servants in the administration of the Church.

(vi) Similarly *lay canons* are permanently engaged in duties essentially the same as some of those performed by the primitive deacons.

These suggestions do not exhaust the possibilities. It might for instance be thought appropriate to make deacons of certain people whose main work consists in the giving of religious instruction or social service in the name of the Church. It would be easier for the Church of England than the Church of Scotland to provide for a variety of deacons, because the Church of Scotland is traditionally wedded to the principle that every elder should be a member of a local Kirk Session.

Some such development as is sketched here may well come about as the result of purely practical needs. It is true that in the past objection has been taken to any such extension of the diaconate on the ground that it is a 'holy' order which ought to be kept distinct from secular life. 'It would be a great misfortune', said the report of a Committee of Canterbury Convocation in 1904, 'that [the diaconate] should be lowered in public estimation. Such a lowering would inevitably follow if a deacon were to follow any secular calling which was exposed to the compromises and entanglements of trade or business, or were forced to advance his own interests by competition with the material interests of his fellow men.' The example of the Presbyterian elder, who is ordained to a life office in the Church while continuing his secular calling, may serve to show how such an office may still remain high in public estimation. At all events the matter is again a live issue within the Church of England. The Convocation Committee on the proposed Canon 83 recommended the ordination to the priesthood of picked men from the ranks of industry who, after ordination, would continue to earn their living as before, and exercise an evangelistic and pastoral ministry among their fellow-workers; the Committee also made proposals for a supplementary parochial ministry of part-time priests, and added (page 9):

> The difficulties which arise from the conception of a supplementry parochial ministry are administrative rather than theological, practical rather than spiritual. If this be true of the ordination of a man engaged in lay work to the priesthood, it is even more true of the diaconate, where there appears to be no conceivable theological difficulty.

At the time of writing, this Committee has been reappointed to consider further the possibility of a lay diaconate. Another Committee is considering the reform of synodical government, where one of the possibilities is no doubt the appointment of lay deacons to a third House of Convocation.[1]

If categories (ii) and (iii) are to be added to the diaconate, it would be necessary to open the diaconate to women. Anglicans, in compliance with ancient tradition, do not admit women to the priesthood, but the diaconate was not considered in primitive times to be part of the priesthood, except in the

[1] The Report is now available under the title *The Convocations and the Laity* (Church Information Board, 1958, 2s. 6d.).

broadest sense of the word.[1] On the other hand the deacons were regarded as 'clergy', which apparently the deaconesses were not.[2] Here we come up against the question whether there ought to be a sharp distinction between 'clergy' and 'laity'. Granted that within the corporate priesthood of the whole Church there is a distinct ministry founded by Jesus Christ, which He 'uses . . . as an organic link between the Church in all ages and Himself',[3] it is for consideration whether there is not room for a second and intermediate but nevertheless sacred ministry, for the purpose of keeping the first ministry in effective contact with the whole Church and the Church in effective contact with the world. There would appear to be much scope here for further conversation between Anglicans and Presbyterians.

It would be unprofitable at this stage to consider the place within Anglicanism of the office of *Archdeacon*. This office has already passed through three stages: originally the archdeacon was a deacon who supervised the other deacons; in medieval times he became a financial officer; in modern times he has become, in effect, an assistant bishop. It is sometimes suggested[4] that the archdeacon should now become a person in deacon's orders charged with the administration of diocesan funds and properties and perhaps also with the oversight of lay deacons. But the question whether there should be archdeacons at all, and if so what they should do, does not belong to the doctrine of the Ministry.

[1] See Bingham, *Antiquities*, II.xix.14, xx.2. Optatus referred to *diaconos in tertio sacerdotio constitutos*, and Augustine once called a deacon his *consacerdos*, but the Council of Carthage (IV.4) laid down that *diaconus non ad sacerdotium sed ad ministerium consecratur*, and most early writers call deacons Levites.

[2] Cf. the questions asked by Professor Greenslade at the end of his article on *Ordo* in *S.J.T.* (June 1956), vol. 9, p. 174. 'In what sense are deacons an order? What is implied where they are treated as having *ordo*? That their difference of office, combined with apostolic institution, constitutes difference of order? Or that they participate, in a limited way, in *sacerdotium*? Can the necessity of deacons, as distinct from the fact of their occurrence in the Apostolic Church, be demonstrated from any biblical principle?'

[3] *Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches*, section 2.

[4] e.g. by Canon W. J. Phythian-Adams in *The Way of At-one-ment* (1954), p. 124.

THE GNOSTIC LIBRARY OF NAG HAMMADI

by The Rev. Dr R. McL. WILSON

From the time of their first discovery the Dead Sea Scrolls have aroused keen interest in the world of scholarship, while the publication of certain sensational theories regarding the relation of these documents to the origins of Christianity has brought them to the notice of the general public also. The result has been a consistent flow of books and articles, ranging from detailed scholarly analyses based on minute study of the texts to more or less popular presentations. The whole area in which the Scrolls were found has been thoroughly explored, and yet more documents discovered. The texts themselves have been subjected to the closest scrutiny by workers in many fields of learning. Answers have been found for some old problems, and new questions have been raised for investigation; and still the study continues. It has been reckoned that the number of publications relating to the Scrolls is now in excess of three thousand, and still the end is not in sight, for not all the texts have yet been published.

Very different was the fate of another discovery, the Gnostic library found some two years earlier at Nag Hammadi in Egypt, in a region associated with the beginnings of Egyptian monasticism under Pachomius. Yet of this find it has been said: 'The historical importance of this discovery may fairly be set on a level with that of the Dead Sea Scrolls. The latter throws new light on inter-testamental Judaism and on Christian beginnings; the former does something comparable for subsequent Christian development.'[1] Admittedly it is unlikely that any sensation, in the popular sense of the word, will arise from the publication of these texts. There will be no shaking of the foundations, nor will any have cause to tremble for the ark of the Lord. For one thing, whereas the date of the Dead Sea Scrolls was open to discussion, and for some the debate is not yet closed, the Nag Hammadi texts can be definitely placed in the Christian era. Accordingly, while the possibility could be

[1] A. D. Nock in *J.T.S.*, ix (1958), 315.

entertained that the ideas of the Qumran sect had influenced Christianity at a formative stage of its development, in the case of the Gnostic texts this possibility is considerably more remote. It may be that the study of these texts will reveal hitherto unsuspected currents of thought in the background of the New Testament period, but the texts themselves quite definitely belong to a later era. Their real importance lies in the light which they may be expected to shed on what was fifty years ago described as one of the dimmest chapters in Church history.[1]

The general character of Gnosticism, of course, has long been known. The heresy is discussed in manuals of church history and in histories of dogma, and it might well seem that we know all that we need to know; but as soon as we begin to inquire more closely the difficulties arise. The traditional view regarded Gnosticism as the result of the contamination of Christianity by Greek philosophy, but the trend in the past half-century or so has been altogether in the direction of considering it as both wider than and older than the Christian faith itself, so much so indeed that in the works of some writers it becomes difficult to draw a line of distinction between 'Gnosticism' as they understand it and the prevalent religious syncretism of the Hellenistic Age.[2] The school of Bultmann in particular has stoutly maintained the presence of Gnostic influence in the New Testament itself,[3] and in recent years R. P. Casey has been moved to protest against the 'general and generalised impression' that Gnosticism was in one way or another a potent factor in the formative period of primitive Christian theology.[4] Here of course is another point of contact with the Dead Sea Scrolls, since some have claimed to find Gnosticism there; but the general opinion now appears to be that while the sect most certainly laid some stress on knowledge

[1] The phrase is that of Robert Law, *The Tests of Life* (Edinburgh, 1909), 26.

[2] cf. Foerster, 'Das Wesen der Gnosis', in *Die Welt als Geschichte* (1955), 100ff, esp. 102.

[3] See for example Bultmann's *Theology of the NT* and his *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting*; Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist* (vol. i, 1934, 1954; vol. ii, pt. 1, 1954); and most recently Becker, *Die Reden des Johannesevangeliums und der Stil der gnostischen Offenbarungsrede* (Göttingen, 1956), and Schmithals, *Die Gnosis in Korinth* (Göttingen, 1956).

[4] *The Background of the NT and its Eschatology* (ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube, Cambridge, 1956) 52ff.

this knowledge was by no means the same as the *gnosis* of the second-century sects.[1]

The subject moreover has a certain practical relevance, if only because Gnosticism in one form or another is by no means entirely a thing of the past. No one with a knowledge of Gnosticism can read an account of some modern 'Christian deviations' without being reminded again and again of the Gnostic theories. As C. H. Dodd has observed: 'In the controversy with Gnosticism in the second and third centuries, the main point at issue was whether the Christian faith could be detached from its biblical and historical basis and presented as a form of Hellenistic theosophy.'[2] And the same problem arises with every fresh attempt to present the Gospel in terms of 'modern thought'. It is in contrast with Gnostic theory that the real theological achievement of the early Church is most clearly seen. It was necessary, and indeed inevitable, that the Gospel should be clothed in a Greek or Graeco-Roman dress when it was carried beyond the bounds of Palestine into a wider world. Judaistic Christianity disappears from the stage at a comparatively early period in the history of the Church, and indeed had Christianity remained Judaistic there might well have been no history of the Church. Admittedly Christianity long retained a certain Jewish character,[3] but without a reinterpretation and exposition of its central truths in the language of the age the Gospel would not have conquered the world; yet the very process was fraught with danger.

How great the danger was may be seen from the simple fact that Irenaeus, Hippolytus and Tertullian, to name no others, all regarded it as sufficiently serious for them to take up the pen against it. A fairly common modern attitude may be summed up in the words of Dr Charles Bigg: 'It is a mistake to approach the Gnostics on the metaphysical side. There is a certain wild poetic force in Valentinus, but otherwise their world philosophy is purely grotesque. The ordinary Christian controversialist felt that he had nothing to do but set out at unsparing length their tedious pedigrees, in the well-grounded confidence

[1] Some points in this paragraph are more fully discussed in Wilson, *The Gnostic Problem* (London, 1958).

[2] *According to the Scriptures* (London, 1952), 136f.

[3] cf. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London, 1958), 17, and for a full study Daniélou, *Théologie du judéo-christianisme* (Paris, 1958).

that no one would care to peruse them a second time.'[1] With this a modern reader has very considerable sympathy, especially when confronted with some of the later texts which have survived in Coptic; but if this were all would Irenaeus and others have taken such great pains? As it is, Dr Bigg himself goes on to say that Gnosticism 'was an attempt, a serious attempt, to fathom the dread mystery of sorrow and pain, to answer that spectral doubt, which is mostly crushed down by force: Can the world as we know it have been made by God?' It is no small part of the value of the new documents that they will not only provide us with the materials for a fuller historical study of the movement but will also, as Professor Puech has said, help us to a clearer understanding of what Gnosticism meant *to a Gnostic*.[2]

Our knowledge hitherto has of necessity been very largely based on the Christian Refutations, which are of course open to suspicion as being the propaganda of the opposition, although F. M. M. Sagnard has vindicated the reliability of Irenaeus in a long and careful study.[3] Here we see Gnosticism through the eyes of its opponents, as it appeared to men who considered it a menace to the truth of the Gospel. Of original Gnostic documents in Greek we had the fragments embedded in patristic writings, those of Heracleon's commentary on the Fourth Gospel, for example, quoted in his own commentary by Origen, or the extracts from the Valentinian Theodotus among the writings of Clement of Alexandria, and the complete text of a letter from another Valentinian, Ptolemy, to a lady named Flora whom he evidently hoped to convert.[4] Apart from these and similar fragments the only original documents at our disposal until recent years were the three books of Pistis Sophia and an older unnamed work in the Askew Codex, and the two books of Jeu and another anonymous work in the Bruce Codex, all in Coptic.[5] The existence of three other

[1] *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (Oxford, 1886), 28.

[2] *The Jung Codex* (ed. F. L. Cross, London, 1955), 29.

[3] *La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de s. Irénée* (Paris, 1947).

[4] The fragments are collected in Völker, *Quellen zur Geschichte der christlichen Gnosis* (Tübingen, 1932); those of Heracleon are edited by Brooke, *The Fragments of Heracleon* (Texts and Studies, i.4, Cambridge, 1891), the *Excerpta ex Theodoto* by Casey (Studies and Documents, i, London, 1934) and Sagnard (Sources chrétiennes, 23, Paris, 1948), and the *Epistle to Flora* by Quispel (Sources chrétiennes, Paris, 1949).

[5] German translation in Schmidt, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften* (2nd ed., revised

Coptic documents had been known for some sixty years, but it was only in 1955 that they were finally published.[1] The delay, however, was in this respect an advantage, in that it allowed the editor to incorporate the variant readings of copies of two of these documents among the Nag Hammadi texts. One of them, the *Apocryphon of John*, is undoubtedly of the first importance: for one thing, part of this text is so closely similar to the account of the Barbelognostics in Irenaeus that Schmidt in 1907 identified it as the source employed for that chapter[2]; for another, it is represented in the Nag Hammadi library by no less than three copies, which is sufficient indication of the prestige which it enjoyed in the eyes of this Gnostic sect. On the other hand it is now necessary to exercise some caution in regard to Schmidt's identification, for three reasons[3]: in the first place, there are some differences, already noted by Schmidt between the Coptic text and the account in Irenaeus. Secondly, two of the Nag Hammadi texts are reported to differ considerably from the published text, and accordingly were not used for this edition; it may be that one of these will prove even closer to Irenaeus. Thirdly, there are certain other documents in the new library which may also require to be taken into account.[4] What is certain, however, is that Irenaeus and the published text describe the same system,[5] and thus we have some confirmation of the reliability of Irenaeus. The existence of three different versions of the same document, of course, opens up the possibility of a comparative study which may reveal the process of expansion and adaptation.

The library of Nag Hammadi consists of thirteen codices in all, comprising some forty-eight writings, of which forty-three were previously unknown. Altogether there are about 1000 pages, of which nearly 800 are complete, and these contain writings of which some at least are reported to provide evidence for an earlier and purer stage of the development of the

by W. C. Till, Berlin, 1954). The anonymous work in the Bruce Codex is edited by Miss C. A. Baynes, *A Coptic Gnostic Treatise* (Cambridge, 1933).

[1] Till, *Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502* (Berlin, 1955).

[2] *Philotesia. Paul Kleinert . . . dargebracht* (Berlin, 1907), 315ff. For summaries of this Apocryphon see Till in *JEH*, 3.14f, and Wilson, *The Gnostic Problem*, 149ff.

[3] cf. *J.T.S.*, vii (1956), 248ff.

[4] cf. Doresse, *Les livres secrets des gnostiques d'Égypte* (Paris, 1958), 228ff, and his article in *Vig. Chr.*, ii (1948), 137ff.

[5] Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne*, 439ff, presents a summary in parallel columns which makes the connexion clear.

Gnostic movement than any yet known. The significance of the discovery may be summed up in the words of Professor Quispel,[1] that when these documents are published the modern scholar will have at his disposal richer sources of information than were possessed by the contemporaries of these Gnostics. The doctrines of these sects were secret, to be communicated only to the initiate. Towards the end of the *Apocryphon of John*, for example, a solemn curse is pronounced upon any who shall transmit its contents to another for the sake of merely material gain.[2]

Of the thirteen codices, twelve were finally acquired in 1952 for the Coptic Museum in Cairo, although the actual discovery dates back to 1945 or 1946. Only within the last three years or so has it been possible for the international committee appointed to attend to their publication to get to work, so that some time must elapse before they are fully available. A photographic edition containing four documents and parts of some others was published in 1956[3] and, on the basis of this, German translations of three of these texts have now appeared in print.[4] An introductory study has been published by M. Jean Doresse, one of the first to know about the new discovery, and an English translation of this book is promised for the spring of 1959.[5]

The thirteenth codex made its way first to the United States and subsequently back to Europe, where it was finally traced by Professor Quispel and acquired for the Jung Institute in Zürich. As it happens, this codex is different both in form and in content from the remainder of the library. Whereas the documents of the Jung Codex have been identified as predominantly Valentinian in origin, those of the Cairo Museum derive from the Sethian sect. The Jung Codex is the principal subject of the one book on the discovery which has so far appeared in English,[6] and one of the documents which it contains is the only one so far published in an edited form.[7]

[1] *Gnosis als Weltreligion* (Zürich, 1951), 3.
[2] *Apoc. Joh.*, 76.10-15 (Till, pp. 192/3).
[3] *Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo* (ed. Labib, Cairo, 1956).
[4] *Gospel of Thomas* in *TLZ*, 1958, 481ff (J. Leipoldt), *The Hypostasis of the Archons*, ibid. 661ff (H. M. Schenke), *Gospel of Philip*, ibid. 1959, 1ff (H. M. Schenke).
[5] *Les livres secrets* (see p. 165, n. 4, above). The English edition is to be published by Messrs Hollis and Carter.
[6] *The Jung Codex*, ed. F. L. Cross (London, 1955).
[7] *Evangelium Veritatis*, ed. Malinine, Puech and Quispel, Zürich, 1956. For an

Unfortunately the published text has two leaves missing, but these were subsequently found among the Cairo texts and are included in the photographic edition referred to above.[1] Inventories of the library as a whole have been compiled by M. Doresse and by Professor H. C. Puech,[2] and a short survey in Dutch, including an outline of four of the documents, has recently been published by Professor W. C. van Unnik.[3]

Within the limits of a single article it is of course not possible to give a full account of all the documents, or to discuss the many problems which they raise and for which we may hope they will provide a solution. In any case speculation is premature until the actual texts become available. A convenient classification has, however, been supplied by Doresse,[4] who groups the documents under four main heads. First come 'the Revelations of the great prophets of *gnosis*, from Seth to Zoroaster', most of them of a type described by Puech[5] as 'markedly abstruse revelations on the origin of the world' but including some which are mentioned by Porphyry in his *Life of Plotinus* or cited by such writers as Hippolytus and Epiphanius. Secondly, there are the 'Gnostics disguised as Christians', under which head Doresse includes the *Sophia Jesu Christi* and the *Apocryphon of John*, both of which are now available

account of this document see *The Jung Codex*, and for a brief summary Wilson, *The Gnostic Problem*, 155ff. In *Ned. Theol. Tijdschrift*, 11, 177, Quispel has claimed that this *Gospel of Truth* represents a transposition of Johannine data into Gnostic terms. In *NTS*, v (1959), 130ff, L. Cerfaux has carefully compared the ideas of this document with those of Paul in Rom. 1. Professor van Unnik (*The Jung Codex*, 104) has put forward the thesis that the *Gospel of Truth* was written by Valentinus c. A.D. 140-5, before the development of the typically 'Gnostic' dogmas, but this has already been challenged by Haenchen (review in *ZKG*, 67), Leipoldt (*TLZ*, 1957, 831) and Schenke (*TLZ*, 1958, 497, n. 1). It is however accepted provisionally by C. K. Barrett (*Exp. Times*, lxix.169). Till in *Orientalia*, 27 (1958), 269ff, has suggested numerous alternatives to the readings and translations of the published edition.

[1] Translation by Schenke in *TLZ*, 1958, 497ff, where other pages belonging to the Jung Codex are also identified among those published in the photographic edition.

[2] Puech in *Coptic Studies in Honor of W. E. Crum* (Boston, 1950), 91ff, Doresse, op. cit., 165ff. Some of the MSS are numbered differently in these two lists, but the inventories have been collated by van Unnik (see next note), 14ff.

[3] *Openbaringen uit Egyptisch Zand* (den Haag, 1958). References to the earlier literature will be found in the books and articles listed in these notes, but special mention may be made of two articles by Puech and Quispel: 'Les écrits gnostiques du Codex Jung', *Vig. Chr.*, viii (1954), 1-51, and 'Le quatrième écrit du Codex Jung', ibid., ix (1955), 65-102.

[4] op. cit., 169ff. It may be noted that the inventories show only one apocryphal book of Acts (of Peter), a point which may be of some significance.

[5] *The Jung Codex*, 20.

in Dr Till's edition of the Berlin Codex.[1] Of the latter Professor van Unnik has observed that here Jesus appears as no more than the revealer of the true knowledge, which is the real redeeming power. Jesus Himself does not occupy a central place, and his figure could be removed without any substantial change in the book.[2] Moreover a tentative probing seems to indicate that New Testament allusions are much less prominent in this document than, for example, in the *Gospel of Truth*, whereas use of the Old Testament is beyond all question. Should this document prove to be really a Christianised version of an older work, it might serve to settle a long-standing problem; but the fact that the original was *non*-Christian would not necessarily mean that it was *pre*-Christian.

Doresse's third category includes 'the Gospels of Christianised Gnosis', described by Puech[3] as 'apocryphas of a more specifically Christian character, some of which profess to transmit the discourses of the Redeemer with His disciples and His teaching after His Resurrection, others the secret traditions of the Apostles'. Here Doresse includes the *Gospel of Truth* in the Jung Codex, which is however not a 'Gospel' but, as van Unnik has shown,[4] a homily or meditation. Of special interest in this category is the Gospel of Thomas, which has no relation whatever to the infancy Gospel of the same title included in James' *Apocryphal New Testament* but contains a collection of sayings of Jesus, and has been identified by Puech as almost identical in parts with the three famous Logia fragments from Oxyrhynchus.[5]

The fourth and final group includes a number of Hermetic documents, one of which contains some part of the *Asclepius*, a work extant in Latin in the Corpus Hermeticum. The presence of Hermetic texts in a predominantly Gnostic library is remarkable but not altogether surprising, since the affinities of Hermetism and Gnosticism have long been recognised. The two movements are however in many respects distinct, the Hermetic remaining largely if not entirely untouched by

[1] See p. 165, n1., above.
[2] *Openbaringen*, 66.
[3] op. cit., 21.
[4] *The Jung Codex*, 95.
[5] Latin translation by G. Garitte of the parts corresponding to the Oxyrhynchus Logia in *Muséon*, 70 (1957), 59ff, and of certain 'parables of the kingdom', with a commentary by L. Cerfaux, ibid., 307ff. German translation in *TLZ*, 1958, 481ff. See Puech in *C. R. Acad. Inscrr. et Belles Lettres*, 1957 (Paris, 1958), 146ff, for a full study in which references to some of these *logia* in later literature are identified.

Christian influences whereas Gnosticism, at least in the more restricted 'traditional' sense of the term, presents a strange variety of efforts by Christians on the one hand to adapt their faith to suit the ideas and the aspirations of the contemporary world, and by pagans on the other to incorporate in their own systems something at least of the new religion which centred in Jesus Christ.

Even from so brief a survey it will be clear how much remains to be done, and how important this discovery may prove in many fields of study. The Coptic scholar will welcome such an abundant accession to the available resources for the study of the language, and particularly of its dialects. The Church historian will eventually be able to speak with fuller knowledge of some of the more obscure by-ways of second- and third-century Christianity. The historian of religion may find here, as Professor Quispel has suggested,[1] a lost religion. For the New Testament scholar Professor van Unnik[2] has indicated four lines of study in which the new material may prove of value: first, the history of the Canon at a comparatively early and formative stage, for some of these documents may take us back as far as the time of Justin Martyr, if not even earlier; secondly, textual criticism, in that Professor Quispel has noted some agreements between the *Gospel of Thomas* and Tatian's *Diatessaron*.[3] Thirdly, the presence in this Gospel of more than a hundred sayings must raise the question of their authenticity, for if some are undoubtedly spurious there are others which may yet stake a claim to recognition as genuine Agrapha. Finally, there is the vexed question of Gnosticism in the New Testament. As van Unnik remarks,[4] anyone who has studied the speculations about Adam in the *Apocryphon of John* will not be so ready to link Paul's exposition in Rom. 5 and 1 Cor. 15 with similar ideas of a Gnostic kind; nor will anyone who has seen how the Gnostics employ the Son of Man concept be inclined to explain the term in the Gospels by the aid of *Urmensch* ideas. Whatever progress may eventually result in these various fields, however, the primary importance of the new library must clearly lie in its

[1] *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, 12.
[2] *Openbaringen*, 78f.
[3] *Vig. Chr.*, xi (1957), 189ff. This article discusses the possibility that these Agrapha were derived from a Jewish-Christian Gospel originally written in Aramaic. Our knowledge of the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* is however insufficient to admit of far-reaching conclusions.
[4] *Openbaringen*, 79.

provision of the materials for a fuller and more comprehensive study of the Gnostic movement in all its aspects which may in time bring us to a better understanding of the whole background of early Christianity and a truer vision of the distinctive genius of the New Testament faith.

THE PAROUSIA OF CHRIST IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

by The Rev. H. P. OWEN

The Second Coming (otherwise called the Parousia)[1] of Christ constituted a serious problem for the apostolic Church. One of the earliest of Paul's Epistles (1 Thessalonians) shows how quickly his converts became discouraged when some of their number died before the Lord's appearing. In reply Paul repeats his promise that the Lord will soon return, although in his second epistle he has to give a reminder that Antichrist must first make a final bid for power (1 Thess. 4.15-18, 2 Thess. 2). Similarly the author of Hebrews, writing to a disillusioned and apathetic group of Christians some decades later in the first century, recalls the words of Habakkuk that 'the Lord will come and not be slow' (10.37). Finally 2 Peter, the latest book of the New Testament (written, perhaps, as late as the middle of the second century), continues to offer the hope of an imminent Parousia to be accompanied by the world's destruction and renewal (ch. 3). If Christians are tempted to despair they must remember that the word of prophets and Apostles is sure (v. 2) and that with God 'a thousand years are as one day' (v. 8).

This tenacious belief in a speedy return of the Lord in glory, which was an element in both the Petrine and Pauline Kerygma (Acts 3.20ff, 10.42, 17.31; 1 Thess. 1.10), would be scarcely credible if it had not been first propounded by the Lord Himself. The Church may well have embellished the belief with details drawn from the common stock of Jewish apocalyptic; it may even (as in Mark 13 or in certain of the Matthean additions to Mark and Q) have allowed these embellishments to affect its record of Christ's teaching; but to suppose that His teaching gave *no* warrant for the belief would be to suppose so alarming a discontinuity between the mind of Christ and the mind of His Apostles that the supposition ought not to be held except for the strongest reasons. Moreover, is it likely that the

[1] In my use of the word 'Parousia' I am following the normal practice of the New Testament where the word 'nearly always means Christ's Messianic Advent in glory to judge the world at the end of this age' (Baner's *Wörterbuch*).

Church would have invented (or, if invented, maintained) a belief that was as productive of embarrassment as it was of hope? Hardly. The natural, as it is certainly the desirable, assumption is that the belief of the Apostles was, in its essence, the belief of Christ.

Any attempt to assess Christ's eschatological mission must begin with Schweitzer. We are concerned here only with the core of Schweitzer's thesis, and the core can be stated in a sentence. Jesus died in the conviction that His death would precipitate His glorification as the Messiah and the final advent of the Kingdom; the Cross would be the prelude to the End. With the peripheral elements in Schweitzer's thought—his views on 'election', his rearrangement of Marcan chronology, even his concept of interim-ethics—we need not be concerned. Our sole question is whether the synoptic evidence allows us to endorse Schweitzer's account of Christ's eschatological expectations. In the preface to the latest edition of *The Quest for the Historical Jesus* (London, 1954, p. xiv), Schweitzer complains that his thesis 'is in the remarkable position of not being disproved and, at the same time, not being fully recognised'. I believe Schweitzer's complaint to be justified. There is (to put it at a minimum) a tendency, even on the part of scholars, to avoid the full impact of his conclusions. Certainly it is not too much to say that among the non-specialist religious public there is an unreflecting (and supposedly comforting) assurance that, to quote words that I heard a well-read minister use in discussion, 'more recent scholarship' and 'realised eschatology' have 'proved Schweitzer wrong'. I do not believe that they have done anything of the kind. They have corrected Schweitzer's extreme perspectives and thereby led to a more balanced —and more profound—apprehension of New Testament eschatology as a whole; but they have not proved his central thesis wrong.

In this article I propose to do two things. Firstly I shall examine the evidence that the Synoptic Gospels offer for the view that Jesus predicted an imminent Parousia and End. I shall arrange the evidence in three classes: individual (mostly 'Son of Man') sayings, parables and teaching about the future Kingdom. This evidence is doubtless not complete; but it is the *main* evidence and as such ought to be sufficient. Secondly

I shall attempt to interpret the evidence in the light of the acute theological problem that it raises. If someone should object that the ground has been trodden before (and often by expert guides) I can only reply that the ground seems to me to have become somewhat obscured of late and that there are some among us who no longer see the necessity of treading it at all. As for the guides (both Schweitzer himself and his many successors) I gladly acknowledge my debt to their illumination and I shall be content if all I do is add a touch of brightness to the lamp that they have lit.

I

1. Let us first examine six sayings in which Jesus appears to predict an imminent Parousia.

(*a*) Mark 14.62. In answer to the High-Priest's question, 'Are you the Christ the Son of the Blessed?' Jesus replies, 'I am, and you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of Heaven.' Jesus here combines two OT quotations: Ps. 110.1, the beginning of a royal enthronement-psalm, and Dan. 7.13, where the prophet predicts that the Son of Man (a symbol for the Saints of the Most High) will receive the Kingdom from the Ancient of Days. Since Jesus clearly understands both texts messianically and applies them to Himself His meaning may be paraphrased: 'I am, indeed, the Messiah and you shall see me fulfilling both the Old Testament passages to which I refer.' The crucial question of exegesis then becomes this. What event or events could count as the fulfilment of the texts? It is only by asking this question that we can be sure of reaching the heart of Christ's reply, for its heart surely resides in the fulfilment of the texts to which he obliquely refers. The fulfilment of the texts will be the fulfilment of His messianic ministry.

Ps. 110.1, taken alone, would naturally refer to Christ's Exaltation—naturally, that is, from the standpoint of subsequent events interpreted through apostolic faith. But what of Dan. 7.13? It is hard to suppose that Jesus would take this to refer to anything short of its original reference—the final consummation; certainly nothing short of this could count as the prophecy's fulfilment. It is true that, as Vincent Taylor notes in his commentary, 'Dan. 7.13 does not describe a

descent, but a coming to the Ancient of Days'. Nevertheless we cannot refer the text to *Christ's* Exaltation, since His Exaltation did not finally fulfil the End, as the apostolic Church knew well. That the Exaltation does not fulfil Dan. 7.13, but that the fulfilment of the latter will occur after the former, is clear from the order of the quotations; Ps. 110.1 comes before Dan. 7.13, whereas if the two referred to the same event and if the 'upward' movement of Dan. 7.13 was to be retained one would expect Dan. 7.13 to be quoted before Ps. 110.1.[1] Finally, the verb ὄψεσθε addressed to Christ's enemies must imply the Parousia, when 'every eye shall see Him, everyone who pierced Him' (Rev. 1.7). Quite apart from the linguistic difficulty of giving the verb a metaphorical sense, the enemies of Christ could not possibly be said to 'see' His Exaltation, since this can be 'seen' through faith alone by those whose 'life is hid with Christ in God' (Col. 3.3; 3.1 is an allusion to Ps. 110.1). Luke, therefore, who evidently wished to confine the saying's reference to the Exaltation, omitted not only ἐρχόμενον but also ὄψεσθε.

(*b*) Mark 8.38. 'Whoever is ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, the Son of Man shall be ashamed of him when He comes in the glory of His Father with the holy angels.' The authenticity of this saying has been impugned on the ground that the parallel saying in Q (Luke 12.8 = Matt. 10.32), while eschatological in character, lacks a reference to the Son of Man's 'coming'. However, a comparison between Mark 8.38 and the Q passage reveals such striking differences in language (ὁμολογεῖν in Q, but not in Mark, ἀρνεῖσθαι in Q and ἐπαισχύνεσθαι in Mark) that it is simpler to assume that we have here two separate logia. The only reason for rejecting Mark 8.38b would then be merely an uncritical prejudice against futurist eschatology. In itself the verse does not necessarily imply an *imminent* Parousia, but since an imminent End is implied in the next verse (9.1, with which we shall deal later) it is reasonable to suppose that imminence is implied here too, or at any rate that Mark (or his source) thought so.

[1] The change in direction was inevitable once the Son of Man stood for the Messiah instead of the Saints. The persecuted remnant ascends to heaven; the victorious Messiah descends from it. Cf. 1 Thess. 4.16-17.

(*c*) Matt. 10.23b (M). While Schweitzer may well have exaggerated the significance of this saying and while the eschatological matter peculiar to Matthew is often unreliable, we still cannot evade the difficulty that this text presents. It comes from the mission-charge to the Twelve and runs: 'Truly I say to you, you will not have gone through (τελέσητε) all the towns of Israel before the Son of Man comes' (R.S.V.). The verb τελέσητε is strange. It may mean either 'go through' in the literal, geographical sense or 'finish preaching to', 'complete evangelising' Israel. In either case the meaning is that before the Twelve have fulfilled their mission to Israel the Son of Man will have appeared. Hard as this logion is to accept as a word of Christ it is even harder to reject as the creation of the Church. Much else in the discourse, particularly the warnings about persecution, can easily be placed in an ecclesiastical *Sitz im Leben*. But who would have invented a logion that was plainly unfulfilled? The Twelve, as we know, returned to Jesus (Mark 6.30, Luke 9.10) and brought back an apparently unsensational report. Jesus, it is true, greets the return of the Seventy with the words, 'I saw Satan fall like lightning from heaven' (Luke 10.18); but even if the alleged author of Matt. 10.38b knew of this logion and knew of it in connexion with the Twelve, not the Seventy (a doubly improbable hypothesis), he could hardly have regarded it as Matt. 10.38's fulfilment. Schniewind goes as far as possible towards a satisfactory solution (*Das Neue Testament Deutsch*, p. 131). Taking the saying to be genuine and extending it to the post-Resurrection activity of the Apostles, he calls it 'ein Verhülltes Wort' which refers to Paul's 'mystery' that 'a part of Israel must remain blind until the fulness of the Gentiles comes in' (Rom. 11.25). This interpretation, however, cannot be accepted since (*a*) the earthly Jesus did not envisage a mission to the Gentiles and (*b*) this logion does not say that Israel will not be converted (fully) before the Parousia; it says that the *Twelve* will not finish *their* ministry to Israel before the Parousia. It is best, therefore, to assume that Jesus actually spoke these words and that He meant what He appears to mean: the Parousia will occur while the Twelve are in the midst of their missionary labours. It should be noted that Jesus does not say that the work of the Twelve is to be a sufficient, or even a contributory

cause of the Parousia. Nothing He ever said implies that the Parousia could come by any means except His death; in Matt. 10.38b he merely sets a time-limit (the present generation) which is wholly consonant with His teaching elsewhere. And whether we confine the saying to the Twelve's first mission or extend it to cover other missions (either before the Cross or even after the Resurrection) makes no difference to the stubborn fact that the prediction was unfulfilled.

(*d*) Mark 13.30. 'Truly I say to you that this generation shall not pass away until all these things are accomplished.' This comes from the end of the eschatological discourse known as the 'Little Apocalypse' and is obviously Christ's answer to the disciples' question in v. 4: 'When shall these things be?' To what do 'these things' (*ταῦτα*) in v. 30 and v. 4 refer? There can be no doubt in Mark's narrative *ταῦτα πάντα* in v. 30 refers to the eschatological events leading up to and including the Parousia that are described in vv. 5-27. Since, however, *ταῦτα* in v. 4 should, grammatically, refer to Jesus' saying about the destruction of the Temple in v. 2 and since elements in vv. 5-27 (e.g. v. 10) are almost certainly unauthentic, Taylor suggests that in v. 30 *ταῦτα πάντα* has replaced a reference to the destruction of the Temple and the fall of Jerusalem. Yet even if this was the original reference of v. 30 one can hardly dismiss vv. 5-27 out of hand. The very fact that Mark (or his source) places vv. 5-27 after the disciples' question in v. 4 suggests, to say the least, that Jesus Himself spoke of the Temple's destruction as an eschatological event, a 'sign' of the End. It would be such a sign precisely because the Temple would have been defiled by the precursor of the End, Antichrist (v. 14); and that Antichrist must appear before the Son of Man Jesus would have known from Daniel. We have therefore good reason to suppose that Jesus spoke of the destruction of the Temple as an event that would herald the End within the present generation.[1] (It is just possible that v. 30 was

[1] We have also to take into account the background of Jewish apocalyptic, 'for every Jew would have understood the prediction of a new Temple to be meant eschatologically, and a new Temple building was expected from the Messianic era' (Kümmel, *Promise and Fulfilment*, English trans. 1957, p. 101). See further Strack-Billerbeck, iv, 2.929ff. This background explains the transition in Mark 13.4-5ff and in particular *ταῦτα* in v. 4. 'They (sc. the disciples) assume that the fall of the Temple is part of a larger complex of events, and it is about this that they ask' (Farrer *A Study in St. Mark*, p. 363).

originally linked in tradition, not with v. 4 or vv. 5-27, but with the parable of the Fig Tree in v. 28. Since the parable describes premonitory 'signs' the sense would be the same.)

(*e*) Luke 17.20ff, with parallels in Matt. 24. This description of the coming 'Day of the Son of Man' has the ring of authenticity. The apocalyptic details of Mark 13 are absent; the stress falls on the suddenness of the Son of Man's appearing. The Kingdom of God does not come 'with signs to be observed' (v. 20, R.S.V.); the Day will be revealed like a flash of lightning (v. 24), bringing with it instantaneous, final judgment such as fell upon the world in the times of Noah and Lot (vv. 26ff). Just as the Kingdom is now 'among' (ἐντός) men without external signs (v. 21) so it will be on the (future) Day of the Son of Man. Admittedly all this does not state anything about the imminence of the Parousia; indeed v. 22-23, with its predictions of 'false warnings', implies *some* period of delay. But there are two reasons for believing that the delay will not be long. Firstly, there is v. 25: 'But first (πρῶτον) he [sc. the Son of Man] must suffer many things and be rejected by this generation'; this suggests that the Cross will precipitate the 'Messianic woes' preceding the Parousia. Secondly, Jesus is addressing the Twelve; He is preparing them for a sequence of events that they themselves will experience. One should note, too, that according to the ensuing parable God will vindicate His elect speedily (ἐν τάχει, 18.8a); the only question is: 'Will the Son of man find faith (or, better, faithfulness), on the earth?' (v. 18b). Even if Luke's setting of the parable is unhistorical (and there is no compelling reason for saying this) we need not doubt either the authenticity of the parable itself or Luke's wisdom in placing the parable here as an indication of the Day's proximity. But we shall consider the parables of the Parousia separately.

(*f*) Luke 13.34-35 = Matt. 23.37-39 (Q). After lamenting over Jerusalem and foretelling the Temple's desolation Jesus says, according to Luke, 'You shall not see me until you shall say, Blessed is He that comes in the name of the Lord.' T. W. Manson aptly comments as follows. 'The words are a quotation from Ps. 118.26, a psalm which has connexions with the great pilgrim feasts of Judaism, but especially with the Feast of

Tabernacles. Now in the Jewish Liturgy the prophetic lesson appropriated to Tabernacles is Zech. 14, which begins with a prophecy of the desolation of Jerusalem (Zech. 14.1ff) followed by the promise that God will then appear to establish His Kingdom over the whole earth (Zech. 14.5). There is also a piece of Rabbinical evidence connecting Ps. 118 with the final deliverance of Israel (Billerbeck, 1.850). It seems probable, therefore, that the time referred to in this saying is the time of the final consummation' (*The Mission and Message of Jesus*, p. 420). This is strong support for the view that Mark 13 is right in regarding the Temple's destruction as a sign of the End; it also shows the importance (already illustrated by Mark 14.62) of placing Christ's Parousia-predictions in the context of scriptural fulfilment.

2. Parables. Here we enter a controversial field. As is well known, C. H. Dodd, in his justly influential book *The Parables of the Kingdom*, holds that those parables which in their present form refer to the Parousia originally referred to situations and events within the lifetime of the historical Jesus. Now while we may readily admit that parables, like other parts of Jesus' teaching, have been altered (and perhaps in a few cases even invented) to meet the various requirements that the Form-Critics describe, we may well doubt whether the Parousia-Parables can be adjusted to the demands of 'realised eschatology' as easily as Dodd believes. While any judgment here must fall short of certainty, I believe that a brief examination of the following parables is enough to make us hesitate before accepting Dodd's method of reconstruction.

Let us take first the parable of the Pounds in Luke 19.12-27 (=the parable of the Talents in Matt. 25.14-30). We can begin by agreeing with Dodd that the Matthean form is a paraenetic adaptation and that the 'moral' appended to the parable in both versions ('To him who has shall be given, and from him who has not, even what he has shall be taken away') is a detached maxim, found also in Mark 4.25, that originally belonged to another context. But it is Dodd's next step that is questionable. He claims that Christ Himself directed the parable against the Pharisees who had hoarded their religious wealth instead of risking it as God intended. 'Simple folk, publicans and sinners, Gentiles have no benefit from the

Pharisaic observance of the Law, and God has no interest on His capital' (p. 151).

Two main objections can be lodged against Dodd's procedure.

(*a*) One is struck by its wholly speculative character. Why should one invent another *Sitz im Leben* when a perfectly good one is given by Luke? Luke says that Jesus spoke the parable 'because He was near to Jerusalem and they thought that the Kingdom of God was immediately about to appear' (19.11). This seems an entirely natural setting. If, after Peter's confession, the Twelve knew Jesus to be the Messiah and if, as Jewish apocalyptic taught, the Kingdom was to be centred around a restored Zion, the disciples would inevitably look for a nationalistic fulfilment of the messianic hope when Jesus entered the City. (The question of the disciples to the risen Christ in Acts 1.6 shows how far, even after the Cross, they continued to think in nationalistic terms.) As for Dodd's view that in Luke 'the parable is on the way to becoming an allegory' (p. 153), there is nothing more allegorical in the symbolical equations of Luke than there is in those of Dodd's hypothetical substitute.

(*b*) Dodd is forced to say of the details concerning the master's journeying and return that 'it has no independent interest' (p. 150). But in that case the parable is, to say the least, misleading; it puts us, as (if Dodd is right) it put the primitive Church, on the wrong track; and Jesus surely did not intend His parables to constitute *that* kind of puzzle. It is therefore better to take the details seriously and refer them to the withdrawal of the Lord and His return in glory. This reference fits not only the specific occasion of the Jerusalem entry but also the (non-parabolic) sequence previously outlined in Luke 17.20-24.[1]

The same objections hold against Dodd's handling of the parables of Crisis. The parable of the Faithful and Unfaithful Servants (Luke 12.42-46 = Matt. 24.45-51) and the parable of the Waiting Servants (Luke 12.35-38 = Mark 13.33-37) have one theme in common. The master is away from home and his servants do not know when he will return; therefore they must be watchful and prepared. Dodd thinks that Jesus spoke the first parable against the faithless Pharisees (p. 160) and the

[1] See B. Noack, *Das Gottesreich bei Lukas*, pp. 39-50.

second for the benefit of the disciples 'to enforce the necessity of alertness in the crisis now upon them' (p. 167). Once again we must ask why Jesus (needlessly) used the dramatic setting of 'withdrawal and return' if it had no significance. Even more specifically, why did He use the image of the bridegroom and the marriage-feast (Luke 12.35-37) unless it was to signify the time when the bridegroom would be 'taken away' (Luke 5.35) before returning to celebrate the feast with the elect in the age to come (Luke 22.30)?

Then, again, there is the parable of the Thief at Night (Matt. 24.43 = Luke 12.39). The ending of the parable is the same in both Gospels and, therefore, presumably comes from Q. 'Be you also ready, because the Son of Man is coming at a moment when you do not think.' The fact that these words are confirmed by the very early evidence of 1 Thess. 5.2 implies, as Dodd concedes, 'that Paul and his converts knew a tradition which contained the parable with an application substantially identical with that of Q' (p. 168). But Dodd still wants to refer the parable to a hypothetical *Sitz im Leben* where it did not signify the End (pp. 169-71). There is nothing in the parable to suggest that he is wrong (for there is no imagery of withdrawal and return); but neither is there anything to suggest that he is right; and since this is so it seems reasonable to accept the setting given by the earliest tradition we can reach.[1]

3. The Kingdom. In several places Jesus states or implies that the Kingdom, or Reign, of God will appear in the (near) future, e.g. Matt. 6.10 (Thy Kingdom Come), Mark 1.15 where the normal LXX and NT usage requires the translation 'The Kingdom of God has drawn near',[2] and the cup-word in Mark 14.25 ('I shall not drink again of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God') where the natural implication is that the period of abstinence will not be long. Here it is enough to consider one particularly important passage where Jesus predicts the nearness of the Kingdom's advent.

[1] Jeremias follows Dodd in his treatment of these parables (*The Parables of Jesus*, English trans, pp. 38-40, 45-52). Nevertheless Jeremias believes that Jesus taught that the last hour had come, and with it Israel's last chance of repentance before the End (pp. 126-39, 153-7). For a criticism of Dodd (and Jeremias) similar to the one offered here see Kümmel, op. cit., p. 21, pp. 54-58.

[2] See especially R. H. Fuller, *The Mission and Achievement of Jesus*, pp. 21-25.

In Mark 9.1 Jesus says: 'Truly, I say to you, there are some of those standing here who shall not taste death until they have seen the Kingdom of God come with power.' The crucial question is the time-reference of the participle ἐληλυθυῖαν. In rendering the latter 'has come' Dodd simply translates a perfect by a perfect and that is right enough; no one can see the Kingdom until it has first arrived. But *when* will it have arrived? There is nothing grammatically or logically wrong in saying that it had already arrived when Jesus spoke, for one can become aware of something long after it has happened. But it would be theologically wrong to say this since four factors compel us to believe that the Kingdom's 'arrival' is its final consummation. Firstly ἐν δύναμει, especially in view of Mark 13.26 and 14.62, can hardly signify anything less than the future apocalypse that will unveil the Kingdom's present, secret working. Secondly Jesus says that some of the crowd (8.34) as well as the Twelve will see the Kingdom, and the same argument applies to ἴδωσιν here as to ὄψεσθε in 14.62. Thirdly Matt. 16.28 understands the saying to refer to the Parousia and, fourthly, one may assume that Mark, in placing the saying after 8.38, thought the same. This verse alone, then, is virtually certain evidence that Jesus predicted the Kingdom's final advent within the lifetime of at least some of his contemporaries.

It must be conceded that, normally, Jesus' words about the Kingdom are distinct from His words about the Son of Man. But two factors make it clear that for Him the Day of the Son of Man and the advent of the Kingdom are one and the same divine event: (*a*) It was a Jewish belief that the arrival of the Messiah in glory would mean, after the defeat of God's enemies, the establishment of His Reign. Our apocalyptic and (particularly) Rabbinical sources admittedly contain the idea that the messianic Kingdom will be 'an interim Kingdom before the real Kingdom of glory under the Kingly rule of God'.[1] Jesus, however, did not entertain this notion. He modelled His messiahship on Dan. 7 where the Son of Man's acceptance of the Kingdom from the Ancient of Days brings the present age to its end (7.27). (*b*) There are *some* places where the recorded sayings of Jesus forge the required link. Even if we regard the

[1] S. Mowinckel, *He that Cometh* (English trans. p. 321).

collocation of Mark 8.38 and 9.1 as the work of the evangelist (or his source), we still have Luke 17.20ff where 'the days of the Son of Man are the time of the Kingdom of God'.[1]

The result of this survey, based on all the strata within the synoptic tradition, must, therefore, be this. Jesus prophesied, through both parabolic and non-parabolic teaching, that His passion would be soon followed by His return in glory; that His return would be accompanied by the judgment of sinners, the vindication of the elect, and the final establishment of God's Reign; and that these events would constitute the fulfilment of His mission as the Messiah—Son of Man. It is true that He refuses to fix an exact 'day and hour' for the End (Mark 13.32), and we cannot be sure how far (apart from the Temple-predictions) He encouraged an expectation of premonitory signs[2]; but that He expected the End to come within His own generation is beyond dispute. That the End did *not* come is equally beyond dispute. 'The conclusion thus appears to be that Jesus expected the consummation of the Kingdom to take place at some time in the immediate future and that this expectation was not realised.'[3] This absence of realisation creates a theological problem to which we must now turn.

II

In the face of this problem it is possible to fall into four errors. Since these errors are not uncommon they must be mentioned briefly.

1. The error of dismissal. There are those who say that Jesus' mistake about the time of the Parousia does not matter. Whether early or late the Parousia *will* occur (albeit in a form we cannot imagine) and this is all we need to know. Maybe this is all we need to know, but it does not solve or even mitigate our problem. Moreover the belief in an imminent End formed an important element in the motive power behind Christ's ethical teaching, as the parables of Crisis show. How far the belief affected the teaching itself so as to justify the term

[1] B. Noack, op. cit., p. 44.

[2] I do not myself see a contradiction between Luke 17.20 and Luke 21.5ff (=Mark 13.2ff). Luke 17.20 (*Οὐκ ἔρχεται ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ μετὰ παρατηρήσεως*) probably means not that there will be no signs heralding the Parousia but that these signs cannot be used as the basis of a precise prediction, since only the Father knows 'the day and the hour'.

[3] T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus*, p. 282.

'interim-ethic' is a question that still needs to be asked, for it has by no means yet received a definitive answer.

2. The error of misdirected symbolisation. By this I mean the attempt to make Christ's words symbolise something other than the meaning He Himself intended. (It should be noted that the choice is not between a literal and a symbolical interpretation, but between different interpretations, all of which are symbolical.) For instance, patristic and Reformation exegesis tried to make Mark 9.1 refer to the Transfiguration, the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, Pentecost—anything rather than the final consummation. Two modern examples are Bultmann's equation of the 'Day of the Son of Man' with the demand for present 'decision' in an 'encounter' and Wilder's equation of the coming Kingdom with the 'spiritual proximity' of God. Christ, indeed, is constantly encountering us, and by His Resurrection God has been brought permanently near; but neither of these facts is equivalent to the Parousia. As Kümmel rightly observes (op. cit., pp. 147-8) such modern attempts to 'demythologise' the Parousia by equating it with a timeless present signify a complete break with the linear conception of time that Cullmann has shown to be characteristic of the Bible as a whole.

3. The error of 'parallelism'. By this I mean the attitude of the person who says: 'Well, there may be this awkward futurist element in Christ's eschatology, but there is a parallel, equally strong, realised element too.' This is true enough, and we must be grateful to scholars like Otto and Dodd for having stressed the 'realised' element that Schweitzer ignored. But this, again, does not help us to solve our problem, since when we have admitted that Christ spoke of the Kingdom as already present in His ministry we have still to discuss His views on the future consummation; and no amount of 'realised' eschatology can make these views any the less disturbing.

4. The error of dogmatic evasion. This is a subtle and dangerous error, all the more so because it does not always come to the surface in the form of an explicit assertion. It consists in saying, or assuming, that what Jesus said does not matter; it is what He did (or what God did through Him) that counts. There is an important sense in which this statement is true, as we shall see. But the statement must come at the end,

not at the beginning, of our task; it must come after, not before, the attempt to solve the problem that critical inquiry presents.

There is, however, a fifth way open to us if we are not prepared to accept any of the above four. This way begins with dogma; but the dogma is a different one; and it enables us to interpret the evidence instead of evading it. The dogma is the doctrine of Incarnation, and it is hardly surprising that we should be unable to understand the mind of Jesus without it. The doctrine states that Jesus possessed both a divine and a human nature; that these natures were neither mixed, so as to form a hybrid being, nor juxtaposed, so as to function independently of each other; but that both natures had their existence in one Person, both being mutually active in everything that Christ thought, said and did.

If the doctrine is true, if God fully assumed man's nature (man's mind together with man's body), and if both the divine and human natures were united in the Person of the Eternal Word, two consequences follow. Firstly, while Christ's union with the Father's will was direct and complete, His knowledge of that will was progressive and indirect; as the author of Hebrews states, He had to 'learn' the content of that will 'through the things that He suffered' (Heb. 2.18, 5.8). And He had to 'learn' the Father's will indirectly, by means of those same images that God had already used in revealing Himself to Israel. Secondly, to express the same point in more formal terms, if the Word became the subject of man's temporal existence, His knowledge of the Father's purpose was bound to be conditioned by the temporal modes of man's perception. Christ, indeed, saw history (its people, its laws and its fulfilment) from the standpoint of God; He was the only man who was equipped *by nature* to see the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. Yet, while His divine nature allowed Him to see history through the eyes of God, His human nature required this insight to be mediated through the eyes of man. This implies not only that He saw history through temporal perspectives, but (even more narrowly) that these perspectives were those of His own age and people.

The way in which Christ's divine apprehension of eschatological facts was filtered through these two human media

(images and their temporal schema) becomes most clear from His use of the term Son of Man. In appropriating this term Jesus doubtless drew on many sources—the Aramaic *barnasha*, the 'representative' man of Ps. 8.4, perhaps the Enochian figure of the 'primal' man—but, above all, Dan, 7 where the term symbolises the righteous remnant of Israel.[1] He identified the term with Himself as the Messiah, adding to it new associations taken from the Servant Poems of Deutero-Isaiah, particularly ch. 53.[2] Why did He adopt the term? It would, I am convinced, be a grave mistake to suppose that He adopted it as a pedagogic device—to put Himself in line with apocalyptic speculation or to conceal His 'messianic secret'. Jesus did not become directly and divinely aware of His mission and then decide to embody that awareness indirectly in human images. That would have violated the unity of the two natures that is essential to Incarnation. It would also be false to the evidence. For the record of Christ's baptism (Mark 1.9-11 = Matt. 3.13-17 = Luke 3.21-22) shows how He knew Himself to be God's Son and Servant through the two texts Ps. 2.7 and Isa. 42.1. These scriptural texts were not additional to Christ's knowledge, any more than they are additional to ours; they were the media through which His knowledge came to be. And what we are told about some images we may believe to have been true of others. So, in the present case, Jesus did not first know Himself to be Israel's eschatological remnant and then decide to use the image 'Son of Man'; He used the image because, 'being made in all things like His brethren', without the image He could not know at all.

If Christ's knowledge was mediated through human images it must also have been mediated through the time-schema that the images involved. The time-schema of Dan. 7 was very precise indeed. Like most apocalyptic writers (including those of the Qumran sect) Daniel believed that the events he forecast were to take place immediately. With the elevation of the Son

[1] So far as I know the term is (significantly) absent from the Qumran Scrolls, although Christ's outlook, like the outlook of the Baptist, is similar to that of the Covenanters in that (*a*) they all envisage an imminent End and (*b*) they all interpret the End as the fulfilment of Scripture.

[2] I am assuming (what cannot here be argued) that the Jews never expected a suffering and dying Messiah, certainly not a Messiah whose sufferings were redemptive and whose death was a necessary prelude to his glory. Mowinckel has proved these points beyond doubt (op. cit., pp. 325-33, 410-15, 448-50).

of Man to receive the Kingdom history would reach its appointed end. Jesus could hardly have adopted the image as an eschatological one without also adopting the sense of imminent fulfilment that the image implied. We, today, can modify the time-reference of the image, partly because we look at it in the light of Pentecost and partly because we and the image are by nature externally related. Christ died without knowing Pentecost, and, so far from being external to the image, stamped it on His heart with an inwardness that we can never understand. His submission to the image was one with His submission to the Father who spoke to Him through it; the divine impetus that He felt towards fulfilment was one with the humanly conditioned impetus that the scriptural image conveyed.

We can reach a better understanding of Jesus' outlook if we realise that, according to the synoptic evidence, it lacked two elements that were to dominate the outlook of His Apostles: the idea of the Spirit and the idea of the Church. These two ideas, and the facts they represented, transformed the Jewish apocalyptic of the earthly Jesus into the universal Gospel of the risen Christ.

It is significant that in Mark's Gospel Jesus mentions the Spirit twice only (3.29 and 13.11 = Matt. 12.32, 10.20 = Luke 12.10-12), and in neither place does He predict an outpouring of the Spirit. There is only one passage in the synoptic Gospels where He promises the Spirit as a heavenly gift (Luke 11.13); but this, even if authentic (which is doubtful) has nothing to do with Pentecost. The pre-resurrection Christ, in short, never takes up the prophecy of the Baptist that the Messiah 'will baptise with the Holy Spirit' (Mark 1.8 = Matt. 3.11 = Luke 3.16). It is not until He is risen that He refers to the Baptist's promise which, He says, will be fulfilled 'not many days hence' (Acts 1.5). Even then His words fall short of the full apostolic doctrine. The Spirit will be confined to the Eleven as a power (*δύναμις*) enabling them to preach the Gospel in whatever time is left before the End (Acts 1.8)—and He says nothing to revoke His previous predictions that the End will soon arrive.

It was only after Pentecost that the apostolic Church was able to formulate a doctrine of the Spirit that was both final in itself and final in its relation to eschatology. Two things were indispensable to a final doctrine. The Spirit had to be under-

stood, firstly, as nothing less than Christ Himself present within believers through His risen power, and, secondly, as the 'first-fruit' or 'first instalment. (ἀπαρχή or ἀρραβών in Paul's terminology) of the Age to Come. The Spirit, as the risen Christ's other self (the ἄλλος Παράκλητος of John 14.16), came to be conceived as the mode under which disciples could receive inwardly and under a veil the life of the eternal order that would be revealed outwardly at the Parousia. In apostolic teaching the Spirit was not only a special power which would sustain missionaries until the End; it was a gift that conferred upon *all* believers the very life of the End itself.

As with the Spirit, so it is with the Church. If the words of Jesus in Matt. 16.18-20 are genuine, He may well have used the word ἐκκλησία, or rather an Aramaic equivalent, in commissioning Peter to lead the Apostles in gathering together the nucleus of a restored Israel during the brief period between the Resurrection and the Parousia.[1] But the synoptic Jesus says nothing about this interim-community that comes anywhere near the Pauline and Johannine symbols of the 'Body' and the 'Vine'. Lacking the apostolic doctrine of the Spirit the historical Jesus was bound to lack also the apostolic view of the Church as an organism that He would indwell. He could not give the title Son of Man both the eschatological and the corporate meaning it had in Dan. 7. The symbol could acquire both meanings, and acquire them together, only after Pentecost, since it was only Pentecost that could reveal the Church as an eschatological community in a final sense, i.e. as a community whose corporate life *in* the Messiah (ἐν Χριστῷ) conferred upon its members a proleptic share in the Messiah's advent glory.[2]

We must say, therefore, that while Jesus saw that His death would bring in the End, He did not distinguish between successive stages in the End's appearing, because He did not foresee Pentecost. The crucial significance of Pentecost may be seen in one more direction: the mission to the Gentiles. Jesus clearly confined His ministry (with rare exceptions) to the Jews and regarded the conversion of the Gentiles as something that

[1] I am myself inclined to the view that Matt. 16.18-20 comes from the Resurrection-appearance to Peter mentioned in 1 Cor. 15.5.

[2] E. Best has shown that Jewish apocalyptic writings nowhere relate the Messiah and his elect as intimately as they are related in Pauline and Johannine thought (*One Body in Christ*, Appendix B).

would not occur until the End (Matt. 8.11-12 = Luke 13.28-29). In the light of Pentecost (and then only gradually and mainly through the influence of Paul) the Apostles realised that the Church's mission was to the Gentiles as well as to the Jews, and this realisation was bound to lengthen as well as deepen their eschatological perspectives.[1] It is no accident that Ephesians (the New Testament book which has most to say about the Church and the 'mystery' of the Gentiles' inclusion) does not mention the Parousia, but, on the contrary, assumes that the present age will last for an indefinite length of time (2.7).

III

We are now able to answer our question more profoundly, or rather (and this is always more important) to ask it more profoundly. If we ask whether Christ miscalculated the time of His Parousia the answer is quite simply 'Yes'. If, however, we ask whether He miscalculated the time of the End the answer is both 'Yes' and 'No'. It is 'Yes' if by 'End' we mean history's dénouement that will occur together with the Parousia. It is 'No' if by 'End' we mean the eternal life that is available here and now to those who are one with their Lord in faith and love. By His death and Resurrection Christ *did* bring the world to its end—not, however, openly, as He will at His Parousia, but inwardly through His Spirit in the Church whereby His disciples, while they sojourn upon earth, have their citizenship in heaven (Phil. 3.20, Heb. 12.22-24, *Ad Diognetum* 5-7). The risen Christ *did* reveal His presence (*παρουσία*) in a new mode to His disciples, but not in the apocalyptic mode that some of His sayings suggest.

This is not to endorse Schweitzer's view that Jesus failed to carry through His task of 'spiritualising' the eschatology that He inherited from Judaism. Jesus' whole teaching was based on the principle that the Reign of God is a spiritual relationship between the King and His subjects. Paul was reflecting the mind of his Master when he wrote: 'The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but righteousness and peace and Joy' (Rom. 14.17). God's Reign can never be anything but spiritual,

[1] See A. Descamps, *L'Attente du Messie*, pp. 81-82, and Kümmel, op. cit., pp. 83-87.

for it *is* in its eternal nature spiritual, with the spirituality of God Himself. The contrast does not lie between the spiritual and the non-spiritual; it lies between a spiritual reality that refashions the material world and is perceptible to all and one that co-exists with the world and is perceptible by faith alone.[1]

The position we have reached may at first sight appear to agree more with Bultmann's attempt to 'demythologise' the New Testament, and in particular its apocalyptic elements. By 'demythologisation' Bultmann means the attempt to recast the 'objective' language of the Bible in a 'subjective' form appropriate to the demands of 'existential' faith. Are we not in fact suggesting that this is what happened when the apocalyptic of the historical Jesus was transformed into the eschatology of the primitive Church? The 'End' that Christ inaugurated and in which Christians now live is not the 'objective' restoration (ἀποκατάστασις) that will occur at the Parousia when our 'inner man' will assume an outward 'body' according to its proper nature and 'we shall all be changed' (1 Cor. 15.51). Rather the End known by faith is the 'subjective' freedom from the world available now to all who accept God's Word of grace. Yet we cannot follow Bultmann in his wholesale retreat from the objective form of what he calls 'myth' into the carefully prepared fortress of existential decision any more than we can follow Schweitzer in his abandonment of the historical Jesus in favour of a mystical Christ. Once again we must be careful to see exactly where the contrast lies. It does not lie simply between an objective eschatology and a subjective one; it lies between a subjective End now and an objective consummation of that End hereafter. We cannot dispense with the objective consummation without dispensing with hope, and we cannot hope without using the images that our Lord and His Apostles have bequeathed.

If, then, the above interpretation of the evidence is correct (and it may well be wrong) we cannot dismiss our Lord's expectation of an imminent Parousia by saying either that it is

[1] I do not, of course, wish to deny that the Spirit transforms matter, and in particular our fleshly bodies, now, in our present life; this must be so since He proceeds from the *Incarnate* Lord; my sole point is to contrast the inward, invisible character of this transformation now with its outward, visible character hereafter. The bodies that the indwelling Spirit now quickens are still 'mortal'; hence we wait for their 'redemption' (Rom. 8.11, 23).

'Not Proven' or that, if it is proven, it is of no importance, on a par with His belief in the Davidic authorship of the Psalter. It is a vitally important matter, as the Apostles knew well, for the very existence of the world in its present, material form depends upon it. If the course of history had turned out as Jesus thought, we should not now need to discuss His teaching. Nor can we distinguish the time of the End from the manner of the End; the time and the manner hang together.

Yet Jesus' viewpoint, so far from being a stumbling-block in the way of faith, is an intrinsic sign of Incarnation. For how would we wish Jesus to have spoken? Ought He to have forecast the exact shape of the *Heilsgeschichte* that His death was to set in motion? But if He had possessed this exact foreknowledge He would not have been truly man, for He could not have suffered as man unless a veil was interposed between His sufferings and the glory that was to follow. Ought He, on the other hand, to have been unaware that the Messiah's death was to be the means by which history would reach its goal? But if He had been unaware of this He would not have been truly God, for we can hardly think that the Father's only Son would have failed to understand the finality of His sacrifice. Jesus understood the eschatological meaning of the Cross in the very way in which (speaking *a posteriori*) we should expect the Incarnate Word to understand it. He understood it through the images and time-schema of His age.

Looking back on Christ's ministry in the light of Pentecost we see a change in the time-schema and a corresponding change in the reference of the images. However, if we are to see these changes in their true perspectives, we must bear in mind three things.

1. It is not we who have changed the time-schema; it is not even the Father *solely*, as if the Father acted apart from the Son; it is the Father who changed it through the Son who, as Peter declared on the Day of Pentecost, 'being exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Spirit has poured out this which you see and hear' (Acts 2.33). Nor did the Father use the Son as an instrument, as if the Son were forced (as the best among creatures must sometimes be forced) to play an unwitting part in a great design. The Father worked through the Son accord-

ing to the fulness of the Son's divine nature and the perfect submission of His human will. The effects that the Father produced from the actions of the Son were the effects that those actions intrinsically caused. At no point do we have deeper insight into the mysterious truth that, while each Person of the Godhead is distinct, each Person's every act manifests the totality of the Godhead's power.

2. Although Jesus gave to apocalyptic images the time-reference of His age, this must not obscure the vital fact that His eschatological outlook was based on the present, not on the future. As William Manson puts it, 'Jesus in His characteristic words about the Kingdom reasons from present events and experiences to the coming of the Kingdom, not vice versa. His Gospel of the End rests on the certainty of the power of God which is with Him in the present.'[1] It was through His ministry on earth, and above all through His victory over evil on the Cross, that Christ won His Kingly inheritance, an inheritance to be bestowed on believers now and on the whole world hereafter (Heb. 1.3-4, Phil. 2.8ff, Rom. 8.18-25). Life through death, triumph through suffering, future glory through present humiliation—these paradoxes formed the crown of Christ's teaching, the centre of His faith and the essence of the messianic hope that He so wonderfully transformed.[2]

3. This principle of life through death that characterised the ministry of Christ characterises also the images through which the ministry is portrayed. Human images, like humanity itself, died in Christ to be reborn. Nothing less than Christ's death as the solitary Son of Man who 'had nowhere to lay his head' could give to the title the corporate significance that it had in Dan. 7. Dodd states the point as follows in commenting on John 3.13-14 ('No one has ascended into heaven but He who descended from heaven, the Son of Man. And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up'). 'The ascent of the Son of Man is here equated with

[1] *Jesus the Messiah*, p. 50. Cf. pp. 14-17.

[2] For the eschatological significance that Jesus attached to His death see especially R. H. Fuller, *The Mission and Achievement of Jesus*, ch. 3. In order to express the continuity of Christ's saving work before, on and after the Cross Jeremias (*The Parables of Jesus*, p. 159) speaks of 'an eschatology that is in process of realisation' ('Sich realisierende Eschatologie'). Dodd accepts this German phrase although, as he says, it is difficult to render into English (*The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 447).

His exaltation. John conceives the "uplifting" of the Son of Man as making possible for men that union with Him by which they too ascend to the Father. Cf. 6.62. *ἐὰν θεωρῆτε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀναβαίνοντα.* As the "looking" at the serpent caused Israel to "live", so the "contemplation" of the Son of Man in His exaltation brings life eternal. It is in His death above all that He is exalted, and, in "drawing" men to Him, uniting them with Him, affirms the character which specifically belongs to the Son of Man, the character of the inclusive representative of true humanity' (*The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 247). The Messiah—Son of Man did not appear immediately in glory, and we do not know when He will appear. But in return for this deferment and the agnosticism it implies we have a larger hope and a deeper knowledge, for we know that since we are now 'one new man' in Him through the Spirit (Eph. 2.15), when He comes again 'He will change our lowly bodies to be like His glorious body, by the power which enables Him even to subject all things to Himself' (Phil. 3.21).

BOOK REVIEWS

The Self as Agent. By JOHN MACMURRAY. Faber & Faber. Pp. 230. 25s.

THIS is a difficult work to review. It is manifestly important; and yet it has a curiously remote and elusive quality. Like the moon floating in the night sky, it shines fascinatingly on high and yet casts little illumination upon the world. The news that Professor John Macmurray was to deliver the Gifford Lectures, and had chosen as his title 'The Form of the Personal', must have evoked in many a hope for that major systematic treatment of the Personal to which Professor Macmurray's previous books have pointed as exciting foretastes and samples. Now that the first half of the two-volume work has appeared, the present reader has reluctantly had to transfer the greater part of his hopes to the forthcoming second volume. Let me add at once, however, that this may be because I have nourished the wrong kind of hopes. No one who is acquainted with Professor Macmurray's earlier publications can doubt that he writes from a significantly original standpoint. The hope that many must have entertained was that he would now make his distinctive insights philosophically available, by relating them to the technical problems with which, for the most part, professional philosophers work. Perhaps such a hope is misplaced, and Professor Macmurray's standpoint is too revolutionary to be expressed as a contribution to contemporary philosophical discussions. Certainly something has prevented this book from hitting any recognised philosophical targets; but to the present reviewer at least it seemed that the barrier was not only novelty but also a certain pervasive vagueness and generality. One might formulate this dissatisfaction by saying that the book as a whole adds too little to a mere headline summary of its thesis. That thesis is an extremely important one, but it is described rather than critically examined, explored and defended. All that I can do, therefore, is to indicate the nature of Professor Macmurray's thesis, and recommend the reader to examine for himself the book-length development of it.

Introductorily, Professor Macmurray argues that philosophy is not an exercise of pure thought, unrelated to man's political, economic and cultural history. On the contrary, philosophy is the reflective aspect of civilisation, and its central problems reflect the basic needs of a given society in a given age. In times of widespread social change and the disruption of cultural patterns there is generally a shift in the nature of the problems which predominantly

engage philosophers. The emergence of modern philosophy after the break-up of medieval Europe is the most recent example of this, and now again in our own day another period of transition is giving a new direction to philosophical thinking. 'The cultural crisis of our time,' says Professor Macmurray, 'is a crisis of the personal.' Personal life and its values are under threat, as is evidenced by the rise of totalitarianisms and the decline of religions. And the resulting problem for contemporary philosophy concerns 'the form of the personal'.

In order to discover the form of the personal, it is necessary, Professor Macmurray believes, systematically to renounce two basic assumptions of European philosophy since the time of Descartes. 'The traditional point of view,' he says, 'is both theoretical and egocentric. It is theoretical in that it proceeds as though the Self were a pure *subject* for whom the world is *object*. This means that the point of view adopted by our philosophy is that of the Self in its moment of reflection, when its activity is directed towards the acquirement of knowledge. Since the Self in reflection is withdrawn from action, withdrawn into itself, withdrawn from participation in the life of the world into contemplation, this point of view is also egocentric' (p. 11). Professor Macmurray's purpose is to challenge both of these presuppositions. 'Against the assumption that the Self is, at least primarily, a "knowing subject", I have maintained that its subjecthood is a derivative and negative aspect of its agency. This corresponds to the fact that most of our knowledge, and all our primary knowledge, arises as an aspect of activities which have practical, not theoretical objectives; and that it is this knowledge, itself an aspect of action, to which all reflective theory must refer. Against the assumption that the Self is an isolated individual, I have set the view that the Self is a *person*, and that personal existence is *constituted* by the relation of persons' (pp. 11-12). The present volume, *The Self as Agent*, seeks to carry out the first half of this programme, leaving its completion to the second volume, to be entitled *Persons in Relation*.

Modern philosophy was launched by Descartes upon its dualist track by the assumption of the primacy of theoretical reason. The *Cogito ergo sum* should really read *Cogito ergo non-sum*! For to be a thinking subject is not to be a part of the real world but only to be an idea, or succession of ideas. To exist, properly speaking, means to exist in relation to others by acting in a common world. 'When I act I modify the world. Action is causally effective. . . . This implies that the Self is part of the world in which it acts, and in dynamic relation with the rest of the world. On the other hand, as subject the Self stands "over against" the world, which is its object.

The Self as subject then is not part of the world it knows, but withdrawn from it, and so, in conception, outside it, or other than its object. But to be part of the world is to exist, while to be excluded from the world is to be non-existent. It follows that the Self *exists* as agent but not as subject' (p. 91). To identify the self, Cartesianwise, with thinking is thus to distinguish it from physical existence, and so to set up a mysterious gulf between the inner and outer aspects of existence. Unreal problems have arisen like spectres from this gulf to plague philosophy, until a new starting-point was provided by Kant's suggestion of the primacy of practical reason, or in Professor Macmurray's phrase, the primacy of the self as agent.

In the central chapter of this first volume, chapter 4, Professor Macmurray presents his view of the relation between the self as subject and the self as agent. The former is the negative pole of which the latter is the positive; for to think is to refrain from acting. Thus the self exists (properly speaking) only in action; contemplative thought is merely the negation of action. Thought is, however, a necessary condition of purposive action. Thus action is 'a positive which includes and is constituted by its own negative' (p. 100).

The proposed change of philosophical starting-point, from the self as subject to the self as agent, is then discussed in its bearing upon perception, causality and reflection. The book ends with a reference to the idea of the world as one action, with the hint that there may be a supreme Agent whose act the world is. This last possibility is to be pursued in the second volume.

John H. Hick

Christianity and Paradox. By Ronald W. Hepburn. C. A. Watts & Co., London, 1958. Pp. 209. 18s.

The protests with which some theologians have greeted philosophical analysis of theological subject-matter and method may argue a deep-seated anxiety over the implications of the philosophy of language for theology. This book is an attempt to assess the justification for this uneasiness by the application of the philosophical 'style' of linguistic analysis in the examination of certain theological concepts. When the theologian describes the specific ways in which religious and theological language operates—through 'parables', 'symbols', 'paradoxes' and so on—and relates knowledge of God to other kinds of knowledge, then he is at these points a philosopher. In other words, Dr Hepburn is not prepared to affirm *a priori*, as the logical positivists did, that theology is nonsense; but he gives the slight hint even at the beginning of the work that there may be 'sheer misunderstanding of the logic of our language' in much theological statement. So though the book is not intended to be

negative in character, the general impression remains at the end of a writer out of sympathy with the subject-matter before him.

The initial treatment of the subject of paradoxes relates these to the question of the nature of definition of God, and argues that, whether such definition be regarded as ostensive or explanatory, there is little justification in the nature of the definition of God for the retention of such 'logically tortured language' (as paradox). Next he investigates the view that knowledge of God is very similar to knowledge of persons. Here the I-Thou metaphysic of M. Buber (repeated in E. Brunner, K. Barth and H. H. Farmer) supplies the basis for discussion; and the conclusion is that there is so great a difference between knowledge of persons and knowledge of God—mainly in that the former is conditioned by our perception of overt behaviour—that the analogy is quite valueless.

Dr Hepburn endeavours to do justice to the Christocentric character of many modern analyses of the nature of our knowledge of God by considering Jesus as 'an indirect ostensive definition of "God" '. But once again the effort to acquire what the logicians call 'cash-value' for the term 'God' fails, for no ground can be given for the authoritativeness of Jesus' claim to be in a peculiar relation to God.

In very interesting chapters entitled 'Historicity and Risk', a strong case is made against the contemporary fashion of combining scepticism about the historicity of the events of the Gospel records with an emphasis upon the existential significance of these same events for us here and now. Looking at another field in which God has been given an explanatory role, namely, that of moral experience, the author rejects the idea that moral principles are simply commands of God or that the reason for obeying the moral imperative is the fact that God wills it. He maintains further that moral authority can be assigned to God's imperative only on the basis of man's ability to make genuine moral evaluations of his own. He proceeds to a very shrewd reminder of the way in which Christians are tempted to conclude the examination of political, social and political evidence in a complex situation by a premature invocation of 'God's will' as a substitute for hard thinking and research.

The chapters on 'God and the Cosmos' are the least satisfactory of the whole book, partly because they are an inevitably sketchy treatment of a vast subject, but partly also because the modern sophistications have made little improvement upon what was so well said by Hume and Kant in this field. The final chapter, 'Scepticism and the Naturally Religious Mind,' is designed to show that the sceptic who agrees with the previous ten chapters is not therefore precluded from religion. He recalls that the claims of morality remain real even when the Christian sanctions of morality

are withdrawn. The religion which remains is a search for a 'parable' which will integrate the many strands of a person's past life and direct him towards an unattainable ideal. The parable or set of symbols will express a moral pattern of life. It is religion in which this parable takes the place of God, and in a curious way the parable performs not a few of functions associated with God in other religions.

This is undoubtedly a book of first importance for all who have read or have taken part in the conversations between philosophers and theologians in recent years. It shows a much more intimate knowledge both of the writings of the theologians and of their concepts than have most of the purely philosophical participants in these conversations. For that reason it must serve as a warning to any who are unduly optimistic about an early *rapprochement* between these two subjects. Its greatest merits are the manner in which it integrates a whole variety of theological problems for treatment in the linguistic style and the sincerity with which the writer endeavours to strike a mean between Christian faith and irreligion for those to whom orthodox Christianity has become meaningless or nonsensical.

Yet there are certain undeniable difficulties in the book.

(i) It was disappointing to discover that the author did not provide an analysis of the nature and structure of paradoxes. There is no uniformity of opinion in modern theological thought upon this subject and a primary task of linguistic analysis in this field is to lay bare this variety and to determine its causes. The question is asked: 'When is a contradiction not a *mere* contradiction, but a sublime Paradox, a Mystery?' (p. 17) but the fact that this question is largely rhetorical blunts the incisiveness of the whole analysis. It is, too, difficult to see how we can trace the use of paradox to its proper source without at some point taking full account of what Kierkegaard had to say about it and of his influence upon modern theology.

(ii) While Dr Hepburn has a great deal to say about analogy (for example, at pp. 32-39 and 174-5) and much that is valuable, he does not quite come to the point of recognising that, even in his presentation, the most important problem in the analysis of religious and theological language is not paradox but analogy. In fact, so pervasive is this problem throughout the book that it might well have been called 'Christianity and Analogy'. Further, the problem of paradox is only one aspect of the problem of analogy, but the two topics are not sufficiently explicitly related to one another in the book for this to be appreciated.

(iii) The actual treatment of analogy suffers from two defects. On the one hand, it has not pursued sufficiently far in the theological context the discussion of the relation of what J. M. Keynes called

the negative analogy to the positive analogy, or a more recent logic, that of the qualifier to the model. This problem does not arise simply in respect of the adequacy of the *personal* category to the description of God, but, as St. Thomas so long ago affirmed, in respect of all of His attributes. To speak of God at all is to raise this question. On the other hand, the discussion of analogy suffers from the omission of consideration of 'the analogy of Christ' which has come to have a largely regulative function in contemporary theology. The problem for the linguistic analyst is to discover how this analogy is related to the *analogia entis* of Thomistic and neo-Thomistic usage. Incidentally the problem of analogy arises within the author's own position outlined in the final chapter, for his integrating parable must itself be an analogy.

(iv) The chapter on 'Meaning and Mediator' which is designed to affix value to the notion that God is known in Jesus Christ takes surprisingly little account of Barth's presentation of the concept of Revelation and of the criterion of its validity. It is significant, too, that the idea of the Word of God is almost entirely absent; and yet the Word of God written and proclaimed must surely be one of the most important *loci* for the investigation of Christian language.

(v) A final question might be raised as to what precisely Dr Hepburn's method is in dealing with theological concepts. He quotes (p. 4) the view that 'every sort of statement has its own sort of logic', and even suggests that religious statements may have a logic of their own which is valid. The impression given thus early is that the linguistic analyst is going to assist the theologian to express his concepts perhaps more clearly than he does, and certainly to become more self-conscious concerning the premises from which he proceeds, about the argumentation which he employs and about the range of conclusions which he may permissibly draw. The procedure of the writer turns out to be this: that certain theological concepts and even doctrines are called in question, if not actually pronounced nonsense, because of failure to conform to certain rubrics of linguistic analysis concerning, for example, verification, definition and explanation. In other words, it is assumed throughout that because religion and theology use the same words as appear in ordinary language, the logic of theology and religion is the same as that of philosophy. But that assumption is ultimately the point at issue in a discussion of this sort. It is said on p. 84 that 'theological language is . . . continuous with ordinary language' but the meaning of the word *continuous* is *the* problem of religious and theological language and it is by no means self-evident.

If the extent to which a book compels the reader to re-examine

his most fundamental premises and procedures is an index to its high quality, then this certainly is a first-class work.

There are misprints on pp. 41, 51, 52, 99, 135.

JOHN MACINTYRE

L'Évangile et le Mythe dans la Pensée de Rudolf Bultmann. By GIOVANNI MIEGGE. Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchatel and Paris, 1958. Pp. 130.

Revelation and Existence A Study in the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. By H. P. OWEN, M.A. University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1957. Pp. 155.

PROFESSOR MIEGGE, of the Protestant Faculty in Rome, published his book in Italian in 1956, and it was translated into French by Mme Helene Naef in 1958. In a foreword to this translation, M. Jean Louis Leuba says truly: 'It is Bultmann and the whole Bultmann whom the author permits to speak for himself.' The book is thus valuable mainly as an introduction for those who cannot read him in the original, and it can also serve as a guide to the original passages by Bultmann and his critics, which have hitherto been of most importance in the debate. It is true that among French writers René Marlé had already given a painstaking account with full documentation, and Father Malevez a penetrating and clarifying interpretation of Bultmann's thought, but there was room also for a French version of this scholarly Italian study, since it was written by a man who is primarily a New Testament scholar, and one who speaks from a Protestant standpoint.

There is inevitably here a good deal of material which is to be found in all the expositions of Bultmann's thought, but there is an interesting first chapter entitled 'Bultmann, Interpreter of the New Testament', which rests on a far wider documentation than the famous Essay on 'New Testament and Mythology', which initiated the controversy. Professor Miegge bases himself not only on this, but also on the *New Testament Theology* and the *Commentary on St. John.*

He makes it clear that while there is an affinity between the New Testament's view of man and that of the existentialist philosophy, Bultmann is quite determined not to allow Christianity to be reduced to such a philosophy. And further, that his whole intention is to do justice to the trans-subjective validity of faith, and not to let himself be caught in the net of subjectivism as Thielicke affirms him to be. He discusses two of Bultmann's examples of existentialist interpretation, the essays on 'What is the Meaning of Discourse about God?' and 'The Christological Confession of the World Council', without, however, taking note of their epistemological

incoherencies, which go far towards justifying Thielicke's strictures, however good Bultmann's intentions may be.

While admiring the finesse of Bultmann's scholarship, and valuing the emphasis which he lays on the need for existential appropriation and the commitment of faith, Miegge in the end doubts whether Bultmann does sufficient justice to the once-for-all-ness of the event of Christ; and one of his last remarks is: 'In the *New Testament Theology*, and in the *Commentary on St. John*, the author's philosophical point of view often suggests to him fertile and interesting insights, but it sometimes happens that the evangelical terminology clarifies the existential allusions whose purpose is to explain it.'

The book has a useful appendix summarising the reactions to Bultmann of Roman Catholic theologians, giving them credit for their sympathy and objectivity, but reassuring Protestants that they are not necessarily driven to choose, as some Roman theologians suggest, between Bultmann and submission to Rome.

Mr Owen's essay is of the type that can really help to advance the Bultmann discussion. It is a lively and forceful book which shirks no issue, and gives one the impression that it was as pleasant to write as it is to read. In studying Bultmann's own writings, one has sometimes the uncomfortable feeling that what is really of the first importance here is not so much what is said as what is taken for granted. If one could only see the fundamental principles of his thought clearly set down, then one would be better qualified to understand, and to assent or to differ.

But Bultmann has nowhere systematically expounded his basic principles. What Mr Owen has done is boldly to set down what he believes to be the four fundamental presuppositions of the master's thought, and he goes on to expound and criticise them in detail, thus facing the risks that confront all those who try to express in their own language the guiding thoughts of others. These four principles are set out on p. 20 of the book:

(1) God's act must be simultaneously transcendent and concealed.

(2) It must take the form of a personal encounter.

(3) It must give man a new understanding of himself.

(4) It must not be demonstrable, or even supportable, by objective evidence.

In the second and third chapters these four criteria are expounded in more detail, and the rest of the book is given to their full discussion. In brief, Owen's position is that the first and third criteria are thoroughly sound, although he agrees with Ian Henderson that it is not necessary that every myth in the New Testament should be interpreted without remainder into statements which describe the narrator's understanding of his own experience.

The fourth criterion states that God's act must not be demonstrable, or even supportable, by objective evidence. That it must not be demonstrable, Owen agrees, for if it were, God would no longer be transcendent and concealed (criterion 1). But he claims that, like Kierkegaard, Bultmann throws faith and reason, revelation and history, into a quite impossible opposition, by declaring that objective evidence can give no support to faith. In an extremely valuable and interesting discussion, Owen shows how historical study and faith can both play a part, in enabling the Christian student to accept Peter's confession that Jesus was the Christ. Owen's position can be summed up thus: 'Historical evidence, in short, implies God's act, but only faith can grasp the conclusion.' We cannot say that Mr Owen has solved this problem, which has so troubled Christian thought from Lessing and Kähler to the present day, how faith can be founded on the merely relative certainties of history, but he has at least made a very interesting contribution.

It is with Bultmann's second criterion that Mr Owen principally takes issue. Here, he tells us, in effect, is the nigger in the woodpile 'The technique of demythologisation is essentially simple. It consists of restating the past in terms of the present, nature in terms of spirit, and every symbol in terms of encounter.' And encounter is somewhat narrowly conceived by Bultmann as taking place in a confrontation between God and the individual in which God speaks a word of forgiveness and challenge to decision, and man answers. That God is personal, and treats man as a person, Owen gladly concedes. But, he asks, is all commerce between Him and man to be fitted into this one scheme? Does it do justice to His immanence? Is not something also to be said for the use of the visual as well as of the auditory figures? Does the Bible not use the concept of Light to supplement that of the Word? And is not the Word itself a much richer concept in the Bible than in Bultmann?

There is food for reflection in these suggestions. Provided that the primary concern is satisfied, that God be not thought of as a thing, nor be conceived of as dealing with men as if they were themselves things, it is clear that other symbols as well as that of encounter may be in place.

But our own criticism would not be so much of the symbol of encounter, as of the extremely defective way in which it is conceived by Bultmann. It is clear that our direct knowledge *of* human persons by encounter is interwoven with our knowledge *about* them from past experience—our encounter with them today is interwoven with our knowledge of their history. Now clearly our knowledge of human persons by encounter is only an analogy of our knowledge of God by faith, but it is an analogy which the Bible encourages us to

use, and the Bible is continually urging men towards the encounter of faith by calling on their memory of God's past goodness. Bultmann so reduces our encounter with God to a present immediacy that, if he were consistent, it would become entirely inarticulate, and all preaching, theology and the Church would become impossible. His own two essays referred to above seem to show this epistemological bankruptcy. Thus it is not so much the symbol of encounter as Bultmann's defective insight into its nature that causes the extreme separations in his theology between revelation and history and between faith and knowledge. Mr Owen suggests that the dualism between *Historie* (the historical) and *Geschichte* (the historic) is overcome by the fact that in Christ's resurrection the one is taken up into the other. I would suggest that until these concepts have been made a good deal clearer than Bultmann has as yet succeeded in making them, there is little profit in their adoption by theologians who seek to criticise him.

In conclusion one can only express admiration for the vigour and freshness of this book. One way or another it cannot but set forward the discussion when a thoughtful man has the courage to set out the fundamental principles underlying a thinker's work, and to try to say where he is right and where wrong. DAVID CAIRNS

Essays in Liberality. By ALEC R. VIDLER. S.C.M. Press, London, 1957. 15s.

THE keynote of this interesting volume of essays is in the first essay, which is on 'Christianity, Liberalism, and Liberality'. Here Dr Vidler, Dean of King's College, Cambridge, contends that Liberalism, 'a nineteenth-century phenomenon which Morley espoused and Newman attacked', should be distinguished from liberality (usually with a small 'l'), which is not confined to any age and is not more common among the adherents of Liberalism than among the adherents of systems that are professedly conservative. The Liberal divines did a work which needed to be done, in securing liberty of thought and speech and publication in the Church of England and most of the Reformed Churches. Many of those who now take advantage of this are not aware of their debt to them. But the Liberals failed to do the constructive work of a new reformation; indeed it still waits to be done. The Liberals flourished in the last century, but now they have run to seed. On the other hand, the Church stands in permanent need of liberality. Admittedly the great preachers have seldom been characterised by the liberal virtues; yet perhaps a new reformation may issue in a new type of character in which apostleship and liberality will be knit together.

The analysis of the term 'Liberal' is carried further in the Gore

Memorial lecture on 'Bishop Gore and Liberal Catholicism'; and there the term 'Catholicism' is also analysed. Gore himself liked this phrase; but Dr Vidler successfully shows that though he was a Liberal in some respects he was not a Liberal in all; nor was he liberal, but rather of a dogmatic and prophetic disposition. Moreover, his conception of the Church 'though High, was not High enough—nor Liberal enough—nor Catholic enough'. What Dr Vidler does with the word 'liberal', other writers do with the word 'catholic; that is, they use it in one sense with a capital letter, and in another sense with a small letter. The device is not entirely convenient if only because the word in question may need a capital through standing at the beginning of a sentence. But this calls attention to a question which Dr Vidler does not explicitly discuss, namely how it comes about that the same word is used in such diverse senses. It is not a sheer linguistic accident that Liberals (for example) tend to claim a monopoly of liberality; these two attitudes must have something in common to make the claim plausible and yet some element of diversity which enables the liberals to attack the Liberals and demand the linguistic distinction. It might be fruitful to study more fully how the distinction arose within the use of what was in origin an undifferentiated term.

Another most interesting paper is that on 'Holy Worldliness', in which, in addition to the author's well-known devotion to F. D. Maurice, we can now trace the influence of Bonhoeffer. These anti-pietist reflections lead to some striking remarks on the education of children, who 'should learn to live in the atmosphere of the Old Testament before being introduced to the New'.

In the Preface Dr Vidler says that whatever coherence the collection possesses is derived from the fact that these are essays of a theologian who aspires after liberality as he has defined it. He modestly adds that he would not presume to say that he has already attained to it. But the reader will readily discern that the volume is indeed coherent because the spirit which is really defined by the three essays here singled out for special attention does in fact breathe freely through the rest or the volume. There are two other major essays, one on the perennial problems of 'Freedom and Responsibility', and the other on 'History according to the Bible'. To these are added five shorter papers already published in periodicals, which well deserve this more permanent form. They deal with 'The Future of Theology' (which pins its hope to the laity), 'The Welfare State; A Christian View', 'What is Anglicanism?' (with some interesting remarks on national churches versus world-sects), 'The Appalling Religiousness of America', and 'The Obedience of a Christian Intellectual'.

These essays present an attractive picture of a Christian outlook which, while drawing its own inspiration from an extensive knowledge of Church history, is yet strikingly free from narrow ecclesiasticism. We may question the need for such words as 'viability' and 'multiguity' (as we may question occasional features of the new reformation), but in general the style is itself the graceful product (one suspects) of a liberal education; and this increases our gratitude for a most rewarding volume. A. Raymond George

Fundamentalism and the Church of God. By Gabriel Hebert. S.C.M. Press, London, 1957. 15s.; also in paper covers 7s. 6d.

Australia's gain has been Great Britain's loss; and Fr Hebert since his departure to Australia has been much missed in ecumenical circles in Britain. We give a special welcome to this book, because it enables us to keep in touch with him.

The book attempts a reply to the resurgence of Fundamentalism. The writer begins with a careful attempt to trace the origin of the term 'Fundamentalist'; and then summarises the biblical story in a way reminiscent of his earlier books. Then, rejecting the term 'inerrancy' he proceeds to show positively in what sense the Bible is true. The truth of God must, however, be formulated in human terms and this relationship is discussed in a very interesting way, which makes use of and extends the familiar termimology of I-thou, I-it, I-him and so on. Theological truth is then related briefly to scientific and historical truth. From this standpoint the author then criticises the type of interpretation of the Bible which is adopted by conservative evangelicals, of which the *New Bible Commentary* published by I.V.F. is taken as a sample. The next chapter on 'The Religion of Experience, adopting an unusual method for a theological work, contains an interesting summary of a Swedish novel which purports to depict a situation in Sweden in about 1879. A pietistic young assistant priest 'deeply influenced by the Revival' is gradually won over to the methods of his non-pietist Rector. This leads to a biblical account of the ground of unity, showing that fundamentalists are a sectarian party, who treat as the ground of unity not simply the Gospel, but the Gospel *plus* the Inerrancy of the Bible and the necessity of a particular type of Conversion. There is a final chapter on Faith in God.

Though the book is perhaps a little hard on revivalism, its substance is sound, and its statement of the current theological view of the authority of the Bible will win widespread assent, except of course from Fundamentalists.

Yet the book is to some extent rambling. Dip into it, and you will find many good things; read it straight through, and you will

sometimes wonder why the chapters are in the order in which we find them. The discussions of some great problems such as demythologising or the Fall are so slight as to be inevitably somewhat superficial. There is nothing strikingly new in the treatment of the authority of the Bible; indeed it is implied in his earlier work on *The Authority of the Old Testament*. We fear lest orthodox churchmen in search of a quick answer to Billy Graham may jump rather eagerly at the help afforded here. Such occasional works of controversy are necessary, but they must not supersede, as Fr Hebert would be the first to say, the major works of biblical criticism and theology which are not written with this particular controversy in mind.

On p. 90 Habakkuk is wrongly spelt.

The writer clearly hopes that the book will do something to bring S.C.M. and I.V.F. closer together, which would indeed be a great gain. If it could be done by Christian charity, this book would do it. Its spirit is admirable; again and again the author goes out of his way to praise the good and Christian qualities of those whose views he is attacking. In this it is a model of theological controversy.

A. Raymond George

The Servant of God. By W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias. S.C.M. Press, London, 1957. Pp. 120. 10s. 6d.

This important work, no. 20 of *Studies in Biblical Theology*, is translated from the article *Παῖς Θεοῦ* in Kittel's *Theologisches Woerterbuch*.

Zimmerli deals with the various uses of the word 'servant', both profane and religious, in the Old Testament, leading up to the phrase 'Servant of Yahweh' as a description of Israel, and as a title for outstanding figures like Moses and David, and finally to the Suffering Servant in the Songs in Deutero-Isaiah. In his second chapter, Zimmerli turns to the translations of *ebed* ('servant') in the Septuagint, and from a comparison between the books Genesis—Joshua and Judges—2 Kings concludes that a development of thought can be traced. *Doulos*, which connotes real slavery, and is all but absent in the former group, is clearly distinguished in the latter from *pais* and similar words. In the former the avoidance of *doulos* 'may well indicate that the translation of the Hexateuch in Hellenistic Judaism shows us a first phase of biblical translation which betrays the uninhibited influence of the Greek feeling for the nearness of God and man' (p. 38f). The rather later translation of the second group of books, which carefully distinguishes *doulos* and *pais*, 'shows the growing awareness of the specific OT consciousness of the distance between God and man, and the fact that man belongs to God'. The view that the Greek translation of the fourth Servant

Song probably implies Messianic interpretation forms a link between Zimmerli's work and that of Jeremias.

It is no depreciation of his co-author's work to say that Jeremias's contribution is characterised by that clarity of statement and meticulous annotation which scholars have long learned to expect from him. He takes up the history of *pais theou* in the post-Septuagintal period in which the Old Testament meaning 'servant of God', with its various implications, is retained. As a real Messianic title, however, Servant of God never existed in Judaism apart from the biblical phrase 'my servant' in the mouth of God. A clear distinction is seen between Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism as regards interpretation of the Servant passages. The former prefers the collective interpretation, whereas in Palestinian Judaism Messianic interpretation of certain of the passages (Isa. 42.1ff, 43.10, 49.1f, 6f, 52.13f) is, without going into the details Jeremias presents, broadly in agreement with the New Testament. When, however, he finds in the *Similitudes of Enoch* proof of a combination in pre-Christian Judaism of the Servant of God and the Son of Man, and therefore of a suffering Son of Man, he is on debatable ground. Mowinckel and Sjöberg have urged that there is no trace in the description of the Son of Man in the *Similitudes* of any element of suffering derived from the Servant figure. What would be affected if Jeremias and earlier scholars whom he follows were right, would be the originality of Jesus in conceiving of Himself as the fulfilment both of the prophetic figure of the Servant and of the apocalyptic figure in Dan. 7 (and in 1 En.?). Such considerations should, of course, count for nothing in the world of scholarship. At the same time, the reviewer is not as convinced by the author's reasoning on this particular point as he is by some of his other conclusions.

The second part of Jeremias's study treats of *pais theou* in the New Testament. This, be it said without exaggeration, is a masterpiece of compression packed with information and enriched by many valuable insights—and all in twenty-five pages! The actual title, though infrequent, is of great antiquity and goes back to the Aramaic speaking Palestinian church. In Gentile Christianity by the second century the ambiguous *pais theou* ('servant' or 'child of God') had definitely acquired the second meaning and perhaps played an important part in the emergence of the title Son (*viós*) of God which was unknown to late Judaism (n. 354), and was more acceptable than the lowly term 'child of God', despite the semantic change from 'servant'. An important exception is the persistence, as the *Didache* shows, of *pais theou* in its meaning 'servant of God' in liturgical formulae. An important consideration is that in investigating the application to Jesus of the Servant Songs in the New Testament

attention should not be limited to actual quotations, which are few. Examination of direct and indirect allusions in St. Paul, the synoptic Gospels, Acts, 1 Peter and the Johannine literature leads to the result that most of them come from an ancient stock of tradition and formulas, and so to the same conclusion as in the investigation of the phrase *pais theou* itself. Jeremias asks, 'Can Jesus have known Himself to be the Servant of God?' He thinks that His recorded references to Himself as the Servant include enough which can be judged authentic to permit an affirmative answer.

A. J. B. Higgins

The Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. By R. V. G. Tasker. Tyndale New Testament Commentaries. The Tyndale Press, London, 1958. 8s. 6d.

'All who are interested in the teaching and study of the New Testament today', says the General Preface, 'cannot fail to be concerned with the lack of commentaries which avoid the extremes of being unduly technical or unhelpfully brief.' The Tyndale Commentaries are designed to fill this gap. As is to be expected, the treatment is conservative, but it should be added at once that in the present volume at least it is a conservatism that commands respect. Indeed, paradoxical as it may seem to some, here is criticism in the best and highest sense.

The commentary is based on the Authorised Version 'partly because it is easier for commentators, working on this foundation, to show why, on textual and linguistic grounds, the later versions are so often to be preferred'. RV and RSV are adduced when necessary, as are the versions of Moffat and R. A. Knox. The editor has found Hodge, Menzies and Denney of the greatest help 'though in somewhat different ways', but Plummer, Strachan and Rendall are also cited, to name no others. References to recent literature include Roberts' monograph on the codex (1956) and Mitton on the formation of the Pauline Corpus (1955). A notable feature is the use made of P 46, e.g. for its confirmation of Hort's conjecture at 2 Cor. 7.9 (p. 105).

Against the prevailing tendency to regard the letter as composite Professor Tasker maintains its integrity. The closing chapters, often identified as the 'painful' letter, were not written at white heat—rather is the writer 'giving a gentle but firm warning . . . that he will not tolerate any further slipping back into disloyalty'. In favour of Professor Tasker's view is the fact that it is so difficult to account for the alleged compiler's procedure in stitching together so many bits and pieces as he is sometimes said to have done.

Not all will agree with all the views expressed, but in general the

various possible interpretations are clearly set out and fairly discussed. A jarring note is struck at the outset of the commentary proper, when for the significance of Paul's opening greeting we are referred to the *Tyndale Commentary on Thessalonians*. This may have been for economy in space, but surely the few lines necessary for an explanation could have been spared, with a reference to the fuller treatment if desired. On p. 53 a reference to *tōn pollōn*, rendered as 'the many' (RV) or 'the majority' (RSV), set the reviewer thinking of the Dead Sea Scrolls—until reference to Nestlé disclosed that the Greek word is *pleionōn*. On p. 123 *paraskeuastai* should be *pareskeuastai*, on p. 187 'unutterably' 'unalterably'. On p. 61 a letter is out of line, and seems to be from a wrong fount.

On p. 41 the interpretation of 1.5 may not be entirely clear to the reader who has not access to such a work as that of Menzies, while on p. 107 the exposition of 7.13 appears somewhat involved. On 7.4 (p. 102) it may perhaps be suggested that Paul is taking up his previous reference to his frankness and that in the first half of the verse the words should be given their natural and primary meaning: 'I have used great frankness towards you' (cf. Menzies). On the necessity of choice between light and darkness (p. 98f) some reference might have been made to the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Fourth Gospel.

Such criticisms could no doubt be multiplied, but are outweighed by the positive merits of the book, such as the very attractive argument (pp. 173ff) for the rendering in 12.7 'thorn *for* the flesh'—'i.e. to prick the bubble of the apostle's arrogance.' Professor Tasker makes demands of his readers, and full benefit will be derived from this book only by those who are prepared to work through it with the various versions at hand. Those who undertake the labour will find this commentary a helpful guide to the understanding of the heart and mind of Paul. R. McL. Wilson

The Canons of the Council of Sardica. By Hamilton Hess. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Pp. 170. 25s.

First, a warm welcome to the *Oxford Theological Monographs*, a series which makes an excellent start with the present volume. The Council of Sardica bristles with problems, and that is especially true of its canons. Are they genuine? If so, which is the authentic text, and what is the history of the forms in which they appear? What authority had the decisions of the Council, what conception of canon law do they embody, and when and where were they accepted as binding? Moreover, several of the canons need detailed interpretation.

Dr Hess arranges his material in two parts, I, *Historical and*

Textual Studies, and II, *Studies in Interpretation*, to which he adds three tables and three appendices. When a book is concerned much more to examine a number of particular problems than to sustain a single thesis, a reviewer is compelled to single out a few important matters for comment. First, the text. Here, of course, Dr Hess has the benefit of Cuthbert Turner's labours. He accepts all the canons as genuine without much argument, as by this time he is entitled to do. He argues that the Latin and Greek versions both go back to the Council itself, suggesting that, while Latin was the language of business there, the Greek version may have been either a set of minutes taken from the Latin debate by a bilingual scribe or, more probably, a verbatim record of the proposals as they were repeated by an interpreter who made occasional slips. This argument must be scrutinised in detail; it is well developed, but raises its own difficulties. Dr Hess also throws light on the subsequent transmission especially on the Theodosian version.

Secondly—and this is probably the most valuable and most original part of his work—Dr Hess examines the form in which the canons are drawn up, comparing this with the form of other fourth- and fifth-century canons and with procedure in the Roman Senate. He concludes that the Sardican canons (together with those of certain African councils) represent a more primitive form of record than the '*placuit* form' which before long established itself. The former class retains more evidence of the debate itself (hence the redundancies of some Sardican canons), the latter expresses the conclusions more precisely. Again, this is an interesting argument which deserves to be pondered in the light of all available evidence. Dr Hess has to face the difficulty that the sets of canons under his review sometimes mix his two forms, as does Sardica itself; and here his explanation is not wholly reassuring.

The most important Sardican canons are those relating to appeals, one of the most difficult and most urgent constitutional questions which the Church had to face in the fourth century. Dr Hess does well to insist that the action taken at Sardica must be (*a*) contrasted with the normal Eastern feeling that appeals from one council should lie to a larger one, and (*b*) understood in the light of the historical situation at the time, namely Athanasius' appeal to Rome and the Eusebian refusal to apply in practice the principle of appeal to a larger council. On what led up to Sardica and on the canons themselves he has many good things to say. It is disappointing, however, that he does not say more of their subsequent fortunes. Did the Sardican bishops intend their decisions to have a limited or a general application? The Greek text names Pope Julius, which could imply short-term administrative decisions. Here Dr Hess

takes the view that, while the name was present in the original text, there was no intention to limit appeals to Julius personally, so that his name was justifiably removed from Roman copies after his death. But why did Gratus re-enact the substance of a Sardican canon at his Council of Carthage, c. A.D. 345? Dr Hess concludes from his '*memini*' that Carthage possessed no copy of the canons, and argues further that they were still unknown there in 418. Neither conclusion is imperative. But if not, why not? In any case, whether they had them or not, it is clear that the Africans regarded only Nicene canons as binding, apart from their own local legislation. So the old puzzle about the authority of Sardica remains, and it is a pity that Dr Hess does not discuss it more fully. Does his own explanation of the *form* of the canons help? Did the western bishops at Sardica think of themselves not as creating 'canon law' but as making recommendations which would be acted on for the time being and which might be given a longer life by local (e.g. provincial) councils if they chose to do so?

There are many points of detail on which the present reviewer would differ from the author or would like a fuller justification of his opinions. This is one measure of the interest which the book has aroused in him. It is unquestionably a useful contribution to the study of the early Church. S. L. GREENSLADE

Lamb to the Slaughter. By BROTHER GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M. James Clarke, 1957. 7s. 6d.

THE contention of this little book is that we cannot understand the issues involved in Christian belief without an adequate conception of sacrifice, and that there have been many influences throughout Jewish and Christian history which point away from, rather than towards, such a conception. In a rapid and stimulating historical sketch Brother Every mentions three groups of influences of this kind: (1) the complex of rituals and myths which appear in agricultural religion and lead through the stories of dying and rising gods to the salvation-religions of the Graeco-Roman world; (2) some theological and non-theological factors which deflected Judaism and, later, liturgical practices and doctrines of atonement in the West, away from a true understanding of the nature of the participation between God and man; and (3) modern metaphorical uses of the term 'sacrifice' and modern dislike of the idea in any literal sense.

In contradistinction to these tendencies, Brother Every draws a subtle and not undeviating line of connexion between the prehistoric cave-paintings of Altamira and Lascaux, the persistent influence of the nomadic and historical tradition in Israel, and the

conception of offering and sacrifice which underlay the early Christian baptismal Eucharist as it is seen for example, in the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus. This line of connexion is not easy to characterise in abstract terms; perhaps it is best hinted at, in theological language, by saying that in all these manifestations sacrifice is seen as a pouring out and a sharing of life between God and man *inseparabiliter* but also *inconfuse*. The theme of the book is thus at bottom christological; and perhaps the most important contribution which it makes is to remind us that questions of Christology can, and sometimes must be approached not from within the framework of Christian theology but from a consideration of the rites, the resultant myths, and the theological explanations in which men everywhere have sought to express their deepest apprehensions about the world and their place in it. How then are we to understand sacrifice today? In the first instance, and also in the last, by looking at Christ. But also, in the intervening stages, by taking in free what anthropologists and historians can tell us about men long ago who, because of the development of these sciences, are in some ways more comprehensible to us that they ever were to our forebears.

This is a book more stimulating, and also less systematic, than the above comments perhaps suggest. It will help all who read it to take not only their thoughts but also their imagination (and this is harder for most of us today) captive to the obedience of Christ.

R. S. Barbour

The Office of the Lord High Commissioner. By Stewart Mechie. Saint Andrew Press, Edinburgh, 1958. 10s. 6d.

There must be ample material in the historical sources to build up a study like this on a big scale, but to most readers that would have been wearisome. This admirable book of just under sixty pages does justice to the subject, and brings out all that is essential for the historical perspective. It is timely too, in view of the near approach of the four hundredth anniversary of the Reformation in Scotland. The review that Dr Mechie makes so accurately and lucidly, is in itself an important, if subsidiary, illustration of the relationship of Church and State in Scotland which has provided the occasion of most of our battles—what Andrew Melville called 'the bluidy ghuillie of absolute authority'. In such a history, it is easy to see why no Commissioner ever had a more difficult task than the Commissioner to the Glasgow Assembly of 1638, and also why there was no meeting of the General Assembly between 1653 and 1690.

In two chapters, the evidence for the office is traced from the Reformation to modern times. It is truly said that the office 'has

grown in popularity with the passing of the generations', and the third chapter describes fully how it now stands. As the reunion of the Church in 1929 was approaching, it was necessary to settle the terms on which the Commissioner would still be welcomed. He can no longer, as in the past, intervene in the business of the General Assembly nor in the election of the Moderator—though he might still, if he were a representative elder from a Presbytery, take part in the business, in virtue of that fact, but not as Commissioner. There seems to have been a time in the past when the members of the General Assembly sat with their hats on, and removed them only when the Commissioner was present. Dr Mechie has a vivid page in which he unfolds the concern that Dr John White had as to the door by which the Commissioner, the King's second son, to the Union Assembly of 1929, should enter the hall.

In theory the sovereign may still attend the General Assembly, though it is unlikely that any reigning monarch will ever break the record of James VI who attended nine General Assemblies—for his own none too good purposes. Now, and in the future, the Commissioner comes as a most honoured guest, and as a personal symbol of a new and happy relationship between Church and State. For that reason, the office is certainly much more than 'a mere picturesque survival'.

The book includes the full list of Commissioners from 1580 to 1956. There is reasonable, if not complete, accuracy as to who held this office during these years. In this list, it does not seem to have been thought necessary to give the surnames of the many peers who have held the Office. Apart from bringing the list up to date as time passes, there will be no need for another book to supersede this one.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Saint Paul. By CLAUDE TRESMONTANT, translated by DONALD ATTWATER.

Buddha and Buddhism. By MAURICE PERCHERON, translated by EDMOND STAPLETON.

Saint Augustine and his Influence through the Ages. By HENRI MARROU translated by PATRICK HEPBURN-SCOTT, with texts from Augustine translated by Edmund Hill.

Master Eckhart and the Rhineland Mystics. By JEANNE ANCELET-HUSTACHE, translated by HILDA GRAEF.

All the foregoing are in the series 'Men of Wisdom', published in stiff paper covers by Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1957. Pp. 192. 6s. each.

Selected Letters of Samuel Rutherford. Edited by HUGH MARTIN. S.C.M. Press, London, 1957. 8s. 6d.

This remarkable series of inexpensive but well printed and generously illustrated books deserves careful attention on the part, for example, of the parish minister who has been asked by a thoughtful member of his congregation for a handy but sound book on Paul, or Augustine, or Buddha, or Eckhart. All are illustrated, some have pictures on almost every page, and these are usually remarkably well produced. The volume on Paul will be found the most controversial, of course, but it does grapple creditably with the great issues of the Epistles as well as with the historical facts. The Augustine volume has nearly a hundred pages of translated texts of Augustine, very judiciously selected and agreeably translated. The Buddha volume is, as is right, more historical and apologetic—a straight account of Buddha and the expansion of Buddhism. The Eckhart has about forty-five pages of extracts from his spiritual works.

Other volumes are in preparation. So far the series appears to be a most commendable enterprise in popular scholarship.

The S.C.M. Press is making a gesture similar to that reviewed above, but on a larger scale, in the publication of its series called 'A Treasury of Christian Books'. The latest addition to that series is Dr Martin's edition of Rutherfurd. Here are seventy-one of his letters, together with a short Foreword, explanatory notes where required, and a glossary. This last leads us to express approval of Dr Martin's decision not to modernise or otherwise dilute the rich lowland Scots in which the letters are written. Without doubt they are great Puritan literature, and it was right to present them as their author wrote them. The selection here given covers the period 1628-46, and forty-seven of them come from the period of his exile in Aberdeen: this number preserves the just proportion of the original (220 of 356). Rutherfurd needs no commendation here. We simply express gratitude to the S.C.M. Press for making him available, and welcome this rich and beautiful compendium of Puritan piety.

Erik Routley

Out of Nazareth. By D. M. Baillie. The Saint Andrew Press, Edinburgh, 1958. Pp. 211. 15s.

It is gratifying to encounter another example disproving the universality of Mark Antony's sombre funeral declaration, and a genuine pleasure to welcome another volume assembled from the papers left behind by the late Donald Baillie. This further 'selection of sermons and lectures' has the high quality which one would desire in any such posthumous volume and expect in the case of their composer. An earlier book, *God Was in Christ*, furnished us with the outline of the theology in which Donald Baillie tried to express the essential meaning of the Christian faith. The present

work is in a sense supplementary to this. Here again there come to expression some of the fundamental elements of Christian doctrine—the prevenience of God, illustrated by witnesses themselves belonging to widely diverse schools of thought ('God Carrying His People'); the paradox inherent in Christian thinking, exemplified in natural law and providence, man's action and God's grace, and pre-eminently in the incarnation ('Can Jesus be both God and Man?'); the unseen world making in general a direct moral claim upon man, and supremely in Jesus Christ ('Man and the Unseen World'). But the book does more than make theological points. In a quite unusual degree, it reveals the character of the theologian who writes it. The reader knows himself to be in the presence of not only a theologian combining profundity and simplicity in a remarkable way, but of a devoutly Christian man. Similarly, it would be difficult to say which of the characters expressed in this book merits the greater admiration—the theologian or the preacher. Fortunately it is not necessary, and perhaps not possible, to make a choice; for the two characters are finely fused together. Here is a scholar who manifestly holds his learning as a sacred and personal trust to be discharged for the benefit of others. The theological student cannot but learn from the sermons; the ordinary Christian, puzzled for example by the intricacies of the doctrine of the Trinity, cannot fail to be enlightened by the lectures. This is theological scholarship at its best. If we cannot now expect more from the pen of Donald Baillie, we must be deeply grateful that he has given us so much.

J. K. S. Reid

Konfirmation i Sverige under medeltid och reformationstid (*Bibliotheca theologiae practicae I*). By Carl-Gustaf Andrén. Gleerups forlag, Lund, 1957. Pp. 316. 17.50 kr.

The prelude to revival in our theological faculties might well be the institution of a lectureship in theological Swedish, as the injunction to go East might be the considered advice to those young men who seek to work in the significant centres of theological revival. It is the Scandinavian countries, and notably Lund and Uppsala, which are the dominant centres in Europe at the present time of Old and New Testament, patristic, liturgical and theological studies. Except for one or two older publications in English of works by such renowned scholars as Nygren and Aulén, the work of the younger theologians in Sweden has come to the notice of English-speaking scholars only in isolated articles in journals or occasional compilations, or in inadequately translated monographs.[1] Exegetical and

[1] A helpful summary of Swedish theology since 1900 by Gustaf Wingren appears in the *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 113-34.

critical studies, the worth and even existence of which are known in this country to only a few, would, by translation, incontrovertibly establish Swedish theological scholarship as being perhaps the most extensive and important in Europe today. It is a deplorable loss that two of the great formative works in Swedish theology within the last fifty years are still unavailable in English—Einar Billing's *De etiska tankarna i urkristendomen* (*The Ethical Thought of Early Christianity*), 1907, revised 1936, and Aulén's *Den kristna gudsbilden* (*The Christian Conception of God*), 1927.

These remarks are occasioned by the appearance of *Konfirmation i Sverige under medeltid och reformationstid* (*Confirmation in Sweden during the Medieval and Reformation Periods*), a doctoral treatise submitted by Dr Carl-Gustaf Andrén to the Faculty of Theology at Lund.

The subject of this carefully documented work is the sacrament of Confirmation during the medieval period in Sweden, and the termination of the use of this sacrament in the sixteenth century. The meaning, and perhaps the admissibility, of the rite of Confirmation has been a matter of frequent debate in all evangelical Churches, and though it has never been denied that Ministers should 'take public and particular examination of the knowledge and conversation of such as are to be admitted to the Table of the Lord Jesus', the actual praxis of Confirmation as a sacrament, or of sacramental character, has frequently to be justified in Churches of the Reformed tradition. In consequence, evangelical Churches have mainly concentrated in historical research on justifying causes for their Confirmation, and there has been insufficient research by scholars of Reformed Churches into the pre-Reformation Confirmation. The great value of Andrén's work for English-speaking scholars is that it represents a serious inquiry by a Reformed theologian into the pre-Reformation Confirmation in a particular country; that in this way we better comprehend the proper affirmations of the Reformers; and that so far is Andrén's subject from being isolated from the English-speaking Reformed tradition, that its narrow limit and clearly-defined period in fact make our understanding of the new Reformed conception of Baptism more clear.

In his Introduction Andrén deals with the separation of Confirmation from the act of Baptism, by which the original complex of acts involved in *baptismus* became separated into the liturgically and temporally distinct acts of water-baptism and laying-on of hands, and the latter became solely the act of the Bishop. This process of dissociation was a long one, and not finally complete until medieval Scholasticism petrified Confirmation as the second of the seven sacraments, and thereby dissolved the integral relation between Baptism and First Communion. As early as the fifth century, how-

ever, a sermon ascribed to Faustus, Bishop of Riez, differentiates between the giving of the Spirit in Baptism and in Confirmation in a way similar to later Roman interpretation, by which the Spirit in Baptism restores fallen man by cleansing him of sin, while in Confirmation the Spirit grants an *augmentum ad gratiam* to confirm the Christian in his struggle against the world, the flesh, and the devil. The Swedish primary sources agreed with this universal Roman interpretation whereby Baptism and Confirmation were related, in that Baptism was absolutely necessary to salvation, whereas Confirmation, as the *Commentaries of the Sentences* states, alone would permit a man to become *verus et perfectus Christianus*, conferring, as it did, the *plenitudo gratiae* through its minister, the Bishop.

In his Fourth Chapter Andrén discusses the tension which existed between the conditions and the gift in the act of Confirmation. Although Scholastic theology held that the sacraments worked *ex opere operato*, there were conditions which had to be fulfilled by the confirmands, viz., a *status gratiae* to be achieved, through, for example Baptism, as the precondition of Confirmation, the attainment of the appropriate age, the presence of sponsors, and the right *intentio*, or desire to receive Confirmation—all these were the practical consequences of the accepted doctrine of Confirmation. The medieval Swedish work, *De sju sakramenten* (*The Seven Sacraments*), however, was unique among Roman documents in stating that the child itself should at Confirmation confess with its own mouth the faith professed by the godfather at Baptism. Confirmation here is thus the renewal by the child of its own baptismal vows. Andrén draws attention to the movement for reform in the act of Confirmation in the medieval Church, particularly in regard to Erasmus who, in his paraphrase of St. Matthew's Gospel, propounded a scheme for a proper and solemn ceremony at which baptised children should ratify the vows of their Baptism, but he rejects the suggestion of W. Maurer that the change proposed by Erasmus referred to the Roman rite of Confirmation. The change was, rather, an extension of the act of Baptism, Andrén holds, and implied no real change in Roman Confirmation. But perhaps Lutheran scholars have never understood Erasmus with sufficient sympathy!

Andrén's final chapter deals with the attitude taken by the Reformers to the sacraments, and in particular with the Reformed criticism of the Roman doctrine of Confirmation. Confirmation had not been a dominant question at the Reformation, but Luther, and generally the other Reformers, had wholly rejected it as a sacrament, denying its 'completion' of Baptism, the use of chrism (although as late as 1529 the Council of Örebro gave an evangelical interpretation to the anointing with chrism), and, in particular,

denying the scriptural basis for the rite; stressing rather the need for the Christian to return to his Baptism (to 'improve' our Baptism, in the words of the Westminster Larger Catechism) so as to make his whole life a daily Baptism. Melanchthon, Calvin, and Zwingli, with Luther, rejected the sacramental character of Roman Confirmation, and substituted for it a form of catechetical instruction culminating in what was virtually a benediction for baptised children; but it was Bucer who was mainly the author of an evangelical act of Confirmation, consisting in the baptised children's profession of faith and the imposition of hands with prayer—a form of Confirmation of marked conservatism which influenced the 1549 and 1552 Books of Common Prayer. Andrén holds that this Reformed criticism of the Roman Confirmation was likewise applied in Sweden, and that Confirmation, as a principle and a practice, was rejected in favour of a catechetical preparation of baptised persons for the Holy Communion. The new Reformed emphasis on Baptism emptied the Roman Confirmation of its significance. It may well be, however, that the influence of some Continental rites of Confirmation, e.g. the Brandenburg or Waldeck Church Orders, traces of which are found in the Swedish *Nova ordinantia*, 1575 (cancelled at the Synod of 1593), was greater than Andrén is prepared to allow. Undoubtedly it was a *de caritate* rather than a *de fide* principle which Luther and the Lutheran followers adopted in liturgical reform, particularly in Sweden, altering in the liturgy only what was doctrinally inadmissible.

For unimaginative theologians who have not yet turned eastwards to the place of the rising of theological light this book has a sixteen-page summary in English. Were it not that the Swedes are not only imaginative, but almost all bilingual, it should properly become our task to append in each of our future theological works a summary in Swedish! Ross Mackenzie

The Pattern of Love: a Discussion of the Tension between the Power of Romantic Love and the Claims of Marriage. By William P. Wylie. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1958. Pp. 212. 16s.

A revolutionary era calls for new patterns. In poetry and art the new patterns are hardly yet discernible; in worship there is much inquiry into the proper 'shape of the liturgy'; and here now is an attempt to discern the pattern of love for our day.

Mr Wylie believes that a chasm separates what the traditional Churches teach and what the ordinary man and woman accept as reasonable and decent standards of behaviour. Particularly is this so in the matter of divorce. Divorce, he writes, is now a normal and necessary part of life. General public opinion considers 'one such

divorce and remarriage to be more or less normal, to be indeed for many people almost a necessity'—one of several wild generalisations in this provoking book. He goes on to assert that the Church in its long history has gone far astray. It has insisted on the legal side of marriage as apparently the only thing that it will worry about. It has given the impression that sexual sin is the worst, if not indeed the only sin, and all forms of extra-marital intercourse are equally sinful. The greatest trouble of all, in his view, is that the Church has ignored romantic love—the driving force of modern society, 'one of the root facts of human nature, one of the greatest possibilities open to the heart of any man or woman'. Nevertheless there is in relation to such love the continual hint within the Church of something waiting to be told. The trouble is that so far no one has tried to tell it clearly and plainly. Mr Wylie will now do this very thing with the help of Charles Williams, Mr C. S. Lewis and Dr Sherwin Bailey. This book is then an essay on the nature of romantic love and the pattern which it follows. It is romantic love which makes the world go round, but the Church does not see this and must be taught to see it.

In what are perhaps the most constructive and helpful pages, two problems are considered which may arise in any normal married life. There is first of all the withdrawal of the original vision, so that husband and wife have to work through dull patches and times of boredom with only their mutual pledge of fidelity to see them through. And there is the reappearance of the original vision in the face of someone else. This he works out in the chapter entitled 'Brief Encounter'. 'There must be very many men and women who do not marry their first love but meet a later "acceptable variant" (the phrase is Mr Sherwin Bailey's) with whom they made a very happy marriage.' A wife is the accepted variant with whom the 'grand experiment' is actually being worked out. (Try a letter to your fiancée beginning 'Dearest Accepted Variant'!) Such brief encounters always carry a threat to the institution of marriage, yet they require interpretation and must be worked into the pattern of romantic love, so that men and women learn to see such 'recognitions' as visions granted of what all men truly are in the Mind of God. Without good theology love is treated as Fate, and this for Mr Wylie is the most pernicious of modern heresies.

We stand in need of writers who will attempt in our day to set forth a theology of marriage. Mr Wylie with his conviction about the importance of romantic love and of the insight of writers like Charles Williams, has made the effort to bring Christian doctrine and the experience of falling in love into close relation, but the result is a rather confusing medley of terms drawn from philosophy,

theology and poetry. Romantic love, we are told, has its roots in the collective unconscious; through it we 'step into an enlarged and abnormal mode of consciousness'. This 'transcendental factor' is the core of romantic love. Words and phrases like 'two-nature', 'acceptable variants' jostle one another. What a jargon it is! Yet Mr Wylie presses on in a rather patronising tone to 'Mother Kirk', and having offered his counsel in such language to those married people who fall in love with another 'acceptable variant', he is humourless enough to say, 'If and when the Church can learn to speak like this the world may perhaps listen to her more respectfully than it has done in the past.' But should the Church do so? A club member came to borrow a book on Sex and, in doing so, remarked that most books of that kind were no good. 'The words are too long. They're frightened to say anything. It is dry, you can't finish it.' This book has many long words. The author has something he wants to say about the nature of romantic love and is not at all afraid to say it. It is rather dry but, if it is not the holiday season, one might finish it. WILLIAM S. TINDAL

Atlas of the Early Christian World. By F. VAN DER MEER and CHRISTINE MOHRMANN, translated and edited by MARY HEDLUND and H. H. ROWLEY. Nelson, Edinburgh, 1958. Pp. 216 (42 coloured maps, 620 illustrations). 70s.

LIKE its well-known predecessor, Grollenberg's *Atlas of the Bible*, this is a splendid book, and there is no reason why a reviewer should stint his praise. First published in Holland by the Elsevier firm, its appearance in an English dress will be a great boon to all students of the early Church and, in all probability, a revelation to many others of the abundant interest of early Christian art. The editors, authors or compilers (it is difficult to know just what to call them) are scholars of high repute, working together at Nijmegen. How they must have enjoyed themselves! Not that I under-rate the labour and devotion which lie behind a publication calling for meticulous care as well as wide erudition. Even so, to make these original maps (they are Professor van der Meer's own work) and hunt up all these lovely pictures must have been delectable work.

First the maps, of which there are forty-two. Some are the maps one expects, showing administrative divisions of the Empire and the extension of Christianity at various dates, with a good measure of regional maps to fill out the more general ones. There is a particularly useful map of the Churches of Persia and its neighbours. Less usual are distribution maps of Christian monuments, *memoriae* of martyrs, monasteries and pilgrimage-routes, and—even more original—the local habitation of early Christian writers. Of cities,

Rome gets three plans, Constantinople, Jerusalem and Ravenna one each. With so much historical detail to include, one cannot expect the physical characteristics as well. No doubt the editors have presumed the simultaneous use of an ordinary physical atlas, which is important, since geography played a large part in the expansion of Christianity. The only serious criticism I would offer is the omission of the Roman trunk roads from some of the regional maps. They are given for Italy and North Africa, where their significance is revealed to the first glance at the line of sees along the Via Aemilia or the close conformation of Churches to roads in Numidia and Mauretania.

After the maps come 150 pages of plates with an excellent running commentary. This fascinating collection illustrates many facets of early Christian life and art—church buildings of many forms, catacomb paintings of high religious significance, sarcophagi, ivories, mosaics, inscriptions and much more. For sheer entertainment I recommend plates 139/40, the allegorical sea-piece of about A.D. 320 which adorns the mosaic floor of Aquileia cathedral; and for instruction, perhaps the now familiar paintings at Dura, the air-view of basilicas at Philippi, the pictures of baptisteries, and the illustrations of Qalat Sem'an, where Simeon Stylites had his pillar. There is also an impressive photograph of Mar Saba, to set one musing on monasticism. The selection is well up to date, with the Christus-Helios of the Vatican excavations, the probable portrait of the Empress Helena from below Trier cathedral (interesting half-justification of a much-doubted legend?), and Augustine's cathedral at Hippo, excavated at last. Perhaps the big complexes of Christian buildings at Salona might have been shown from the air.

The pictures are sure to entice us away from the maps, but that temptation must sometimes be resisted, for the maps deserve hours of thoughtful attention, preferably with a magnifying glass. They stimulate questions. Greece, for instance, is a puzzle. Why were Christian writers so scarce there? Why did the great see of Thessalonica produce no important theologian in this period? Why is Greece so blank in the map of monasticism?

I must not omit to mention the indexes which are a substantial and important part of the volume, almost a guide to its use. The whole production is a credit to all concerned, including the publishers, both Dutch and British. I make one suggestion for consideration when another edition is called for. Some readers may ask on what evidence the maps are plotted. The proper answer would be, the whole of early Christian literature, plus the relevant modern scholarship, especially archaeological; and it is understandable that no bibliography is included. Still, there are certain types of book

of which a select list would be helpful—a few dictionaries, like Cabrol-Leclercq, some of the older classics of ecclesiastical geography like *Gallia Christiana*, *España Sagrada*, *Italia Sacra* and *Oriens Christianus* (now under revision), and, among more modern books, Duchesne's *Fastes episcopaux de l'ancienne Gaule*, Lanzoni's *Diocesi d'Italia*, Schultze's *Altchristliche Städte*, Grabar's *Martyrium*, Gam's *Series Episcoporum*. S. L. GREENSLADE

Le Stoïcisme des pères de l'église. By M. SPANNEUT. Éditions du senil, Paris, 1957.

IN any attempt at historical research, and especially in describing the history of ideas, two approaches have to be made. The first is to outline our present knowledge of the subject under investigation; the second, to enlarge and correct this present knowledge either by the use of newly discovered sources or by re-interpreting the source-material which has been available before. Fr Spanneut's book has to take this last course since, apart from Melito's Easter homily, no new evidence of the second-century Fathers' teaching has come to light in recent times. Such an attempt at re-interpreting known—albeit not generally well-known—sources will yield fruit only if the appreciation of today's accepted views is made carefully and correctly. For only then will the increase in our knowledge and the justification for doubting earlier statements appear clearly to the reader.

These remarks are meant to support Fr Spanneut in his giving a somewhat lengthy introduction to his excellent studies in the Stoicism of the early Fathers. His outline of what should be understood by Stoicism as 'the' rather than 'a' system of philosophy in the first 250 years of the Roman Empire is both critical and constructive. Upon this basis he then analyses the response to Stoic tenets that is to be found in the theology of the contemporary Fathers of the Catholic Church. The special doctrines to be tested are their anthropology or doctrine of man, their theology or doctrine of God, and their cosmology or doctrine of the world.

The lucidity of this approach is to be highly commended, and many of Fr Spanneut's new interpretations of the Fathers' sayings in the light of comparable Stoic utterances will be applauded by his fellow scholars in the Patristic field. For his book shows all the marks not only of a wide and deep knowledge of both philosophical as well as Patristic sources and literature, but also of a mature critical judgment. One of its particular merits is that it endeavours to give reasons why these early Fathers should have been so ready to employ Stoic doctrines just at this stage of the development of Christian theology. Apart from the fact that in their time Stoicism

was 'in the air', Fr Spanneut points out how its system of an optimistic monism was opposed to the dualistic pessimism of the Gnostics. Since, therefore, a great number of the Fathers with whom Fr Spanneut deals, such as Justin, Irenaeus, Hippolytus or Tertullian, were actively opposing the various founders of Gnostic sects, the assistance provided by a similarly minded philosophy would be readily accepted. We are inclined to pass this argument as a strong support for Fr Spanneut's warning directed against the acceptance as a proved fact of the 'Platonism' of the early Fathers.

Another equally significant reason proposed by Fr Spanneut for the adoption of Stoic doctrines by the second-century Catholic Fathers is this: that these Fathers, and in particular the early Apologists, discussed the doctrine of God at much greater length and in greater detail than that of Jesus Christ, the Saviour. Consequently it is to be noticed that in their writings, which have come down to our time, they were far readier to incorporate Stoic thoughts and theories than were Origen and his school as well as the participants in the Christological conflicts of subsequent centuries. The fact outlined (with the given limitation of our incomplete knowledge, which is felt especially with regard to the monarchianist debates) has to be accepted; but its unqualified application to the problem why the early Fathers succumbed to Stoic influence in their doctrine of God to the extent that becomes probable from the results of this book should be checked in each case. For to Fr Spanneut, who is a priest in the Roman Church, the fundamental unanimity of the early Catholic Fathers is established beyond question. Even the schismatics (or worse) Tatian, Hippolytus and Tertullian are included in that traditional group of 'Fathers of the Church'.

It is at this point that criticism will have to take its start. We grant readily that the second century A.D. reaped the last and most perfect fruit of that civilisation which, by the conception of great Augustus and his companions, had been founded upon Stoicism as its authoritative philosophy. Second-century philosophers were therefore willy-nilly under its spell, however valiantly they might have tried to resist it. We also grant that Stoicism proved a welcome ally time and again in the struggle of the Catholics against the apparent dualism of Gnostic teaching. Nevertheless, Stoicism was known to be an alien element in Christian teaching, and therefore we would hesitate to abandon, to the extent that Fr Spanneut has abandoned it, the research into the separate contributions made by each Father, each province, each language of the Church. For we are not afraid of discovering disharmony instead of harmony, frailty instead of authority, even deceit and cowardice: 'Nostra

institutio de porticu Salomonis est, qui et ipse tradiderat *Dominum* in simplicitate cordis esse quaerendum' (Tertullian, *De praescr.* vii.9).

ARNOLD EHRHARDT

The Easter Drama. By HUGH BISHOP, C.R. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1958. Pp. 60. 3s. 6d.

THE six talks in this volume were broadcast in Easter Week 1958, and those who heard them will be glad to have them in this permanent form. They were a sequel to a series broadcast in Holy Week 1955, and published under the title *The Passion Drama.* The subjects of the talks here are The Easter Drama, Hope, Joy, Peace. The Drama of the Altar, Eternal Life. There is here no theological argument for the Resurrection of our Lord. The purpose is rather devotional and practical. The author's desire is to make the Easter Drama more real to his readers, and to help them 'to enter into the fruits of Christ's victory by appropriating themselves some of the qualities of which our world stands desperately in need, which are made available for us by the risen ascended Lord through the Holy Spirit'. The talks take but a short time to read, but they provide subjects for prayerful meditation, and the reader who uses the book as it is meant to be used will certainly be strengthened for daily living and deepened in his spiritual understanding.

JOHN A. LAMB

Prayers for Daily Use. By SAMUEL H. MILLER. Pp. 128. 7s. 6d.

A Private House of Prayer. By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD. Pp. 338. 12s. 6d., 15s., 21s. Both published by Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1958.

THESE two volumes, coming from the same publishing house and issued for much the same purpose, are yet very different in their style. Both are intended to assist the devout in their daily prayer, and they are both very personal, though not in quite the same way. In the first book everything has been composed by the author, 263 prayers that have grown out of personal need and awareness. About three quarters of the book contain prayers for morning and evening, and these are followed by sections for the more important parts of the Christian Year, and a few occasional prayers. The language is fitting, often beautiful, though some may feel it is sometimes a little strained. But the book can be recommended for personal use, and being beautifully printed and bound is very suitable for use as a gift.

Dr Weatherhead's book is much larger, and while it contains a great deal of original material, there is also much anthology—quotations from the Bible, from poets, philosophers and others.

After two introductory sections, the plan of the book is based on daily prayer and meditation for a month. Each day has seven 'rooms'—divisions of material into Awareness of the Divine Presence Adoration, Praise and Thanksgiving; Confession, Forgiveness and Unloading; Affirmation and Reception; Petition; Intercession; and Meditation. The last part, called 'Spare Rooms', contains additional prayers. There is a helpful index (but why should Browning's poem be called 'Abbot Vogler'?). The author suggests that the book may be particularly useful to those who are suffering from illness, depression, weakness or loneliness. It will be of very great value to these, but also to all who practise daily prayer and meditation. This book too is well produced. JOHN A. LAMB

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Rev. Professor T. F. TORRANCE
Rev. Professor J. K. S. REID

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Editors:

Rev. Prof. T. F. Torrance, M.B.E., D.D., D.Theol.,
21 South Oswald Road, Edinburgh, 9 (Telephone 46114)

Rev. Prof. J. K. S. Reid, D.D.,
44 Headingley Mount, Leeds, 6 (Telephone 56853)

Consulting Editors:

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THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF LOVE

by The Rev. Dr WILLIAM LILLIE

I

All Christian love has its source and exemplar in the love of God. 'Beloved,' wrote St. John, 'if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another',[1] or again, 'God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him.'[2] St. Paul was equally clear; it is God's love which 'has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us',[3] and it is the love of Christ (which is, of course, the love of God revealed in Christ) that constrains us to live no longer for ourselves[4]—the usual way in which our human love is evidenced. Dietrich Bonhoeffer echoed this from his German prison, 'No one knows what love is except in the self-revelation of God. . . . It is only the concrete action and suffering of Jesus Christ which will make it possible to understand what love is.'[5] So we must begin with the love of God; and yet our understanding of God's love comes to us through the experience of human love. It was with a picture of an earthly father, surrounded by the human things of home and field, calves and kids, robes and rings, sons and servants, that Jesus made His most vivid portrait of the love of God; and it was not only in dying on Calvary, but also in living in human fellowship with Peter and John, Martha and Mary that Jesus Himself exhibited the Father's love to men. Yet, while Christ gave the supreme revelation of that love, we need not despise the lesser revelations of it that come to us in our ordinary human experience; a man may truly say that, in the forgiveness given to him by a man or a woman, he has gained a new understanding of the love of God. In any systematic treatment of our subject, the love of God must come first, for it is logically and actually prior to all human loves, but in our own experience the love of a parent or of a friend may be the step by which we have risen to some understanding of God's love.

[1] 1 John 4.11. [2] 1 John 4.16. [3] Rom. 5.5. [4] 2 Cor. 5.14.
[5] D. Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, pp. 173, 174.

The essential characteristic of the love of God, which we may call by its biblical name of *agape* to distinguish it from forms of love that may appear different, is self-giving. The Swedish theologian, Nygren, contrasted *agape* with *eros*, the love of which the Greeks talked much, in this respect among others, that *eros* is egocentric: 'Every desire of the self is a desire of good for the self.'[1] This cannot be accepted as true of all human love, apart from the *agape* that is poured into men's hearts through the Holy Spirit; the pagan mother and the pagan lover may forget themselves in their desire for the good of those they love. What is true is that a great deal of ordinary human love is selfish, and seeks to find satisfaction for its own desires in the beloved person or object, and that in the loves of fallen men there is always a trace of self-regard. Karl Barth also regards *agape* as self-giving—'a turning from self to another for the sake of the other'.[2] The fact that God is love indicates that the giving of the self for the sake of another is not something occasionally necessary to meet adverse conditions like a 'national emergency'. It is something essential to the nature of the universe, found eternally in God Himself. An obvious manifestation of it in nature, animal as well as human, is the maternal instinct by which the mother gives herself up, sometimes even sacrificing her life, for the sake of her young. Our Lord saw something of the same kind in the corn of wheat dying and bearing much fruit.[3] (Modern biological study may complicate, but it does not invalidate the point of, this example.) In the world's history, the supreme example of this is the Cross of Jesus Christ, and this demonstrates the special form the love of God had to take in dealing with sinful men, for in the love at work on the Cross men have found forgiveness, reconciliation and restoration. Our Christian reaction is, 'He loved me, and gave Himself for me.'[4] Forgiveness, which is essentially love restored, seems to us in our need the very essence of the love of God, but His love is found in Creation and Providence as well as in Redemption. God is always the God who gives, but on the Cross in a special way He gave Himself for the sake of men to bring them back to His love.

[1] A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, I, p. 137.
[2] G. W. Bromiley, 'The Doctrine of Reconciliation', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. 10, p. 84.
[3] John 12.24. [4] Gal. 2.20.

Nygren lays great emphasis on the fact that *agape* is spontaneous, uncaused or unmotivated. 'God's love is "uncaused", not of course in the sense that it is arbitrary or capricious; on the contrary, it is necessary, because it belongs to the very nature of God Himself. Again, God's love is spontaneous; it is not called out by anything outside itself. Hence, when it is said that God loves man, this is not a judgment on what man is like, but on what God is like.'[1] This states the obvious truth that the love of God is not given to a man, because of any merit in that man; it is certainly wrong to think that God loves the godly on account of his godliness.[2] In this respect the *agape* of God is far more like our ordinary human love than the more refined *eros* of the Greek philosophers. For it is to something worthy, to the beauty in a person or object, that Plato's *eros* is drawn; 'that which is the object of love must indeed be fair, and delicate, and perfect, and most happy'.[3] In common life, very fortunately for many of us, people can and do love those who are neither fair nor perfect. A mother loves her deformed and difficult child, and cynics often wonder what two very ordinary lovers see in one another to love. God's *agape*, however, is not uncaused and spontaneous in the sense of its being indifferent as to its object. We must not think of love as an emanation or a substance necessarily flowing out from God whether there be an object to receive it or not, like the water which must spray from a fountain in all directions with no concern as to the objects on which it falls. Barth's analysis suggests an important safeguard here; *agape* is self-giving *for the sake of* the other. Nygren is certainly right that this does not mean 'for the sake of the merit or worth of the other', but love is still for the sake of the other even when there is no merit in the other. The teaching of the Bible is most helpful here; we may smile a little at the pictures of God providing garments for Adam and Eve, suddenly embarrassed by the consciousness of their own bodies, or of His visiting Abraham in his tent by the oak of Mamre in order to discuss family matters with him, but the truth behind these stories is that it is in the concrete affairs of men, the things that concern men most, that the love of God is at work. The climax of the revelation is One who went about

[1] A. Nygren, op. cit., I, p. 52. [2] ibid, I, p. 54.
[3] Plato, *Symposium*, 204.

doing good, particularly concerned with human need, and finally sharing a gallows with two criminals. To call love 'uncaused' may lead us to forget that there is no love without an object, and the objects of God's love, so far as we are concerned and our knowledge goes, are just sinful men and women for whom love must show itself as forgiveness. The Bible does talk of God loving righteousness and hating iniquity, just as we talk of people loving the ballet and hating Communism, but both these uses are secondary and metaphorical; it is men and women whom God loves and we love.

This raises the question, 'Does God love all men or does He love only a limited group—the elect or the true Israel or the like?' Is God's love what Karl Barth calls 'an electing love'?[1] It is common today to take the universality of God's love for granted—that all men are His children, so that 'the dear Lord, Who loveth us, He made and loveth all'. (Coleridge, quite logically, includes birds and beasts, as well as all mankind within God's love.) Yet the Bible clearly indicates that God has a special love for His own people. Malachi hears God saying: 'Yet I have loved Jacob, but I have hated Esau.'[2] ('Hate' here may be the vivid Eastern way of expressing a love that comes second.)[3] In Hosea, we have a picture of God's special love to Israel in terms both of loving husband[4] and devoted parent.[5] Even in the Gospel where we are told that 'God so loved the world' (and the 'world' in the most common Johannine usage is the world alienated from God), we are also told how Christ, who was the revelation of God, had a special love to a brother and two sisters at Bethany,[6] and to one of His immediate disciples.[7]

Are we then to conclude that *agape*, as applied even to God, is an ambiguous word, that there is one *agape* given to all men without distinction, and another *agape*, more akin to our human love, which God felt towards the patriarchs and Christ gave to a few selected people? We may parody Kipling and say: 'God gave all men all men to love, But since our hearts are small, Ordained for each a few should prove, Beloved over all.' This is certainly true of us, and it may be that, in the limitations of

[1] G. W. Bromiley, op. cit., p. 84. [2] Mal. 1.2, 3.
[3] cf. Gen. 29.31; Luke 14.26. [4] e.g. Hos. 2.19, 20.
[5] e.g. Hos. 11.3, 4. [6] John 11.5. [7] John 13.23.

His human life, Christ could only give a close personal friendship to a small number of people. But, quite certainly, this does not apply to the love of God the Father, who is subject to no such limitations. The common, and, in my opinion, the thoroughly wrong way of meeting this difficulty is to suppose that, while God loves all men, He 'liked' the patriarchs or the people of Israel with an affection closely resembling human love as we ordinarily think of it, but really having nothing to do with the Divine *agape*. Similarly, while the *agape* of Jesus towards all men was such that He died to save them from their sins, He liked a few human individuals in the way that we love our friends. If, however, God's *agape* is the source and pattern of our love to one another as Christians, it must have its supreme expression in close personal relations—relations like those human ones where we expect liking as well as forgiveness and self-giving. The fact to be taken seriously here is the fact of election,[1] that God chooses a particular race or a particular individual for a special purpose. God called Israel out of the world to bring the world unto Himself. Such an election of Israel was bound to bring the people of Israel into personal relations with God, and once men are into the sphere of personal relations, *agape* will show the personal interest, the emotional warmth and the genuine liking that we usually associate with love. Abraham, who was the first of the race to know God's electing purpose according to the record, became 'the friend of God'; Israel became 'my chosen in whom my soul delights'. We must not confine the *agape* of God to those whose election to a special destiny brings them into special relations with Him. We may see a picture of the *agape* of God in the story of the Good Samaritan. He may or may not have had a benevolent attitude to the Jewish race as such, but it was when he came into personal contact with the wounded Jew on the road that there was the self-giving of *agape*. It is wrong to think of the Samaritan as using the wounded Jew as a means of expressing the *agape* that filled his soul; the compassion of the Samaritan, which is recorded in the story, was an emotion felt towards this particular person, and indeed a rudimentary love. There may be a sense in which the *agape* of God is infinite and universal, but the *agape* which concerns us

[1] For a discussion of this, see H. H. Rowley, *The Biblical Doctrine of Election.*

is the forgiving and active love, which God shows in His personal dealings with men, whether it be an individual clearly chosen for a special task or a poor sufferer encountered on the wayside, when the *agape* of God has all the concrete warmth and individual concern of our human love at its best. To deny this would be to make the love of God in certain respects a poorer thing than the love of man. How God chooses those to whom He makes known His love is beyond our understanding.

Some thinkers find a difference between God's *agape* and ordinary human love in the fact that *agape* creates in the object of love something worthy to be loved, particularly the restored image of God in forgiven sinners. This is, however, subject to our human limitations, sometimes true even of ordinary human love. It is a happy experience that, when a woman falls in love with a man, she sometimes evokes in him lovable qualities that previously were invisible or perhaps even did not exist. The same creativity can be seen in the love given by parents to their children, although here the slowness of the child's development makes the process less obvious. 'The best modern psychiatry, when dealing with the problem of delinquency in children, . . . insists that they must be accepted, must find security in the love of others, out of which security they gain sufficient freedom from self to "let go" and love others.'[1] This is a picture of the security which sinning men need to find in the love of God, so that they can 'let go' in their own creative urges. The stories of the saints are, for the most part, stories of men who with some reason thought of themselves as the chief of sinners, but in whom holiness and love itself were created by the *agape* of God. This is one of the paradoxes of the love of God. God loves us as sinners, and 'shows His love for us in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us',[2] but, in responding to that love, we are 'called to be saints'.[3] Holiness, or moral worth, is not the cause of God's loving us, but it is certainly the effect of God's loving us. We do not understand how *agape* creates goodness; the most comprehensible analogies are in the creativities of human love.

There are other qualities, attributed to God in the Bible which we understand by the analogy of our human qualities,

[1] Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems*, p. 145.
[2] Rom. 5.8. [3] Rom. 1.7.

particularly the justice and holiness of God. In the Christian revelation, indeed, love in its work of forgiving appears to take precedence of and even comprehend justice and holiness, and we never can believe that God possesses them in such a way as would detract from His love. The very fact that God loves men means that He deals with them as men, and not as puppets or animal pets, and, in such dealings there must be justice and holiness. The New Testament saying, 'The Lord disciplines him whom he loves'[1], reminds us that the sterner dealings of God with men are the actions of God's love as well as of His holiness and justice. Our human love to one another, if it is to follow the example of the Divine *agape*, must exhibit in proper proportion God's holiness and God's justice.

II

Love begets love, and the response to the *agape* of God to man should be the love of man to God. St. Paul, however, never speaks explicitly of man's *agape* to God; for him 'faith' seems to be the more appropriate word for our human response. This is certainly not surprising; it might appear blasphemous to use the same word for the perfect love of God and the warped, mixed-up aspirations of sinful men. There is a sense, indeed, in which men ought to fear God in His Divine Majesty. 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom'[2], and even St. John, who knows that the ultimate goal is that we should love God somewhat in the way that He loves us, seems to suggest that there must be an educative process in which 'perfect love casts out fear'.[3] But, even when this is accomplished, there must still be some differences between God's love for man and man's love for God. God cannot love us for our moral worth, but we can assuredly love God for His moral worth. God's love creates what is worthy in the object of His love; there can be no such direct creation of worth in our love to God. And gratitude for what God had done for us in Christ must always be central in our love to Him.

There is a barrier of ignorance and sin on man's part which seems to prevent any real possibility of his loving God. 'Obviously we cannot love someone we do not know; therefore', suggests a modern devotional book, 'our first effort must be to

[1] Heb. 12.6. [2] Prov. 9.10. [3] 1 John 4.18.

know God.'[1] This is to begin at the wrong end, for Christ has broken down the barrier, reconciling us to God, and in Himself showing us God as a Person whom we can know and love. 'He came down from heaven, in perfect love from Perfect Love, and became man for us men and our salvation.' So, as soon as Barth points out that love for God includes love for Jesus, he 'retracts his own earlier exclusion of emotional warmth'.[2] We are most of us like the child who says that he loves Jesus but is afraid of God. Indeed there is a danger of our love for the man Jesus degenerating into a sentimental hero-worship. But, as we grow to know Him better not only as man but as Lord and God, something happens to us and to our love. Our natural human love by God's grace begins to take on something of the quality of the Divine *agape*. St. Augustine, who thought much on this, has made it very clear that it is only by the grace which God gives to us in His dealings with us that He raises our natural love to a love that is more fitting to offer to God. 'When God gives Himself to us in Christ, He gives us at once the object we are to love and the *Caritas* with which to love.'[3] In Christ our love to God is not merely a love at the human level to which He came down from heaven; it is through our communion with Him being transformed into love at the Divine level to which He has ascended to be the first among many brethren.[4] This transformation is the work of the Holy Spirit speaking to us of Christ.[5]

We have to keep together two complementary truths about our relations to God. Man is made in the image and likeness of God. He is not merely a creature like the other things which God has made; in the jargon of Buber and Heim, God addresses man as a 'Thou' and not as an 'It'. Man, too, is in a covenant relationship with God. It is true that God always takes the initiative in making the covenant and that man depends on God for the power he needs to fulfil his part. Yet man is a party to the covenant, one who can respond to God in love and obedience. Yet man, even when 'ransomed, healed, restored, forgiven', remains God's creature. The love he gives to God must be like the love of a child to his father, never the love of a man to his brother or friend.

[1] Bowden, *The Dazzling Darkness*, p. 39. [2] G. W. Bromiley, op. cit., p. 84.
[3] A. Nygren, op. cit., II, p. 307. [4] Heb. 2.10. [5] John 16.14.

Man's response of love to God has certain resemblances to one aspect of *eros* in Greek thought. In Plato, *eros* is the love for the Beautiful and the Good and the way of man to the Divine.[1] Human nature does have such lofty aspirations, although many think of them as so self-centred and acquisitive that they can have nothing to do with the love that should be man's response to God's *agape*. The Christian tradition from Augustine onwards to the Reformation was rather that the *agape* of God takes hold of the natural aspiration of man towards what is above him, and transforms it into the likeness of the Divine *agape*. By *eros* all men look up to God and seek Him, but such is man's weakness that all his efforts are unavailing. The bent will must be straightened and then uplifted, and for this God's descent to man and His grace are necessary.[2] 'Grace does not destroy all that is human; it perfects it and elevates it to a new dynamic.[3] It is wrong to think of the Christian's love to God as having no roots in that *eros* through which, with many illusions and perversions, men have aspired to what is above. Such aspirations Christianity does not destroy, but fulfil.

We cannot make the sharp contrast that Nygren has made between *agape* and *eros* in the respect that *eros* is a will to have and to possess.[4] The language of non-Christian mystics often suggests the desire not to have and to possess the Divine Being, but to be possessed by Him and to surrender oneself wholly to Him. When such mysticism uses the language of sexual love, the soul is the bride waiting to be possessed by the divine bridegroom. Similarly the first response to the love of God in Christ is the readiness to receive Him, to open the door of the heart to Him, to say with Mary, 'Be it unto me according to Thy word.' Even when the outcome of our receiving the Love of God through the Holy Spirit is the active giving of ourselves for the sake of our fellow-men, it is still true to say that we are being moved by the love of God rather than that we are the active agents ourselves.

III

The love of man to man is something so familiar that we may

[1] *Symposium*, 204. [2] D'Arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love*, p. 65.
[3] ibid., p. 71. [4] A. Nygren, op. cit., I, p. 165.

fail to notice its rich variety. What is common to our various loves appears to be a state of feeling, and the endeavours that theologians have undertaken to make love a matter of will and so of moral duty seem misdirected towards the perversion of language. (In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, for example, the emotive element appears to be the primary one in all the meanings given for 'love' outside the game of tennis!) Yet the theologians are drawing attention to something that is undoubtedly true of love in its higher forms; it involves a man's whole being, knowledge and will as well as emotion. The Hebrew idiom of a man 'knowing' his wife suggests something larger than the sexual act, and the Johannine teaching makes the knowledge of God almost equivalent to abiding in God's love.[1] The Bible is even more clear that love finds expression in willing and action; the loving of God means the obeying of His commandments.[2] Yet here, too, the emotional element is central; it is because there is no friction between duty and inclination in the loving heart that 'love is the fulfilling of the law'.[3]

The rich varieties of love are illustrated but by no means exhausted in the uses of the Greek word *eros*. *Eros* obviously belongs to what we may call the instinctive make-up of our human nature, the kind of thing that modern psychologists find in the depths of the unconscious. It occurs in love between the sexes, but Plato, like too many since, tends to brush this aside as 'vulgar love',[4] identifying it with its perversion lust. *Eros* is again the desire to possess or to take to oneself what is worthy in an object, and so the desire for the Good or the Beautiful, which is part of our instinctive nature. Even in pagan man, however, love is not confined to those persons or objects in which he sees a goodness or a beauty to be possessed. It may be true that we needs must love the highest that we know, but we love a great many other things as well. Of this 'heavenly love', as Plato calls it, the supreme form is the love of God to which we have already referred. What is strangely lacking in the common analysis of love in terms of *eros* is what we may call the love of the natural relationships. There is a love of parent to child, of child to parent, of brother to sister,

[1] e.g. John 17.26.
[2] 1 John 5.3.
[3] R. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 140.
[4] *Symposium*, 181.

and, less obviously, even of servant to master, of master to servant, and of neighbour to neighbour. There is a love that can be traced to natural ties, as well as the loves that come from sexual attraction and the recognition of attractive qualities and mutual sympathy. 'I know that personal relations are the real life for ever and ever', says one of the characters in E. M. Forster's *Howard's End*,[1] and personal relations are just those that are (we may believe), in the order of creation as God intended it to be, characterised by love; the purpose of the feeling of love may well be to preserve the natural orders and make them agreeable to God's creatures. When love is lacking, our natural relationships go wrong. For completeness here we must mention the love of friendship or *philia*. It differs from the love of natural relationships in being a matter of deliberate choice; we are born with our relations, we choose our friends. There may accordingly be often an erotic element in friendship in that we may choose a friend because of some attractive quality in him. What is evident in friendship is what may be called the mutuality of love; it takes two to make friends more truly than to make a quarrel and a love that meets no response is a truncated love.

We may well believe that in the Divine intention all these varieties of love were to be characterised by the 'giving of oneself for the sake of the other' which we know in the revealed *agape* of God. Indeed, even among pagans we still often find a great deal of such self-giving between husband and wife, in the relationships of the home and even among neighbours; people who live in reasonable harmony together must to some extent give as well as take. This is also true of the heavenly *eros*; the lover of beauty has, in some sense, to surrender himself to the beauty he pursues, and the scientist has to make real sacrifices in his enterprise of discovering the truth. The descriptions of *eros* as 'egocentric', 'a form of self-assertion' or 'a will to have and possess resting on a sense of need',[2] while they may draw attention to dangers that are implicit in our human love, are simply not true of a great deal of human love, even apart from its transformation by the grace of God in Christ.

What is true is that in all its forms love is impaired, perverted and destroyed by human sin, and particularly by human

[1] Quoted G. Bowden, op. cit., p. 112.

[2] Nygren, op. cit., I, p. 165.

selfishness. It may be that in the very ecstasy and spontaneity that are characteristic of love there are the beginnings of danger; excess, as Jean Guitton points out, seems to be 'love's desirable and normal course',[1] and this may lead to the uncontrolled excesses of savage delight, which Euripides pictures in the *Bacchae*, or to the idolatry which gives to the human beloved a love of which only the Divine Being is worthy, as in the romances of chivalry. Love may be perverted again by a too prudent consideration of its appropriate objects and its consequences; the home can become a nucleus for bourgeois self-centredness, and the wounded man on the road to Jericho may be seen merely as one who might disturb the pattern of one's religious life. It is easy for our love to lose all traces of the glory and wonder of the *agape* in which it was created.

There is a perversion of love which is so common that men have taken it to be the essence of *eros*. The lover treats the object of his love not as a person but as a thing—a means to his own enjoyment or self-enhancement. There is, indeed, alongside our natural tendency to self-giving, a tendency to regard the self as of primary importance and to use other things as means to the good of the self. Human experience, however, should have taught us that the human spirit can never be content with things, or even with persons used as things or means. Ecclesiastes contains the biblical revelation of the futility of such an attempt. 'It [the human I] will seek—and it is not some *other thing* which it will seek, for things cannot interest it nor satisfy it—it will seek *another* I, which it will long to make its own in order to discover itself there and to lose itself. . . . To be a person is essentially to be in search of a person.'[2] Moralists have expressed this by saying that we must treat other persons as ends and not as means, or they have laid down principles of distributive and retributive justice, which secure 'a tolerable harmony of life with life', but are only preliminary conditions for the presence of love. What may happen thereafter, when one person faces another as a person, without seeking gain or advantage for the self from the other, has traditionally been described as having a supernatural origin, whether it be an arrow from Cupid's quiver or *agape*

[1] J. Guitton, *Essay on Human Love*, p. 20.
[2] P. Philippe de la Sainte Trinité, quoted D'Arcy, op. cit., p. 321.

poured into men's hearts by the Spirit of God. '*Agape* enters from another dimension into the whole of life, and into all qualities of love.'[1] Unfortunately, when this happens, it does not guarantee that there is no further danger of treating the loved one as a means. Love given unselfishly in a spirit of high adventure may degenerate into a desire for the comfort or self-seeking of the one-time lover. The wife may become a cheap housekeeper; the friend may become a tool in winning wealth or power, and even the fellowship of the saints may be a guarantee of one's social respectability. It is because of this that the Divine *agape* is constantly needed to set right our human loves; the man who is in a right relation of *agape* with God must set right his personal relations with his neighbours, as our Lord taught both in the parable of the Unjust Steward and in the condition for forgiveness in the Lord's Prayer, and God alone can give him grace to do so. Forgiveness is here again at the heart of love.

There is a place in our human relationships for those aspects of love, which have been given the label of *eros* as well as for those called *agape*. Our instinct to seek what is fair and lovely is a noble instinct, receiving apostolic commendation.[2] There may be a place even for *eros* in the form of a wise self-love, although here there is much difference of opinion among thinkers. There is room in Christianity for the heavenly *eros* in its two characteristic Greek forms, that which seeks with Plato and the Hebrew Wisdom Literature to pursue the highest wisdom, and the more passionate *eros* that provided the nobler aspects of medieval romance and chivalry. (It may be admitted that of all forms of *eros* this is most liable to excess and perversion.) Yet all these forms of *eros* can flourish in a world without Christ; they were probably as vigorous in ancient Greece as they have ever been since. *Agape*, the love that gives itself for others, is in far greater danger of being crushed out in a fallen world. 'You must look after yourself'; 'Heaven helps those who help themselves'; 'My religion is a private matter between me and my God'; 'One should mind one's own business' are typical maxims by which worldly common sense tries to get rid of *agape*. Man's encounter with the forgiving love of God in Christ restores *agape* to its place at the head of

[1] P. Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice*, p. 33. [2] Phil. 4.8.

the 'loves', and it is only when it has this place, that our human love becomes completely personal—the 'I' responding to the 'Thou' in perfect mutuality and full richness of emotional content. Thus, all of real value that is wrongly sought for by self-love is attained. As Solovyov puts it, 'Love as the actual abolition of egoism is the real justification and salvation of individuality.'[1]

IV

There is a strange two-sidedness in the attitude of Christianity to the love of man and woman. On the one hand, it has been the esoteric symbol of the relation of the Church, or more dangerously of the individual soul, to Christ. St. Paul expresses the fundamental truth here, 'Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church, and gave Himself up for her, that He might consecrate her, having cleansed her by the washing of water with the word.'[2] Here we have the *agape* of God applied to human marriage in the giving up of oneself for the sake of the partner, in the selfless seeking of the partner's supreme good found in union with Christ, and in the forgiveness of wrongs symbolised in the cleansing of Baptism. In such a marriage the love between the sexes is both a training in *agape* and a provisional fulfilment of *agape* within human conditions and limitations. Solovyov sees in Christian marriage a realisation and incarnation of the Divine love:— 'In sexual love rightly understood and truly realised this divine essence finds a means for its complete and final embodiment in the individual life of man, for the deepest and at the same time most outwardly sensible and real union with him.'[3] This, as St. Paul said, is a great mystery, in the deepest sense of that word!

On the other hand, Christian thought has been reluctant to relate our human love between the sexes to the *agape* of God. For one thing *agape* is a universal love to all men, and a particular love, like that of husband and wife, may be thought as likely to narrow the capacity for loving all men. In Catholic mystical piety, the love of God is sometimes set in complete contradiction to the love of the neighbour, so that the love of the creature must be abandoned when the love of God is

[1] 'The Meaning of Love' from *A Solovyov Anthology*, p. 157.
[2] Eph. 5.25, 26.
[3] op. cit., p. 174.

reached. Even the Protestant Kierkegaard wrote, 'Christianity has not come into the world to teach you how specifically to love your wife or your friend but . . . how in common humanity you should love all men. Love is a matter of conscience, and hence not a matter of impulse or inclination.'[1] Behind all this there seems to be the view we have already referred to, that the *agape* of God has nothing to do with the love of Jesus for the beloved disciple. This is simply not true to Christian experience at its best; we may find the exceptional Mrs Jellyby who neglects her home in her devotion to the distant natives of Borrioboola Gha,[2] but there are far more Christian women whose enthusiasm for foreign missions is the outreaching of a love which has grown and developed in their care for their own homes and children. There is the danger, of course, that the love of the partner in marriage may take the place that belongs to the love of God alone, and then the marriage will certainly go sour. What is fundamentally wrong with this kind of argument is that the *agape* of God is no universal benevolence, but a love that finds its greatest opportunities for self-giving, for its forgiving and for its richest emotional warmth in the personal encounters of human life—and most of all in the most intimate of human encounters, that of husband and wife.

Christians have often tended to regard sexual relations as carnal or unspiritual. Although this tradition has found a scriptural basis in the guarded counsels of St. Paul to those living in the notoriously depraved atmosphere of Corinth,[3] its real power lay in the Greek outlook with its emphasis on the dualism of soul and body, the body being definitely of a lower order than the soul. The Hebrew outlook, which seldom thought of soul and body as apart, and even then of the body as manifesting the activity of the soul, was entirely different.[4] We have seen the Greek outlook already in Plato's contrast between the vulgar, sexual *eros* and the heavenly *eros*. This Greek contempt of the flesh and consequently of the sexual instincts, although it is based on something older and more fundamental to our human nature than the Platonic philosophy, is certainly not evident in the Old Testament. This Book

[1] Quoted R. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 150.
[2] Charles Dickens, *Bleak House*.
[3] 1 Cor. 7.
[4] See A. R. Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in Ancient Israel*.

recognises sex as part of the order of Creation, accepts sex as a normal part of the life of its heroes, in which God takes an interest, without exaggerating that part, faces with an uncompromising realism and an outspoken condemnation the obvious dangers and perversions of sexual life, and sees and sympathises with its tragedies. This is the attitude to which our Lord was heir: He proclaimed as clearly as the author of Proverbs the dangers of the lustful glance, accepted the creative order as normative for monogamous marriage, and treated with compassion the victims of perverted sexuality. St. Paul too, whatever he may have said to people in the vitiated circumstances of Corinth and however much his own position, as one called to be a eunuch for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake, may have biased his views on marriage, expresses in his letter to the Ephesians the happier and more truly biblical view.

A third factor in the depreciation of sexual relations was the exaltation of virginity. Here the early Christians were on firmer ground, for they had the example of our Lord Himself and His Virgin Mother before them. In the light of these examples none can doubt that there may be for some a vocation to the life of virginity, and that such a life, provided that it is filled with the love of God and of the brethren, may be even richer and fuller than the lives of most married people. The acceptance of such a position implies no inferiority in those whose vocation is married life.

Christians see the obvious temptations, excesses and perversions of sex, but to run away from these proves no solution of man's problem. Sex has often become an obsession in the minds of those who have shut it out of their lives, or has led to some strange perversions of religion. Some of man's sexual perversions are strange and demonic, but many of them are simple and familiar sins. There is the use of the partner as a means, not merely to gross physical gratification, but, more subtly, to gain for oneself worldly security or position. There is the lack of any permanent satisfaction in a sexual life from which a spiritual partnership is excluded; bodily desire, like the horse-leech's daughters in Proverbs, cries: 'Give, give' in an endless emptiness.[1] There is the lack of readiness to forgive after God's example. There is the failure to set the love of

[1] Prov. 30.15.

God above even the most sacred of human ties, for without it the proportions of our human relationships go wrong. All this suggests that our sexual love must, like every other form of human love, be raised and transformed by the Divine *agape*. 'There is certainly', writes Jean Guitton, 'a continuity between the fire of human *Eros* and the flame of the Divine *Agape*. . . . But, that this unity may be realised, it is necessary that a higher love should descend to the lower love and become its guide. The lower love might, perhaps, be able to give the taste, the flavour and the first image of the celestial love; it is within the love of the senses like a luminous darkness; but this darkness cannot, of itself, give the light. Nature cannot lift herself up to that which surpasses her, unless that which surpasses comes down, in the form of grace and abides within her.'[1] There is again an affinity between the love of man and woman and *agape* in that our human love is creative, not only in the way that animal love is creative, but also in that it is one of God's ways of soul-making. By the grace of God the experiences of married life can be a discipline and preparation for the life of heaven.

The normal outcome of married love is the family, and, here too, there is a two-sided attitude in Scripture. St. Paul regards every human family as pointing back to 'the Father from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named',[2] and, even in a fallen world, the relationships of the family show something of that *agape* between men, which should characterise the universal brotherhood of mankind. Yet Jesus definitely taught that the claims of one's human kin must always take second place to the love that we owe to God. In the end, 'whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and mother'.[3] The form that the corruption of the family has commonly taken is a narrow selfishness, seeking only the family's good. This has been aggravated in our own day by two factors. Small households have taken the place of the large households, either of the Eastern joint-family type or of the kind found formerly in this country which included a large household staff and often some relations outside the immediate family circle. Such homes were more likely to be training grounds in a wider self-giving than the tiny households of today. Again the smaller number of

[1] op. cit., p. 196f. [2] Eph. 3.14, 15. [3] Mark 3.35; cf. Luke 14.26.

children, now common, provides within itself less opportunity for the practice of *agape* between brothers and sisters. Ideally the love of the family should be the fountain of a more widespread *agape*. As Ruskin puts it, 'For a noble woman, it [her home] stretches far round her, better than ceiled with cedar or painted with vermilion, shedding its quiet light far for those who else were homeless.'[1]

V

There is a Sibylline saying, 'There is but one love', and the thesis of this study is that all genuine human love has its roots in the original order of Creation, the work of the Divine *agape*, and is capable of being restored and raised to the quality of Divine love by that same *agape* revealed in Christ. What this *agape* should mean for the Christian character and in practical Christian living has been stated so clearly by St. Paul in 1 Cor. 13 and in Rom. 12 as to need no comment. The restoration of such love can never be easy. For one thing love in its fulness implies mutuality, and even when one person gives himself in love to another, the other may reject his love. This was in the book of Hosea the tragedy of both God's love to Israel and of Hosea's love to his wife, Gomer. Love, in the form of forgiveness which it must always take in a fallen world, is very costly; the Cross of Christ is the price of God's forgiving love. Love, too, means 'the transforming of one's entire existence by God',[2] and this means the love of God taking the first place in our lives. 'Human love does not possess its own order and end within itself; it also should be subordinate to a higher love, which it symbolises and for which it should prepare the way.'[3]

We end, where we began, with the love of God, but, except for the few whose vocation is the religious life, this love must be lived out in our common human relationships, in giving oneself for the other not only in the high adventure of martyrdom, but in the washing of the other's feet, and most of all, in the two spheres where love is most passionate and yet most precariously near to perversion, the love of man and woman, and the love of the family.

[1] *Sesame and Lilies*, p. 68. [2] D. Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 175.
[3] J. Guitton, op. cit., p. 231.

THE CHURCH SERVICE AND MUSIC[1]

by Dr GERHARD KAPPNER

Reflection on Divine Service from the ecumenical point of view has brought us to the realisation that the question of reform of the Order of Service is not a matter of what is effective, or beautiful or reverend within that Service. These traditional standards originating from psychology, aesthetics and history may be considered as outdated. It is rather a question of what is right and fitting as to the details pertaining to the Service. The standard for the ritual ordering of Church Service is the testimony in the Holy Scriptures to the truth of Christ and to His reality. Hence we shall examine, firstly, the essence of the Service as we find it in the Scriptures, and above all in the New Testament. Then, secondly, we shall inquire into the nature of music as we encounter it in the performance of its own special function. And finally, in a third section, we shall clarify the task which faces music in its performance in the Services of the Church. By these means we shall attempt to define the contents of the Lutheran liturgy, and the responsibilities which present themselves to the choir, the organ and the ensemble of brass instruments.

1. The Nature of the Services of the Church

In searching for the answer to an inquiry into the nature of Church Service we are able to make progress very quickly by contrasting the heathen, the Old Testament and the New Testament procedures in the worship of God. The character of heathen worship is clear to us in the very name. *Cultus dei* denotes an act of man by which he strives to exert a certain influence on the deity. Something should result from this which is not obtainable by human means. The outward, obvious expression for that is the sacrifice. Sacrifice represents an offering by mankind to God to ensure His friendly disposition and to secure the desired service in return. Nevertheless one should not judge the nature of heathen worship solely

[1] The translation is by Professor James Denny, Professor of Music in the University of Leeds.

from such caricatures. Besides the self-seeking intention of influencing the deity and obtaining something as a result, there stands an undefined awareness of the disrupted association of God with man and a desire for its restoration. Pagan man, as a result of a deep, inward and truly devout urge, longs for this relationship to be brought about. He wishes to create that which he certainly cannot create. What the heathen *cultus* strives for here (so far as it has been born of a religious conviction), that God has presented to mankind in Jesus Christ—reconciliation with God and communion with the Father.

The Old Testament attitude to the worship of God is somewhat similar. Service in the Old Testament is the manifestation of the law, with precise rules which must be fulfilled. It has as its role the people's sacrifice for the preservation and restoration of the holiness and purity of the People of Israel. 'Thou shalt be holy, even as I am holy.' It was for that reason that the order of Service was fixed—down to the details of the furnishing of the temple, of the calendar of festivals, and of the ritual, even down to the utensils and garments. From a glance at chapters 35-40 of the second book of Moses, the responsible priest could at any time make sure whether the Service would accomplish the will of God, and whether the presence of God had been vouchsafed to His people. The Service of the Old Testament is God's preliminary command which represents progress towards the coming fulfilment.

But everything was changed with the coming of God's Son. Jesus Christ has fulfilled the Old Testament, the Law and the Promise. He accomplishes in His person the one, true and perfect service of God, and besides and beyond that there is no true and perfect service. Certainly Jesus Christ was also 'true man born of the Virgin Mary', 'subject to the Law'. He himself adhered to the traditions of His people. He made use of the prayers, thanksgivings and songs of praise of His people. But at the same time it becomes obvious everywhere that He is deflecting the religious traditions of His people in a new direction. He appeared at the Feast of the Tabernacles with the cry: 'Whoso thirsteth, let him come to me and drink!' In the breaking of bread and the drinking of wine at the Last Supper He refers to the breaking of His body and the shedding of His blood. Here we see for the first time that Christ is God's temple, Christ

is God's High Priest, Christ is the Lamb of God. His becoming man, His crucifixion and resurrection are the fundamentals of the Christian Church Service.

That is only one aspect by which the nature of the Christian Services becomes clear to us. For the Lord, who is raised to the right hand of God, summons and gathers in, lights up and sanctifies the eschatological congregation in their faith. He exerts His dominion over them by means of His Grace. It is essential for right understanding to realise that these are instruments and means of Grace. His power is Grace, His sovereignty lies in forgiveness and service. His presence is peace, salvation and reconciliation. The Lord who is present in the Word and the Sacrament, and the congregation faithful to Him—these together present an understanding of the Christian Service reached through the Gospel. The nature of Christian Church Service consists in this, that God works through Christ and the Holy Spirit, who are present in the Word and the Sacrament; and that the congregation of the sinful receives this service of Christ their Saviour, rendering thanks and confessing, praising and praying. The Latin word for 'thanks' conveys this idea very beautifully in the expression '*gratiam referre*', that is, to bring back again the mercy we have received.

Services in the Early Church

Now we understand why Christ gave His disciples no orders as to how they should hold Services together after His ascension to the Father. It is just not the case that Christ left His followers alone in the world with only a set of instructions to keep them together. On the contrary, He wants to be in the midst of them according to His promise, in order to testify to them as the Resurrected and Living One. For that reason, the Christians continued 'steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship and in breaking of bread, and in prayers' (Acts 2.42). If the original congregation in Jerusalem continued to observe the Jewish hours of prayer and took part in the services of the Temple (Acts 3.1), and even if they sang the psalms in their assemblies (Acts 4.24ff), the essence of their form of Service was nevertheless inspired with a completely new meaning. In their Church Services in the Temple they experienced the presence of Jesus as a reality.

And another point is important. It leads to surprising disclosures if we pursue the literal meaning of the conception of 'Liturgy'. Liturgy really means nothing more than service. The Greeks understood by this a public service which is performed for the good of the community. If someone equipped a ship or arranged a feast he called it '*Leiturgia*'. Liturgy, as Odo Casel has expressed it, was 'a word in every mouth, just as everywhere today one hears people referring to taxes'. The congregation of Jesus transferred this conception to their Lord. He performs a service of eternal worth on our behalf. He equips the ship of the Church and feeds us in the Communion Service with the bread of life. This living communion of the Resurrected One with His followers, just as in the intimate association of the Master with the disciples in the days of His earthly life (only in many respects more solemn)—that, at bottom, is Liturgy. For that reason the New Testament makes use of this conception in a variety of meanings. Liturgy is the Office of Christ (Heb. 8.6), and the Office of the Angels (Heb. 1.14); Liturgy is applied to the prayers and fasting of the five prophets and teachers before their dispatch on missionary duty (Acts 13.2), and to the brotherly assistance for the very first congregation in Jerusalem (Rom. 15.27). With it the New Testament declares that the Service in the Church is an element of the Service of God, which the Christian offers with his very life (Rom. 12.1).

The History of the Church Service

In its ups and downs the history of Service in the Christian Church is a passionate struggle to preserve this comprehensive conception of life being the service of God, and not to surrender it to the ritual of Church Service; to maintain the reality of the presence of Christ, and to restrict the liturgical forms to their subordinate functions. The Reformation of the sixteenth century, more than anything else, exposed this struggle which, like subterranean thunder, had accompanied the religious history of the Middle Ages. Luther spent himself in emphasising again and again (by means of pointed declarations) that modest services in some worldly occupation are a better service to God than ornate Services at every canonical hour, provided that they who perform them 'believe in Christ'. The point of

Luther's reforms of the Church Service is specifically to renew the real presence of Christ which had been falsified by the Sacrifice of the Mass. For that reason, first and foremost, the Altar Sacrament retained, with Luther, its ruling place in the middle of the Service. Luther moreover restored the preaching of the Gospel in the sermon to its proper position. He maintained the traditional prayers and hymns, and gave them a German rendering in both language and tune so that they could be understood by the congregation. The sixteenth-century Order of Service, as a whole, retained these elements of the early Church.

The Decline of the Church Service

The coming of the Enlightenment brought about a fundamental change in the Church. The relationship of Divine Service to life was profaned. The sense of the presence of Christ disappeared from the Service. The Altar Sacrament was removed from the central position of the Service. The sermon took on a moral character. The prayers and hymns were stripped of their inner meaning and dropped out of the Services. The music of the Church lost its place at the altar, the office of cantor lost its importance, and the '*Kantoreien*'[1] were closed down. Deprived of its liturgical foundations, Church music sank to the position of an insignificant companion of its secular counterpart—the music of the concert halls and theatres, which inspired the generations of the nineteenth century (infected as they had been by the natural sciences and philosophy) in the same way as sacred music had inspired their fathers in Divine Service. Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had lost sight of the connexion between the Service and music to such an extent that in one of his letters he was able to write: 'a genuine form of music for the Protestant Church, such as might find a place in its ceremonial, seems to me to be impossible; and not merely because I do not see at which point in the Service music should intervene, but rather because I cannot imagine any such point at all.'

The Reform of the Service

We all know that up to the present time our congregations

[1] '*Kantorei*'—the material available to the cantor for the performance of music in the church, choir, organ and instruments—translator.

have not recovered from this decline. But we also see that a far-reaching revolution has quietly taken place. This revolution goes right through all denominations. We listen thankfully to Karl Barth when he says: 'that which we know today in both Catholic and Protestant spheres as the Order of Service is only a torso. The Catholic Church has a sacramental Service without a sermon. . . . We have a Service with a sermon but lacking the sacrament. Both are equally impossible. . . . Would not the sermon be delivered and heard quite differently, and would not thanks be offered up in another manner in our Services, if all this clearly originated in Baptism and pointed onwards toward the Communion? One of the decisive questions with which Protestantism may be faced in the near future is whether we shall succeed in leading the Protestant Service towards the unity aimed at by Luther as well as by Calvin; that is to say, by abolishing the absurd separation of Sermon and Sacrament, and by restoring their natural position alongside of each other.'

2. The Nature of Music

Has music any function in the sphere of Divine Service? 'Can we overlook the fact that Jesus left us no melodies but only words? Does not the reality of Christ's crucifixion utterly shatter the interplay of art with God?' These questions by Edmund Schlink from his study, *The Theological Problem of Music*, have not only been answered in the affirmative by Zwingli and Calvin; they are also accepted by creative artists of our own day. In a recent public discussion with T. S. Eliot in Hermannsburg, Manfred Hausmann (a poet who has applied himself to Christian thought) felt compelled to express his misgivings as to the 'preaching' qualities of Bach's St. Matthew Passion. 'If I were the devil, and so had his power to hinder man's approach to God, I would write a St. Matthew Passion. Just imagine: your brother has been killed in some concentration camp under terrible circumstances; and now comes a friend and tells you of your brother's agony in an aria with orchestral accompaniment. What would you say to that? Could you really take the man seriously? Would not everything in you revolt against such a report? But if the aria was so wonderful and the music so glorious that you forgot the horror of the crime, if the art so hid the reality that it almost ceased

to be true, what kind of a role of deceit would art be playing then? And this is exactly what Bach did in the St. Matthew Passion. Just look at the people who attend a performance of the St. Matthew Passion! Are they listening to an account of the Passion? Not at all; they are listening to art. Bach certainly did not intend this but he brought it about. The devil is very cunning. He prefers to use unsuspecting souls to gain his end. Every word of the Gospel, not only the words of the Passion, is too serious to be rendered innocuous through the medium of art. There is no justification for art in this context.'[1]

The Tension between Music and Church Service

We have every reason to take note of the strong tension which exists between music and Church Service since all premature though well-meant attempts to harmonise them will always have the defects of being neither genuine nor credible. Wherever human (all too human) emotions interfere with the making known of God's holy acts and distort them; wherever the ineffable and hidden mysteries of creed are secularised—wherever these things are found, an alert religious consciousness cannot but cry 'No'. Does not music's development over the past centuries show that, in this sense, instrumental music is most in danger of fault? Magnificent and perfect as are the sacred works of Heinrich Schütz and the church cantatas of J. S. Bach, instrumental music forced vocal music to develop in a manner which eventually became ill-suited to the liturgy which it ought to serve. There is no doubt about this. There is a terrifying centrifugal power inherent in all art used to support the Church Service (and especially in music) which, if not made subject to the Cross, leads towards a horrible perversion of the Service.

The Church, however, not only says 'No' to art, but also 'Yes'. It says 'No' to all egocentric, autonomous and self-glorifying music: and 'Yes' to all music which accepts the judgment of God which not only has been imposed on us by the Cross but which also can be incorporated in the re-creation of all things—a new creation founded on the Resurrection.

[1] Compare also Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, IV/2, p. 280: and Hermann Keller, 'J. S. Bach und die Säkularisation der Kirchenmusik', in *Universitas*, 1947/12, p. 1425f.

The late Walter Timmling, a painter, came very close to this view in his *Prolegomena zur Theologie der Musik*: 'The beautiful which we experience through our eyes and ears is always the recollection of paradise, the splendour reflected from paradise, and the longing for eternal bliss.' The magnitude of eternal beauty which no tongue on earth can ever express (Johann Walter) projects its splendour from afar on to the form of Divine Service by means of the performance of music. 'The boundlessness of salvation; the presence of Christ in the Word and in the Sacrament; the latent dawn of the world to come through the working of the Spirit and through the celebration of Holy Communion; the withdrawal of the congregation from the old, disappearing aeons and its entry into the kingdom to come; the dissociation of the congregation from this world and its ways, and its mingling with the company of Saints in Heaven—all that suggests that the liturgy should not be spoken as it is now, but sung' (Peter Brunner).

Music as the Handmaid of the Word

It follows that from a historical point of view the use of music in the Service has its origin at a spot where we would hardly look for it today. In the reading of the Scriptures the reader's voice becomes the substitute for the voice of the Apostles and prophets, even for the voice of Christ Himself. 'There are no means other than the phonetic symbols for a voice intoning the Scriptures by which the proclaiming power of this Word, the divine origin of this voice, the holiness of this text, as well as the summoning and attracting "nearness" of His message can be declared more clearly' (Peter Brunner). Luther knew that perfectly well. And for this reason he spent a great deal of time and care in shaping the German Mass, to evolve suitable intonations for those passages of the Scriptures which appear as part of the Protestant Service: the Epistle, the Gospel, and the words accompanying the Sacrament. The suitability of music in the Service was, to Luther's way of thinking, based on the fact that it is possible to offer praise and thanks at one and the same time with both melody and words—'that is, with the clear, ringing preaching and extolling of God's goodness and grace, wherein fine word and sweet sound are heard together'.

Music as an Event in the Service

The beauty of music is a fleeting beauty, and only exists in the very act of performing music. Every product of pictorial art, that is of architecture, painting and sculpture, is complete on its accomplishment. The cathedral, the picture, and the statue, remain for centuries what they were at the very moment of their creation—unless they are destroyed by man. A piece of music, however, represents a gradual development, a history, and is therefore an apt means of expressing the inner history of spiritual life. Certainly a Passion by Bach is finished once and for all in the notes the composer has written down on the paper. But it can be forgotten as such for centuries, until a genius finds it and awakens it to life with the burning ardour of his spirit. The performance of music is a happening, an action, an event.

The event, the happening, the development of the Service corresponds with this in a very deep sense. The Gospel, St. Paul says, is a power of God. In our Service everything depends on the transformation of God's Word from its written to its spoken form—the form in which it was originally delivered. Only when the Gospel out of Scripture again and again becomes the Word, an address to the individual, an encouragement to the individual, can it create a communion with God. Further, the Sacrament is understood by Protestants not as something static but as something dynamic. The Roman Catholic Church venerates the consecrated Host. The pious Catholic bends his knee in front of the tabernacle on the altar when he enters the Church. We worship the Lord who is present in the fulfilment of the action. We experience His coming in the act of eating and drinking. This relationship between the actual presence which is in both the Church Service and in music suggests that music should be embodied in Church Service.

Music as a Paradoxical Simultaneity

There is something more in this connexion. In this fleeting age which has no present, and in which every moment is a never-returning transition from yesterday to tomorrow, music can concentrate its declarations in a unique manner by converting a temporal succession into a temporal simultaneity.

Luther in his table-talk wondered again and again at the fact that though two people cannot speak in unison they can sing together. Music can do what the spoken word is unable to do. It makes possible the sounding of several truths simultaneously, and combines them into one vibrating cosmos. When Bach, in the opening chorus of his St. John Passion, expresses simultaneously the suffering of the Son of God in the sighing and wailing flutes and oboes, and the glory of the Son of God in the solemn semiquavers of the strings (intensified by the double-basses' pedal-points which throb gently in quavers)—then we have this truth right in front of us.

Because of this, music corresponds in a mysterious way with the succession of events in the Church Service. For the Service, in like manner, is not constructed in the sense that it is a logical system or a psychological progress, or again in the sense that it is a dialogue unfolding rationally. The *Kyrie* returns once more in the middle of the *Te deum*; and the *Agnus Dei* echoes the *Kyrie* yet again. Changeable portions of the Service are mingled with those which are constant. The crux of the liturgy is not a temporal succession but a paradoxical simultaneity. The event which is to come is already happening at this very moment when we sing a hymn of praise at Holy Communion 'with angels and archangels and all the company of heaven'. The liturgy takes place before the gate of the heavenly city and before the throne of the Lamb—there, where time does not exist. We are still on our way there, and so we sing and pray the liturgy in a temporal order of succession. But we must always regard it, despite the polyphonic expression, as coming from God in the form of a spiritual unity.

Music as the Answer of Faith

And does not music have quite definite influences on the faith of mankind? In this context we are reminded of many of Luther's pronouncements—for instance, on the enlivening power of music, its instructional significance, its ability to create a community, and its power to lead towards inner concentration. Innumerable people have come to realise through singing that music—and above all, singing—demands man in his wholeness; that means in his unity of body, soul and spirit: and that it is able to liberate healing powers in the convulsed,

hunted man of our present day. And, of course, the sermon too deals with man as a unity. But we often forget the *living* nature of the Word through its spiritual substance. At this point music comes helping to convey the message of the Word in stirring the heart 'by sweet song'. Music has its roots in the very centre of man's being, the place in which his fundamental decisions are made.

3. Music in Church Service

We have seen that in Church Service we perform music not for traditional, psychological or aesthetic reasons but rather for purely practical purposes. The Service and its music have, fundamentally, an affinity towards each other. What kind of conclusions follow from this in favour of the singing of the choir and congregation, the playing of the organ and wind instruments, and the various forms of vocal and instrumental music-making Sunday after Sunday in the principal Morning Service, the Sung Evensong, and during the celebration of the Sacrament? It was not by chance that we have spoken up to now almost exclusively of singing when referring to the function of music in the Services of the Church. Singing is the foundation of church music because it combines sound with the Holy Word. The precept which St. Paul laid down in Corinth (1 Cor. 14.9) applies to instrumental music with no scriptural connexions.

Congregation and Choir in the Service

Christhard Mahrenholz has drawn this happy picture. The cantor is the master, the choir members are the livery, the congregation the apprentices in the sphere of Church music. For this reason, the cantor and choir should regard it as their primary duty to lead the congregation in the correct way of singing, and to set them a good example by their performance of the liturgy. Only if the congregation has learned a hymn-tune or a liturgical melody under the leadership of the choir has the ground been prepared for the legitimate introduction of a work sung by the choir in parts. By that means the choir can take the lead at the side of the congregation in that it guides and spurs on the singing of the people. For that particular purpose, the Gradual hymn of the Sunday Service is the most appropriate for performing on Festival days as the alter-

nation between congregation, choir and organ. But the choir can also support the priest in that it helps him in preaching the Gospel. That happens most suitably by means of hymns bearing on the Epistle, or by motets on the Gospel which can be sung between, or following, the reading of the Scriptures. The Lutheran Church knows the principle of variation by addition, substitution and alternation. Whenever the choir sings the Introit psalm before the congregational Introit hymn, it adds something to the action of the congregation. Whenever the choir sings the *Sanctus* in the Communion Service by itself, it is a substitute for the congregation. Whenever the choir, in singing the hymn between the two Lessons, alternates between the congregation and organ (or, if occasion arises, even between passages for single voice such as H. G. Schönian has written), the principle of alternation is being followed. Further, we should bear in mind that the Lutheran Church also recognises the possibility of variety in performing the individual sections of the Liturgy. Thus the Introit can be presented in unison plainsong, in part-writing, or as a congregational hymn. We regard the liturgical and musical efforts of the Lutheran Reformation with great awe, in that it has succeeded in producing an order of Service and a repertoire of church music which are not only alive but are suited to all conditions—to the abbey and cathedral, to the ordinary town and country church —and all without having to alter the fundamental order of the Service. One must bear in mind this principle to realise that, in the almost bewildering variety of possibilities available for the performance of music in Divine Service, there remains a subtle code of procedure and a rigid arrangement of detail. It will be one of the most important tasks of any future reform of church music to fuse the choir into the regular scheme of the Service so that it is not a mere appendage.

The Organ and the Service

This also applies to the organ which, from having an independent function, has come to be an integral part of the Service of the Western Church; and which, in the course of an eventful history, was only able to establish its place in the Roman Catholic and Reformed (Calvinist) Churches after many trials and on specific conditions. In the Lutheran Church,

on the other hand, it soon became an independent and essential aid in the praising of God and the declaring of His holy message. In Wittenberg, the function of the organ was even extended by using it to accompany the Protestant hymns—and in so doing, the foundations were laid for a unique efflorescence of organ music. But 'pure' organ music—that which has no external associations—has been justified in the following theological utterance: 'Instrumental music is in itself a gift of God in that it has the power to stir the hearts of men, even if human voices do not mingle with it. One has only to comprehend its message to be sure that the effort of performance is not in vain. This message is certainly fully understood when we remember that hymns, composed for the praise of God, are played on it.' The more the organ was used to accompany congregational hymns, the more its opportunities for independence were neglected. Today everything hangs on restoring this independence of performance to the organ once more—in the voluntaries at the beginning and the end of the Service, in the extemporising on hymn-tunes sung by the congregation, and during Holy Communion; but without mechanically copying historical models or neglecting the importance of the organ as an accompanying medium for congregational singing.

Co-operation between Choir and Instruments in the Service

Only when the congregation have come to know that the choir, the organ and the wind instruments have a part in the most important functions of Service will they again understand aright that in taking part in a Sung Evensong, in producing a cantata for the principal Sunday Service, or in supporting Church ritual, the choir, organ and other instruments are performing in a quite special manner. We must never forget that the choirs of the Protestant Church two hundred years ago—for example, the boys' choir of St. Thomas' Church in Leipzig (the so-called '*Thomaner*')—could only sing a Bach cantata in the Service because they had their proper place in the liturgy: that is, they fulfilled the primary liturgical requisites and were therefore entitled to raise their voices (just as much as the priest) in the cantata. The more the cantor and his assistants feel themselves a part of the Service and a part of the life of the congregation, the more likely are the congregation to feel that

they are linked with the special music the '*Kantorei*' offers on certain occasions. But the congregation and parish elders should bear in mind that the close bonds which link the cantor and his associates to the Service are not sufficient of themselves. There must be artistic sensitivity if church music is to have 'the fascinating musical breath which drives us to devotion' (Oskar Söhngen). Let us always remember the great responsibility we have towards Church music. In this connexion the late Ferdinand Schmidt, the one-time supervisor of Rhenish church music, wrote these thoughtful words: 'The practising of music ripe for the service of God means more than making it concert- or stage-worthy; for even the humanly perfect is imperfect before God.'

INTER-CHURCH RELATIONS: A RETROSPECT

by The Rev. A. C. CHEYNE

The subject of relations between the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches exercises a peculiarly urgent claim upon the attention of contemporary students of theology. Nevertheless many may be reluctant to allow that the task of dealing with it can profitably be undertaken by a historian—even if he be a church historian; and I suspect that some will read the words 'a Retrospect' with depression or alarm. Is this not a time for looking forward rather than back? Did we not read with approval the signatories' declaration in the Joint Report on Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches: 'We have renounced, and believe that the Churches concerned should renounce, the method of selecting and measuring such faults and errors in the past history of the Churches now conferring as might be judged to be responsible for our present divisions. These matters have been investigated frequently, and complete agreement on them is not to be expected at this stage in history. . . . The time has come when the voice of mutual recrimination should be silent'? And has Bishop How not reminded us that 'Scotland needs a purged memory'?

Yes, all that may not be denied. But surely it is also true that Scotland needs a memory, purged though that memory must be; that historical studies are not inevitably acrimonious (any more than dogmatic studies are invariably marked by the proverbial *odium theologicum*); and that unless the separate Churches know something of their past, and realise their present distinctiveness, they cannot be discriminatingly receptive in the future. Besides, even our hopes and fears ought not to blind us to the Christian insight, vividly expressed by Professor Butterfield, that 'history is not like a train, the sole purpose of which is to get to its destination' (even if that destination might seem to be the unity of the Church): all of it exists for God's glory, and all of it—though no doubt in varying degrees—can interest, and indeed profit, the man of faith. Within theological study there is a place, albeit a humble one, for historical curiosity. That, at any rate, is my

excuse for directing attention, at a time when church unity is so much discussed, to the period between 1688 and 1714: the years when disunity seemed to have become, after many vicissitudes, a final and irrevocable fact; when two very different ecclesiastical Establishments, still in existence today, began to confront each other across the Anglo-Scottish border; and when, within Scotland itself, the Reformers' ideal of 'one face of the Kirk' was increasingly contradicted by the emergence, over against state-recognised Presbyterianism, of an inchoate Episcopalian Church.

The immediate cause of this collapse of unity was the revolutionary events of 1688 to 1690, which drew England and Scotland close together politically, but drove them further apart ecclesiastically than, perhaps, at any time since the Reformation. The two countries were at one in exiling James II and VII to France and welcoming William and Mary from Holland. But while the English Revolution was intimately connected with a successful defence of Anglican privileges (though with certain concessions to Protestant Dissent), Scotland's rebels viewed prelacy with as much repugnance as they did 'popery', quickly secured the abolition of Episcopacy by Parliament, and reinstated Presbyterianism as the only legal form of church government within the country. To these far-reaching dissimilarities may be traced many of our present religious discontents, as well as most of the controversies which unsettled the generation of Marlborough's wars and the Union of 1707, of William Carstares and Dean Swift, of Robert Wodrow and Daniel Defoe. Let us, therefore, look now at the attitudes of the various religious bodies to the situation which confronted them on the morrow of the Revolution.

And first, the forerunners of today's Scottish Episcopalians. These men refused to accept the new conditions—not very surprisingly. Their form of church government had been proscribed; many of their clergy in the south-west had been driven from church and manse by mob action; in spite of royal pleas for leniency, the animosity of the Presbyterian church courts was making it increasingly difficult for them to remain on any terms within the Establishment; and in addition, considerable numbers of the 'curates' were removed from their livings by Parliament for their failure to swear loyalty to

the new sovereigns. Although as late as 1707 perhaps one beneficed minister in six was Episcopalian by conviction (chiefly in the north-east), the Kirk was slowly but surely becoming uniformly Presbyterian in ethos as well as in government, and Episcopalianism had clearly been relegated to the position of a persecuted, barely-recognised sect, alongside the State Church. In these circumstances, there was only one direction in which the Scottish Episcopalians could look for aid: south to their sister-communion, the Church of England. To England, then, they turned, and from 1688 onwards letters and pamphlets flooded across the Border to enlighten Anglicanism and enlist its support. It was an uncoordinated and haphazard campaign, of course, and mainly concerned with the specific needs of independently acting individuals; yet it achieved a remarkable unity of testimony, and enables us to select without difficulty the main aspects of Scottish Episcopalianism's case.

Basic to it was the contention that the Presbyterians, in spite of their successes, were still only a minority in the country. Churchmen then as now seemed to find statistical returns peculiarly impressive, and the advocates of Episcopacy realised that if they could not carry conviction on this matter they would hardly be successful in any other. And so the remarks of one early critic of a famous clause in the Claim of Right may be taken as typical: 'There is not a falser proposition in the world than that the inclinations of the generality of the people are against Episcopacy. . . . If by the people you mean the commonalty, . . . the third man through the whole Kingdom is not Presbyterian; and if by the people you mean those who are persons of quality and education (whose sense, in my opinion, ought in all reason to go for the sense of the nation) I dare boldly aver not the thirteenth.' The truth in this question will probably never be conclusively established—though some may find it hard to believe that a few rabblers and an allegedly unrepresentative Convention could so easily have upset a strong Episcopalian majority, and may suspect (in the light of certain revealing asides) that our controversialist was much less of a democrat than he would have us believe. But constant repetition, together with English ignorance, secured widespread acceptance of his argument. Along with it there was

put out a luridly coloured picture of the Scottish ecclesiastical scene. 'The Church of Scotland', declared one pamphleteer, 'is at this time under the claw of an enraged lion', and then proceeded to detail all the enormities and injustices of the Presbyterian régime. His narrative is not altogether free from distortions or omissions. While criticising the ecclesiastical favouritism of King William, it passes over the still more evident partiality of King James; the rabbling of curates is condemned, without a hint as to the anti-Covenanting measures which helped to cause it; the fierce and stubborn intolerance of the Kirk is emphasised, but nothing is said of the hysterical Jacobitism of many Episcopalians. Nevertheless, Anglicanism was much impressed. Particularly interesting as an aspect of the campaign was the rise in Scotland of what might almost be called a school of Episcopalian historiography, much given to statements of this kind: 'Scottish Presbytery in the Church is not consistent with legal monarchy in that Kingdom'; 'the principles of Scottish Presbytery grant no Toleration to Dissenters'; 'the Episcopal clergy of Scotland, from the year 1662 to the year 1686, showed nothing of the spirit of persecution against Presbyterians'; and so on. The worst in Presbyterianism's past having been laid alongside its worst aspects in the present, it was then easy to draw the conclusion that basically the enemy was unchanged from the days of the infamous Solemn League and Covenant: a standing danger to Episcopalianism on both sides of the Border, a constant and unnecessary irritant in Anglo-Scottish relations.

With these general indictments of the Kirk were usually associated heart-rending accounts of the poverty it had caused prelate and parish priest alike. Scores of letters must have been written on this subject, and—in addition to their intrinsic interest—these appeals from men as exalted as the Archbishop of Glasgow are important because they kept the fortunes of Scottish Episcopalianism constantly, and in a particularly vivid and moving way, before English eyes. The ultimate aim of their writers is clear. Everything in them—narrative, satire, lament or invective—culminated in a call for political, legislative action by the larger nation. Let England intervene, was the cry, and restore 'that national church' to its 'primitive and apostolical institution'. Or in other words, let the Revolu-

tion Settlement in Scotland be overthrown. As we shall see later, these appeals went far to achieving a dramatic and momentous success in the hectic years between 1710 and 1714.

For the moment, however, a very different picture of the situation demands our attention—the picture painted by supporters of the Presbyterian Establishment north of the Border. Against all contrary accusations and denunciations, they contented themselves with two principal retorts. In the first place, they declared that Presbyterianism was bound to receive state recognition in Scotland since its supporters were a clear majority of the population. Now, we have already noted how difficult it is to return a confident and convincing verdict, one way or the other, on this crucial question. And yet it seems to me that the balance of probabilities favours, if anything, the Presbyterian contenders. In the earlier years of the seventeenth century, admittedly, problems of church government did not greatly agitate the Scottish people as a whole. So far as they were concerned, bishops and the hierarchy of Presbyterian church courts might even exist side by side: the main thing was to eliminate all traces of so-called 'popery' from worship. But in time—in spite of the failures of Covenanting extremism and the successes of Stuart repression and appeasement—there was a change. Episcopacy came to be looked on with abhorrence as an English innovation, the chief weapon of a despotic monarchy, and a half-way house to Rome. By 1688 its leading representatives were in the main unimpressive figures without the ability to rally effective support, and the Revolution swept it away with little resistance. Whatever we may think of the assertion made in the Claim of Right that episcopacy was 'contrary to the inclinations of the generality of the people', the late Professor G. D. Henderson was almost certainly right when he wrote that 'Scotland was as ready for Presbyterianism at the Revolution as it had been for Episcopalianism at the Restoration'. So much for the first point made by defenders of the Kirk. In the second place, they contended that the Scottish Episcopalians' loyalty to the new régime was, to say the least, unreliable—a fact which accounted for, and indeed demanded, their loss of all consideration from post-Revolution governments. One of the first to say this was William Carstares, the Kirk's most able and

astute leader and the King's chief adviser on Scottish affairs. 'The Episcopalian party', he averred, 'was generally discontented to the Revolution and enemies to the principles on which it was conducted. Whereas the Presbyterians almost to a man had declared for it. . . . None, therefore, could think it strange that the friends of the government should enjoy all the encouragement it can afford, whilst it withheld its countenance from open and avowed enemies.' So Carstares in 1689, and later events went far to confirm his judgment that Scottish Episcopalianism still hankered after the exiled royal house. The bishops who had once described loyalty to the Romanist James VII as 'an essential part of their religion' could never be induced to give more than the most lukewarm of welcomes to his Calvinist supplanter, and at times they or members of their flock actually crossed the line between treasonable inclinations and treasonable activities. Small wonder, therefore, that even sympathetic observers like the Bishop of London were constrained to say: 'The King must be excused for standing by the Presbyterians.' In this, their second main contention, the Kirk's supporters generally had the best of the argument.

Unfortunately for themselves, they frequently weakened a strong case by the fierce intolerance of their general attitude (in days when the Churches had not learned how to coat the pill of denominational obstinacy with the sugar of ecumenical zeal). Especially bigoted were the Cameronians and their admirers, of whom it has been said that they 'stood for the Reformation (against Rome), Calvinism (against Arminianism), Presbyterianism (against Prelacy), Constitutionalism (against Tyranny), Scottish independence (against English interference), and Puritanism in morals, art and everything (against the Devil)'. These men deplored the Revolution—in spite of the fact that it had put an end to their acuter miseries —because it confirmed Episcopalianism in England, represented the triumph of compromise over intransigence, and rejected their obsession with the past. In opposition to all in Scotland who had failed to 'vindicate the faithful contending' of Covenanting times, to confirm by statute the reforms of 1638-49, and to acknowledge that Great Britain was still bound by the Covenants, they shrilly proclaimed that William and

Anne were uncovenanted usurpers, that Parliament and General Assembly alike had sinned in recognising them, and that all contemporary evils were a result of that initial defection. Their hostility to most Churches other than their own, and their well-nigh pathological distrust of the secular power, injected a kind of poison into the life of the time. Like the Non-jurors in England, they influenced many who were more moderate—or less single-minded—than themselves. Under pressure from them, the Kirk periodically overstepped the bounds of charity or good sense, clashing with the state over largely imaginary grievances and pretentiously asserting the divine right of its particular doctrine of the Church (a fault now perhaps more frequently evident in other communions than the Presbyterian). And it did not confine itself to mere words. On occasions too numerous to mention Assemblies and like-minded Parliaments proved the genuineness of their desire to 'root out all heretics'; and all suggestions of a legal toleration for Scottish Episcopalianism were fiercely and effectively condemned. Altogether, throughout the reigns of William and Mary and Anne, the Kirk showed itself capable of ferocious narrow-mindedness in great and small matters alike. Its vehement objections to card-playing, to surplices—or 'white sarks'—and to organs ('and why not dancing?' asked one outraged minister in this connexion) must have helped to convince many Englishmen that the Presbyterians were quite unable to distinguish between religious differences of fundamental importance and others which derived merely from dissimilarities in social status, in education, and even in aesthetic sensibility. Taking everything into consideration, it is clear that by far the most important single weakness of Presbyterianism throughout the period from 1688 to 1714 was simply its own inveterate intolerance, which undermined its moral position, alienated its friends, and eventually goaded its enemies into taking the offensive against it.

We turn now to the body where most of those enemies were to be found: the Church of England. What was its attitude to the post-Revolution situation in Scotland, and what were its relations with Episcopalians and Presbyterians there? For a variety of reasons, humanitarian and ideological, the sympathy of Anglicans was given almost exclusively to the dispossessed

Episcopal clergy. And it is easy to see why. Every good Church of England man had in common with them a devotion to episcopacy as the apostolic form of church government (though perhaps he failed to realise how far removed was the Episcopal Church of Scotland, 1661-88, from the distinctively Anglican tradition). His historians had for long directed his attention to episodes of seventeenth-century history which did Presbyterianism little credit, so that he inclined to believe with quaint Thomas Fuller that 'a Scotch mist may wet an Englishman to the skin', and with a minority at the Westminster Assembly that 'the pressing of an exact concurrence to the Presbyterian government was but a kind of conscience-prison, whilst accurate conformity to the Scotch Church was the very dungeon thereof'. He was grieved and horrified to learn how his Scottish co-religionists had suffered during and since the Revolution. And he felt a self-interested concern about the evil effect which Presbyterian successes in the north might have on his own Dissenters. Whatever the complexion of his churchmanship, then, he was almost invariably susceptible to Scottish Episcopalian appeals. Some Anglicans nevertheless were more susceptible than others. Particularly sympathetic were the Non-jurors, who held similar principles to those of the deprived clergy in Scotland and endured similar misfortunes in consequence. They early expressed disquiet at the results of the Revolution in this country, for leading men among them like Archbishop Sancroft and Bishop Ken believed that the two Episcopalian countries must stand or fall together. And although their sympathy was not always very well informed it was enthusiastic and influential, stirring as it did the unquiet consciences of more time-serving Anglicans and gradually turning their unease to good account. High Churchmen who had felt able to remain within the English Establishment were equally favourable to Scottish Episcopalianism, but had the ability to render more tangible help. Their great men were in positions of power, and the Earl of Nottingham, Archbishop Sharp of York and Bishop Compton of London would all have agreed with Dr Henry Sacheverell when he declared that every good High Churchman 'much laments the destruction of the Episcopal Church in Scotland—and should be for addressing Her Majesty to restore it'.

Lament they certainly did, *and* address the Queen; but perhaps the greatest service they rendered was within the Tory party, with results which very nearly spelt disaster for the Scottish Kirk in the years immediately after the Union of 1707. Even among Low Churchmen (providing they were not too Whiggish) the distressed clergy had their friends, and Archbishop Tenison of Canterbury did not let his suspicion of their politics deter him from doing what he could to improve their condition, as his 'Memorial concerning the Episcopal clergy in Scotland' shows. Through the activities of the leaders of all branches of Anglicanism, then, a new climate of opinion began to make itself felt in England. Men began to regard the religious situation north of the Border as an open question once again, and to see in the proposals of the Episcopalians there an answer to it. For a time, they had to content themselves with the giving of financial help, privately and to individuals. But in due course the benevolence of countless Englishmen began to be reflected in official, or at least semi-official, government action. By 1702 and 1703, Scottish Episcopalianism had good reason for optimism: Queen Anne and the whole Tory party were on their side, and even the Whigs were not hostile; a so-called 'Cavalier', but really Episcopal, party had emerged in Scotland; Anglicanism seemed on the eve of scoring a signal triumph against the Dissenters (Presbyterianism's friends) with the Occasional Conformity Bill; and the Privy Council in Edinburgh had actually been advised by the Queen to give the Episcopalians tolerant treatment. They were, apparently, at last on the brink of reinstatement.

Then, almost suddenly, there occurred a deflection of interest from all such matters. During the period between, roughly, 1704 and 1708, religious considerations—which had bulked large for nearly a generation and would soon do so again—had to yield in importance to political, economic and even military ones; and Scotland and England, ceasing to drift farther and farther apart, drew closely and dramatically together. The explanation is not far to seek. England's war with France had reached a crucial stage, and her statesmen were becoming convinced that a long step to victory would be taken if, somehow or other, they could induce Scotland to

abandon a position of neutrality which played into French and Jacobite hands. It was, moreover, increasingly certain that Queen Anne would leave no direct heir and that, to keep the Stuarts out, the Protestant House of Hanover must be brought in. But here, too, Scotland's incorrigible independence was a difficulty: she had so far refused to oblige England by settling the succession on the Electress Sophia and her descendants, and so was actually free to recall the exiled James. The very possibility gave English statesmen nightmares. In the end, the only way that could be found of persuading the Scots to toe the line and make the anti-French, pro-Hanoverian cause their own was to offer them a complete, 'incorporating', Parliamentary Union with great economic advantages attached. This England did. After protracted negotiations, the Scots agreed to come in; and the celebrated Union took effect in May 1707. While it was under discussion, politicians were chiefly anxious to eliminate the bickerings of churchmen, whose concerns temporarily took second place in national affairs. Much could, of course, be said about the attitude of the different Churches to Union; but all we have time for here can be summed up in the words of the old song concerning the Vicar of Bray: 'Moderate men looked big.' Among Presbyterians, most minds were set at rest by the Act of Union's ratification of Scotland's Presbyterian Establishment. Among Anglicans, a similar guarantee of the Church of England won over many doubters. Archbishop Tenison's statement that 'the narrow notions of all the churches had been their ruin' received much support—and the Union of Episcopalian England with Presbyterian Scotland passed into law.

The interlude of enforced harmony, however, was brief. Once the Union had been concluded, and victory against France virtually assured, Scotland's strategic importance declined, and any need to placate her (in religion as in other matters) vanished. In these circumstances, a turn for the worse in the relations of the Episcopalians and Presbyterians was almost inevitable; and during the years immediately after Union signs of such a deterioration were not lacking. Judicial proceedings in Scotland, so it was said, were interfered with in the Episcopalian interest as a result of directives from the English court and government. Incessant anti-Presbyterian

propaganda in England fanned national and ecclesiastical antipathies; while funds for the 'distressed Episcopal clergy' never failed to find generous subscribers. A virulent pamphlet war was being waged between Presbyterians and Episcopalians in Scotland. Inter-church relations were indeed bad; but they did not become critically so until, in 1710, the Whig government in London was supplanted by a Tory one conspicuously lacking in enthusiasm for the Revolution Settlement (especially as it affected Scotland), and bent on working in close alliance with the most intransigent elements of the Anglican Church.

Unfortunately, too, there can have been few times in her history when that Church contained more intransigents than then, for she was in the grip of an enthusiastic—not to say extremist—'High Church' movement. Even before the death of William III, many English clergymen and laymen had begun to entertain second thoughts about the events which (with their help) had put him on the throne and banished James. This process had possibly been set in motion by the Nonjurors' self-sacrificing devotion, in the name of the Catholic traditions of their Church, to the exiled Stuarts, but it was greatly accelerated by the accession in Anne of a Queen renowned for her intense piety as well as her generally Tory sympathies. The old association of Church and Crown again became possible and attractive. The notion of the divine right of monarchy returned to Englishmen's thoughts, the practice of passive obedience to their duties, and the cult of the royal martyr (Charles I) to their devotions. And at the same time the High Church animus against Dissenters increased in bitterness, and the exaltation of the 'apostolic priesthood' in extravagance. The introduction of Episcopacy into Presbyterian Churches in Prussia, Switzerland, Scotland and England became, we are told, a favourite project (in this connexion, it is interesting to read a hostile critic's report that Archbishop Tenison 'stuck not to say, that to give Bishops to any of the Reformed Churches, though they had a mind to Bishops, would be to disturb the peace of all, and make a schism among them'), and not a few agreed with Dr Henry Dodwell, one of Anglicanism's great scholars, that immortality to damnation would be the lot of English Dissenter and Scottish Presbyterian. As Dr Calamy put it, the High Church attitude

amounted to 'a casting out for heathens many members of the established Church at home, and the whole body of the Protestant Churches abroad, unless strictly and properly within the Episcopal pale'. It was certainly not calculated to improve relations with the Kirk.

Evidence is available to prove the existence of an equally aggressive High Churchmanship among the Episcopalians of Scotland at this time. Here, the new movement had liturgical, social and theological aspects. Perhaps its distinguishing feature was the substitution in worship of the English Book of Common Prayer for the earlier 'extempore effusions' of the seventeenth century. This change began to take place soon after the Revolution; and—quite apart from religious reasons of the kind which induced Jeremy Taylor to write his *Apology for Liturgy*—it was probably due to the fact that a distinctive order of service gave a comfortable feeling of unity to the small, scattered and oppressed congregations of Scottish Episcopalianism, linked them with encouraging closeness to the powerful and prosperous Church of England, and emphasised their differences from the hated Kirk. The influx of English officials into Scotland after 1707 also had something to do with it. Whatever the reason, the new book spread far and fast, liberally assisted by large consignments dispatched from well-wishers south of the Border, and in spite of the anxious opposition of the General Assembly. Nor was this all. The optimism of the Episcopalians was further increased by the mounting popularity of their views and practices with Scotland's nobility and gentry, which in time would deprive Presbyterianism of a valuable reservoir of political power. Indeed, by 1712 an English observer noted that the Kirk was so abandoned by her nobility that it would be exceedingly difficult to find a suitable Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly. Yet another aspect of Scottish Episcopalianism in this period of resurgent life was the emergence of 'high church' doctrines of a type which the Oxford Movement of the nineteenth century made more generally familiar. In November 1711, for example, one clergyman announced, 'to the surprise of many', that he would shortly preach in his meeting-house on the divine right of Episcopacy. And vigilant Robert Wodrow, at Eastwood, gloomily recorded in his diary how a sermon delivered by

another curate on 30th January 1713 had 'proven that no churches that wanted Episcopal ordination were to be reckoned true churches—and much to this chime of the Highfliers in England'.

All these developments gave real cause for Presbyterian alarm. But more disturbing than anything else was the knowledge that—at the very time when the Church of England was drawing ever closer to Scottish Episcopalianism and ever further away from the Church of Scotland—Parliament and the central government were no longer friends of the Kirk. The Tories had come to power in 1710, and were increasingly dominated by their 'high-flying' section. It was virtually certain that action would soon be taken, along political lines, to alter the Scottish situation in ways far from favourable to the Presbyterian Establishment.

The occasion for that action was provided by a series of law-cases in which the central figure was the Rev. James Greenshields, a Scottish Episcopalian clergyman. In the course of 1709, Greenshields had opened a meeting-house in the heart of Edinburgh for the public conduct of worship according to the English Book of Common Prayer. His aim seems to have been threefold: to show that Scottish Episcopalianism was quite compatible with political loyalty (he was careful to take the oath of allegiance to Queen Anne); to challenge the Presbyterians' assumption that their form of worship was the only legal one and their jurisdiction universally binding throughout Scotland; and to canalise Anglican sympathies into politically effective channels. He was, of course, arrested by the Edinburgh magistrates on Presbyterial instructions, and charged with exercising an unlicensed ministry and infringing the purity and uniformity of worship, and imprisoned. But the matter did not end there. A succession of appeals eventually brought the case before the House of Lords itself, and all Britain was constrained to listen to the views of Scotland's warring Churches. What, then, were the rival contentions?

The Episcopalians were careful to point out that they were not Jacobites, for they knew that English devotion to the Revolution Settlement had still to be reckoned with. But their favourite argument was undoubtedly to draw attention to Presbyterian dislike and fear of the English Prayer Book, and

so underline the identity of interest between the Anglicans and themselves. As Bishop Rose of Edinburgh put it to Compton of London: 'This harsh treatment of our brother plainly shows that whatever pretences our enemies make for their prosecutions, yet Episcopacy and the English service are the main grounds of the quarrel. They rage exceedingly to find the service of the (Anglican) church takes so mightily with such multitudes among us.' Or in other words, the Presbyterians were religious bigots, not political loyalists. This point established, the urgent necessity of upholding Greenshields' appeal, for his own sake and that of the English Church, would be emphasised. 'If the Right Rev. Bishops of the Church of England do not espouse my interest, or rather their own,' wrote the appellant himself, 'the enemies of their church will ruin the most hopeful prospect that ever was of advancing the interest of the Church of England in this place.' And—after reiteration of the old assertion that Presbyterianism was in the minority and consequently almost certain to yield quietly to determined pressure from the south—Episcopalian propagandists would generally conclude by requesting not only a reversal of the Scottish verdict against Greenshields but also some positive Parliamentary action on behalf of his Church. As Greenshields expressed it, 'A legal Toleration is the only expedient to preserve the[se] beginnings, and to propagate the Church of England in this place.' We turn now to the Presbyterian version. Apart from a rather desperate avowal that the whole episode was purely a Scottish affair, it confined itself to two main lines of approach. In the first place, it endeavoured to drive a wedge, as it were, between the Church of England and the Scottish Episcopalians. One pamphleteer went out of his way to draw attention to the many differences between the two Episcopal Churches and to deny Greenshields' claim to Anglican orders, declaring: 'His ordination makes him a minister of the Scots Episcopal Church. Now everyone knows that neither of these Churches pretended to any jurisdiction over one another, and that they quite differed in their constitution, government, discipline, and form of worship.' And in the second place, the Kirk's version impugned the political loyalty of the Scottish Episcopalians to the Revolution and the Revolution monarchy. According to

Wodrow, even where they *had* sworn the oaths of allegiance to Queen Anne they were insincere and had done so only to win English patronage. And another writer concentrated on pinning the Jacobite label to Greenshields himself: that arch-enemy had spoken in defence of the rights of the Pretender, and when reminded of his promise of loyalty to William III and his successors had remarked 'with a levity peculiar to men of his kidney, that that was on one side the water (i.e. Ireland) but this on another'. We need not stop here to sift the truth from the falsehood in these allegations and counter-allegations —but merely note in passing that Episcopalian behaviour during the Jacobite rising of 1715 did much to substantiate the Kirk's suspicions, and that (on the other hand) the basic intolerance of those whom we might call the High Presbyterians could not be entirely hidden by all their assumed reasonableness as controversialists: Scotland, like England, still had men who were unreconciled to the existence of more than one Church within a single nation and believed (to quote one of them) that 'no other form of worship than that used at present by the Church of Scotland can or ought to be set up there by law'.

The rival views in Greenshields' case having been stated, it fell to the House of Lords to pass judgment. In the spring of 1711, when Toryism in England was at full flood and the High-flyers of Anglicanism were at their most influential, it gave the only decision which could have been expected: the verdict of Scotland's Court of Session was reversed, and the magistrates of Edinburgh found liable in costs. It was a great triumph for Episcopalianism's self-appointed agitator, and had its inevitable consequences. In Scotland, the popularity of the English Prayer Book and the optimism of the Episcopalians grew steadily—to the Presbyterians' discomfiture. In England, Greenshields became quite a hero (Oxford, in an excess of zeal, conferred an honorary degree upon him), and his scheme for a large-scale distribution of Prayer Books in Scotland at English expense received generous support from devout Anglicans. But of course the greatest service of all which England could perform for Scottish Episcopalianism was to give it legal standing—i.e. to grant its clergy and laity, by Parliamentary enactment, a full toleration for the practice of

their religion. A campaign for just such an Act was therefore launched in earnest on both sides of the Border. The proposal was not absolutely new. There had been a suggestion of it in the days of Episcopalian exuberance shortly after Anne's accession, but the General Assembly described it as 'establishing iniquity by a law' and secured its rejection. Shortly after Union it reappeared, and men of the Cameronian type frankly deplored 'the vast, unlimited toleration of error in sectaries which, as a necessary and native consequence of this union will inevitably follow'. But now, with England's political complexion vastly altered and the Kirk's sole hegemony in Scotland called in question by the Greenshields decision, it became a virtual certainty; and in the spring of 1712 the scheming of Lockhart the Jacobite and his Tory friends led to Parliament's passing of the Toleration Bill. The new Act permitted Episcopalians to meet and worship in their own manner (providing they were not Jacobites), repealed an act which had forbidden their priests to celebrate baptisms or marriages, and declared that henceforth excommunication should not carry with it any civil penalties. Viewed from today's standpoint, it was a wholly desirable measure. But to Presbyterians still obsessed (like most men at that time) with the seventeenth-century ideal of uniformity, and conscious also of the affiliations and intentions of those who had introduced or supported the Act, it seemed an unalleviated disaster. Throughout Scotland it was condemned as a deplorable instance of English interference in our religious affairs, and of the power of High Anglicanism to undermine the Presbyterian Establishment. Many thought it a direct contravention of the Articles of Union. Some lamented the relaxation of moral censorship which it might involve. Others, equating Episcopalians with Jacobites, averred that it favoured the enemies of the Protestant Succession. Nearly all saw in it the latest and worst example of England's superiority in political guilt and unscrupulousness, and asked (in the pertinent words of one pamphleteer) 'whether it be equal that persons should be exempted from all incapacity, forfeiture or penalties resorting to Episcopal meetings in Scotland, when this very Parliament has made the Dissenters of England incapable of possessing any place of profit and trust for resorting to Presbyterian

meetings'. No doubt these fears and criticisms were frequently exaggerated, but they had at least some justification: so long as High Church Toryism was in the ascendant in England, the Presbyterians of Scotland could not hope to have their interests considered with anything like the respect given to their Episcopalian rivals'.

As if to underline this fact, the restoration of patronage came hard on the heels of Toleration. It too had been expected for some time. We have mentioned the desertion of the Kirk for Episcopalianism by the Scottish nobility: this inevitably produced a gradual estrangement of wealthy heritors from the ministers and congregations on their lands, which in its turn led to rumours that the Scottish gentry were planning to petition Parliament for the return of their old powers. 'We are daily threatened', wrote Wodrow, 'with attempts to restore patronages; and our heritors, unless they get all their will in planting parishes, talk very loud to this tune.' In due course the government listened to their talking, and in the spring of 1712 the Patronage Bill—destined to cause so much trouble in Scotland for generations thereafter—became law in a Parliament which was neither interested in the Kirk nor sympathetic to it. The new Act's immediate effects only increased the alarm with which the Presbyterians had received it. Newly restored patrons soon clashed with congregations living in a very different social, intellectual and religious world. The Jacobites and the Episcopalians were exultant. And early in the following year it was rumoured that Parliament might yet enable patrons to present Episcopalians to vacant charges—a move which would, of course, have undermined the whole Presbyterian Establishment. In the light of changes such as these, moderate men in Scotland might have been excused for asking where it was all to end—and for answering (in words reported by Daniel Defoe to Lord Treasurer Harley) that 'the end of all these things is the bringing in of the Pretender and the dissolution of the Establishment; . . . the ministry aim at overturning the Union, the (Protestant) Succession, and the constitution'.

Britain had indeed drawn near to a kind of precipice in civil and ecclesiastical affairs. But at the very edge she stopped and drew back. The dangers which so agitated men like

Wodrow and Defoe faded away in August 1714 when the death of Anne—long anticipated yet nevertheless too sudden for Jacobite calculations—brought not an exiled Stuart but a Hanoverian to the throne of the United Kingdom. In Dean Swift's phrase, the Tories' 'machine of four years modelling' was 'dashed to pieces in an instant', and little or no opposition was offered to the accession of George I. The Whigs returned to power. Revolution principles were reasserted. The ultimate crushing of the Jacobites and the gradual consolidation of the Union were made possible. Scottish Episcopalianism entered upon a long eclipse. Presbyterianism was confirmed as the established religion of our land. To this striking dénouement, the story of inter-church relations over a period of twenty-five years no doubt made a considerable contribution—not least because it sometimes revealed to contemporaries what were the basic presuppositions of the rival groupings in Church and state, and the real implications of their policies.

For us, theologians and churchmen of today, that 250-year-old story can perhaps do something more. There is, surely, warning in it. Let us beware of bigotry, harsh and ill-informed, in our denominational loyalties; remembering how the contentiousness of one body has very often served no purpose but to accentuate the other's differences from it—as when the ferocity of the Presbyterians immediately after the Revolution helped to drive Scottish Episcopalianism (at that time a disposition rather than a denomination) right out of the Kirk and into closer relations with the Church of England than ever before. Let us beware of overmuch logical consistency in ecclesiastical matters, remembering what disruptive influences in inter-church relations the Covenanter and the High-flyer were. No doubt the extreme Covenanting Presbyterian was in some respects truer to the Kirk's acknowledged ideals between 1689 and 1714 than its chosen leaders—yet how much more harm he did it! And the High-flying Church of England man was certainly the most Anglican of Anglicans—yet he very nearly brought about the overthrow of the Constitution with which his Church was intimately associated, and the return of a Roman Catholic King. (It may, of course, be objected that no such intransigents now exist. Possibly so, and I doubt whether any of us has ever encountered a true des-

cendant of Hepburn, McMillan or McNeil. But perhaps we should leave it to the Episcopalians to tell us whether the race of Nottingham, Packington, Dodwell and Atterbury has likewise altogether perished from the earth.) And let us beware of exaggerating the influence exerted by theological factors in the life of the Churches, in their relations with each other, and even in the development of their characteristic tenets and attitudes. During the period we have been examining, religion was irretrievably mixed in with political, social and economic factors. For example, Scottish Episcopalianism and Jacobitism were at times almost indissociable, so that it might almost be said that Presbyterianism attained its position as the national religion of Scotland by virtue of political rather than religious superiority. Again, the estrangement of our nobility and gentry from the Kirk in the decade after Union was hardly due to theological reasons, but rather to social advances, the gravitational pull of government circles in London, and an admixture of simple snobbery. Yet again—and this to illustrate the non-theological influence of chance—it was only after 1707, when High Churchmen's hopes for Scotland had been frustrated by the securities given to the Kirk by the Act of Union, that they began to give fresh precision to their doctrine of Apostolic Succession (as a kind of compensation).

But if there is warning in our story, there is also encouragement. Let us rejoice at the great and obvious increase in charity between the Churches which has come about since the eighteenth century: their diminishing ignorance of each other, and their willingness to talk—if not to agree—together. Let us also rejoice in the knowledge which history gives that what is best in our church life today does not by any means come to us exclusively from one side in the conflicts of the past: we have, under God, a debt to all sincere men who for the truth's sake had to oppose each other and now (in the words of our great Anglo-Catholic poet) 'accept the constitution of silence, and are folded in a single party'. Lastly, I cannot but feel that there is exhortation in our story also. Archbishop Leighton once prayed, 'Deliver me, O Lord, from the errors of wise men, yea, and of good men.' It might be our prayer too; for surely, in surveying the evils of disunity, we have been pointed anew to the goal of true unity (whatever differences there may be

in our interpretation of that word) and to its only Source, the King and Head of the Church. We have already noted the wise comment of a distinguished Anglican that 'the narrow notions of all the churches had been their ruin'; our last word will be from that doughty Presbyterian of an even earlier day, George Gillespie: 'Let there be no strife between us and you, for we be brethren; and is not the Canaanite and the Perizzite yet in the Land? . . . There is but one Christ! yea, the Head and the body make but one Christ, so that you cannot divide the body without dividing Christ. . . . Oh, brethren, we shall be one in heaven; let us pack up differences in this place of our pilgrimage the best way we can. . . . Nay, we will not despair of unity in this world. . . . Brethren, it is not impossible; pray for it, endeavour it, press hard toward the mark. . . .'

LUTRON

by The Rev. NAHUM LEVISON

It is very dangerous to make a single word or paragraph the central theme of a doctrine or dogma, even when due considerations are given to content and context; but in the case of *lutron*, in Mark 10.45, it becomes inevitable, for it expresses the essence of the mission of our Lord. '*For the Son of Man came not to be served, but to serve and give His life a Lutron on behalf of many.*'

Christianity is a soteriological religion; it is concerned with the relationship of God and Man. It believes that sin breaks the relationship, and asserts that in and through the Cross that relationship is reconciled. The Pauline theology is based on this doctrine, and so is the theology of the rest of the New Testament. When it comes to the formulation of the doctrine it finds that words are inadequate to express it, hence the various terms that are employed. The usage of these terms has been made the basis of the manifold theories in which the doctrine has been presented. Among the earliest soteriological concepts we have the idea that Christ's death was a ransom given to the devil. Origen seems to have accepted this theory. Broadly speaking the following theories have been advocated at one time and another in the Church: (1) the Governmental; (2) Moral Influence; (3) the Mystical; (4) the Satisfaction; (5) the Penal. To these theories we have to add the most modern views as expressed by A. Ritschl, R. W. Dale, J. Denney, J. McLeod Campbell, J. K. Mozley, R. C. Moberly, H. Rashall, G. Aulén, etc. The different theories have their bases in the different terms used in the Bible.

Let us examine these terms. Firstly, there are the Hebrew terms generally appealed to. They are *gā'al*, *pāḏāh*, and *kôp̱er*. The question whether any one of these terms is ever used in the connotation of the Christian sense as related to soteriology in the spiritual and sacramental sense is a matter in dispute. Many Jewish scholars would strongly argue against any soteriological doctrine in the Old Testament, or in the Mishnah and the Talmuds.

Gā'al and *pāḏāh*, these two terms, which occur 132 times in the

OT, must be considered together, for their meanings are so close that either might be used in the expression of the concept. *Gā'al* expresses the concept of redemption. Thus in Isa. 35.10 *pāḏāh* is translated both in the A.V. and R.V., 'ransomed', so also in Hos. 13.14, Isa. 51.10 and Jer. 31.10. In all these cases the basic idea of ransom, which is release by payment of a price, does not enter. In both the Isaiah and Jeremiah passages it is used in connexion with the returned exiles, and in Hosea both *pāḏāh* and *gā'al* are used, and translated '*I will ransom them from the power of Sheol: I will redeem them from death.*' But we have yet another Hebrew term to consider, viz. *kōp̱er*. In Exod. 21.30 we have the use of *kōp̱er* in conjunction with *pāḏāh*. The problem dealt with in the passage is an ox who gored a man or woman. If a ransom is declared, then the owner must redeem his life by whatever penalty has been appointed. The 'ransom' concept is very fully set out in Exod. 13, Yahweh decrees that every male first-born of human or domestic animal (milk animal or ass) belongs to Him, and must be ransomed through the priest, or else be killed. In Num. 18.14 the law of ransom is set out. The male child shall be ransomed for five shekels and twenty *gērāh*, but the firstling male calf, the firstling of sheep or goat, is not to be ransomed, but offered up. The male ass, however, may be ransomed. The root form of *pāḏāh*, found in the Assyrian *padū* and the Arabic *fadā*, leads to the conclusion that originally the word had no sacramental meaning. Yet in the Psalms we have a deeper meaning in which ransom is not assessed in money: Ps. 78.42, '*They did not remember his hand on the day he ransomed them from the straits*'; Ps. 130.8, '*And he will ransom Israel from all his iniquity.*'

Gā'al has the moral meaning of honour. It concerns kinsmen who have to avenge harm or murder committed against a member of the family, or tribe, or the kinsmen who have to uphold the honour of the family by marrying the wife of one of the family who had died childless. In chs. 40 to the end of Isaiah Yahweh is the *gô'ēl* twelve times; and then there is the passage in Job which has given translators and commentators so much trouble: Job 19.25, '*And I have known that my gô'ēl lives, and finally he will be established over the dust, and finally this skin shall be parched, and from my flesh I shall have a vision of God.*'

Our third term, *kāp̲ar*, is more difficult, and yet more important. The earliest use of the word is in connexion with the Ark of Noah: Gen. 6.14, where *wᵉkāp̲artā* means 'and you shall cover'. That this is probably the original meaning suggests itself from the cognate Arabic word *kafara*, to cover, hide. But *kôp̲er* (noun masc.) is the actual price for the ransom. But its deepest meaning is the Anglo-Saxon 'atone', or 'at-one'. Yet, though this word has become deeply embedded in the OT, it is only used once in the NT. We shall deal with this later.

With this cross-section of examples from the OT, we would be hard put to it to establish a basis for the Christian doctrine. There is yet another Hebrew term that we have to consider, viz. *yāšʿa*, 'deliver', and *yēšʿa*, 'deliverance', 'rescue', and *yᵉšûʿāh*, 'salvation'. In the main the deliverance or salvation is from external evil, but often there is a deep spiritual concept woven in, as in Isa, 52.7-10, 59.11-12 and often in the Psalms. After all these references are carefully examined, we would have to stretch a point very far in order to read the precise NT conception into them.

When we turn to the NT we find the following words used to express the Christian concept of the relationship of Christ to the believer. In the NT we have two words which correspond to the Hebrew *gāʾal* and *pāḏāh*. They are *lutro*, and *agorazo*. They have the same implication as the Hebrew words. Professor A. Deissmann directed attention to a passage in a Delphic inscription (in *Light from the Ancient East*, p. 327) in which the matter of the buying of a female slave is concerned, and where the same implication appears. But before going any further into the doctrinal exposition, we must decide two matters. (1) What language did our Lord generally use? was it Greek? If we were dealing with some Galileans only, or with some of the educated Judaeans, we could assume that Greek would be understood by these. Many of the Galilaeans were forced converts into Judaism by the Maccabees, and most of them were of Greek or Syro-Greek origins. That some of them maintained their contact with their ancestors we learn from such names as 'Andrew', Simon Peter's brother, and Mark, his nephew. But our Lord directed much of His message to the common people, and they spoke Aramaic. We must therefore try to get the Aramaic term He used. After long

research it is quite clear that *pāraḳ*, is the most likely. The meaning of *pāraḳ* is 'to break, separate, untie, loosen, unload'. But *pāraḳ* stands for *pāḏāh* as in the Targum of Onkelos on Exod. 12.13. There we have instead of *tiṗdeh*, *tiṗrôḳ*. The Jerusalem Targum also has *tiṗrôḳ*. Again in Num. 18 *pāraḳ* is used for *pāḏāh*. Not only is *pāḏāh* equated by *pāraḳ*, but *gā'al* also: Lev. 25.25, 26, 29, 30, 31, where the Hebrew reads *gā'al* and its derivatives. Onkelos uses *pāraḳ* and its derivatives, as does Jonathan and the Jerusalem Targum. In the case of *kāṗar* the same root is used in the Aramaic Targums. In the Hittpail form it is sometimes, as in *Bᵉrāḳôṯ*, 54*a*, used in the sense of 'redeem, release, deliver'. The Syriac of Mark 10.45, and Matt. 20.28, where we have the term *Lutron*, also has *Purḳônô*. There is a very wide choice in this etymological field for the equation. The Syriac distinctly uses the term *ḥalaf*, in exchange of, or in place of. We have still the very wide field of concepts to take into consideration. *Katallage*, a reconciliation—St. Paul uses this concept mainly in Romans and the Corinthian letters (Rom. 5.10 twice, 11.15; 1 Cor. 7.11; 2 Cor. 5 three times). The LXX uses *hilasterion* to translate or equate *kāṗar*, in the sense both of reconciliation and of expiation. The closing words of Isa. 53, *wᵉ lappôš'îm yaṗgî'a*, have been translated in our English versions: 'And made intercession for the transgressors'—*yaṗgî'a* comes from the root *pāg'a*, the primary meaning of which verb is 'to meet, encounter, reach'. In some passages the best translation is 'to interpose', in others 'to meet with hostility'. The LXX either had not our text or misread the text, for it translates: 'He was delivered because of their iniquities.' Would not a simple translation of the two words '*and for the rebellious He makes a meeting place*' (a place of reconciliation?) be more in keeping with the general intent of the passage? Let us now examine the other concepts: *hilasterion*, *sozo*, and *soter*. The last two are the most often employed in the NT. Principal H. Wheeler Robinson has classified them in his book *Redemption and Revelation*, p. 232. *Soteria* occurs forty-five times, and *Sozo* 106 times, and he ranges them in the following categories:

(1) Deliverance, in the fundamental and most general sense	6
(2) Deliverance from disease or demon-possession	16
(3) Deliverance from physical death	25

(4) The universality of this deliverance, especially its extension from Jew to Gentile	15
(5) The reference of this deliverance to God or Christ as its source	23
(6) The experimental content of the deliverance (faith and conduct)	33
(7) The eschatological completion of the deliverance	33
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The American revisers have translated *katallage* in Rom. 5.11 'reconciliation', and so eliminated the only Anglo-Saxon word which is so apt from their soteriological thought. In Rom. 3.24-25, we have a good example of the contrasting concepts in St. Paul's thinking when he uses *apolutrosis*, and *hilasterion*. The first word has to be translated 'deliverance', and the second is more difficult but may be an equation of *kappôret*, which would be better expressed in 'atonement' than 'propitiation'.

While this is by no means an exhaustive etymological examination of all the concepts regarding the mission and work of our Lord, we have considered the most vital aspects in their relation to *lutron*. There is, however, one other passage in which our Lord defines His Mission: it is 1 Cor.11.23-26—'*I moreover received from the Lord, and handed over to you: That the Lord Jesus on the night on which He was handed over, lifted the bread, and when He had given thanks He broke it, and said: this is My body which is for you, this do among you as a memorial of me. In similar manner, the cup after supper, saying, this cup is the new covenant in My blood: This do as often as you drink it, as a memorial to Me.*'

The *lutron*, and the *kaine diatheke*, have to be integrated if the mind of the Master is to be understood. The '*new covenant*'—what were the Old Covenants? There was the Covenant with Abraham: '*On that day Yahweh confirmed a covenant with Abram, saying, to your progeny have I given this land, from the river of Egypt, to the great river, the river Euphrates*' (Gen. 15.18). There follow the names of the peoples inhabiting the mentioned territories. In Gen. 17.10 we are told how this Covenant is to be perpetuated: '*This is My Covenant which you shall observe between Myself and yourselves, and your progeny after you, circumcise every male . . .*; (11) *and it shall be a pledge of the covenant between Myself and yourselves.*' St. Paul has been taken to task over the abolition of the pledge of the Covenant, and it must be admitted

that his argument is somewhat involved; but this does not change the fact that the Covenant concerned the heritage of the territory which Abraham's progeny was to inherit after its return from the Egyptian exile. In that Covenant the Gentiles had no share or part; it just did not concern them. It was a tribal Covenant which was afterwards made clear to depend on the tribe or nation carrying out the further Covenant to be made when they returned to occupy the territory.

Before entering into the heritage, the Covenant at Sinai was to be entered into. It was looked upon as collectively binding on the nation until the time of Jeremiah who taught that collective responsibility was at an end. '*In those days they shall no longer say, the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge, but man shall die in his own iniquity, everyman that eats sour grapes his teeth shall be set on edge . . .; for this is the covenant that I shall promulgate to the house of Israel after these days, pronounces Yahweh, I have placed the Tôrāh in their midst, and I will write it upon their hearts, and I shall be God to them, and they shall be my people*' (Jer. 31.28-32). Ezekiel reinforced the doctrine of individual responsibility (Ezek. 18.1ff).

While every one of the suggested soteriologies has its basis in biblical thinking, and arises from the terminology used in the Bible, the real question that must be faced is why we need soteriology. The closer our relationship is to God the more urgent the need for a rational soteriology, for the deeper the feeling of sin is. But the question why there is sin, must first be answered, before we can build up a rational soteriology.

The problem of 'Original Sin' does not arise in this particular approach; for we have to carry the matter deeper, and ask whether God shares with Man the responsibility for the existence of sin. The answer is in part given in Gen. 3: God gave Men FREEDOM TO SIN. Let us face this ethical problem honestly. Man has freedom of choice in the matter of doing good or evil, and this freedom has been given him by God. We would have to go very far afield if we entered here on the problem of 'Predestination and Free Will'. Judaism had no settled doctrine on this. The Pharisees, Scribes and the main stream of the people who followed these sects held to a predestination doctrine. The Sadducees held only the free will doctrine, and they both claimed to extract their doctrines from the *Tôrāh*.

The Essenes believed in a little of both, but orthodox Jewry remained predestinarian. Maimonides wrote a very forceful book (on logic) *Millot ha-Higgajon*, in which he treats of the problem. The position today is no nearer solution than it was in the Reformers' time. We have to meet the problem individually. My own attitude is that I know that as a free being I am responsible for every act I am involved in as a free being. There are some acts that I am involved in that are imposed upon me by higher forces, but I claim no exemption from responsibility in these, for if I think them wrong I should be willing to suffer the consequences of the higher forces and disobey them. But I cannot rid myself of the thought that God must share with me in some way the consequences of my sins. I am sinful not because I want to be, and I cannot hide behind a doctrine of original sin. For the sins I commit, my brothers and sisters, who belong to the same parents, do not, and some of their sins I eschew. Ethically I cannot see how I can get away from the thought that God must share responsibility with me, for He gave me the freedom to sin. If anyone turns the tables against me, and tells me: 'But you are free and you ought not to sin', I simply answer: 'Show me the sinless man or woman.' Has God made man so imperfect that he sins whether he wants to or not? If that is the case then I am not free, I am not free not to sin.

Let me turn to one of the parables to illustrate my point. The parable of the father and the two sons, Luke 15.11ff. The younger of the sons demands his freedom. Legally he had no case at all, but out of love for this son, the father gives him his freedom, and the son makes a sorry mess of it. Has the father no responsibility whatever, in having made it possible for the son to have got into the state he did? Of course there is the repentance of the son. In Judaism very great stress is laid on repentance. In the Mishnah tractate *Âḇôt*, Rabbi Elieser son of Jacob expresses the concept as follows: 'He who fulfils one commandment acquires for himself an intercessor; he who breaks one commandment acquires for himself an accuser. Repentance and good deeds are as a shield against punishment', A.13. Many passages in Rabbinical literature could be quoted to emphasise repentance as the antidote to sin that had been committed. I could never accept the ethic of this doctrine.

Socially this doctrine is a necessity. If a person wrongs me and comes to realise his wrongness, I forgive him; but sin is something more than the original Hebrew word *ḥāṭ'ā* (the missing of the mark) means. It is something that enters into the relation between God and oneself.

One would assume that in the parable the father suffered and was anxious about the younger son, and welcomed him when he saw the error of his ways, but this still leaves the ethical problem unanswered. Should the father have made it possible for the son to have done what he did? Granting that freedom is indispensable to human personality, and it is God's most gracious gift to man, we have still to face the problem whether God must not share with man his abuse of that freedom. We need not drag in the red herring of original sin. It is original in so far as each of us are sinners. The son that stayed at home was a sinner too, for he grieved his father when he refused to join in the feast made for his erring brother.

The Cross seems the only solution. In the Cross God suffers with man for his sin, and in the Cross the God-Man is obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross. It could only be God Incarnate in the *Logos*, *Meṃrā*, or the Son who could share the consequence of sin.

The doctrine of 'Impassibility', and Aristotle's theory of the transcendence of Deity, do not trouble me, for they are just not biblical categories, dogmas or doctrines.

In Jesus God incarnate we behold the answer to the ethical problem. Freedom meant sin, not in the absolute sense, but it opened the door and it gave the opportunity for disobedience. Ethically God must share in the consequences which resulted from the giving of the freedom. God in sending His Son to be born of a woman and to live the sinless life demonstrates that the giving of freedom did not entail disobedience, or sin, but since it worked out that way in the race, He takes His share of suffering in Christ His sinless Son on the Cross. He does not remain impassible, but in the God-Man He does suffer. The Cross is not just the answer to the ethical problem, but it releases power to enable man to live by faith in the Son of God who loved us and gave Himself in order to give us the power to live in Him and He in us, to use our freedom to glorify the Giver.

Lutron, with its manifold meanings in *pārak̲*, or more correctly *lip̲ᵉrōk̲*, then comes to have a very important, yes all-important, content. It represents the Hebrew *gā'al*, *pāḏāh* and *kôp̲er*, it represents the Greek *agorazo*, *katallage*, *hilasterion*, *sozo* and *soter*. It goes further still, it breaks the impasse which our freedom has brought us. It unburdens, unties, loosens, the consequence of our freedom. As to which of the particular terms we find to be the answer to our own personal needs, it is quite obvious that it depends upon ourselves. If we need to be salvaged from the mire we got ourselves into, *soter* would suit us best. If I have been at dispeace with God, then *katallage* would suit my condition best. If I have sold my conscience for worldly goods or position, then I should need Him to be my *pôḏeh*. If I have dishonoured my family or country, I should need Him to be my *gô'ēl*. All the terms used are not to express different doctrines or dogmas, but to meet our various needs. If by His grace I am to be partaker in the 'New Covenant', it is no longer a mark in my flesh which did not prevent me from sinning, but His pledge in the ratification that His grace will be sufficient. That in partaking of the outward symbols of His joint responsibility on the Cross, He through His Godhead and Manhood, and just because He is very God of very God and very Man of very Man, creates the meeting place at Calvary between God whom I cannot see, and God whom I can see suffering for the freedom from which I have fallen so short.

ARTICLE REVIEW

Systematic Theology,[1] Vols I and II. By Paul Tillich
by The Rev. Professor John H. Hick

There are two kinds of theological system, kerygmatic and apologetic. In our own day the outstanding example of the first is undoubtedly Karl Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, and of the second, probably Paul Tillich's *Systematic Theology*. As Reinhold Niebuhr has written, 'If Karl Barth is the Tertullian of our day, abjuring [metaphysical] speculations for fear that they may obscure or blunt the *kerygma* of the Gospel, Tillich is the Origen of our period, seeking to relate the Gospel message to the disciplines of our culture and to the whole history of culture'.[2] The *magnum opus* of each is still in process of creation, although in sight of completion. The present essay is an interim report and comment upon the two volumes of Tillich's work which have so far appeared. I cannot attempt in the space available to reproduce the substance of Tillich's two volumes, every page of which contains matter of theological interest. Instead I shall confine this review to three of the most important aspects of his system: his method, his doctrine of God, and his Christology.

I

The Method of Correlation

Tillich points out that theology, as a function of the Church, serves two interests—the Christian Gospel itself, and the human situation in which and to which it is being proclaimed. As an apologist Tillich is concerned with the latter no less than with the former, and urges that contemporary theologians should undertake 'a courageous participation in the "situation", that is, in all the various cultural forms which express modern man's interpretation of his existence' (I, 6). These last words define Tillich's special use of the term 'situation'. He does not mean by it man's space-time environment, but the human response to that environment as expressed in man's view of himself and of the central problems of his life. 'The "situation" to which theology must respond is the totality of man's creative self-interpretation in a special period' (I, 4). Tillich believes

[1] Volume I (Chicago University Press, 1951, and Nisbet, 1953); Volume II (Chicago and Nisbet, 1957). I shall quote from the British edition of the first volume, and the American edition of the second. A concluding third volume is yet to appear.

[2] 'Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology', in *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, edited by Kegley and Bretall (New York, 1952), p. 217.

that man's cultural situation in any epoch implies for its participants a particular formulation of the abiding problems of human existence, and that the Christian message implies answers to these questions. Apologetic theology is accordingly an 'answering theology'. Tillich calls his procedure as an apologist the method of correlation: 'It tries to correlate the questions implied in the situation with the answers implied in the message' (I, 8). Accordingly his Systematic Theology is set forth dialectically, analysing some aspect of human existence, formulating the question which it poses, and then answering that question from the resources of the Christian faith. Tillich deals in this way with five aspects of man's existence. For in all its forms the existential question is 'man himself in the conflicts of his existential situation' (II, 13). The conflicts within man's rationality and his cognitive experience pose problems to which the answer is the fact of Revelation. Man's finitude and his experience of finitude generally constitutes a problem to which the answer is God as unconditioned Being (Volume I). Man's self-estrangement and his experience of despair and meaninglessness constitute a problem to which the answer is Christ as the manifestation of the New Being (Volume II). Man's experience of the tensions of organic life poses problems to which the answer is the Spirit. And man's experience of participation in the ambiguities of history poses a problem to which the answer is the Kingdom of God (Volume III). In each case the theological answer comes as a revelation; the answers 'cannot be derived from the questions, that is, from an analysis of human existence. They are "spoken" *to* human existence from beyond it' (I, 72).

What, in Tillich's view, is the dominant characteristic of our own situation in this twentieth century? How does modern man conceive the central problem and need of his life? And what, accordingly, are the implications or aspects of the Christian message which are to be drawn out by the contemporary theologian? Tillich's answer to these questions constitutes the hub around which his system revolves, and can best be presented in his own words:

> It is not an exaggeration to say that today man experiences his present situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness and despair in all realms of life. This experience is expressed in the arts and in literature, conceptualised in existential philosophy, actualised in political cleavages of all kinds, and analysed in the psychology of the unconscious. It has given theology a new understanding of the demonic-tragic structures of individual and social life. The question arising out of this experience is not, as in the Reformation, the question of a merciful God and the forgiveness of sins; nor is it, as in the early Greek Church, the question of finitude, of death and error; nor is it the question of the personal religious life or of

the Christianisation of culture and society. It is the question of a reality in which the self-estrangement of our existence is overcome, a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of creativity, meaning, and hope. We shall call such a reality the 'New Being', a term whose presuppositions and implications can be explained only through the whole system. It is based on what Paul calls the 'new creation' and refers to its power of overcoming the demonic cleavages of the 'old reality' in soul, society, and universe. If the Christian message is understood as the message of the 'New Being', an answer is given to the question implied in our present situation and in every human situation. (I, 55-56)

The source of the New Being is Jesus Christ. The full formulation of Tillich's theological norm is thus 'the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern', the latter phrase being based upon Tillich's dichotomy between man's ultimate concern, which is the sphere of religion, in distinction from all his preliminary or non-religious concerns.

This definition of religion as the sphere of man's ultimate concern is one of the foundations of Tillich's thought, and should now be referred to more fully. Instead of religious experience, Tillich habitually speaks of man's ultimate concern. 'The religious concern', he says, 'is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary. The ultimate concern is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or circumstance. The unconditional concern is total: no part of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it; there is no "place" to flee from it. The total concern is infinite: no moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a religious concern which is ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite' (I, 14). Only that can concern us ultimately 'which determines our being or non-being', by which Tillich does not mean our biological life but 'the structure, the meaning, and the aim of [our] existence. . . . "To be or not to be" in *this* sense is a matter of ultimate, unconditional, total and infinite concern' (I, 17).

There is a query to be raised about Tillich's concept of religion as man's ultimate concern. The phrase 'ultimate concern' is ambiguous and can refer either to the state of being concerned or to that about which one is concerned. If Tillich were using the phrase in the latter sense, in order to assert the 'existential' character of religious faith by indicating that men cannot be aware of God without being at the same time ultimately concerned about Him, one would have no quarrel. But it seems clear that in developing his criterion of religion he is using 'ultimate concern' to describe an attitude, the attitude of valuing something absolutely and regarding it as the source and determiner of one's good. But this is,

notoriously, an attitude which is capable of being very variously directed. For monotheistic faith the only right direction of it is to God, and to treat anything else as a final centre of value is idolatry. However, for Tillich any interest which is for anyone ultimate is by definition religious; 'whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him' (I, 234). Tillich is thus defining religion subjectively, as the exercise of a human faculty, in contrast to an objective definition in terms of man's response to God or to the Supernatural. He is to this extent following Schleiermacher. Indeed Tillich remarks, 'Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence" was rather near to what is called in the present system "ultimate concern about the ground and meaning of our being" ' (I, 47). However, a definition of religion in terms of a human religious attitude is liable to be so broad as to be of little value. On the basis of Tillich's definition an atheist may properly be said to be religious, so long as there is something which he values absolutely. And we do indeed speak, in popular parlance, of people taking this and that secular interest 'religiously'. However, such elasticity of usage is philosophically undesirable, for it has the effect of postponing rather than bringing forward the claim that there exists a divine Being to whom alone the attitude of ultimate concern is appropriate, and to whom it is alone appropriate even when it is withheld or directed elsewhere in idolatrous worship. Subjective definitions of religion have the further demerit that they foster the view of religion as essentially a cultural and psychological phenomenon—an attitude which is particularly prevalent in Tillich's adopted homeland.

Given his central and normative concept of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as man's ultimate concern, how does Tillich proceed to build his theological system? What materials or sources does he consider relevant? First, of course, the Bible. For Tillich, divine revelation consists in the occurrence of revelatory events rather than in the promulgation of divinely guaranteed propositions. The Bible takes its place as a permanent source of Christian theology not as a collection of oracles but as the original documentation of revelatory events. The inspiration of its writers consists in their response to those events as revelatory. 'The inspiration of the writers of the New Testament is their acceptance of Jesus as the Christ, and with Him, of the New Being, of which they became witnesses. Since there is no revelation unless there is someone who receives it as revelation, the act of reception is part of the event itself. The Bible is both original event and original document; it witnesses to that of which it is a part' (I, 40). To the present writer at least, this seems an admirable treatment of the problem of biblical authority, although it needs to be supplemented from the

doctrines of the Holy Spirit and of Providence, which are to be dealt with in Tillich's third volume.

As an apologist, Tillich's aim is not simply to expound the scriptural message in its own terms, but rather to confront it with the contemporary human situation and then to draw out its answers to the questions posed by that situation. Accordingly the Bible itself is only one of the sources of his system. His second source is the history of Christian thought. For the Bible is part of the total phenomenon of Christianity, a phenomenon which began prior to the adoption of the Old and the production of the New Testament, and which extends through time as a living prism of tradition and interpretation through which the contemporary theologian views the original revelatory events. Third, Tillich sees the world-wide history of religions as an environment which has influenced the development of Christianity, or of the New Being in history. He notes however that a theological history of religion, or description, classification and evaluation of the religions of the world in the light of the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ, has yet to be produced. (Since Tillich wrote, just such a theological interpretation of religious types has been attempted for the first time, and carried through with considerable success, by H. H. Farmer in his Gifford Lectures, *Revelation and Religion*, 1954.) Finally, Tillich's view widens out to include human culture at large as providing material for a systematic theology; and readers of his earlier works will know how thoroughly Tillich is at home in the diverse fields of art, politics, philosophy and contemporary depth psychology.

In concluding this note on Tillich's theological method I must add that he discusses a large number of other topics which I have lacked space even to mention. Indeed the methodological chapters of the *Systematic Theology* are packed with material of the highest interest and importance, to which I have been able to do no sort of justice in these brief remarks, but to which I must refer the reader for his own first-hand study.

II

God as Being-itself

Tillich's doctrine of God constitutes one of his most profound and original contributions to apologetic theology. It is a doctrine which makes a strong appeal to many religiously uncommitted minds, and which deserves the most careful consideration of Tillich's fellow theologians. As I shall point out, Tillich's thought in this area runs grave theological risks. But Tillich is essentially a theological explorer, despite the systematic nature of his work; and one cannot go far in exploration without running risks.

We may begin with Tillich's at first sight paradoxical rejection of the statement that God exists. The motive behind this rejection is a firm intention not to reduce God to our own level or even to draw Him within the same dimension of being with ourselves. 'It is', Tillich says, 'as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it is to deny it. God is being-itself, not *a* being' (I, 263). The paradox that God does not exist is not, however, quite so startling as it is liable to sound. It is simply a vivid repudiation of every form of belief in a finite deity. Tillich means, not that the term 'God' does not stand for any reality, but that the reality for which it stands is not merely one amongst others, not even the first or the highest, but rather the very ground and source of all reality. Tillich is in effect urging a restriction of the use of the term 'exists' to the finite and created realm, thereby rendering it improper to ask of the infinite creator whether He exists, or to affirm or deny His existence. But of course it is only on the basis of this restricted usage that Tillich wishes to repudiate the statement that God exists. He is emphasising the point, which was familiar to the Scholastics, that the creator and the created cannot be said to exist in precisely the same sense.

What does Tillich mean by 'being-itself'? He offers as synonyms, 'the ground of being' and 'the power of being'. The latter phrase introduces Tillich's notion of non-being ('dialectical non-being' or *me on*, in distinction from sheer nothingness, or *ouk on*) as a tension within being-itself. Because of this tension, being-itself is described as 'the power of being infinitely resisting non-being, giving the power of being to everything that is' (I, 278). Non-being is the ground of evil and of all destructive and disintegrative tendencies. Human life, as finite existence, participates both in being and in non-being. We are perpetually threatened by non-being, which evokes in us the feeling of *Angst*, and yet we are at the same time sustained by being-itself as the creative ground of our existence, faith in which is a courage to be which annuls anxiety. It is distinctive of Tillich's doctrine of God that non-being is included, dialectically, within being, within God. 'God as creative life includes the finite and, with it, non-being, although non-being is eternally conquered and the finite is eternally reunited within the infinity of the divine life' (I, 300). This position has implications concerning the relation between God and evil, which Tillich defends elsewhere by saying that 'the positing of the non-being, and therefore of the finite in the process of the divine life, is not as baffling as a doctrine which posits evil as an ontological reality outside God'.[1]

The concept of meontic non-being (also used by Berdyaev) must be challenged. It has every appearance of being an example of the

[1] 'Reply to Interpretation and Criticism', *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 340.

tendency of the human mind to hypostatise language. The terms 'being' and 'existence' generate the terms 'non-being' and 'non-existence'; but it does not follow that there in any sense is or exists or subsists anything to which these words refer. Tillich points out that 'the root meaning of "to exist," in Latin, *existere*, is to "stand out". Immediately one asks: "To stand out of what?" . . . The general answer to the question of what we stand out of is that we stand out of non-being . . . existence means standing out of non-being' (II, 20-21). Surely this is mythological rather than philosophical thinking, and can only serve an opposite purpose from that, espoused by Tillich, of bridging the gulf between philosophy and theology. In modern philosophy the negative existential proposition has been very fully analysed. Russell's theory of descriptions shows that to say that something exists is to say that such-and-such a description has a referent, and conversely that to say that something does not exist is not to locate it in any meontic realm of the non-existence of individual things, but consists in the fact that any-description has a referent. There is thus no semantic justification for the hypostatisation of 'non-being'. The basic philosophical problem, however, according to Tillich, does not concern the existence or non-existence of individual things, but consists in the fact that anything exists rather than nothing. To realise that one might not have existed is 'the shock of non-being' which compels one to pose 'the question of being' (I, 207). This is indeed the ultimate problem. But it is an insoluble, or rather an improperly formulated problem; there is no conceivable proposition that would constitute an answer to it. We can only accept with piety the fact that there is something rather than nothing. The problem is not lightened by a doctrine of creation, for the query then attaches itself to the creator. Nor is it in any way lightened by an invocation of the notion of non-being. The notion of meontic non-being as a negative force which is overcome by the power of being represents, in the opinion of the present writer, mere confusion and mystification. It is at best a symbol for the finiteness and contingency of the world.

Another important feature of Tillich's teaching is that speech about God is 'symbolic'. The only non-symbolic statement that can be made about God is that He is being-itself: 'nothing else can be said about God as God which is not symbolic' (I, 265). We speak about God symbolically whenever we attribute to Him a characteristic found in finite existence. That the characteristic is asserted of God symbolically and not literally means that the ordinary meaning of the expression is 'negated by that to which it points' (I, 265). Inquiring into the possibility of such a procedure, Tillich asks: 'Can a segment of finite reality become the basis for an assertion about

that which is infinite? The answer is that it can, because that which is infinite is being-itself and because everything participates in being-itself. The *analogia entis* is not the property of a questionable natural theology which attempts to gain knowledge of God by drawing conclusions about the infinite from the finite. The *analogia entis* gives us our only justification of speaking at all about God' (I, 266).

In the Introduction to his second volume Tillich restates his doctrine of God and thereby throws added light upon it. He describes his position as being 'beyond naturalism and supranaturalism'. By naturalism he means the identification of God 'with the universe, with its essence or with special powers within it' (II, 6). Such an identification is to be rejected because it 'denies the infinite distance between the whole of finite things and their infinite ground' (II, 7). By supranaturalism on the other hand, against which he has always contended, Tillich means the view which 'separates God as a being, the highest being, from all other beings, alongside and above which He has His existence. In this position He has brought the universe into being at a certain moment (five thousand or five billion years ago), governs it according to a plan, directs it towards an end, interferes with its ordinary processes in order to overcome resistance and to fulfil His purpose, and will bring it to consummation in a final catastrophe' (II, 6). His objection to supranaturalism is that 'it transforms the infinity of God into a finiteness which is merely an extension of the categories of finitude' (II, 6). In Tillich's rejection of what he calls the supranatural, and his reinterpretation of the very extensive supranatural element in the Bible, there is an independent parallelism with the demythologising programme of Rudolf Bultmann.

What then is Tillich's own doctrine of God, beyond naturalism and supranaturalism? It agrees up to a point with each of the positions which it denies. 'It agrees with the naturalistic view by asserting that God would not be God if he were not the creative ground of everything that has being. . . . In this respect God is neither alongside things nor even "above" them; He is nearer to them than they are to themselves' (II, 7). On the other hand, in agreement with supranaturalism, 'God as the ground of being infinitely transcends that of which He is the ground' (II, 7). But whereas the naturalist, or immanentist, element in Tillich's position has been stated with admirable clarity, the supranatural element, or element of transcendence, remains obscure. Apparently for Tillich God's transcendence is another name for the finiteness and pointing-beyond-itself-ness of the world. He says that to call God transcendent means that 'within itself, the finite world points beyond

itself. In other words, it is self-transcendent' (II, 7). On the next page, however, God's transcendence is equated with the fact that man has freedom. 'The divine transcendence is identical with the freedom of the created to turn away from the essential unity with the creative ground of its own being' (II, 8). All this, together with a number of other passages, suggests to the present writer that for Tillich 'God' is the name, not for the self-existent infinite personal Being who has created the universe, but for a dimension of the universe itself, or a quality in man's awareness of his total environment. 'God' is the element of indefinable depth and mystery in human experience, the recognition of which enriches, and the acceptance of which purifies human life. On this interpretation Tillich does not stand beyond naturalism and supranaturalism. He stands firmly within naturalism, using the vocabulary of supranaturalism to point to the holy as a dimension of the natural which gives a special meaning and value to human life.

Once again, however, I want to add that this brief account of Tillich's position has certainly been inadequate, and possibly unjust, and that each theologian must examine Tillich's works for himself.

III

The New Being in Jesus as the Christ

Volume II of the *Systematic Theology*, which was originally delivered as a series of Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen, was published in the United States in 1957 and has been published in Britain. This volume contains Tillich's doctrines of sin and salvation. In his own language, it treats of man's state of existential estrangement and of the establishment of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. In this second volume Tillich continues to run theological risks and (in the present reviewer's opinion at least) to go too far in some of the directions which he explores; but it must be emphasised that even when Tillich appears to be in error his thought is profoundly illuminating, and demands careful study by everyone working in the theological field today.

Finitude (according to the teaching of the first volume) is included within the totality of being as such. A human individual, as a finite being, is an essence or ideal potentiality within the divine reality. The Fall of man is his transition from essence to existence, from essential to existential being. This is not, however, a temporal transition. 'The essential nature of man is present in all stages of his development, although in existential distortion. In myth and dogma man's essential nature has been projected into the past as a history before history. . . . In psychological terms one can interpret this

state as that of "dreaming innocence" ' (II, 33). The mythical unfallen state is not however a state of moral perfection. 'Only the conscious union of existence and essence is perfection. . . . The symbol "Adam before the Fall" must be understood as the dreaming innocence of undecided potentialities' (II, 34). The inner drive which propels man to his Fall is an anxious awareness of his finite freedom. 'At the moment when man becomes conscious of his freedom, the awareness of his danger gets hold of him. He experiences a double threat, which is rooted in his finite freedom and expressed in anxiety. Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by not actualising himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing himself by actualising himself and his potentiality. He stands between the preservation of his dreaming innocence without experiencing the actuality of being and the loss of his innocence through knowledge, power, and guilt. The anxiety of this situation is the state of temptation. Man decides for self-actualisation, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence' (II, 36). The analogy to this pattern in the psychological development of the individual is the emergence of sexuality. 'The typical adolescent is driven by the anxiety of losing himself, either in the actualisation of himself sexually or in his non-actualisation sexually. On the one hand, the taboos imposed on him by society have power over him in confirming his own anxiety about losing his innocence and becoming guilty by actualising his potentiality. On the other hand, he is afraid of not actualising himself sexually and of sacrificing his potentialities by preserving his innocence' (II, 36).

Man's fall is both his guilt and his destiny. (Tillich's discussion in both the first and second volumes of the relation between freedom and destiny is exceedingly valuable, but is only one of many important discussions which cannot be adequately summarised here.) Despite the reference to man's guilt, one is not surprised to find Tillich saying that 'there is a point in which creation and the Fall coincide' (II, 44; cf. I, 284), thereby apparently attributing the fall to universal destiny to the exclusion of human responsibility. However, whilst this aspect of Tillich's system is liable to induce in the reader a feeling of acute theological discomfort, it also challenges him to point to an alternative doctrine of the Fall which is equally realistic.

The analysis of the Fall as the (non-historical) 'transition' from essence to existence is followed by Tillich's review of man's actual condition of estrangement from his own essence and, as a consequence, estrangement from his fellows. Here Tillich's thought takes in the main conclusions of contemporary existentialist philosophy.

The estrangement of existence has been overcome in the person of

Jesus when He is received by faith as the Christ. In Him the New Being is manifested. 'New Being is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence' (II, 118-19). That Jesus is the Christ, the centre and source of the New Being, rests upon His simultaneous maintainance of unity with God and sacrifice of everything that He could have gained from this unity. 'He proves and confirms His character as the Christ in the sacrifice of Himself as Jesus to Himself as the Christ' (II, 123).

Tillich rejects the classical two-natures Christology, and replaces it with the notion of the manifestation in a human life of the essentially real but existentially lost unity between God and mankind. 'The assertion that Jesus as the Christ is the personal unity of a divine and a human nature must be replaced by the assertion that in Jesus as the Christ the eternal unity of God and man has become historical reality' (II, 148). The New Being is manifested in a life which displays under the conditions of space and time the 'eternal unity of God and man within the divine life. This unity in a state of pure essentiality or potentiality can become actualised through finite freedom and, in the unique event Jesus as the Christ, became actualised against existential disruption' (II, 148). Accordingly the symbol 'Son of God' may be applied to Jesus. 'Being the Son of God means representing the essential unity between God and man under the conditions of existence and re-establishing this unity in all those who participate in His being' (II, 110).

Tillich's doctrine of redemption is accordingly a doctrine of participation. From the divine side it is God's participation, in Christ, in man's estranged existence, and from the human side it is man's answering participation in God's participation, which is the New Being. 'The doctrine of atonement is the description of the effect of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ on those who are grasped by it in their state of estrangement' (II, 170). This effect is threefold. It is participation in the New Being (Regeneration), acceptance of the New Being (Justification), and transformation by the New Being (Sanctification). Salvation is not, however, all-or-nothing. It is not, as in classical theology, 'identical with being taken into the state of ultimate blessedness' which is 'the opposite of total condemnation to everlasting pain or eternal death'. Instead, in Tillich's system, 'salvation is understood as healing and saving power through the New Being in all history. . . . In some degree all men participate in the healing power of the New Being. Otherwise, they would have no being. The self-destructive consequences of estrangement would have destroyed them. But no men are totally healed, even those who have encountered the healing power as it appears in Jesus as the Christ' (II, 167).

I have space only for one final query, which refers to Tillich's system as a whole. Do I rightly discern in it significant affinities with the ancient Gnostic conception of the divine *pleroma* from which a number of sparks of divinity, human souls, have fallen, existing now in estrangement from their true nature, until a being of heavenly power comes to reunite them with their eternal ground and source?

In conclusion I must emphasise that a review of Tillich's two volumes, even when expanded to the length of an article, can do no more than outline the skeletal structure of his thought. I have depicted the bare backbone or cranium of Tillich's system, but my diagram is no substitute for the full living organism as it is found in Tillich's pages. I have been able to give very little impression of the richness of his detailed discussions. Tillich's unswerving theological honesty and realism; his sensitiveness to contemporary human life in all its reaches; the amazing breadth of his learning, both sacred and secular; and his creation of a systematic theology of intricate architectonic unity, embodying a life-time's thought and experience, make him beyond question one of the most important Christian writers of our time. It is an indication of his stature and power as a thinker that one can be in almost continuous disagreement with his formulations and yet at the same time be continuously influenced and illuminated by them. It is to be hoped that Tillich will become as widely read in Britain as he has been for many years in the United States.

JOHN H. HICK

BOOK REVIEWS

Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft. 1951. Pp. 280. DM. 14.80; and *Dogmatik.* 1955. Pp. 313. DM. 15. By Hermann Diem. Christian Kaiser Verlag, München. English Translation of the second volume: *Dogmatics* (translator Harold Knight) 1959, Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 30s.

Dr Hermann Diem, Professor of Practical Theology in Tübingen and parish minister in Ebersbach/Fils, has already completed two of the proposed three volumes of his theological work. The first part deals with *Theology* in its self-understanding, in its relationship to the Scriptures, and in the relationship of its history to the history of Dogma and to the ecclesiastical history. The second part, entitled *Dogmatics*, is a discussion of questions arising between exegetical and systematic work and leads along a line where the exegesis—dogmatics antithesis is resolved. The third part which is to follow will deal with *Practical Theology*. Is the whole work to be a theological encyclopaedia, a systematic scheme, supposed to cover the entire field of theology? H. Diem who is, by the way, a widely known Kierkegaard scholar, knows only too well that such a scheme does not exist. Thinking theologically does not mean classifying actual problems into a system, in order to obtain answers. Amongst modern theologians, Diem stands out as an original but also radical thinker. He is well versed in the background of the resurgence of theology in the twenties and the first great test to which it was subjected in the Kirchenkampf 1933-45. As well, however, he sees clearly the motives of the present-day unrealistic discussion on the different Protestant denominations and their confessional institutions and knows its historical context. Diem, being a genuine follower of Luther, and of the tradition of the Reformed Church, and of K. Barth at the same time, does not speak for a theologically 'soft' unity but he is a scholar able to perceive profounder and more comprehensive links between them. His books, especially the second volume, can be heartily recommended for translation into English since they present an exellent introduction to modern theological discussion on the Continent.

Vol. I: *Theologie als kirchliche Wissenschaft* (Theology as the Function of the Church)

The first question raised is that of the 'criterion of theology' as a legitimate theological task. Is theology a function of the Church? Is there a limit to its freedom which it dare not overstep (as Bult-

mann was accused of doing)? Roman Catholic theology gives a simple answer: 'Yes, there is a limit. It is fixed by tradition and by the *propositio ecclesiae*.' But in Protestant theology, tradition cannot be accepted as compulsory nor can the teaching office be recognised as an institution at all. Our theology finds itself in a dilemma, as the Canon which is taken as compulsory has itself been made up by the Church. Diem finds an answer to this question of the criterion of theology which follows the line taken by K. Barth: Theology is subjected to the proclamation of the Word. The task of proclamation will turn theology from introspection and end its monologue. It cannot any longer handle revelation in its 'own administration' (p. 13).

The exposition of these thoughts furnishes the three chapters of Diem's book. First the Roman Catholic, then the Protestant way is mapped out; the distinction between philosophy and theology is elucidated (this being one of the most impressive sections). Finally the disciplines of theology are classified. Here Diem is working in close conjunction with K. Barth. He proceeds to the statement: 'Thus theology has to charge the Church with her confession to be the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, as thereby she implies the confession that the assembly of the people of God becomes event in her today in the same way as it became event in the times of the Apostles' (p. 55).

The first task of theology as a critical function of the Church, is the examination of the biblical evidence in its relation to the Church. The identity of the apostolic Church and the present-day Church is to be believed as existing within a historical continuity. This reminds us of the passage in K. Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik* I 1, p. 3 (German ed.), where he says ecclesiastical history is a sort of 'auxiliary science', a statement which has upset many historians. In Diem we now find a correct exposition of Barth's assertion: This auxiliary science is really 'indispensable' as Barth says. Dogmatics cannot function without its own history. (Critics of Barth ought to take the trouble to read the historical portions in *Kirchl. Dogmatik* to convince themselves that Barth is in no wise an enemy of ecclesiastical history.) The examination of the ecclesiastical history in its relation to the identity of the apostolic and the modern Church is the second task of theology as Diem sees it. The third task is connected with the practice of the Church in worship, instruction, and order. Diem names a fourth and last task of theology: the exposition of the Church's dogma. This fourth point, however, has already been involved with the first three. Here one may be permitted to remark that it is a pity that Diem has not divided these sections equally between the three volumes.

In the second chapter, Diem examines the relationship between biblical evidence and the Church. We find a further exposition of this discussion in vol. II (Dogmatics). At this point, however, Diem gives us in fifty-five pages a brilliant résumé of the problems concerning Scriptures and Apostolic Evidence, Canon and Inspiration, and finally he demonstrates a biblical way of interpretation under heading *Scriptura Scripturae Interpres*. Although his lines of thought go closely with K. Barth's, we can learn some new ideas, especially in discussion of modern literature which is considered briefly but thoroughly.

In the third and longest chapter, we find a bold outline sketch of the entire history of the Church. It is examined from the aspect of the acknowledgment of the *Kyrios Christos*. Out of this short proposition the creeds have developed in the unfolding of theological interrogations. It remains the criterion for the whole of theology and the preaching of the Gospel. 'The confession *Kyrios Christos* proclaims the ever present Lordship of Christ. Thereby it means not only His Lordship in the Church, but also His being Lord in the world. But the basis of recognition of His Lordship over the powers of the world is His Lordship in the existence and in the preaching of the Church. Therefore the interrogation regarding continuity and unity has to be asked not of the history of the world but of the history of the Church' (p. 135). Thorough and fundamental debate with Catholicism, Liberalism, and modern theologians (such as Cullmann, Ebeling, Barth, E. Wolf) make this chapter one of the most interesting pieces of present-day theological literature. This is especially true of the discussion of the relationship between state and society in Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed theology. We would particularly draw attention to the explanation of Luther's teaching of the two kingdoms, to which, despite critics, more justice is done than is otherwise usual. New and very informative is the elucidation and historical explanation of how and why Luther's preliminary views on this theory have been taken up in an altered form by subsequent theologians and have led to a separation of the two kingdoms.

Sound knowledge of neo-Protestant theology as well as of sixteenth-century Protestant orthodoxy are manifest in Diem's remarks on canonical law, on the basis and consequences of the controversy between Sohm and Harnack, and lastly in his criticism of the so-called confessional churches of the present. The book closes with a section on the unity of the Church which contains a methodical presentation of three questions: (1) the question of the *unitas*, unity of the Church (2) the question of the *unicitas*, uniqueness of the Church, and (3) the question of the *esse* and form of the Church,

which is intended to test whether a Church has by innovations separated itself from the one true Church or whether it still belongs to the one true Church.

The book is written in easily understandable and, apart from a few exceptions, good German. The division into three chapters and twenty paragraphs enables one to retain a clear view of the whole. Unfortunately there is no index or list of names. It is to be hoped that the third volume will contain an index for all three parts.

Despite numerous quotations in Greek and especially Latin, misprints are few. The typography and outward appearance of the book are attractive.

Vol. II: *Dogmatik* (Dogmatics)

In the first volume we found many exegetical and historical excurses and critical considerations of scholarly literature of all centuries. The second volume presents quite a different picture. We notice that there are no passages in brevier type, and on the whole we have the impression that this work is even more compact than the first. It is, to my knowledge, the most generous and objective presentation and critical examination of the present debate between NT and dogmatics scholars on the question of exegesis and systematics, as it is to be found in continental theological literature. This book with the title 'Dogmatics' has a subtitle: 'Its course between Historism and Existentialism'. That means that it is intended not so much to give an all-round account of dogmatics but rather to answer the question: How can theology escape from the present-day situation in which exegesis and dogmatics, both developing from quite different hypotheses, are at strife with each other? Diem takes the dilemma and the distress seriously and does not bagatellise any of the problems. He starts off with 'The End of Dogmatics in E. Troeltsch' and examines critically the possible solutions suggested in the nineteenth century. (Especially noteworthy are the two sections on Kierkegaard which will be of special interest to those who know Diem's publications on Kierkegaard.) The various answers to the question of the historical Jesus, in Catholicism, K. Barth, and R. Bultmann, are examined. Then Diem starts to unfold the idea of History as the Self-proclamation of Jesus Christ (pp. 102ff). Analysing the methods of interpretation connected with the names of Bultmann and Käsemann, Diem reaches a position which leads beyond Bultmann's alternative: isolation of the 'Kerygma' from the mythological material or acceptance of the entire biblical 'mythology'. This would designate the actual positive contribution which Diem's book yields.

The question of teaching and apostolic tradition is dealt with in

discussion of A. von Harnack and with K. Barth for support. Only then is the problem of the Canon dealt with and, in discussion with G. W. Kümmel and O. Cullmann, put in its right perspective. The right view of the freedom of theology in its subjection is expounded. Here it becomes clear that both the apparently so different ways of exegesis and of dogmatics, if we are thinking dogmatically correctly, cannot in fact be so different. Anxiety about the 'pre-understanding' of the dogmatists is now omitted. Genuine obedient hearing will overcome the tension between history and dogma. From this double aspect of 'evidence' and 'hearing' the systematic reflections of Bultmann, Ebeling and Gogarten are treated. The book concludes with three elaborated examples of exegesis on predestination, descent into hell, and ascension of Christ, and with basic thoughts on dogmatics and systematics, and on the authority of Dogma and dogmas.

Perhaps two quotations may suffice to illustrate the aim and result of Diem's work. Dogmas are 'meant to inquire of the text about its purpose', 'we have had enjoined not what the text will have to say but only about what we have to inquire of it' (p. 258). The dogmatic statement, however, which we fore-know has been 'formed in the course of the event of the ἀκοή'. This conception of ἀκοή and of the above-mentioned idea of the 'Himself-proclaiming Jesus Christ' belong closely together, being the key to dogmatic and exegetic work in their oneness. So Diem can sum up his results by stating: 'Genuine dogmatic and exegetic discussion is possible and the particular statements are comparable because of the freedom in subjection that comes forth from the ἀκοή.' 'The breaking to pieces of contemporary theological work in dogmatics and exegesis which makes theological discussion so difficult, could therefore not be called reasonable. We have, on the contrary, every reason to continue joint theological discourse and co-operation with great confidence' (p. 294).

This book gives not only a highly interesting insight in some of the most complicated fields of present day theological work but is also an effective assistance for both the scholar and the parish minister. It shows new ways and gives suggestions to an individual elaboration on the general current problems in theology. One looks forward with great expectation to the publication of the third volume, on Practical Theology.

D. Ritschl

Reasons and Faiths. By Ninian Smart. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958. Pp. lx + 211. 25s.

Despite the fact that this book is concerned with Buddhism and

Hinduism as well as Christianity it is not a book on comparative religion. It is an attempt to describe the nature of religious doctrines and concepts and so is more properly regarded as a philosophical treatment of religion. Mr Smart recognises that the primary task of the philosopher of religion is the description of the character of doctrinal schemes which involves showing what we may call their domestic and their foreign logic. It is not too much to say of this book that it is one of the finest recent attempts to do this, since it reveals a readiness to be led by the linguistic schemes themselves into the mysteries of their arguments as well as a keen eye for the differences between one part of the scheme and another. Thus Mr Smart will admit that each language-frame has its own characteristics and that it is not possible to understand religious statements except in their doctrinal context and in the context of religious activities.

He distinguishes two main strands of religious discourse: (i) the numinous and (ii) the mystical—that is to say (i) statements of the form 'God created the world' or 'Brahman is all this' and (ii) statements concerning the achievement of an unspeakable bliss. The former, whilst not exactly empirical, are very close to descriptive statements whereas the latter are expressive rather than descriptive. Yet the indescribability of the bliss is not something which is in principle impossible but is like the special degree of pain or pleasure which is 'indescribable'. This distinction, which is in itself valuable enough, is made more valuable by the recognition that certain doctrinal schemes succeed in 'weaving together' these different strands, a process which is rendered possible by certain analogies between concepts belonging to the different strands. This, however, does not mean to say that whenever you get one strand you will also get the other, as the example of the Buddhist one-strand doctrinal scheme shows.

The description of logical structure is not the whole of the philosopher's task and we inevitably raise the question of justification. Mr Smart distinguishes three modes of justification: the basic, the formal and the organic. By basic justification he means the appeal to the empirical bases of these doctrines, which in the case of the numinous strand, for example, will be those marvellous and awe-inspiring features of the world which reveal God's handiwork. Formal justification is the appeal to the formal advantages of one type of doctrine over another—e.g. the simplicity of monotheism as against the untidiness of polytheism. Organic justification takes place in a complex scheme where the description of one strand in terms of the other is justified by a process of reasoning similar to aesthetic criticism.

Mr Smart does well to treat the notion of an incarnate God separately and to count it as a different strand, but his argument here is a little difficult to follow. He sees quite clearly that there is a difference between the saint and (to use his quaint phrase) 'a candidate for divinity', and though he regards the difference as one of degree he also says that the divine man is a limiting case of purity. I am not sure that his description of what constitutes eligibility for the title 'God-Man' does justice to the way in which the incarnational element is understood in Christian doctrine if only because this has here the function of testing the spiritual significance of all other doctrine. He recognises the complexity of incarnational doctrine and draws an illuminating comparison between the Christological assertion and a complex aesthetic judgment. This reveals the importance of the evidence but it leaves untouched the question of the way in which such evidence weights the scales—and this is *the* difficult question here.

Two other topics discussed must be mentioned—the moral propositions within religious discourse and the general epistemological points. Mr Smart maintains both that moral statements are generally different from religious statements and that, because of the similarity of attitudes demanded by morality and worship, there can be a solidarity between morality and religion. In the epistemological discussion he shows how metaphysics can contain religious elements and the impropriety of the traditional contrasts between faith and reason etc.

I have noticed some misprints: p. 45, 'mere metaphysical' should be '*more* . . .'; p. 48, 'propesiton' for 'proposition'; p. 112, 'appearto' for 'appear to'; p. 158, 'principle' for 'principal'; p. 161, 'that is revealed' for 'that are revealed'.

J. Heywood Thomas

The Nature and Authority of the Bible. By Raymond Abba. James Clarke, London, 1958. Pp. xv + 333. 21s.

Ground Plan of the Bible. By Otto Weber. Lutterworth Press, London, 1959. Pp. 221. 27s. 6d.

Perhaps there never was a time when the Bible was more read than at the present, by scholars, and less read by the faithful. If this is true, then the work of the middleman who seeks to mediate between scholarship and the general reader is of quite critical importance and difficulty. It is important because those who now wish to begin a reading of the Bible for what is to all intents and purposes the first time in their adult lives need and deserve competent assistance. It is difficult because the shift in interest of much modern biblical study to thematic and typological exposition has tended to widen

the gulf between academic scholarship and the ordinary layman who is still interested in the old 'liberal' questions which everyone else seems to assume have been answered.

Each of the two books under review is claimed by the author to be an attempt at middleman's work. Mr Abba in *The Nature and Authority of the Bible* has accomplished an impressive *tour de force* in covering an enormous field in a well-informed, lucid and interesting way. He provides excellent full and up-to-date conspectuses of information on the formation and contents of the biblical literature, the history of methods of biblical exegesis, the biblical interpretation of history (which includes an interesting treatment of the place of myth and legend in this), miracles, the relation of the Old Testament and the New, the levels of truth in the Bible, and the concept of the Bible as the Word of God. Throughout Mr Abba shows himself sensitive to the kind of query and problem likely to be put by the general reader, and he is very much concerned with the relation between the Bible and human life as his two very good sections on non-resistance and marriage and divorce indicate. Inevitably this kind of work must lead to some oversimplifications; one might give as instances in this case the author's comments on poetic and prophetic inspiration (p. 110), on humanism (p. 123), and on the 'claims' of Jesus (p. 187). The section on the miracle at Cana of Galilee will not satisfy the reader who wishes to ask questions about historicity (and there are many of these in the constituency for which Mr Abba writes), and the same reader will wonder how he has managed to discuss miracles without mentioning the raising of Lazarus. There are, again inevitably, many points of detail where the scholarly-minded would wish to take issue with the author, but on the whole his treatment of his subjects is reliable and his judgment level-headed. It is a pity that he has felt it necessary to make such extensive use of quotations from the authorities which he has consulted. Some parts of the book read like pastiche. Greater confidence in his own style would have enabled him to see that he could himself have put things so much better than many of the banal comments which he quotes. One ought not to be directed, for instance, to a book in German for the remark: 'with Daniel begins the apocalyptic literature of Judaism' (p. 35). Even the ministers and theological students for whom the footnotes are said to be designed ought to be told that Otto's *Reich Gottes und Menschensohn* has been translated into English, and that the German original of his *Idea of the Holy* was entitled *Das Numinosa* will be new to many. But these are minor matters: Mr Abba has assembled his material in a fresh, clear and very useful way, making the book of particular value to teachers, students, members of extra-mural

classes, and, if the gap between academic theology and the ministry is as great as some suggest, to ministers and clergy also.

Professor Weber of Göttingen in *Ground Plan of the Bible* has written what might be described as a first reading course in the Bible, and he has done this in such a way as to lead readers to the biblical text and not away from it by contenting themselves with a paraphrase. He packs in an amazing amount, yet always with great economy and clarity, and he stimulates the reader to go and read the Bible for himself. The emphasis throughout is excellently placed for the reader he has in mind. This book, and Mr Abba's, lying to hand on either side of the Bible itself would provide the intelligent general reader or student with excellent material for an initiation into the use of Scripture. Professor Weber's sections on the Gospels are specially valuable, giving an excellent introduction to the aims and methods of the particular evangelist. The teaching of St. Paul is presented almost exclusively in terms of justification by faith, and nothing is said about 'mystical union' even when the phrase 'in Christ' is being discussed. It is no help to say that in St. Paul there is not so much mysticism as mystery—especially since the early Church used the word *mystikos* with special reference to *mysterion*. One wonders why it was decided to print this book in double columns, unless perhaps a companion to the Bible ought to appear in the style of the traditional English versions. One hopes that it is not a surrender to the modern journalistic fad that the contemporary eye cannot tolerate more than six or seven words to the line. The effect is to make the book aesthetically unattractive and irritating to the reader's eye. And this is a pity.

E. J. Tinsley

A New Quest of the Historical Jesus. By James M. Robinson. S.C.M. Press, London, 1959. Pp. 128. 9s. 6d.

Dr James M. Robinson, who is Associate Professor of Theology and New Testament at the Southern California School of Theology, has provided us with a book which is notable not only for its careful scholarship but also for getting to grips with some of the central problems of contemporary theology and New Testament study.

As Dr Robinson sees it, the most significant development in post-war theology has been the emergence of the Bultmannian position. We are told that Bultmann's 'monumental *Theology of the New Testament* provided the theological synthesis of the day, as did Barth's *Romans* a generation ago, and Harnack's *What is Christianity?* at the turn of the century'. But already we are entering a post-Bultmannian phase, characterised by the critical re-assessment of

Bultmann's own views by some of his leading pupils. Central in this new approach is the problem of the historical Jesus.

Everyone knows that in the nineteenth century theologians devoted much of their energies to a quest for the historical Jesus. Their aim was to strip away mythological and theological accretions, and to uncover what they supposed to be the underlying 'reality'—the simple Jesus of history. Their quest ended in failure, and the point of view which they represented has today fallen into disrepute. Bultmann himself played a considerable part in discrediting the older quest. 'His form-critical research tended to confirm the view that such a quest is impossible, and his existential theology carried through the thesis that such a quest is illegitimate.'

But does this mean that we need concentrate only on the kerygma, and that we can afford to neglect questions of historical factuality? Dr Robinson quotes one of Bultmann's younger German followers as arguing that 'something *can* be known about the historical Jesus, and that we must concern ourselves with working it out, if we do not wish ultimately to find ourselves committed to a mythological Lord'. This is indeed a crucial point upon which Dr Robinson has seized.

In the course of his book, he shows in detail the impossibility and the illegitimacy of the original quest. It mistook the true character of the Gospel records, and it worked with an outmoded conception of history. The new quest, which is necessary if we are not to be content with a mythical Lord, cannot be a revival of the old one. It must recognise the kerygmatic character of the Gospels and it must work with modern ideas of history as the disclosure of possibilities of existence. 'Hence the purpose of a new quest of the historical Jesus would be to test the validity of the kerygma's identification of *its* understanding of existence with *Jesus*' existence.'

From this brief survey it will be clear that the author is breaking new and difficult ground, and this well justifies the claim that he makes for his work—that it is 'a contribution to basic thought about the unfulfilled task of New Testament scholarship'.

JOHN MACQUARRIE

Religious Freedom in Spain. By J. D. HUGHEY, Jr. Carey Kingsgate Press, London, 1955. 15s.

THIS is an admirable book, well-written, moderate and very well documented. The book begins by reference to the creation of Catholic Spain in the long struggle with the Moors: the author shows that it was here that the Spanish Catholic temper with its intense fervour, its rigidity and its intolerance was forged. He quotes a seventeenth-century Spanish scholar: 'Spain, evangeliser of half

the planet; Spain, hammer of heretics, light of Trent, sword of Rome, cradle of Saint Ignatius—this is our greatness and our glory: we have no other.' Therefore, Spanish patriotism and Spanish Catholicism are inextricable. Dr Hughey—who is Professor of Practical Theology at the Baptist Theological Seminary, Ruschlikon-Zürich, and who spent the years 1947 to 1950 in Spain—describes the history (from the Reformation to the present day) of Protestantism in Spain seen through the perspective of the few relaxations of intolerance and its reassertion. He outlines the essential historical detail with full references in notes and makes his points most effectively concerning the varying state of religious freedom in Spain. Dr Hughey shows that to the intense nationalism of the Spaniard, Protestantism has a foreign and therefore undesirable air whereas Catholic unity is seen as the ground and means of Spain's identity as a nation. For the Spaniard Protestantism is alien, un-Spanish, culturally and politically divisive and destructive. The author quotes a writer in *Ecclesia*, a journal of Catholic Action: 'Millions of Spaniards have never known a Protestant, and have no idea what it means to be one.' Nevertheless, Dr Hughey estimates that there are ten thousand communicant Protestants in Spain, and these—with their adherents—are clearly and openly discriminated against in spite of the fact that even Roman Catholics elsewhere have made some protest against the Spanish habit of assuming that heretics have no rights. The Pope has said nothing so far to alleviate the situation, and further, Dr Hughey claims that nothing will improve in the attitude to Protestants so long as the present régime lasts. In reading this most useful book two points suggest themselves to this reviewer, that Protestantism only took effective root in Spain in the early nineteenth century through Presbyterian and, later, Baptist influence, supported by ministers and funds from abroad: and that the Republican Government prior to the civil war, even though it separated Church and State, was so anti-clerical, that Protestants hardly benefited by it (and the victory of General Franco's Catholic Crusade has certainly made the situation of Protestants well-nigh intolerable). Dr Hughey has given us a book which is excellently produced, based on thorough research (evident in the footnotes), and which, while it is concerned with the question of religious freedom—a Baptist fundamentum—is also a history of Protestantism in Spain, a history made significant and alive by being interpreted in terms of freedom within the absolutist society which is Spain.

Basil Hall

Israel and the Aramaeans of Damascus. By MERRILL F. UNGER. James Clarke & Co. (an Evangelical Theological Society publication), London, 1957. Pp. 189. 21s.

THE author of this book is Professor of Old Testament at Dallas Theological Seminary, Texas, and the book is a revision of the author's dissertation toward the degree of Doctor of Theology at Johns Hopkins University.

The book seeks to present the history of Damascus from the earliest period down to the end of the eighth century B.C. and its bearing upon the destiny of Judah and Israel. The author has made a careful study of this period, and is well acquainted with recent critical and archaeological work. He makes a good use of the achievements of modern scholarship to illuminate and solve, as far as possible, the various problems concerning the history of Damascus and Israel. Thus the author makes a number of suggestions which, although not necessarily new, are presented in an interesting manner. So he argues, e.g., that 1 Kings 20.34 can scarcely refer to Ahab's father Omri, and that the term 'father' may be taken in the sense of 'predecessor' (p. 61).

He also points out that there is no evidence that Omri was actually a tributary to Benhadad I (p. 64). Similarly he suggests that there is no sufficient reason to deny the historicity of 2 Kings 14.28 in spite of 'the decided tendency of critical opinion'. The author thinks that it is very likely that actually Jeroboam II not only exacted tribute from, but also annexed Damascus and parts of Hamath (p. 92).

The book is well annotated and we are indebted to the author for the gathering of much valuable material, and for the clear presentation of it. ARNOLD ANDERSON

Calvin: Commentaries. Edited by JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN. S.C.M. Press, London (Library of Christian Classics, vol. 23), 1958. 35s.

THE twenty-third volume of this notable series is an important addition. From the thirty-three volumes of *Corpus Reformatorum* which contain Calvin's Commentaries, it would be easy to make a selection which would be pretty good and adequate for most purposes. The task of making a really first-class selection demands not just a little more trouble, but a quite disproportionately greater amount of work, care and critical judgment. It is this much greater degree of labour that has gone to the compiling of the present volume. The editor writes an Introduction on 'Calvin as Biblical Commentator' which is more ambitious than the title indicates, and more things are well said in section III, 'Calvin as Renaissance

Humanist', than the heading would lead the reader to expect. For example, of Calvin's view of scriptural authority, the writer's judgment is that 'the ground of the authority of the Bible for Calvin was not inerrancy, but God who speaks by it'. He strongly emphasises Calvin's position as 'interpreter for the suffering Church': Calvin 'never fails to see Christian life as *sub specie crucis*'; and the persecutions of the prophets, the trials of the early Christians and the present afflictions of the Church are closely linked with one another and also with the crucifixion of Christ Himself.

Calvin is allowed to introduce himself in three documents which are usefully brought together. These are the well-known Preface to his Commentary on the Psalms, which historians have repeatedly ransacked for the autobiographical material it contains; the Preface to Olivétan's New Testament, which shows Calvin, shortly after his conversion, giving expression to his new-found faith; and the letter affixed to his Commentary on Romans, in which Calvin throws some light on the principles which guide him in exegetical work.

The explanatory notes provided by the editor about persons living and dead, movements past and present, historical events and so on, that are mentioned in the Commentaries, are unusually full and competent. They will certainly be helpful to the student, and will greatly add to the usefulness of the book.

As for the translation itself, it was thought better, despite the existence of several other English translations, to make a new one. The decision has justified itself. Calvin is difficult to translate. Among other reasons, it is not easy to know how best to render the frequent variations of style that occur. For a passage of sustained dignity is often enlivened by a very colloquial phrase or homely illustration, and the exalted tones of the Christian ambassador can suddenly give way to the pungent abuse of the sixteenth-century controversialist. The translation given here is both fresh and accurate.

When the amount of material is so large, the principle of selection and the method of arrangement are important. For unless care is taken, the result is no more than an anthology. The present volume is much better than this. Even so, it is difficult for such a work to please everyone entirely. The reason for this is not so much that people have varying tastes, but even more that there are so many different tests to which a selection may be subjected, and most of them may be quite different from the principle employed by the compiler. If such tests are applied, there is a risk that some injustice may be done; but how else is a selection to be assessed? If we venture to apply three tests, the results are at least interesting. First, comprehensiveness. The method adopted for presenting what the Commentaries have to say is the familiar one of *loci*

theologici. There are nine heads: the Bible, the Knowledge of God, Jesus Christ, the Christian Life, Faith, Providence, Election and Predestination, Ethics and the Common Life, and the Church. This would not perhaps be everyone's choice. It is notable that no section or even sub-section is devoted to the Sacraments or to the Last Things. We ought perhaps to conclude that it is not the editor's intention to deal with all the major points necessarily included in a theological system.

Second, arrangement. For this purpose, a closer look may be taken at one of the sections. Most of these have sub-headings. In the case of that devoted to Jesus Christ, these are: the Mediator, the Person of Christ, Ascension, Christ the King and the Kingdom of Christ. The list is a little surprising—there is no sub-section dealing with the crucifixion or with the work of Christ. One supposes that the explanation offered would be in the terms stated by the editor in his Introduction, that 'Christ's divinity meant to Calvin above all that He, with the Father, was the source of the Christian life and its blessings'. Accordingly, salvation is dealt with in a sub-section under 'The Christian Life', and what is said about the Cross appears in conjunction with the Christian life in a sub-section entitled 'The Cross and Persecution'. This is not altogether convincing. It was the tendency of Schleiermacher and Ritschl to say very little about Christ's person and work apart from what can be read off from the experience of the individual Christian and the Christian community. But if it is under the influence of these theologians that the arrangement is here made, it is doubtful whether it is appropriate to Calvin's thought. The editor says that Calvin's 'eloquent comments on the events of Christ's life and death as recorded in the Gospels are clearly intended to show the Christians that they are suffering after their King and participating in His life'. This awareness of the contemporary situation as influencing Calvin is one of the valuable insights of this selection. But to the present writer, it seems to go much too far to link the Cross so closely and (so far as methodology is concerned) exclusively with the contemporary suffering of the Church in Calvin's day. (Cf. what is said about predestination: 'Calvin's doctrine of predestination was inspired by the need of the Protestant churches for a knowledge of the continuity between the gospel which they believed and for which they suffered, and the promises of God made from the beginning and through the ages.') Must it not be said that sociological circumstances are being credited with a larger influence upon Calvin than we have any right or ground to suppose? We may perhaps conclude that the editor's aim is not to present systematically even the outline of Calvin's system.

Third, the passages cited. The Fourth Gospel easily takes first place in frequency of citation. Nor is the justice of this likely to be disputed. Calvin himself says 'this Gospel is a key to open the door for understanding the rest'. Passages on the Psalms, in view of the long and manifestly loving work Calvin devoted to them (as Arthur Golding says in the preface to the first English translation to be made: 'next untoo his Institutes, this presente volume beareth the Bel'), are cited comparatively seldom. In expounding 'The Person of Christ', twelve passages are cited, no fewer than ten from the Fourth Gospel. This perhaps represents fairly enough Calvin's own view as it appears in the introduction to his Commentary: 'the three (synoptics) exhibit His body, if we may be permitted to use the expression, but John exhibits His soul'. But more surprising is the fact that for expounding 'The Mediator', ten passages are cited, of which three are from Hebrews and seven from books of the Old Testament. Too much stress should not be placed on this preponderance of Old Testament quotation, for Calvin, while intolerant (even in the case of Augustine, from whom he borrows so much support) of spiritual or allegorical exegesis, always himself reads the Old Testament through the medium of the New. Yet, one asks, what about Calvin's commentary on Matt. 11.27 (from the 'Harmony'), or on Gal. 3.19f, or Rom. 8.1? We should from all this draw the conclusion that the editor has not wanted to offer a selection which is evenly representative in all sections of the whole range of the Commentaries. And this decision is no doubt right.

The fact is that the intention of the work is to focus attention on the Commentaries themselves, and the aim is to give a selection which will induce the reader to turn readily and expectantly to Calvin for illuminating exegesis of passages of Scripture. The editor himself says: 'Our primary interest has been to present Calvin as biblical commentator.' The book succeeds very well in doing this.

J. K. S. Reid

A Shorter Commentary on Romans. By Karl Barth, translated by D. H. van Daalen from the German edition of 1956. S.C.M. Press, London, 1959. Pp. 188. 15s.

The first edition of Karl Barth's *Römerbrief* (1917) was an epoch-making event. It was received by some with shocked amazement and by others with enthusiastic admiration. Since the publication of the *Römerbrief*, however, Barth has confessed that he has changed his viewpoint in some respects. In his *Kirchliche Dogmatik* (vol. II, part 1, 716f) he admits that his earlier work was marred by a good deal of exaggeration and in particular that it was too much of a reaction against the liberal protestantism of the late nineteenth

century. He has to a large extent renounced the ideas of time, eternity and history of his earlier commentary (*Dogmatics*, vol. I, part 1, ix f; vol. I, part 2, 50).

It was therefore with interest that this new book on the Epistle entitled *A Shorter Commentary on Romans* was read to see how it reflected the new standpoint. It must first be stated that this is a completely new exposition of Romans: it is not an extract from the older book. Barth still claims that in this book he is letting Paul speak for himself. And I think that he has achieved this purpose more faithfully in the present commentary than in the earlier work. The value of the *Römerbrief* was to be found rather in what it revealed of Barth than as an exposition of the thought of St. Paul. This new book originated in a course of extra-mural lectures delivered at Basel during the winter of 1940-1 and published in German in 1956.

In *A Shorter Commentary* there is not so much philosophy evident as in the older book. Yet, as he says in the Introduction, 'No interpreter can escape from the qualification: "as I understand him", and that naturally applies to me too'. Barth's own epistemological attitude reveals itself in his insistence that the knower is wholly passive, wholly conditioned and possessed by the known in revelation. It is not our faith that matters, but the object of our faith; it is not human love that possesses any value but God's love; we do not even need to ask how it is possible from our side to have peace with God (pp. 52, 59, 60). In this case the usual forms of Christian apologetic are not only worthless, but perverse. They try to force a way to the knowledge of God which God has barred. It is, of course, as the prophet of God's transcendence pushed to the fullest extreme that Barth has come as the challenging note of interrogation to the Christian theology of our day. Nevertheless I was glad to see that in *A Shorter Commentary* he admits that a 'bare sovereignty would indeed not distinguish the electing God from a tyrannical demon' (p. 116). This seems better than his earlier comment on Rom. 9.16 when he described God as 'the King, the Monarch, the Despot'.

In the earlier exposition of Rom. 1 Barth did not question the possibility of a knowledge of God in creation. In *A Shorter Commentary* he seems to repudiate all natural theology. This is in line with his work *Natural Theology* in which his controversy with Bounner is recorded. The religion of the Gentiles, he says, cannot possibly build a bridge to the knowledge of the living God. Human religion must be radically distinguished from belief in God's revelation; it is indeed the object of God's wrath (p. 19). There are therefore no human avenues of approach to God. The gulf which

lies between God and man is deepened by the fact that man is fallen man and completely at a loss ethically. He is subject to God's wrath not because of his wickedness or ignorance, but because of his wisdom, because of the highest levels of his humanity (p. 30). However, the starting point is no longer the *opposition* between God and man with Jesus Christ as the bridge between the two, but Jesus Christ Himself as the point at which the two have become one. This is the theme of the lecture entitled 'The Gospel as Man's Reconciliation with God'.

There is so much more on which a reviewer could comment—Barth's attitude to history and the Resurrection; his exegesis of certain passages in the later chapters of Romans and the ethical problems which emerge in connexion with them. But enough has been said to show that Barth is still seeking to do greater justice to the text of the Epistle to the Romans; he even confesses that what is said in this book has to some extent already been superseded elsewhere. It is this constant growth in theological understanding that makes Barth so difficult to interpret with fairness—and so exciting.

E. Kenneth Lee

The Letter to the Romans. A Commentary. By Emil Brunner, translation based on one by H. A. Kennedy from the German edition of 1956. Lutterworth Press, London, 1959. Pp. 168. 21s.

Brunner exaggerates when he says in the Introduction (p. 11) to this Commentary that 'Paul has supplied the material and pointed the way for the whole of Christian theology and all Christian thought with these sixteen chapters'. That can hardly be said of an Epistle in which the Holy Communion, the Church, the Nature of Christ and his future Advent receive no definite treatment. The Epistle is rather a *Tract for the Times*. Professor Klausner has described the Graeco-Roman society in the first century A.D. as a world decaying for lack of God and social morality. And in this Epistle Paul presents the claims of Christianity against such a background. In view of the fact that so much in the modern world reflects a similar situation it is no coincidence that two of the greatest living theologians should have published at the same time expositions of this Epistle in English. Brunner's Commentary is an outstanding exposition of Pauline thought. The pages sparkle with passages which reveal deep theological insight and evangelical fervour.

Paul's argument in the first part of the Epistle is summed up in the following way: 'In Jesus Christ the stream of mankind's history as a whole has been guided into a new channel. Previously, and apart from Him, the stream of generations rolls ceaselessly towards a terrible end of destruction—the great pictures of the judgment of

the world with their flow of human bodies being drawn into the abyss appear before our view. Jesus Christ orders a halt to this stream of death. He alters its course; the stream of death becomes the stream of life; everything that flows into its current is being carried towards the glorious goal of eternal life' (p. 44). And all this, says Brunner, is not just 'a beautiful theory, but an experience tried in the fiery trial of suffering and struggle' (p. 81).

Brunner's understanding of human nature and sin is an interesting one. He denies that man can be spoken of as totally depraved. 'Man cannot excuse himself by pleading that he could not know God prior to his revelation in Jesus Christ; he could very well know him, namely his majesty as Creator and therefore also the fact that he belongs to God' (p. 171). Nor does he accept the Reformers' description of the good which remains in him as a 'vestige' of the image of God. 'Man either says Yes to God or No.' Since the fall of Adam a doom of death lies over mankind, over the whole of history. But though Paul speaks so much about Adam, he is not interested in the physical hereditary transmission of sin. It is not 'this dark, fatal power as such that the Apostle calls sin, but one's own self-responsible decision against God's command' (p. 45). Man is made in such a way that he must always be obedient; the question only is: obedient to whom? Either he obeys God, or he obeys sin. Man in sin is the 'slave of sin'; freedom from sin involves obedience to God and when this happens he becomes the 'slave of righteousness'. But the freedom which is constraint to God is life unconditional, simply life, eternal life. This freedom can be found only through faith in Jesus Christ.

In an Appendix to the Commentary, Brunner discusses some of the leading ideas of Paul. The purpose of this is twofold: it is meant to show the leading ideas of Paul in the Letter to the Romans in their own context and in the context of the whole of Pauline teaching; it is also meant to serve as a bridge between the idiom and thought of Paul to the problems of our own day. We have thus a very useful summary of Pauline doctrine. It is significant, however, that among the many subjects discussed, there is no essay on the Cross. This is no doubt due to the fact that Brunner regards the truth of the crucifixion to lie not in the historical fact, but in its existential dimensions. History is the façade or mask behind which true meaning is concealed. Jesus Christ is not for us, in faith, a 'historical' character, but alive and present. 'Even His death and resurrection are for us through faith a living present—not in the manner of a man of the past who by a vividly historical presentation becomes "present" for us, but really and effectually present as God is present to us' (p. 149). And it is the resurrection that enables

this to be so. For this reason the entire message of Paul, he says, might almost be said to be the message of the resurrection (p. 131).

This is a book which every minister should read not only because of the quality of its exposition of the Epistle, but also because it is an excellent demonstration of how theology and evangelism can enrich one another. E. KENNETH LEE

Ephesians and Colossians. By E. K. SIMPSON and F. F. BRUCE. W. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich. $4.00.

Galatians and Philippians. By KENNETH GRAYSTON. Epworth Press, London. 9s. 6d.

The Pastoral Epistles. By DONALD GUTHRIE. Tyndale Press, London. 9s. 6d.

The Letter to the Hebrews. By JOHANNES SCHNEIDER. W. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich. $2.50.

The Gospel and the Church in the Pagan World. By W. GORDON ROBINSON. Independent Press, London. 12s. 6d.

THERE is a steady, rich stream of Commentaries large and small on New Testament books. The preacher has no excuse for want of material. The best kind of preaching is a combination of the expository and the doctrinal. But that sort of preaching can be very dull and remote, if there has not been vigorous and level study of the kind which is best assisted by a reliable commentary. Ministers beginning their lifework should solemnly vow to make a continuing habit throughout the years of the study of one book of the Bible after another with the best available commentary. This is worth more than a great deal of varied and desultory reading, and it is most relevant to effective evangelism.

The volume on *Ephesians and Colossians* is the seventh in the New International Commentary. It is interesting and encouraging to find the work on Ephesians done so well by a layman who is a thorough scholar. Mr Simpson, now in the neighbourhood of eighty years of age, has lived the life of a private scholar, and has already given us a valuable commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, based on the Greek text. In this book the introduction of five pages is too short to take account of all the problems of the epistle. Those who desire to relate the epistle more closely to our time and the contemporary Church should supplement and sometimes connect Mr Simpson's book by Dr John A. Mackay's book on Ephesians, *God's Order.*

Mr Simpson hoped to do Colossians also, but that proved impossible, and a fine substitute was found in Professor F. F. Bruce now of Manchester. He has already done Acts in this series, and is working on Hebrews. Professor Bruce is becoming a voluminous writer,

but his output lacks that unevenness which is often the sign of copious production. His exposition is trustworthy and sane. He brings out in moving terms the vast theme of 'the cosmic Christ' which is Paul's answer to the Colossian heresy. Lightfoot's great commentaries are not out-of-date, but they are almost unobtainable, and new work is constantly needed.

Mr Grayston, who is tutor in New Testament studies at Didsbury College, Bristol, has made a remarkable use of his available space, in the treatment of epistles so different from each other as Galatians and Philippians. The purpose of the series, of which this is the fourth to appear, is to help those who can scarcely tackle the more advanced works, is well served by this compact and suggestive book. Based on the Revised Version, with many cross references to A.V. and R.S.V., and copious references to many parts of Scripture, it follows a threefold treatment of the text—paragraph by paragraph summary, detailed exegetical comments, and special exposition of passages which every preacher must wish to deal with.

Mr Guthrie, who is tutor in New Testament studies at the London Bible College, has in mind a commentary 'which avoids the extremes of being unduly technical or unhelpfully brief'. The long introduction—forty-two pages out of the total 228—is to be welcomed, for several reasons and especially because of the significance of these epistles for the Christian Ministry. The difficulties for the Pauline authorship are recognised, 'but there are more which make it impossible', and he believes that these epistles are 'directed to meet the contemporary situation in Paul's closing days'. The linguistic arguments by which P. N. Harrison sought to deny the authenticity of the epistles are vigorously contested in a long Appendix. The exposition of the text bears the stamp of the conservative point of view from which the book is written, but it has good quality and clear insight.

Dr Schneider, a Baptist, turned from political science to theology, studied under Deissmann, and is now Dean of the Theological Faculty in Berlin University. He regards 'Hebrews', like 'Revelation', as a tract for the times, written to discouraged Christians; and he is content to regard its authorship as 'impossible to ascertain with certainty'. Any preacher should be grateful for this straightforward paragraph by paragraph exposition. The two-page Appendix on 'the Picture of Christ in Hebrews' is an excellent survey. This book should be balanced by Professor Nanson's more incisive study which is probably the best treatment of this controversial epistle which has appeared for many years.

The last book on the list is not a commentary in the strict sense. Dr Gordon Robinson, Principal of Lancashire Independent

College, has made '1 Corinthians' most relevant to our time by his manner of treatment of it. The title of his book is a concise and accurate summary of what the epistle is all about; and the general reader will have no difficulty in using it. He divides the epistles into four main sections, each with a single theme—the Church and its fellowship, the Church and its problems, the Church and its Worship, Life in the setting of Eternity. A very full paraphrase of each section is followed by detailed exposition; and the plan works most successfully. Sermons do not lie on the surface for the lifting, but for the imaginative reader it is a gold mine. GEORGE S. GUNN

Jesus' Promise to the Nations. By J. JEREMIAS (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 24) S.C.M. Press. Pp. 84. 7s. 6d.

WE are grateful to Dr S. H. Hooke for this translation of *Jesu Verheissung für die Völker* (1956). A review of the French version was contributed to the June 1958 number of this *Journal* by Dr R. McL. Wilson, and it only remains to endorse his commendation of this outstanding study by the eminent Göttingen professor.

A. J. B. HIGGINS

The Story of the Church. By A. M. RENWICK. I.V.F., London, 1958. Pp. 222. 6s. 6d. (paper 4s. 6d.).

To present a bird's-eye view of the whole field of Church History, in a text running to only 206 small pages, is no mean achievement; and Professor Renwick will earn the gratitude, not only of the beginner who wishes to find his bearings, but also of others seeking to refresh their memory or to renew their sense of direction. He has taken pains to provide an objective record, cutting down interpretative comment to a minimum, and cramming together as many facts as the brief limits of his space will allow. Writing from a conservative Evangelical standpoint, he displays a wide capacity for sympathetic understanding, and his book is on the whole remarkably well balanced. It begins at Pentecost and ends in 1955.

In such an undertaking, drastic selection of material is inevitable. It is perhaps unfair to criticise, since every reader will favour his individual choice. Personally, I should have liked to see some mention of Apollinaris in the brief paragraph which describes the second Ecumenical Council; some account of the Greek Church and Empire in the two pages devoted to the Crusades; and at least the name of William Temple in a chapter on the Twentieth Century which does name Billy Graham. This cult of brevity has sometimes been carried to extremes. The story of St. Francis may be too well known to deserve repetition; but it is disappointing to be told only that he was 'saintly' and that his first followers practised

poverty in imitation of Christ. Other great figures are described in equally meagre terms; and it might have been better to select even more drastically, and to bestow a fuller treatment on the selection made. However, Professor Renwick has valiantly attempted to include some mention, however brief, of a great variety of characters and events. If the narrative which results is sometimes no more than a stark outline, that defect is due to the confined amount of space at his disposal.

A more serious criticism is concerned with the sources on which that narrative is based. For the Reformation era and all that follows, the book is a reliable guide. But for the ancient and medieval periods, Professor Renwick seems to have depended too much on authorities which are now out of date, and consequently his statements are sometimes open to question. Thus, the 'martyrs of Madaura', whom he places in the second century, were almost certainly Donatist hooligans who perished in the fourth. Again, the relations of Celtic Christianity with the Roman See were by no means so simple or so pugnacious as he would have us believe. And the figure of 600,000, given by Fulcher of Chartres for the total of those who went on the first Crusade, would be regarded as a gross exaggeration by any modern historian. However, these are points of detail, and the general picture presented in the book remains uniformly clear and good. The chapters on the Reformation are particularly valuable; that on the Counter-Reformation is scarcely adequate, and a little unfair.

It is natural to compare this book with similar outlines which already exist. In 1922 D. C. Somervell produced *A Short History of Our Religion*, chiefly for the benefit of divinity teachers in schools. The section dealing with the Christian dispensation is approximately equal in length to Professor Renwick's book. Being less crowded, it is more readable; it covers some ground omitted by Professor Renwick, in the peripheral regions of politics and literature; but for purely religious history, it provides much less wealth of information. Another outline, written from a very different viewpoint, but of about the same length, is provided by the brilliant essay on *Christianity* written by Edwyn Bevan for the Home University Library in 1932. This contains a great deal of highly stimulating comment, but again, much less in the way of detailed fact.

Professor Renwick's work appears in a series of I.V.F. Pocket Books. It has already been available in paper covers, and now comes out in an attractive cloth binding. The type is excellent, and I have only noticed one misprint, at the bottom of page 57. There is a useful index, and a brief bibliography which, for no

apparent reason, omits the third volume of F. F. Bruce's trilogy on the early history of the Church. Scottish readers will be pleased to find that their country has seven entries in a list of twenty-seven 'Books on Special Periods'. G. S. M. WALKER

Conflict and Agreement in the Church. Volume One: Order and Disorder. By T. F. TORRANCE. London: Lutterworth Press, 1959. Pp. 332. 45s.

IN the ecumenical conversation of recent years Professor T. F. Torrance has played a notable part. He is said greatly to have influenced the whole course of the Lund Conference when the Faith and Order Movement turned from its former method of comparative ecclesiology to a fresh Christological approach. He has been a prominent representative of the Church of Scotland in the Presbyterian-Anglican conversations; and it is sometimes said that the report of those conversations was the first application to an actual situation of the new insights gained at Lund. It is thus important that we should have ready access to the statements of his views.

We therefore welcome this volume, the first of two, into which Dr Torrance has gathered his contributions. Many of them have already been published in journals, eight of them indeed in this Journal. There are, however, also some addresses now published for the first time, and brief introductions to the sections. The first part of this volume concerns discussions with Churches; the second, problems of Faith and Order. The writer explains that his main theological interest continues to be in the field of Christology and Soteriology, and these volumes contain the *parerga* to that task.

This is perhaps most clearly seen if we begin with the second part of the volume. Here we have a review of two of the preparatory volumes for Amsterdam, an article on 'Where do we go from Lund?', a lecture on 'The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church', material prepared for Evanston, and finally an article and an address arising out of Evanston. It is in this part of the book that we see the main thesis most clearly; this is that the doctrine of the Church, which has been thrust by the Ecumenical Movement into a relatively excessive prominence, cannot be understood until we have gone more deeply into the second member of the Creed, faith in Jesus Christ. It is not merely in Dr Torrance's activities but in the proper nature of things that the doctrine of the Church is a *parergon*. But what does this involve? What was the new insight at Lund? It is not simply that our approach to Christian truth should be Christian (which is obvious, whether or not it is always achieved), but that it should be Christological, indeed one might

say Chalcedonian. There is here a manifest and acknowledged debt to Karl Barth, to whom the volume is dedicated.

This approach means that the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in Christ provides an analogy which throws light on other problems such as the Church, the Eucharist, the inspiration of Scripture and so on. It is clear that this may often provide a useful way of speaking for theologians, as when, to take an old example, the charge is brought against the doctrine of transubstantiation that it is monophysite. Its application to the Church is thus described (p. 203): 'The analogy runs not "as God and Man are related in Christ so the divine and human are related in the Church", but rather "as God and Man are related in Christ so Christ and the Church are related".'

We may now consider the objections that are often brought against this procedure. The most serious is that the humanity of Christ has sinlessness which is lacking in the other entities with which it is compared, in this case the Church. Thus the analogy clearly has its limitations, but the author really admits this by saying that there is an analogical unlikeness as well as likeness (p. 248). He also says that all this needs to be stated dynamically (ibid.), thus meeting a charge that is sometimes made that these categories are too static. He also says that the application of this analogy to the doctrine of the Church has yet to be worked out fully (p. 246).

All this is of course related to the conception of the Church as the Body of Christ, of which Professor Torrance, like many others, observes that this 'is no mere figure of speech but describes an ontological reality' (p. 248). This common antithesis is misleading. Those who call this concept figurative or metaphorical will be equally ready to call it analogical. They do not mean that the Church is a 'body' of Christians in the sense in which some people speak of 'the Baptist body' or 'the Methodist body'; if this view were held, it would need to be attacked, but we do not know who holds it. Those who speak of metaphor certainly assert an ontological reality but they insist that the term 'body' describes it in metaphorical, that is, in analogical, terms.

So long, therefore as Professor Torrance's warnings about the limitations of analogy are observed, the method is sound and fruitful, but it does not of course solve the problems, for in any given application of it the question arises afresh whether in this particular case the similarity or the dissimilarity is the more important factor. It is thus a method of discovery rather than proof.

A common criticism of this Christological approach is that too little attention is paid to the Holy Spirit. This volume has frequent

references to the Spirit, but very little about His characteristic work of applying salvation to the heart of the believer.

Another objection sometimes heard is that it exaggerates the difference between the periods before and after Lund. After all the Faith and Order Movement before Lund did not neglect the Bible, and comparative ecclesiology was not undertaken for its own sake, but in an attempt to discover the truth. On the other hand, the new method of common biblical and theological study is not being undertaken by irresponsible theologians, but by theologians deeply rooted in particular ecclesiastical traditions. The contrast between the two methods is thus not absolute. It is to be hoped that the Commission on 'Tradition and Traditions' will throw light on this problem. It is widely hoped that the new method itself may be fruitful in many other Commissions, notably that on 'Christ and the Church', of which Professor Torrance is himself a member. But it must not be so emphasised as to appear to undervalue the work done before Lund.

The major criticism which we should bring is on the ground of style. Theology is of course entitled to its technical vocabulary, and parts of it can never be easy, but Professor Torrance pays little regard to the convenience of the reader, not to mention the hearer. The sentences are laden with technical jargon (some of it relatively uncommon, such as the phrase *in solidum*), and are closely packed with argument. It is often assumed that the reader understands the Christological approach, and the argument proceeds by way of allusion to it. Thus the most important item in the book is probably the lecture on 'The Atonement and the Oneness of the Church', which expounds it more systematically and shows more clearly the vital link between ecclesiology, Christology and soteriology.

With this in mind, we can more briefly consider the first part of the volume, about discussions with other Churches. The Anglicans are dealt with by reviews of *The Apostolic Ministry*, *Catholicity*, *The Fulness of Christ*, and *Problems of Reunion*. The section is somewhat dominated by the first of these reviews, written in 1948, in which the Christological approach already appears. The sharp critique of the position of many High Anglicans should suffice to clear the author, if any such defence is needed, of any facile capitulation to the Anglicans in the conversations. Then come the Presbyterians, who are discussed in an address given at a meeting of the World Presbyterian Alliance. Presbyterian-Anglican relations receive two addresses and an article, from which we learn exactly what is meant by 'bishops-in-presbytery'. The argument moves at a far deeper level than many opponents of these proposals (and possibly some supporters) have realised. The theological argument is most

weighty. But here the difficulty of style already mentioned has serious consequences. Professor Torrance needs to start further back; he gives an impression of assuming that his readers both understand and support his general position and so he hastens to his conclusions without expounding it with the simple clarity which it demands. If he had asked himself more often what is the point of all this when it is reduced to its simplest possible terms, the Church of Scotland (if an outsider may presume to hazard a comment) might have been more readily convinced.

The first part of the volume also contains a discussion with Romans about the new Mariological dogma of the Assumption, which is treated in a review and then in a lengthy correspondence with the Rev. James Quinn, S.J. The letters from both writers are printed in narrow columns as though to remind us of their origin. Professor Torrance rightly remarks that it would be very difficult to find a newspaper willing to allot so much space to a discussion of this kind as *The Scotsman*. The letters illustrate the same kind of Christological critique.

There are not many theologians whose occasional writings are worth collecting in this way; yet even for readers of this Journal, whose readers have seen more of the material than anyone else, it is a great convenience to have it all gathered into one place; and Professor Torrance's contribution is of such outstanding importance, both because of his actual influence on the course of events and because of its intrinsic excellence and stimulating quality, that in this case it is fully justified. We look forward to the second volume, which is to be entitled *Ministry and Sacraments*.

On p. 44 a Greek word is wrongly spelt. On p. 70 'consensus' would be better than 'concensus'. On p. 94 something seems to have gone wrong with the opening sentence of the paragraph beginning 'This means—'. On p. 311, some will deplore the surrender to the growing custom of using 'contact' as a verb. On p. 321 there is a mistake in the order of Schleiermacher's initials.

A. Raymond George

The Cure for Human Troubles. By W. Montgomery Watt. S.P.C.K., London, 1959. Pp. 159. 15s.

The Wonder of the Christian Gospel. By John Mackintosh Shaw. Lutterworth Press, London, 1959. Pp. 143. 12s. 6d.

In the first of these volumes a noted Islamic scholar has made a scholarly and painstaking attempt 'to translate into terms of modern thought the faith once for all delivered to the saints'. It might be described as an essay in the Re-mythologising of the New Testament, for the particular terms of modern thought which Dr Watt

chooses are those of C. G. Jung. The source of 'our troubles' is the appearance of self-consciousness in man, with resultant estrangement from his fellows and inner disintegration, which is neurosis. ('Neurosis' is used as a bad word, a state worse than selfishness and sin. Jung's insight into the positive value of a neurosis is neglected.) The words and actions of Jesus were a revival of 'archetypes of the collective unconscious'. 'Jesus was deliberately moulding his life and activity so that it exhibited certain archetypes, or rather a synthesis of archetypal patterns.' This synthesis led to 'the release of libidinal energy which brought about the expansion of the Christian Church'.

Short quotations cannot do justice to painstaking exposition: Dr Watt is concerned to show that his translation is equivalent to traditional formulations. Yet question-marks bristle. Can imminent psychological terms bear the weight of biblical truth? If archetypes are what matter, why should the powerful archetype of the *anima*, as expressed in Mariolatry, continue to be excluded from our religion? (Is this not natural religion?) Does Christian truth really become more accessible to modern men when stated not in the traditional mythology, but in the mythology (*pace* Dr Watt) of C. G. Jung?

Yet criticisms must be tempered. If Dr Watt has failed, he has failed in a notable undertaking, and his boldness is to be applauded. Yet perhaps his very orthodoxy is the trouble. However skilfully he handles Jungian concepts, he is really more at home with the traditional formulations. This is translation *into* a foreign tongue. What we need is translation *out of* a foreign tongue, before man's depths are stirred, and that new release of libidinal energy takes place.

Dr Shaw, like Dr Watt, is concerned with a statement of the faith for our age. It is aimed, however, at the Church member, and speaks in terms with which we are familiar. There is no strange terminology here (if one excepts the word 'nowhen' on p. 40). Here are the warm, ethical tones of the Liberal orthodoxy in which many of us were brought up. The two references to 'Demythologising' only serve to underline the fact that such problems are quite foreign to this book. Dr Shaw, writing out of his retirement of the things that he loves, commands our respect for his sincerity as much as for his seniority. We are at home here: we know at once where we agree with him and where we disagree: and he has written with clarity and simplicity. And yet—at home there is no adventure. Dr Shaw's book, which will be read with pleasure and profit by many Christians, makes us see the necessity for books like that of Dr Watt.

J. A. WHYTE

Baptism. By JOHANNES WARNS, translated from the German by G. H. LANG. The Paternoster Press, London. 1957. 15s.

IN addition to its engagement with the unbelieving world, the Reformed Church finds itself continually in dialogue, or conflict, with other Christian bodies, the most significant of which in Western lands are on the one hand the Church of Rome and on the other the multifarious bodies which seek to incorporate the principle of the 'Gathered Church', most of which practise believer's Baptism. The significance of this book is that it represents the point of view of the latter group, and more specifically the views held by many of the Assemblies of Christian Brethren.

The author, Johannes Warns (1874-1937) was the son of a Lutheran clergyman in Germany. He studied at the universities of Greifswald, Halle, Berlin and Bonn, intending to become a minister, but after an experience of conversion at a Salvation Army meeting severed his connexion with the Church of his fathers, and ultimately found his spiritual home in the Assemblies of Christian Brethren. His purpose in writing was to try to persuade members of the Fellowship Movement in the Lutheran Church to sever their connexion with the State Church and to throw in their lot with Churches or Assemblies of the Gathered Church type.

The book was published in Germany shortly before the first world war, but the translator has added considerable material of his own to it, attempting to bring the matter up to date by including a brief treatment of such recent discussions as those of Barth, Cullmann, and the 1955 Interim Report of the Church of Scotland's Special Commission on Baptism. As might be expected, the result is rather lacking in unity. One cannot but feel that the more recent material has not received either thorough or open-minded consideration. Substantially the thought is out of touch with the whole world of modern biblical research, and that recovery of biblical theology which is so marked a feature of the Ecumenical Movement of today.

Like all who write from a Baptist standpoint, the author reads into the text of the NT the unprovable assumption that Baptism was only administered to those who were of an age to have a conscious personal faith. 'Faith was *always the condition precedent* for Baptism' (p. 25). 'In the time of the Apostles the custom of baptising children of tender years was wholly unknown. This fact is today acknowledged by all authorities of the different Churches and is openly declared in the best textbooks' (p. 57). Such a statement may have been justified at the time when Warns wrote, but it cannot stand today when there is a growing body of scholars who are con-

vinced that the Baptism of children was the practice of the Church from the first.

One cannot but be astonished at the effort expended by the author in the futile attempt to prove that in the Book of Acts 'according to the circumstances recorded at the mention of each one, all the baptised households consisted of adults' (p. 61). The interpretation of 1 Cor. on the same page is as follows: 'the resemblance of the unbelieving husbands to the children mentioned consists in this, that both did not belong to the assembly and were not baptised.' This interpretation is based on a failure to note that the children are not described by the same term as is applied to the unbelieving parent. The text means that the children are 'holy', i.e. members of the Church, and therefore baptised, while the unbelieving parent is only infected with the 'holiness' of the believing spouse in such a way that his unbelief is not able to destroy the relation to Christ which the children have through their believing parent.

Like all Baptists, the writer is most unsatisfactory on the relation between the OT and the NT. His canons are: 'Would one prove a Christian doctrine or a principle applying to the Church of the New Testament, then the evidence must be taken, first, from a plain direction of the Lord; second, from the records of the practice of the apostles; third, from an apostolic instruction in some writing of the New Testament. Failing all testimony of this kind it is impossible for a conscientious expositor of Scripture to justify any doctrine or action as biblical' (p. 62). This is manifestly preposterous. It would, e.g. exclude women from the Lord's Table. It fails to recognise that there are many OT precepts and practices which the NT takes for granted, and which were rightly continued without a break in the Church of the NT. It was only when a break had to be made with OT belief or practice that the NT required to contain explicit injunctions. The absence of any NT injunction depriving the children of the new Israel of their right to the NT seal of the covenant is the strongest indication that in fact the NT Church, as St. Paul shows, treated the children of believers as belonging to the Church.

In Patristics, as in biblical interpretation, the scholarship of the book is not in line with the best recent work. It asserts that Justin Martyr knows nothing of infant Baptism (p. 77). Yet Justin not only speaks of Christian Baptism as the fulfilment of circumcision, but also says: 'Many, both men and women, who were *discipled from childhood* to Christ remain pure at the age of sixty or seventy years', thus implying that they had been baptised (discipled) between the years A.D. 70 and 90, i.e. well within the lifetime of some of the Apostles.

On pages 78f he fails to understand Irenaeus who, in including '*infantes*' among those who through Christ are born again (*renascuntur*), is using a technical term which is a synonym for 'are baptised'.

In dealing with Tertullian he draws a wrong inference from his early advocacy of the postponing of Baptism. Tertullian was not suggesting that infant Baptism was an innovation. It was he who was proposing the innovation of postponing Baptism to years of maturity and sobriety—a suggestion arising as a consequence of false views of Baptism.

The most preposterous example of Warns' misdirected erudition is his treatment of Origen (pp. 331ff), whose explicit statements ('secundum ecclesiae observantiam etiam parvulis baptismum dari' and 'ecclesia ab apostolis traditionem suscepit, etiam parvulis baptismum dare') he handles in the manner of those extreme critics of the NT who reject any passage in the text which does not fit in with their own predilections.

His whole discussion of the Patristic evidence shows the inaccüracy of an amateur scholar with an axe to grind. Thus he affirms that 'the Baptism of children is to be viewed as a fruit of superstitious ideas which were attached to Baptism' (p. 90). In fact it was false ideas of Baptism which led to the widespread departure in the early centuries from the apostolic practice of baptising the children of believers, and encouraged postponing Baptism as long as possible—even until one's deathbed—'because after Baptism the guilt of sinful defilement becomes greater and more dangerous' (p. 90).

Apart from some misleading statements which suggest that believer's Baptism was to be found in the Church from the earliest times, we have less criticism to make of the section of the book which deals with the history of the Baptist movement, and which tells of the persecutions which Baptists endured both before and after the period of the Reformation.

It is noteworthy, however, that Warns interprets the Reformation primarily as a movement for 'complete liberty of conscience' (p. 173) i.e. as a humanistic, Renaissance movement, and that he fails to see the great place which authority and obedience have in the NT, and therefore in any truly Reformed Church. The individualistic and rationalistic spirit of the Renaissance is strongly marked in the whole Baptist movement, preventing it from being as true to the Bible as it seeks to be.

The Reformer whose teaching Warns examines most closely is, naturally, Luther. Here he concentrates upon the early phase of Luther's thought in which he laid the greatest emphasis on the place of faith in the sacraments, and justified infant Baptism on the

ground of the faith of the infant. This line of thought is very problematical, and almost inevitably suggests that it might be more defensible to delay Baptism until the individual can himself profess his faith. The later phase of Luther's thought, which laid the chief emphasis upon the creative power of the Word of God in the sacraments rather than upon the faith of the recipient, is passed over.

It is interesting to note evidence from their own history that some of the Baptist bodies, such as the Mennonite Churches, have added to their numbers almost entirely from the offspring of their members (p. 222), thereby showing that the continuing life of the Church does not really conform to the ideal pattern of the 'Gathered Church'.

As has often been pointed out, the difference between those who hold to infant Baptism and those who recognise only believer's Baptism is in its essence the difference between two incompatible conceptions of the Church. 'State Church or Church of believers? Infant Baptism or Baptism of believers? These questions hang very closely together, and the solution of the one is the solution of the other' (p. 254).

Warns is unashamedly in favour of the 'Donatist' conception of the Church, which he supposes to be biblical. 'The supposition underlying a biblical Church is first of all the existence of believers and then their voluntary union' (p. 245). This view can hardly stand in the light of the rediscovery of the biblical significance of the Church as the People of God. The Church is always prior to the individual believer, who comes to faith through the Word of God working in and through the Church. As K. L. Schmidt says: 'it is of the very essence of the ἐκκλησία of God that its foundation and continuance are in its Messiah Jesus alone, and that its Lord is Christ alone—not men in theocratic arrogance . . .' (Kittel: *T.W.N.T.*). The conception of the Church as the result of a kind of 'social contract' among believers is quite incompatible with the teaching of the Bible, and could have emerged only out of the milieu of the Renaissance.

Our rejection of the 'Donatist' view does not, however, mean that we are driven on to the other horn of Warns' dilemma—the State Church, which he conceives, in the light of the situation then existing in Germany, as coterminous with the State so that all its citizens are *ipso facto* members of the Church. Such a Church, as he rightly says, has two grave weaknesses: (1) It inevitably becomes intolerant of dissenters, and may even become a persecuting Church. (2) It is prevented from exercising ecclesiastical discipline because of its desire to embrace everyone, and so it becomes more and more identified with the world in its ethos.

Both in Scotland and in England we have seen National Churches emerge which are true Churches, and not merely the State in its religious aspect. They have abjured all forms of coercion and persecution, and hold firmly to the necessity of the free response of men to the Word of God. Yet for them Baptism is neither to be confined to those who are able to profess their faith nor is it to be administered indiscriminately to all. It ought to be confined to those who profess faith in Christ, and to children who, by birth or adoption, belong to the household of faith. This position is mentioned only incidentally in a passage by the translator referring to the movement for Baptismal Reform in the Church of England 'which aims at deferring Baptism except in the case of children of practising Christian parents, until there is assurance that they will be brought up as Christians' (p. 285).

To come back, in conclusion, to the chief subject of the book, we cannot possibly agree that the original significance of Baptism is that it should be 'an outward testimony to an inward experience of salvation' (p. 309). That to which it testifies is the one Baptism into our human nature, sin, and death, which Christ underwent for us. It is a sacrament of the *Gospel*, not a mere outward expression of our inner experience. As a true sacrament it has as its chief actor Christ Himself, who, in Baptism, engrafts us into His Body, embracing us in His love, and seeking to evoke from us the response of faith, which is most clearly manifested when, in the conscious freedom of years of discretion, we come to the Lord's Table. This, presumably, is the doctrine which the translator is attacking when, after giving just over a page to a summary of the 1955 Interim Report of the Special Commission on Baptism of the Church of Scotland, he characterises it as exhibiting the mind of 'the advanced Sacramentarians with their fatal doctrine of baptismal regeneration' (p. 103)!

JOHN HERON

Principles and Practice of Preaching. By ILION T. JONES. Independent Press, London, 1958. 17s. 6d.

THIS book puts me in a quandary. Essentially the secret of preaching eludes the stalking technocrat, who puts his trust in consciously acquired skill of approach. He may have all at his finger-tips: and a stuttering, shambling neighbour outdo him utterly as a true and humble servant of the Word. Preaching is essentially the summoning of men to hear with the preacher and through his words God's living Word, the summoning of men to stand, alert, under an Authority to whom the preacher testifies and submits. It seeks to open men's eyes that they may see their daily world as God's, and move about it in the confidence that it, in all its sin, is redeemed and

governed through the Holy Spirit. For this nothing suffices but the bewitchment of Christ, the authorisation of the whole Church in recognition of a calling, the continual search, with others, to be at the mercy of the Scriptures, so that the Church may be upbuilt in its mission and compassion. Preaching has essentially to do with commitment, not with technique. We should never forget Moses, the tongue-tied, who declared the mind of God so faithfully that a people was prepared; and Aaron who, for all his fluency, was a disappointment.

But—here is the other side of it—technique must come in. Method everyone has. It is either apt, fitting the substance of the sermon, or inept and unworthy. People of a conviction like mine may well be doing less than justice to the avid concern for homiletic equipment shown in the U.S.A., of which this book is a sample. Too often our sermons are formless, undisciplined. They need the vigour of a greater mental discipline, of a more conscious orderliness of presentation, of a more clearly defined objective. The sections on 'Planning the Sermon' and 'Preparing the Sermon' contain material which would allow us to examine again our habitual mode of approach and probe it for inadequacies we have lived with too long.

I would not commend this book for the use of those who are at the beginning of their ministry. They might think they can learn how to preach from it, and that would be fatal. I would, however, put it in the path of those who think they now know how to preach and are fairly satisfied with their accomplishment. The book has valid uses for self-examination. To my mind, this is its chief merit.

I regret that it is stuffed so full of illustrations and quotations over which one continually trips. It is difficult to see the rabbits among all the snares.

There is a very comprehensive bibliography.

IAN M. FRASER

The Account of the Tabernacle: Translation and Textual Problems of the Greek Exodus. By D. W. GOODING. C.U.P., Cambridge, 1959. Pp. xi + 114 (map). 22s. 6d.

THE author's task has been by no means an easy one. In order to sustain his arguments, he has had to sort out a mass of detail which has been worked through before with different results. Dr Gooding has not been content to produce new solutions to an old and vexed problem; he has illuminated the misconceptions of his predecessors. That he has been successful is a tribute to his careful, painstaking scholarship.

This book will become important for Septuagintal (methodo-

logical) studies, as well as being a textbook on Tabernacle problems. Ample space is given to defining the Septuagint translator's style, his attitude towards the Hebrew text, and the reasons for the inaccuracies in the translation of technical terms. He shows that the translator was using the Hebrew text known to us!

The chief burden of the author has been to compare the two Greek accounts of the Tabernacle, Exod. 25-31 (commands) and Exod. 35-40 (execution of the commands). The M.T. text, it is shown, is consistent and original, while the LXX is consistent in its inconsistencies! The two Greek accounts are by the same translator (contrary to the usual belief), with the exception of ch. 38. The author's conclusions are surprising, even shocking (especially to Septuagint lovers), but they are based on strong internal evidence. Having once proved that the Greek translator of both sections is consistent in translating Hebrew technical terms, he shows how the problems of content and order must be solved. The M.T. is vindicated as a result of this study.

Excellent appendices, a table of Hebrew technical terms and a useful diagram of the Tabernacle put the finishing touches to a beautifully produced volume (one Hebrew misprint in p. 36). One criticism may be levelled, that the author has tended to repetitiousness in driving home his chief points, but this may be regarded as having the advantage of producing a continuous clear picture for the reader. Dr Gooding and the Cambridge University Press have given the academic, but perhaps hardly the lay, public a valuable book.

JOHN MACDONALD

English-speaking Missions in the Congo Independent State (1878-1908). By RUTH M. SLADE. Académie royale des Sciences Coloniales, Brussels, 1959. Pp. 432. 400 fr. Belg.

THE history of Protestant missionary effort in the Belgian Congo is little known in this country. This is due, no doubt, to the fact that, with the important exception of the Baptist Missionary Society, and to a lesser extent the Congo Balolo Mission, the missions of the British Societies have not shared in the work in Congo. At the time when Grenfell and Comber for the B.M.S. were exploring the lower Congo in order to find their way into the country, the bulk of British missionary effort was being given to the British, or soon to be British, territories in Uganda, Nyasaland and Nigeria.

The story of the English-speaking Missions in Congo thus forms a most interesting parallel to Dr Roland Oliver's *The Missionary Factor in East Africa*. The Congo story is bound to be different because of the predominance of the Roman Catholic effort, the nationality of the government concerned and the complaints of

maladministration and abuses with which the names of King Leopold on the one side, and E. D. Morel and the Aborigines' Protection Society on the other, are associated. Then there were the American Presbyterians, the American Baptists, the African Inland Mission, the Heart of Africa Mission and others of an inter-denominational character, mostly American. This made Congo missionary history more diversified than that of other fields.

In such a vast country, with so many independent efforts and over against a foreign government which leant heavily towards the Roman Catholic missions, it is not surprising that the Protestant missions had peculiar difficulties. None the less they had their encouragements. It is true that by 1945 the Catholics claimed three million baptised members, but between 1924 and 1950 the number of baptised Protestants rose from 60,000 to well over 500,000. In 1950, however, there were only some 300 ordained Protestant pastors, and the development of indigenous African Churches was slow as compared with other parts. It was not until 1956 that Africans became full members of the Congo Protestant Council. Protestant missions suffered because they were for the most part English-speaking. This has now been remedied by sending missionaries for training to Belgium. The Congo Protestant Council has done much to encourage the development of 'the Church of Christ in Congo' and to present a united front to the government in all matters of Church and State.

This is a careful and well-documented history, with narrative judiciously blended with comment and interpretation. It brings together material otherwise difficult of access and supplements our knowledge of Africa as a whole and of other missionary effort in a most interesting way. One's only complaint is that the story in general stops short at 1908 instead of 1958.

J. W. C. Dougall

The English Carol. By Erik Routley. Herbert Jenkins, London, 1958. Pp. 272. 25s.

This book meets a much-felt want, for no study of carols has been published for a considerable time. And it was wise of the publishers to ask Dr Routley to write it, for few others could have done it as well. We have here in fact what is likely to be the standard history of the English carol for a long time to come. We are given an annotated bibliography where the various sources are quoted, and we are warned to have beside us a copy of the *Oxford Book of Carols*, because it is referred to so frequently for musical examples and for the words. Many musical quotations are provided in the text, and perhaps some readers will feel that the type and music of these

examples, though clear and readable, are on the small side. There are eight plates which add greatly to the interest.

As to the text itself, this is written with Dr Routley's usual competence, his clear style, forthright opinions and not infrequent humour. The story is told against the historical background, beginning with the 'Singing Ages', the scene of the medieval Manuscript Carols and Ballad Carols. Part II is called 'The Great Controversy', and is a mixed bag, dealing with the medieval play, the 'Wrath of the Puritans', and Christmas Hymns. Part III describes 'The Return of the Carol' in the nineteenth century, the carols adopted from other countries, and those of today. The first appendix tells of the Festival of Nine Lessons and Carols, providing several orders of the Festival, and the second appendix gives a service of Lessons and Music for the Season of Lent as used in Mansfield College, Oxford, where Dr Routley has been lecturer and chaplain. The main index will prove most valuable, as it contains the names of all the carols mentioned, as well as of authors, hymn books, and much else. A second index notes the references to carols in the Oxford Book.

As suggested, the book is most readable and provides many starting points for thought. Indeed every minister and choir leader should make a point of studying it well in advance of next Christmas, for they will find much to guide them in planning services for that festive season.

The book is well-produced and there seem to be very few printers' errors, but the following may be noted: page 55, line 3 of the second verse of the first quotation should read 'And carry home thy corn again' (the Oxford Book reads 'And carry home thy ripened corn', which is better); page 78, in the quotation cancel the 'quotes' round the words 'and your land'; page 91, line 5, read 'sing it in'.

JOHN A. LAMB

Music in Medieval Britain. By FRANK LL. HARRISON. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958. Pp. 491. 60s.

THIS is the first volume of a new series of 'Studies in the History of Music', edited by Dr Egon Wellesz, and the choice of Dr Harrison to write it was a very happy one. There was room for a study of this subject as nothing else covers quite the same ground. The detailed information, much of it the result of original research into contemporary documents, makes it a very valuable contribution to musical history.

The author begins with the reminder that the medieval musician was always a member of a community which had not only a musical but above all an ecclesiastical *modus vivendi*, and therefore the first

need is a consideration of the various institutions of which they were members, especially the choral foundations of cathedrals, abbeys, parish churches, colleges and so on. Many references to unpublished archives, as well as to printed sources, give much illuminating information about these. The book goes on to deal with 'the Liturgy and its Plainsong', discussing the various component parts of the services in Missal and Breviary, and the music used for them. The development of Polyphony from the Norman Conquest to the Reformation is described in two chapters, which include a very interesting section on the development and use of the organ, especially in connexion with the performance of polyphonic music. Thereafter various ritual forms—Mass and Motet, Votive Antiphon and Magnificat, Respond, Tract, Hymn and other forms, and finally the Carol—receive detailed attention, their origin and significance and their music being treated in a clear and interesting manner. Six appendixes provide extracts from Deeds of Appointment and Inventories as examples of medieval documents. Special notice should be taken of the very valuable Register and Index of Musicians who lived during the period covered by the history. This has been compiled as a result of new research into the lives of composers and other musicians. There is an extensive bibliography, an Index of titles of musical pieces, and an exhaustive general index. The book is beautifully produced in every way, apparently without errors, though it is a pity that St. Andrews in references to Colleges and the Abbey is spelled with an apostrophe. The musical examples in the text of which there are 227 are clearly printed, and the twenty-six fine plate illustrations and the line drawings are most useful.

Altogether this is in every way a most welcome volume, a pleasure both to handle and to read. It can be strongly recommended to all who wish to increase their knowledge both of the liturgy and of its music in medieval times. JOHN A. LAMB

The Prayers of Kierkegaard. By PERRY D. LE FEVRE. University of Chicago Press, 1956 (Cambridge University Press, London). Pp. ix + 245. 27s. 6d.

THIS is a very valuable addition to the already vast collection of books about Kierkegaard. What makes it particularly valuable is that it presents for the first time a collection of Kierkegaard's prayers translated into English. It might be imagined that this is a very small matter and does not justify the claim. However, a great deal of harm has been done both to Kierkegaard and to theologians influenced by him by the foolish judgment of those who imagined him to be nothing more than a neurotic and an irrationalist. This book reveals

the heart of Kierkegaard's religious life and endeavours to describe his life and work in the light of this revelation. The author would agree with Bohlin that Kierkegaard's piety is the essence of his thought, but it is not likely that he would agree further that the dialectical thinking was artificial. Yet Mr Le Fevre insists that 'Kierkegaard was primarily a religious thinker' whose 'central problem was that of becoming a Christian'. All this is admirable, but it is not at all clear whether we can accept his description of Kierkegaard's understanding of faith and prayer. He says that 'faith is seen to be Kierkegaard's goal and prayer is revealed as man's sole means of moving towards that goal'. If that were the case how can Kierkegaard speak of prayer as the daughter of faith? This may be no more than a verbal quibble, but it does illustrate how easy it is to make Kierkegaard appear a pragmatist, which he was not.

The prayers are drawn from the Works and the Papers and are in four groups according to the Subject addressed or the occasion: (1) God the Father; (2) God the Son; (3) God the Holy Spirit; (4) For special occasions. It is difficult to say anything about the prayers, so powerfully moving are they. They are intensely personal, but not because they are sentimental—it is passion we have here. Nor are they personal because they are all personal petitions. Their personal character is reminiscent of the classical literature of meditation in that they talk in a non-empirical dimension. They underline certain essential features of his theological outlook such as the infinite difference between man and God, the infinite of God's love, the centrality of Jesus Christ, 'not to admire but to follow' is discipleship, the Church on earth always the Church militant, the Holy Spirit the divine coachman.

The second part of the book is the author's interpretation of Kierkegaard's life and thought, and it would be churlish to complain overmuch about these hundred pages. For they not only give a fairly adequate summary of Kierkegaard's life and thought in a very brief compass, but the final chapter actually breaks new ground by discussing Kierkegaard as a man of prayer. Inevitably one feels that the discussion as a whole is inadequate, but it may be necessary to remind ourselves that Mr Le Fevre did not mean merely to add another general interpretation of Kierkegaard to the many available already. He must then be judged by this last chapter more than by anything else, and the oversimplification of the story up to that point must be said to be a necessary evil. Some minor points may be mentioned first. It is surprising to find in such a well-produced book that 'Søren' always occurs as 'Soren', and it is irritating to find the author constantly using such meaningless terms as 'deepest' and 'profound' and such ambiguous terms as 'personal' and 'vocation'.

How unenlightening is the following sentence: 'One of the ways of approaching an understanding of Kierkegaard's inner life is to see his struggle as the development of a sense of personal vocation' (p. 128)! Another thing that puzzles me is the hesitant way Mr Le Fevre speaks of Kierkegaard's use of 'existence' (p. 149), for it is quite clear that when Kierkegaard spoke of 'existens' he meant the Christian's existence. Mr Le Fevre's understanding of Kierkegaard is, nevertheless, quite sure, as is seen from his remark (p. 152) that Kierkegaard rejected the reductionism of both romanticism and rationalism. And to understand this is surely to understand Kierkegaard's importance for both philosphy and theology. By the final chapter the book must be judged, we said; and so judged the book is seen to contain not only sympathetic understanding but also a wealth of information about Kierkegaard as a person and about his interpretation of prayer. The honest simplicity of his faith, his unyielding trust and the tremendous sense of God's majesty are here noticed. In this brief compass too we are shown the many elements in Kierkegaard's interpretation of prayer—its *fons et origo* in man's sense of unworthiness before God, its obligatory character, its non-verbal nature and its relation to suffering. Truly, this is a valuable book.

J. Heywood Thomas

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Rev. Professor T. F. TORRANCE
Rev. Professor J. K. S. REID

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Editors:

Rev. Prof. T. F. Torrance, M.B.E., D.D., D.Theol.,
21 South Oswald Road, Edinburgh, 9 (Telephone 46114)

Rev. Prof. J. K. S. Reid, D.D.,
44 Headingley Mount, Leeds, 6 (Telephone 56853)

Consulting Editors:

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IS LANGUAGE ABOUT GOD FRAUDULENT?[1]

by Professor FREDERICK FERRÉ

The question stated in the title of this paper may seem absurd to many who are unacquainted with the concerns of contemporary philosophy. 'Is language about God fraudulent?' How strange (they may say) that anyone should be silly enough to raise the question! Because, therefore, the seriousness of the issue and the genuineness of its challenge may not be immediately apparent to everyone, it will not be amiss to sample some of the ways in which innocent-seeming language is liable to mislead. The failure of philosophers to make such preliminary points—which to them are platitudes too familiar to require repetition—may account for the sense of unreality which many non-philosophers find in modern critiques.

I

For our present purposes we shall take note of three traps which may lurk in apparently irreproachable language. These I shall for convenience christen the 'noun-thing fallacy', the 'sentence-sense fallacy', and the 'response-thought fallacy'.

First, the 'noun-thing fallacy' is simply the unjustifiable assumption that 'behind' every noun or noun-phrase there somehow exists something corresponding to it. One of the lasting contributions of Bertrand Russell has been his insistence that merely because a noun appears in a sentence (even as the grammatical subject of that sentence) we have no ground for assuming the *existence* of anything at all. One of the major preoccupations of Russell's type of 'logical analysis' is with rewording sentences so that certain problem-raising terms disappear without loss of meaning to the sentence as a whole. We can speak, for example, of 'the average man': what 'he' eats for breakfast, how much 'he' earns per week, how early 'he' goes to bed, and how many children 'he' begets. But, as the Russellian analysis reminds us, the linguistic presence of this noun-phrase and its related pronouns does not involve the existence (or even the 'subsistence') of some ghostly 'average

[1] Read to St. Mary's Theological Society, St. Andrews, April 1958.

man' whose characteristics we study. We are dealing, instead, with all the men in the population concerned, considered in terms of the sort of 'average' which we are employing: mean, median, or mode.

We are not very likely to be misled, of course, by our talk about the 'average man' into uncritically assuming the existence of some one thing corresponding to this phrase; but the noun-thing fallacy may operate much more subtlely and dangerously. Consider, for example, the power of Hitler's invocation of the *Volksgeist*. How irresistible this force appears as long as the practice of referring to 'it' by a single word facilitates slipping into the belief in 'its' mystical existence, somehow independent of the individual lives of the particular persons composing the *Volk*! Examples could be multiplied to show that the noun-thing fallacy is far from being an occupational hazard limited to a few cloistered academics. The vital point to remember is that people have been persuaded by the existence of a word or phrase into uncritical belief in the existence of some kind of being corresponding to that word. If we succeed in remembering this, we shall be on our guard against the noun-thing fallacy; once exposed, it loses its power to deceive.

The second danger into which unexamined speech may fall is the 'sentence-sense fallacy'. Most of us are fairly skilful at identifying an utterance as nonsense when it fails to form a proper sentence as, for example, when an idiot babbles, 'Fast over laugh blue.' But we are usually far slower to recognise nonsense when the rules of sentence-formation are all carefully observed. It is all too easy for us to assume that given a grammatically correct sentence we *must* have sense, even if *we* happen to fail to understand it. Usually we are justified in this assumption, since none of us can hope to be familiar with all the technical but (to some) perfectly intelligible terms in common currency around us, and since (luckily) most people talk sense to one another most of the time. Nevertheless, the tacit assumption that, wherever we find a sentence, there (could we but grasp its meaning) we must have sense is obviously false. Simply to state it is to reject it. No sentence (for one example), however impeccable its syntax, will be meaningful if it contains a *senseless term* infecting the whole.

Let us take an example. Imagine someone approaching you

and asking politely, 'Could you lend me your largest ramafruge?' The sentence is perfectly well formed but is rendered unintelligible by the last word which (let it be assumed) has no meaning whatever. It is not *just* the last word, however, which is senseless, but it is the whole expression containing it. True enough, we know what 'lending' means when applied to a good many objects like combs and five-pound notes, but what would it be to 'lend' a ramafruge? Would we be involved in handing something over, or sending for a van, or signing some papers, or *what*? We have no idea. We know, further, what 'being able to do' something is in many cases, as in jumping over a stream or reading a passage or declaring a war, but what conditions would have to be the case before we might 'be able' to lend a ramafruge? We haven't a notion. We know, again, what 'largest' means as applied to many contexts, for example elephants or screwdrivers or ocean liners, but what would 'largest' mean as modifying a ramafruge? We are at a total loss inasmuch as 'ramafruge' is not capable of being modified since there is no thought to modify. You would not be able to answer the polite stranger, therefore, by replying, 'Sorry, I'm fresh out of ramafruges today.' Instead, all you could say would be, 'I'm sorry, but I'm afraid I don't know what you *mean*.' This, or something very much like it, would be the only appropriate response until a meaning for the senseless term was offered.

The sentence in question can have a chance of making sense only when all its component terms are meaningful. What, for our example, would this involve? Basically, our stranger is required to provide 'ramafruge' with one of three kinds of definition. First, we may be given an 'ostensive' definition; that is, a ramafruge may be pointed out to us. 'What does "ramafruge" mean?' 'It means *that*.' (And we are shown one in whatever way is appropriate for ramafruges: through a microscope, through a telescope, from an airplane, or however.) Alternatively, we may be given a 'dictionary' definition; that is, we may be offered a statement as to its nature in terms of words the meaning of which we already know. Thirdly, we may be given an 'indirect' definition; that is, we may be told what collection of events the word stands for or explains the behaviour of. (A ramafruge will probably not be defined in this way, however, since things given indirect definitions, like

average men or genes or electrons, are not the sort of things which can be *loaned* on request.)

The most basic kind of definition is, of course, the ostensive; this is because dictionary definitions presuppose previous understanding of the words employed, but this prior understanding cannot be due to earlier dictionary definitions and so on for ever! At some point the regress of dictionary definitions must be broken and an ostensive definition ground the series. Likewise, indirect definitions assume an understanding of the words referring to the phenomena dealt with—an understanding which, too, must somewhere be grounded in experience. The only legitimate 'lingui-centric' definitions are those in the purely formal disciplines where certain signs are defined wholly in terms of other signs in a system; but even in these disciplines no 'interpretation' of the signs or the system is possible without sacrificing the purity of its freedom from extra-linguistic considerations. Even in mathematics, if numerals are interpreted (as they almost always are) in terms of varying *quantities* of things—like apples or fingers—ostensive definitions cannot ultimately be avoided.

So far so good; but (we may think) if it is a fallacy to assume that every grammatically correct sentence must have a sense, it is surely not a very dangerous one. We are ready to accept the implicit warning to make sure that all the terms in our sentences are meaningful on pain of senselessness, but who would seriously be misled by the sentence-sense fallacy? Why should anyone *want* to use language involving meaningless terms? The modern philosopher's answer is, of course, that no one would want this (normally), but that some may do it occasionally and a few may do it a great deal without themselves realising it. The noun-thing fallacy, for example, may obscure the fact in some circumstances; or, still more frequently, the sentence-sense fallacy may be abetted by the third linguistic trap on our list, the 'response-thought fallacy'.

This last fallacy consists of the assumption that wherever language affects us or others it must do so by virtue of its literal thought-content. That such a supposition is not true may be clearly shown by one or two examples.

Imagine, first, two or three scientists in a frivolous mood in the company of an earnest clergyman who, despite honours

Greek and first-class church history, doesn't know an isotope from a cyclotron. If these naughty scientists choose to impress the learned cleric by heatedly discussing the merits of the 'incompatibility ratio of the latest ramafruge', I can imagine no bounds to their hilarity—or to their success in stirring in the ecclesiastical breast the most satisfying thrills of awe and rapturous amazement. Their jargon may be double-talk and strictly senseless, but it is not without *effect*. The scientists themselves lack the slightest idea of what they are saying since they are really saying nothing, but their discourse has the sort of *sound*, despite its nonsensicality, which is capable of impressing the uninitiate. Our wide-eyed clergyman has fallen hook, line and sinker for the response-thought fallacy; he assumes that where grammar is not violated and where responses are aroused there must also be thought-content. How wrong he is! But, we hope, he is little the worse for the foolery.

Another example could be more serious, however, where not only those who hear but even those who speak suppose falsely that their language has a genuine thought-content. It has become platitudinous to point out that many people simply do not know what they mean by such highly-charged words as 'democracy'; they use them for the emotional reaction which they feel and which they hope to arouse in others by using it. This situation can give a demagogue great power, but it *need* not be the case. 'Democracy' *can* be given a literal meaning through one or more of the defining techniques we have already noted. Other words, however, fail even in principle to be literally definable, and it is with these that we are primarily concerned.

Certain scientific terms (now discarded) offer us good examples of language which, although once hallowed by use and tradition, was empty of literal thought-content. For many years scientists spoke of 'the ether' supposing that they knew its literal meaning, but finally, under Einstein's caustic influence, physics discarded such language as literally senseless. No definition of 'the ether', it was finally realised, was *possible*: no ostensive definition could be offered for 'the ether' itself; no dictionary definition could be applied without involving contradictions; and, above all, no indirect definition could be admitted once it was discovered that no crucial experiment

could be devised, that is, that so far as the facts were concerned there was nothing to choose between retaining talk about 'the ether' and dismissing it. Screwing up the courage of their convictions, the physicists abandoned such language in spite of the prestige of its tradition, and they found that no ill effects ensued. On the contrary, advances along new lines were made possible in the new freedom from terminology with misleading suggestive power.

Unfortunately, however, not all such stories share this happy ending. The response-thought fallacy continues to take its toll in sphere after sphere of human activity. It is appalling to consider how many political epithets, for example, are still used not only without any literal thought-content but, much worse, without even the realisation that they *are* without this meaning!

Such examples as these should be sufficient warning to us against any over-facile leap from the fact that language finds a response of some sort in us and evokes a reaction in others to the supposition that this language must express a literal thought. Whitehead is right, I believe, in asserting that there can be no thought without its emotional undertones and overtones; but the converse is not true: emotional twinges and flutters need not carry thought and, as we have seen, sometimes do not.

The gist of this section of our discussion is now clear: nouns need not imply existing things 'behind' them to which they refer; sentences need not be meaningful under all circumstances, despite faultless grammar; language which stirs a reaction in us, and even effects an identical reaction in others as well, need not express a literal thought in order to do so. There are, of course, volumes more to be said on this subject, particularly on the variety of ways that grammatically correct sentences may fail to be literally meaningful in use (this question has hardly been touched!), but our sketch should be enough to make even the most sanguine more language-conscious and better prepared to consider the possibility of flaws in familiar forms of speech.

II

When one becomes conscious of the snares which may be hidden within familiar language, the question: 'Is language about God fraudulent?' may carry a more ominous ring than

previously. The challenge implied (that such language *is* somehow fraudulent) can no longer be shrugged off as absurd. If distinguished scientists could have been misled in their belief that a portion of their discourse was genuinely meaningful, can clergymen be absolutely certain in advance that they are free from danger of any similar error?

We may rule out, of course, the cynical suggestion that preachers are to be compared with those teasing scientists whom we imagined earlier; no one who knows the facts can seriously accuse the clergy of deliberate mystification, of consciously offering double-talk to suitably chastened laymen who sit in their pews listening in grateful stupefaction to what they assume to be Great Ideas. Although there is, of course, an occupational vested interest in the validity of theological language, there is no dark conspiracy among the priesthood.

The critics' suggestion, then, is that religious people are not engaging in deliberate trickery so much as being themselves tricked. They themselves are held to be defrauded by one or more of the subtle fallacies of their language, assuming that they are talking important sense when in fact they are saying literally nothing at all. This is particularly the case, these critics continue, with the religious person's most distinctively religious language, language involving the term 'God'.

All theological language,[1] I believe, depends for its justification ultimately on such language; indeed, this ultimate dependence can be offered as a defining characteristic of theological language itself. But, be this as it may, there is a strong case to be made for treating language about God as a test of the validity of all theological discourse. If it is shown to be empty of all meaning, then the heart of religion has been torn out; if, on the other hand, its employment can somehow be justified, then it is unlikely that difficulties in other areas of theological language will prove insurmountable.

We may rule out at once the possibility that such critics consider theological language to be suffering from any defects of grammar. But we have seen that this is not the most serious possibility. Could it be that theological language is dependent on a literally meaningless term? Such a term, if familiar, might

[1] 'Theological language' is here taken in its broadest sense, as 'theo-logy' (words-about-God), whether in academic or worshipful contexts.

benefit from the noun-thing fallacy which would help to prevent even the raising of a question about its meaning. 'It means whatever the *thing* is that the word stands for,' this fallacy tempts us to say, dismissing all worries. But such an easy way is no longer open to us. We must seriously inquire whether 'God' in theological discourse is analogous to the word 'ramafruge' in our foregoing discussion. If so—if, that is, the word 'God' is empty of literal meaning—then, the critics say, theological language will be as nonsensical as openly recognised double-talk, and its sober employment will be equally absurd.

The obvious refutation of this unpleasant suggestion would be the provision of an adequate literal definition of the key term. If this can be done, than the critic will have been silenced; if it cannot be done, the theologian would seem to have cause for grave concern. Before turning to consider whether such literal definitions can be provided for the word 'God', however, we must pause to recognise an important check on the freedom of any Christian in defining the word 'God': if the proposed definition is to be of interest to other Christians, the limits of theological orthodoxy must be maintained. If it becomes certain that tradition must be abandoned at some point, even then violence must not be done to the true essentials of Christian faith. Christians are not free to define 'God', for example, by pointing to the fiery disc of the sun or to a rumbling volcano. Such ostensive definitions would be *logically* impeccable, and similar definitions have had wide popularity in other cultures and in other ages; but for a Christian to have such recourse would be plain apostasy. More subtle, but equally banned to the Christian, would be any literal definition of God in terms of anthropomorphic images which do violence to the claims of universality, spirituality and infinity for the Christian deity.

One further point should be borne in mind: if a definition of 'God' were to be found acceptable, we have *not* thereby shown that God, so defined, *exists*. We should at that point have accomplished no more than to have shown that language which might be used to assert His existence is actually asserting something. If, on the other hand, it should be found impossible to provide a literal definition for 'God', belief or disbelief would be shown to be out of place. Belief requires something to believe. Imagine, once more, the polite stranger asking you (this

time solemnly) to believe in the existence of ramafruges, while refusing to tell you what 'ramafruge' means. If you are honest, your only line of reply can be: 'But I *can't* believe (or disbelieve) that until you tell me what you *mean*!' You can *say*, if you feel that his feelings will be wounded by your refusal to assent immediately, 'Of course I believe in the existence of ramafruges.' But these are empty words. Should literal belief in propositions about God prove to be impossible, vital questions would then be raised concerning the relationship between belief and faith. Faith, of course, has never properly been thought to be *merely* a matter of literal belief. Faith essentially involves active commitment to a quality of life. But traditionally it has also involved assent to one or another account of the nature of the universe as literally true. Without belief, it has been held, faith would be degraded to some kind of emotional naturalism or to the empty sentimentalism of the current 'popular' religious song. Faith apart from literal beliefs should no longer claim itself to be orthodox.

If, then, the very possibility of literal theological belief is threatened, the stakes are extremely high for all orthodox Christians who dread change. Somehow, suddenly, the would-be believer finds himself in a nightmarish position with seemingly everything to lose and nothing terribly impressive to gain. He is like a man who, thinking that he holds a clear title to his house, has been living comfortably on the premises only to be confronted with a harsh challenge either to prove his rightful ownership or to face summary execution! If he is successful he holds only what he had long assumed to be his own—together with all the problems of maintenance—but if he fails he loses . . . everything.

III

In what ways can the Christian attempt to avert the apparent catastrophe of literal theological meaninglessness by producing an adequate definition of 'God'? As we have seen, three sorts of definition are available: first, the dictionary definition in which the problèmatic noun is given a meaning in terms of other words antecedently known; second, the ostensive definition in which something directly experienced is offered as the literal meaning; and, third, the indirect definition in which other phenomena

are cited on the basis of which the new term gains its significance. All three types of definition, however, inherently provide problems for the orthodox Christian. Let us briefly survey these problems.

First, it seems exceedingly unlikely that a successful literal definition of 'God' will be fashioned out of words which are (or remain) clearly meaningful to us in their theological application. Any perfectly meaningful words which we may choose to employ in a dictionary definition of 'God' will violate orthodox scruples if applied in the *same* sense to God as to the ordinary contexts from which they draw their original meaning; but these words, if applied in some *different* sense ('appropriate to God alone', as orthodoxy may put it), are thereby stripped of their literal significance and so forfeit their usefulness in the definition. Let us find an illustration. Many dictionary definitions of God make use of such words as 'wisdom', 'goodness', and 'love'. In their ordinary uses these terms have more or less definite meanings. 'Wisdom' involves sagacious judgment patiently developed through shrewd observation of success and failure; 'goodness' (in its ethical application) has to do with victory in the moral struggle; and 'love', despite its ambiguities, is unknown entirely apart from the interactivity and desires of those physical organisms which compose human society. But when we attempt to forge a literal definition of God out of these words, such thought-content as in normal usage and daily experience is expressed by these words must (we are told) be pruned away. Only after 'wisdom' has been 'purified' from dependence on learning from experience, after 'goodness' has been 'freed' from all 'degrading' reference to moral struggle, and after 'love' has been 'elevated' out of the context of physical organisms—only then may these terms be employed theologically. Very well, let them be so purified if orthodoxy demands it; but with what literal content are we left? What is wisdom when there is no learning? What is goodness where there is no moral victory? What is love combined with 'self-sufficiency' or 'impassibility'? These questions may not be without answer on a *non-literal* basis (as, for example, Austin Farrer tries to show in his profound book, *Finite and Infinite*), but it does no good to offer 'symbolic' qualities where these very qualities are to be relied upon to provide literal meaning for the term 'God'.

Giving a dictionary definition of God in terms which are themselves without literal meaning is like offering a blind man not a stick but a length of rope: it may give a sense of reassurance when clutched, but it will provide no support when leaned upon.

Another alternative would be the defining of the word 'God' through some ostensive definition. Such attempts suffer from fatal difficulties, however, which an alert critic like Ronald Hepburn, of Aberdeen, does not fail to point out in his book, *Christianity and Paradox*.[1] There are those, for example, who would define 'God' by pointing (metaphorically) at Jesus Christ as 'visible' in Scripture. '*That* is God,' they say. 'Look *there* and you will discover the whole meaning of the word "God", which means no more nor less than what you will find there.' Such a suggestion claims the merits, first, of simplicity and definiteness and, second, of unchallengeable orthodoxy. But can it actually justify either of these claims? How shall supporters of this approach deal with the radical biblical scholars who deny that we can know the historical Jesus at all? If, on the other hand, 'Christ of faith' is accepted as the adequate definition for 'God', then what has become of the claim for simplicity and definiteness? Even apart from the most radical of the modern New Testament scholarship, can Christians allow their definition of God to vary from week to week, depending on the latest ideas on Jesus which are emanating from the New Testament Department of Research? Not only, furthermore, is the attempted definition of 'God' exhaustively in terms of Jesus *unclear* thanks to the muddled biblical picture and the even more muddled state of biblical interpretation, but such an attempt is also grossly *heretical*. Orthodoxy insists, it is true, that Jesus was 'very God'; but this is a far different matter from claiming 'God' to be *defined* as Jesus Christ. In the former case we are dealing with what is said to be God's mysterious act of Incarnation, while in the latter case we have suggested a logical equivalence between the terms 'God' and 'Jesus Christ'. How truly heretical this suggested equivalence really is may not strike us immediately, accustomed as we are to popular docetism in religious circles high and low, but suffice it to point out a few consequences which would spring from this equivalence. First, it would make nonsense of all those passages

[1] London: Watts, 1958.

in Scripture where Jesus is portrayed praying to or speaking about God; second, it violates the doctrines of the Trinity; third, it implies that for three days the universe ran on untended while God was lying literally dead in a cold tomb; fourth, it involves belief that God's career on earth was limited to thirty-odd years; and fifth (the list could be almost indefinitely extended), it offers a distasteful dilemma—either that Jesus was not man or that God is a human being—both well-recognised heresies.

Quite a different sort of ostensive definition, the definition of the term 'God' as the 'Thou' sometimes encountered in worship, suffers no less decisive difficulties. In so far as the experience of 'meeting' indicated here is similar to the deeply personal and emotional experiences of 'encounter' which we have with other persons, that experience is recognisable and to a certain extent identifiable. But why should we suppose that even when we seem to be in inter-personal relations on the human level there need in fact be a transaction between more than one personality? The evidence drawn from the mistakes which are often made about human 'encounters' points to a subjective source for these experiences; how much less, then, should they be made the basis of a literal definition for what is held by orthodoxy to be an independently existing Being! What of the times that a friend supposes himself to be in a state of 'vibrant encounter' with his companion during a period of what seems to be 'pregnant silence'—only to have the spell broken when his 'soul-mate' lets out a long, loud snore! What of those acquaintances whom, after countless moments of 'encounter', we discover to be clever hypocrites? If our emotions can play us false in the human situation, why should we refuse to admit the possibility of illusion in circumstances of alleged contact with the yet more elusive invisible, immaterial Person of God? Here there can be no objective check against such illusion: no snore, no stab in the back, can ever prove that we were mistaken. The position seems to have the attraction of invulnerability, but its cost in subjectivity is too high. Indeed, these consequences eliminate this definition of God on grounds of heterodoxy. Why should one claim his private 'Thou' to be the 'God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob'? If 'God' be *defined* in terms of personal experience, how could such a claim even be meaningfully asserted? Has one's 'Thou' told one so?

Probably not, but even if one should seem to get such a message while in 'encounter' (a question-begging word), why should this element of specific interpretation not more reasonably be credited to one's religious background than to any other cause —especially since those of different doctrinal training seem uniformly to offer different interpretations for what would seem to be the same basic experience? It is quite true that orthodox Christianity has a place for the personal confrontation of man by God; but reminding oneself of this is a far different matter from *defining* the word 'God' by ostensive reference to any supposed confrontations. 'God' in Christian usage must inevitably exceed in meaning anything which could in principle be offered in an ostensive definition. There is as little hope of finding our definition of the term here, therefore, as among dictionary definitions. Neither type offers us the literal meaning for which we are searching.

One final hope remains: a literal meaning for the word 'God' will be provided if it can be defined in terms of phenomena requiring unification or explanation otherwise not forthcoming. Many legitimate indirect definitions are reflections of the need for the postulation of some entity not itself ostensively definable. The words 'gene' and 'electron', for example, receive their literal meaningfulness thanks to the otherwise inexplicable behaviour of things of which we can be directly aware. Why should the word 'God' not also be indirectly defined in terms of observable things which will thereby receive a new explanation for 'why they are as they are' or for 'why they *are* at all'? Attempts have been made to provide such definitions, usually by defining God as the 'author' of the events of history (which events are held to receive a new 'explanation' through the postulation of a divine providence) or as the 'ground' of all existence (which 'ground' is held to be 'necessitated' by the existence of the un-self-explanatory world); but such indirect definitions fall short of proving their legitimacy by failing either to provide genuine explanation or to spring from true necessity. And even if they were to be shown perfectly legitimate—as legitimate as indirect definitions of 'electron' or 'gene'—they would have to deal with the powerful arguments designed to show that terms given indirect definitions need not be anything *in themselves* (we are reminded of

warnings against the noun-thing fallacy once more) but only the *phenomena* mentioned in the definition, referred to in a convenient, 'shorthand' manner. Indirect definitions of 'God', however, never even get far enough to let these further questions be of concern.

In the case of the would-be literal definition of 'God' as that entity explanatory of the events of history, we must ask: is to invoke 'divine providence' really to offer a true explanation? Would the Christian who claims to find an explanation of the course of history thanks to his belief in God be prepared to withdraw his belief in the existence (or alter his convictions concerning the nature) of this God if—as is theoretically possible—new historical discoveries should show that our present ideas as to what happened in history are radically false? If so, his faith is indeed precarious! If not, then he must mean by 'God' *more* than: 'That which will provide the most coherent interpretation of the particular events we suppose took place in the course of history.' Again, would the Christian be prepared to make any prediction on the basis of his alleged explanation which, if his prediction is falsified, would cause him to withdraw his 'explanation'? If so, then he must be prepared to give up his faith on the basis of some specified future historical event, which would involve both a tentativeness inappropriate to religious conviction and a sacrifice of Christianity's claim to help the believer face *any* eventuality. If not, then although he may not thereby have forfeited *every* important sort of meaningfulness for his claim, as Professor Antony Flew believes,[1] he has at least lost his right to call his belief in God an *explanation*, for an 'explanation' that can cover all possible events without danger of disproof is equivalent to no explanation at all.

Although *particular* events may not serve as a basis for an indirect definition of God, some Christians hope for such a definition based on existence *in general*. Surely (they insist) the fact that something exists but that nothing with which we are acquainted explains *why* anything exists, requires us to postulate a further something, 'God', to account for 'the world' or 'history' as existing at all. But even if we decide to grant that the question: 'Why does anything exist rather than nothing?' is a legitimate one (as many would forcefully deny), we cannot

[1] cf. A. G. N. Flew's 'Theology and Falsification', *University*, 1950.

allow the answer to it, if it has an answer, to pretend to be an adequate literal definition of Him whom Christians adore in worship. In the first place, the Cosmological Argument itself, on which, of course, this attempted definition rests, involves highly questionable assumptions concerning the nature of 'being' and of the 'infinite regress'. More important for the Christian, it offers the God of Aristotle in place of the God of the Prophets, ontological plentitude in place of Grace and Love. We are not surprised, therefore, that contemporary Protestant theology itself frowns severely on the metaphysical contortions involved in providing indirect definitions for the word 'God'.

IV

How shall we assess our result? None of the three ways of defining our puzzling term has proved adequate to the present challenge of providing a literal meaning for the word 'God' which is at the same time compatible with theological orthodoxy. Ostensive definitions are inappropriate to a subject like the Christian God, indirect definitions fail to explain and create new problems of their own, and dictionary definitions cannot carry us very far on words shorn of their familiar meanings. Are we, then, to conclude that 'God' for the Christian is as empty an expression as 'ramafruge', and that theological language—all dependent on language about God—is a fraud? This suggestion, which seemed so blatantly absurd earlier, now looms ahead with apparent inevitability. But we need not be stampeded into accepting it.

The following is an attempt to describe the kind of meaning offered in theological language and to show that this kind of meaning is literally *vital*. This vital meaning is, if I am correct in my view, of a different sort from that usually credited it by orthodoxy or that recognised with approval by most philosophers; but language conveying such meaning could under no stretch of the imagination be disparaged as 'fraudulent'.

What, anyway, does 'fraudulent' mean? It *suggests* trickery, deception, spoof. It is a word to 'smear' with. But what in this context is its literal thought-content as distinct from the emotional hob that it plays with our judgment? Has it not been the following: that language about God, while having the appearance of meaning, is really guilty of *utter* meaninglessness?

If theological language (it assumes) proves to be without *literal*, clearly definable meaning, then it is *totally* barren and ('let us have no more to do with it') a fraud. *But this all-or-none assumption is itself the fraud*, drawing an emotional red-herring across our path. Let us admit that language about God cannot be credited with 'meaning' of the *sort* with which we have so far been almost exclusively concerned. And, when the dust has settled after this admission, let us then see whether there are not other kinds of meaning of immense significance which Christian language about God possesses in high—perhaps uniquely high —degree.

Thus far I have deliberately refrained from making use of the neat dichotomy which has been accepted as platitudinous by most contemporary philosophers, the dichotomy between 'cognitive' and 'emotive' meaning. I have avoided these handy labels because despite the fact that they reflect undoubted facts about the workings of language and about different types of meaning (facts to which I have referred a number of times already), they also lure us into habitually conceiving of these facts in distortingly crude ways. Normally, on this dichotomy, we are given the choice between 'cognitive' meaning, which is clearly definable in one of the ways already familiar (this, on the standard view, is 'meaning' *per se*, pure, bright, and to be approved), and 'emotive' meaning, which is something else that language seems to bear but which is not of much interest to rational people (this is 'meaning' by gracious sufferance, muddied, murky, and to be avoided). I should like to see this neat division radically questioned, the scope of 'cognitive' extended, perhaps, and much clearer thought applied to the miscellaneous scrap-heap of 'emotive' meaning. The job is too big for more than a start to be given in this place, but one or two points may be raised in connexion with language about God.

First, to admit that theological discourse is not of the sort to which clear and literal definitions are appropriate *should* not necessarily involve the instant reaction: 'Then it must be merely emotive.' That, in fact, an admission of this kind *does* evoke such a reaction shows, I think, that most thinkers, including Christians, are in the grip of what Charles Stevenson has taught us to call a 'persuasive definition'.[1] We approve of 'cognitive' mean-

[1] cf. C. L. Stevenson's 'Persuasive Definitions', *Mind*, Vol. 47, 1937.

ing and disapprove of 'merely emotive' meaning: some people find it satisfying, therefore, to find a definition of 'cognitive' which will include subjects in which they are interested while sweeping into a limbo labelled 'emotive' those subjects to which they are indifferent or hostile. These remarks are designed not to show inadequacies in the persuasive definition itself, as I hope to do later, but to raise questions in hopes of finding room for manoeuvre where present categories are too confining. If 'cognitive' in its present use is dependent on a persuasive definition, then the label need not be clung to at all costs. A more useful expenditure of energy, rather, would be the exploration of the sorts of meaning which are now tarred with the epithet 'emotive'. The results of this investigation might be to throw into relief the dogmatic tendentiousness of present usage.

I am quite sure that one distinction which such an investigation would bring out would be the difference between what I should like to call *reactive* meaning and *responsive* meaning. The former, 'reactive' meaning, is what is usually considered to be 'typically' emotive meaning—in which the superficial associations of words and phrases produce a reaction in the hearer quite beyond the literal or clearly definable significance of the utterance. Reactive meaning plays a vastly important role in all our language and both gives power to propaganda and lends verve to popular literature or subtlety to polite social intercourse. It is because of reactive meaning that you describe your financially conservative uncle to himself as 'thrifty' and to others as a 'tightwad'.

Besides reactive meaning, however, there is a yet more important though less widespread sort of significance which I have called 'responsive' meaning. This is the kind of meaning communicated by truly great literature. It is this responsive significance which we find in the 'archetypal images' of myths. We discover it in some metaphysical systems. And, above all, responsive meaning is expressed through the world religions. It is this kind of meaning, not literal meaning, which is expressed in Christian language about God. Let us examine it more closely by contrasting it with reactive meaning, with which it is too often confused.

It will be useful, for this purpose, to distinguish between 'signs' and 'symbols'. We *react* to many signs (of which verbal

signs, words, concern us here), but to symbols we *respond*. Reactive meaning is conditioned by relatively superficial experiences (often only linguistic habits) which vary from time to time and culture to culture—even between Britain and America there are many striking, and often amusing, divergencies between the reaction-content of certain words or phrases. But responsive meaning is founded on depth-experiences which are integral to our human lot. Civilised sophistication may soften but can never eliminate such common experiences as sex, nourishment, birth and death. None of us are immune from depth-feelings of loneliness, frustration, joy, fear and the like. The potency of responsive meaning is due to its direct relevance to such deep and universal springs of motivation. *Symbols*, having a bearing on these unavoidable ingredients in human life, differ, therefore, from *signs*, which merely receive a conventional 'emotive colour'. Signs can be produced at will and even their reactive content may (given time) be deliberately manipulated. Symbols are never produced but only 'created'—usually out of an agony of spirit—and their appearance on the historical scene is always inexplicable, therefore, in simple rational terms. Signs gain reactive meaning only of the sort and to the extent that usage dictates, while symbols—because of what they touch 'directly' in common experience—have what may be called 'intrinsic' meaning.

Some symbols, the great ones, touch many of our most basic drives and experiences. They can reflect a pattern or organisation of these depth-experiences and, if responded to affirmatively, can mould one's total response to his world: implicitly embodying a scale of values, an emphasis of outlook, a dominance of drive which provides a distinctive 'stance' or 'posture' towards the normal flow as well as the great crises of life. Such great symbols may be called 'organising images'. 'Nature red in tooth and claw' is no less such a possible organising image than the symbol of Jesus nailed to His Cross. Both deal with death and with different possible ways of ordering life. Both strike an extraordinarily deep chord of response in different human lives. The various patterns of organisation which they effect in the lives of those who respond affirmatively to the one or to the other are mutually exclusive, though the world protrayed by both—and the world lived in by those committed

to the contrasting images—is the same empirical world. It is in this sense that two organising images may be 'contradictory' or 'complementary'.

But is the sheer fact of commitment to one or another of the many possible organising images the last word on the subject? Are our affirmative and negative responses simply to be recognised and no more? Much contemporary opinion seems to lean towards this view, but it is at best a partial truth. Its inadequacy is shown, I think, by the fact that there are many 'imperfectly committed' persons, persons torn or tossed between two or more organising images, who seem to have a certain degree of control over—and responsibility for—the symbols which they encourage to become dominant in their lives. And the modern 'fatalist' view is shown to be further inadequate by the fact that genuine 'conversion' from a commitment to one organising image to another through discussion and meditation does take place. It is true that we are not entirely in control of our ultimate commitments. Shallow voluntarism will not fit the facts any better than fatalism. But we are to some extent responsible for the 'posture' of our lives.

Perhaps we owe our responsibility here to the fact that man is an *imagining* animal. We are told by Cassirer and many others that no one is without some image or set of images whereby he responds to his world. Very true; but it is also true that because of our power of imagination we sometimes allow ourselves to adopt various symbols in a tentative way, to 'try them on', as it were. Sometimes we find the new symbol possible, sometimes compelling, and sometimes, even, we 'live ourselves into' the symbol until it becomes *our* symbol, the new focus of our depth-response to our world. For this reason (because we have some control over the steps in such 'conversions') we can assert our responsibility, denying that our response to our world is determined entirely by 'fate', though 'fate' has much to do with the point from which we begin and the responses of which we are capable.

This, then, is a glimpse of what the cognitive-emotive dichotomy has effectively swept under the philosophical carpet: first, the overwhelmingly important issue of *how* we acquire those responsive symbols which affect the way in which our total life—practical, emotional, and intellectual—is to be organ-

ised; and, second, the equally vital issue as to *which* of these symbols, all loaded with responsive meaning for us, we shall encourage to colour our vision of reality and dominate our effective attitudes towards our world. The importance of these questions (not 'questions' which are intellectual *problems* applying modestly for neat unravelling but inescapable *challenges* to responsible decision concerning the basic orientation of life) has been obscured by their burial on the 'emotive' pile under comparatively trivial loads of 'reactive' dross.

If, then, it is my contention that the language of Christian theology in general and language about God in particular is charged with responsive meaning, how is this meaning communicated? Our foregoing discussion has ruled out its transmission through literal thought-content; and, significantly, religious people are increasingly realising that literalism is a blind alley in Christianity. Instead, they are learning to emphasise the great images of the Bible to which—with a sound instinct—contemporary theology is returning. It is, in fact, in the Bible itself that we find the clue to what I consider to be the correct communication of theological meaning: there we find *in combination* the bold assertion of symbols of the grossest anthropomorphism together with the heated repudiation of anthropomorphism, the presentation of great archetypal images with the denunciation of imagery! In like manner, the task of the theologian or clergyman today is to offer the great 'sagas' (in the terminology of Karl Barth) of Christianity in such a way that the responsive meaning implicit in the organising images of the Bible may take constructive hold in the lives of his listeners *without* at the same time giving the impression that these images are to be taken as nothing but literal truths. The tension is an old one: the way of affirmation must at every point be balanced by the way of negation; the way of negation has no point apart from positive affirmations. The religious training of every child must be carried on in the same way, by teaching images and then denying them, by offering stories and pictures and then purifying them. From the literal point of view we are engaged in self-cancelling and therefore meaningless activities. No matter. The canons and criteria of responsive meaningfulness are different from those of literal significance.

But *are* there any 'canons and criteria' for responsive meaning?

This was precisely the point from which the original cognitive-emotive division drew its primary justification, was it not? Was not 'literal' meaning chosen as cognitive and the rest denied this title just because literal, clearly definable meaning was thought to be alone capable of admitting reasonable criteria for its use? If so, then showing that the various life-regulative symbols of responsive meaning can be judged better or worse, appropriate or inappropriate, true or false, would be a way of suggesting that the 'cognitive' title be extended beyond its present use. There is, of course, no way (so far as I know) of *forcing* an enlargement of any definition with strong reactive overtones like that of 'cognitive'—not, at least, where there are genuine differences, as in this case, which can be made defining characteristics—but it does no harm to point up similarities between literal and responsive meaning where only differences have for long been visible, and divergences between responsive and reactive meaning where nothing but uniformity has been in sight.

The question is too big for adequate treatment here, but three suggestions may be made towards a favourable verdict to the question: 'Is responsive meaning cognitive?' First, it must be granted that some organising images have greater inclusive relevance than others, dealing more simply and naturally with more of the exigencies of life than the inherent potentialities of others allow. This is the criterion of 'appropriateness' which is quite relevant to responsive meaning. It is often this criterion which, when violated, causes the quiet abandonment of even the most majestic metaphysical schemes or which, when well fulfilled, accounts for the power of great symbols to survive millennia of radically changing historical conditions. Second, there is an arguable case for admitting a broader understanding of 'truth' than is currently fashionable. The word can be used in a number of contexts; why should one or two uses claim all the prestige of the term? Presently in favour are two diverse meanings: the correspondence of a statement to a state of affairs ('empirical truth') and a tautological combination of signs ('logical truth'). Why should we not pay at least equal heed to those usages where a work of art is said to 'ring true' ('responsive truth') or where a great symbol is said to have 'the feel of truth about it' when we face our world and

our unavoidable choices within it in the light of that symbol? This criterion of 'truth' which is relevant to responsive meaning is, when fulfilled, a source of the great power of some organising images and, when unfulfilled, a common explanation for their powerlessness. The sense of profound truth about early Christianity—its 'click of conviction'—goes far towards explaining its triumphal march through the Hellenistic world. Third, and perhaps most important, the symbols which we inevitably adopt (critically or uncritically) shape our response to our world for better or for worse. If, through fear of being made a laughing-stock by the universe, I choose organising images which stunt my life and harm my fellow men, I have chosen for the worse. Over-concern for literal meaning can develop an overgrown dread of being hoodwinked; but no organising image can (by literal standards) be a 'sure thing', and what irony it would be if those who are most anxious not to 'back a loser' should thereby be cheated of the best in life! The quality of a symbol should be judged on the basis of the kind of lives lived by those who most completely have made it dominant in their effective choices. And on this basis, Christian symbols may face competition with confidence.

Should responsive meaning, then, be classified as 'cognitive'? I think it should be, but I must plead indifference to the terminology employed so long as the situation reflected (but sometimes obscured) by the terminology *is seen for what it is*.

Is theological language fraudulent? Not if the pattern and quality of my life and your life matters, for it is with these things that our language about God powerfully deals.

Nothing that I have said, of course, should be taken as affirming that reality is essentially different from what the symbols of the Christian Gospel suggest. On the contrary; is it not likely that if the life committed to Christian symbols finds a fulfilment, a breadth of vision, and a sense of truth within this world, this is so because something about the universe makes it so?[1] Christians, however, must learn with good grace to combine humble suspension of judgment concerning literal descriptions of the world with creative commitment to the responsive meaning of the Gospel of self-giving love. I am well aware that this

[1] To continue this line of thought would involve a lengthy consideration of metaphysical issues into which we cannot go here.

suggestion will offend many among the orthodox, for it minimises the importance of *belief* even as it urges a heightening of living *faith*. But orthodoxy must, it seems, give way at some point. Where shall it be? Shall we give way to apostasy by offering ostensive definitions of the finite in order to secure a literal definition of God at any price? Shall we give way to idolatry by absolutising some image dogmatically, refusing to admit that reality exceeds the greatest that we can imagine as well as the most we can think? Or shall we, as I propose, retain our humility before the literally unknown together with an undimmed commitment to the most appropriate, truest, and best symbols we can find? The choice is momentous but it must be made.

Statements about God are essentially made not in the abstract, therefore, but in the immediate situations of life. How am I to treat my neighbour?—'God is love.' What shall I do with this enemy?—'God was in Christ, reconciling the world. . . .' Here is meaning, volumes of the deepest meaning, waiting to be translated into the fabric of specific act and concrete life-pattern. It is because we are here dealing with the most important sort of meaning which any language can carry that talk about God is incomparably vital, despite its non-literal significance.

The Christian who suddenly awakens to the non-literal nature of his language may at first suppose that he has lost everything. He may feel much as an artist might feel who finds one day that the market for all paintings has vanished overnight. *Financially* paintings are now worth practically nothing; one sort of value has, indeed, been lost. The temptation is to despair of them entirely as *totally* without value. But this would be foolish, for although one kind of value is indeed gone, it is not the essential kind of value for *paintings* to have. They are still beautiful; their intrinsic, aesthetic value is undiminished. Indeed, perhaps the collapse of the financial market will create renewed interest in the essential artistic value of paintings—interest which was too much in danger of being neglected for the non-essentials. Language about God, too, is in undiminished possession of its essential type of meaning, its unique value. Criticism of its literal significance may actually help to focus attention once more where it should properly be.

The artist may at first suppose that with the financial market gone, all paintings have been reduced to equivalence. 'There is no better, no worse, any more,' he may moan. And, *financially* speaking, he is right. But only when a single standard—an alien one at that—is accepted as the *only* standard of judgment, can this be maintained. Merits and demerits of paintings can quite well be judged apart from their price-tags. In like manner only the assumed premise that there is only a single set of criteria (the literal) with which to judge language can justify the conclusion that language about God is on all fours with every other non-literal statement. This premise is false. If it is of the essence of rationality to draw conclusions according to acknowledged criteria, then language about God—far from being fraudulent—is a legitimate vehicle for rational discussion. Let us then discuss what it says; to refuse is to defraud oneself of the Words of Life.

THE MODERN PARADOX OF CHRIST'S LORDSHIP[1]

by The Rev. ALEXANDER CZÉGLEDY

To proclaim that Jesus Christ is Lord over the world is to make a paradoxical statement. First, in the original sense of the word 'paradox', His lordship over the world is contrary to *doxa*, that is, received opinion, reason and experience. His sovereignty seems to the ordinary mind not less paradoxical than His mighty wonder of healing the man of the palsy which called forth the amazed exclamation: 'We have seen strange things [*paradoxa*] today.'[2] We cannot see, neither can we prove the reality of His kingship. This is meant by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews: 'Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet. . . . But now we see not yet all things put under him.'[3] Then another sense of the word is suggested—though probably to non-Greeks only—by the New Testament meaning of the word *doxa*, glory—'paradoxical' being something that is contrary to glory—not simply devoid of it, but appearing as the very opposite of royal splendour and might, as weakness, helplessness, shame and mortality. Also in this second sense the lordship of Christ is highly paradoxical. The visions of the Apocalypse assign power and glory to the Lamb that was slain. And thirdly, in modern usage, the word 'paradox' means an apparently self-contradictory statement in which the truth is expressed by two contradictory but necessary propositions. In this sharpened sense of the paradox one would express the lordship of Christ only in terms of those features which indicate His lowly service, weakness, humiliation and shame. We may think, in this connexion, of Luther's formula *sub contrario absconditum*, or refer, for instance, to a passage in the Gospel of John in which Jesus Himself seems to anticipate His suffering as the act of His glorification, when, after the disclosure of the contemplated betrayal by Judas, He says: 'Now is the Son of man glorified.'[4] Or we might point to the fact that He received

[1] This paper was written for Special Commission on the Lordship of Christ, appointed by the World Council of Churches.

[2] Luke 5.26. [3] Heb. 2.8. [4] John 13.31.

the first homage as the King of glory in the very hour of His deepest humiliation, when the penitent malefactor prayed to Him on Calvary: 'Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom.'[1] We may even assume that it was the very mockery and shame of the royal *titulus* over His head that conveyed to the penitent criminal the decisive truth of His lordship. Was not His defeat on the Cross the very act of asserting His lordship? Must not we suppose that the act of emptying Himself was the act of assuming power and dominion over the world? Was not His sacrifice by itself the act of discharging His function as the priestly King? Is His lordship merely hidden from earthly eyes, or can we say that what conceals His sovereignty, that is, His apparent weakness in this world, is the very manner in which He exercises His royal prerogatives in the world? Do we find in the Bible the 'simple' paradox of His 'hidden' lordship or the heightened paradox of His lordship being somehow disclosed exactly by what hides it from our eyes, that is, the very fact that the world rejects His royal claim and gives Him no other throne than the Cross on Calvary? Or do we find both?

We have, of course, the familiar way of taking the force of the paradox by relegating the lordship of Christ to the world of inwardness. This is not biblical. His kingdom is a spiritual kingdom, but this does not mean that only the souls of men are subject to Him. His word before Pilate, 'My kingdom is not of this world',[2] refers to the origin of His kingdom and can by no means be interpreted as a relinquishment of His lordship over the world. One may interpret Luther's teaching on the 'Two Realms' in such a way as to subdue, in effect, the message of Christ's lordship over worldly matters, and some of the Reformed theologians of the orthodox period had the tendency of limiting the kingdom of Christ to the Church,[3] thereby weakening the impact of Matt. 28.18: 'All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth.' Yet it was first the sway of the philosophy of idealism in the minds of liberal theologians that flattened out completely the paradox of Christ's lordship, when the sovereignty of Christ was, in fact, reduced to His reign over the minds and hearts of those accepting His spiritual leadership.

[1] Luke 23.42. [2] John 18.31.
[3] cf. H. Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche*, 1935, p. 384.

There is, of course, nothing paradoxical about the strong appeal in the personality and teaching of Jesus to many people, nor about the claim that the innermost core of human personality is responsive to the ideas of Christianity. There was a time when, not only in theology but especially in preaching, this assumption seemed to offer the most promising approach to Christ's lordship. But this time is past. One may have doubts about Bonhoeffer's diagnosis and prognosis of a 'religionless world', but it seems quite certain that the quality and capacity of mind which is called *Innerlichkeit* by the Germans is now shrinking and offers no sure anchorage to a 'spiritualising' exegesis.[1] The de-personalising influence of our modern industrial society makes people more or less unresponsive to what goes beyond their preoccupation with the world of inanimate objects. Niebergall could yet advise the preachers to regard only those passages in the Bible as 'Word of God' which offered something to our *Innerlichkeit*,[2] but few preachers today would follow his advice. A preaching based on a 'spiritualising' exegesis, thus reducing, in our case, the meaning of the lordship of Christ to a merely spiritual leadership, would certainly miss its mark. And it would be the removal of the real paradox that would blunt today the edge of such a preaching.

On the other hand, the cultural and philosophical climate of our time suggests another approach which, at first sight, seems to do full justice to the paradoxical aspects of Christ's lordship. It takes the line of a *demonstratio ex contrario*. It dismisses the former assumptions of a 'spiritualising' exegesis and tries to take seriously the worldliness of the world. It no longer appeals to the religious *a priori* or to the *Innerlichkeit* of the hearers. It writes off as liabilities what were formerly regarded as assets. It faces squarely the fact of a secularised society in which men think and act '*etsi deus non daretur*'. Preachers in former ages could wax eloquent while speaking about the historical signs of Christ's lordship, but today, when the emancipation of large areas of life from Christian assumptions seems to be complete, we are more restrained about these matters. It is in itself a paradox of Church History that precisely in our time, in the

[1] See the highly original paper of H. Berkhof in the *Monatsschrift für Pastoraltheologie* on 'Die kirchliche Verkündigung in einer religionslosen Umwelt', 1956, p. 321.

[2] *Prakt. Auslegung des NT*, 1923, p. 21.

aftermath of two world wars and in the age of the A and H bombs, the attention of the Churches is focused with an ever-growing intensity on the doctrine of Christ's lordship over the world—a teaching that defies the daily experience of our world as we see it. Indeed, 'now we see not yet all things put under his feet'.[1]

Now in this situation, theology is inclined to attach great value to the paradox as a positive category which is a particularly apt medium to express the lordship of Christ *sub contraria specie*. To be sure, theologians and preachers can hardly afford today to dispense with this important means of communication. But we must also realise that its theological employment is fraught with great hazards. The main danger arises from the conscious or unconscious influence of philosophy, or rather of the philosophical climate of our time. The aversion of liberal theology to the paradox was due to its alliance with idealism which held the meaning of being to be firmly anchored and assured in the world of ideas. Now idealism, as a practical philosophy or as an atmosphere of thinking, has been replaced, in many parts of the world, particularly in continental Europe, by a new type of thinking which begins with the rejection of the fundamental assumption of idealism, i.e. the tenet that there is an assured sense of meaning of being in the ideas of reason. So the positive programme is to make sense out of the non-sense of being (J.-P. Sartre). This is the primary paradox which then determines the further line of thought. Theologians too are lured by this new approach and swayed by this new *Lebensgefühl*, and the result is that the paradox comes to the front of their thinking.

This predilection for the paradox, which is thus not simply a matter of artistic preference but may stem from deep-rooted religious and philosophical convictions, tends to concentrate our theological thought on certain features of the biblical message and even narrow our interest almost to the point of excluding from our field of vision those facts of the Gospel history which resist the paradoxical treatment. This happened already to Kierkegaard who first introduced the paradox as a major category into modern Protestant theology. Siegfried Hansen shows in his paper on *Die Bedeutung des Leidens für das*

[1] Heb. 2.8.

Christusbild Sören Kierkegaards that the attention of the great thinker was so much absorbed by the supreme paradox of Christ's suffering that he had little attention left for the other events of salvation history.[1] He wrote comparatively very little on the resurrection, and the exalted Lord had no existential significance for him.[2] 'It is the misfortune of Christendom', he complained, 'that the conception of the exalted state of Christ has become so immoderate that it has grown phantastic. . . .'[3] I have the impression that the peculiar *theologia crucis* of Rudolf Bultmann, with his intense concentration on the death of Jesus, reflects a similar attitude. The Apostle Paul was certainly determined not to know anything among the Corinthians save the crucified Christ, but this supreme emphasis did not thwart his interest in the plerophory of the facts of salvation. To give an extreme example of the narrowed biblical scope of paradoxical thinking, I may quote Simone Weil, a French Jewish convert to an informal kind of Roman Catholicism, who wrote: 'The power and the glory and the Kingdom are images of this world. . . . And if the Gospel omitted the mention of Christ's resurrection, faith would be easier for me. The Cross by itself is enough.'[4]

Then, as regards the theme of Christ's lordship, we may gladly assent to the truth of Luther's paradox about Christ: '. . . this wonderful and unique King who is nearest to us when He is farthest away from us, and farthest away from us when He is nearest to us'[5]; but one has the feeling that the paradox is sharpened to the breaking point when Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in his enigmatic assessment of our 'mature world', takes a similar line of demonstrating *ex contrario*. 'We cannot be honest', he writes, 'unless we recognise that we must live in the world *etsi deus non daretur*. . . . The God that is with us is the God who leaves us (Mark 15.34: My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?) . . . . God suffers Himself to be crowded out from the world unto the Cross; God is helpless and weak in the world, and exactly and only thus is He with

[1] In *Kerygma u. Dogma*, 1956, pp. 1-28.
[2] Hansen: 'Wenn Kierkegaard unter dem Kreuz Christi stehen bleibt und den Weg nicht findet zu dem Auferstandenen, dann ist von vornherein deutlich, dass der erhöhte Herr für ihn keine Bedeutung haben kann' (op. cit., p. 17).
[3] Quoted by Hansen, op. cit., p. 19.
[4] Quoted by Susan Anima Taubes, *The Journal of Religion*, 1955, p. 12.
[5] W.A., 19, 154, 32.

us to help us. It is quite clear from Matt. 8.17 that it is not by virtue of His ultimate power but by virtue of His weakness and suffering that Christ helps.'[1] Again, probing the fringes of modern religious thinking, I may point to a remarkable similarity of thought, when the above-quoted authoress, with her religious background so utterly different from that of Bonhoeffer, makes her comment on the same text (Mark 15.34): 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?—here is the actual proof that Christianity is somehow of divine origin.'[2] For Simone Weil believes that the absence of God is the mode of divine presence and God's impotence in the world proves His reality.[3] But is this proof more conclusive than that of the idealistic theologians who believed in the inherent or hidden Christianity of man and argued with the *testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae*? Does indeed the experience of the 'void' of a religionless world indicate God's reality and saving presence?

This negative theodicy, however, is alien to the New Testament. On the whole, the New Testament writings present not the Cross but the events of the *status exaltationis* as the vindication of Jesus Christ. The strongest proof I could now quote in support of the contention that the Cross by itself was the vindication of Christ is Col. 2.15 (cf. 1 Cor. 2.8); but even here the paradox—in our modern sense—is weakened first by the 'antagonistic' (E. Stauffer) imagery (Christ leading in triumph His disarmed enemies), and, secondly, by the preceding reference (v. 12) to Christ's resurrection. We are certainly justified in speaking of the glory and victory of the Cross, but only in the light of the Easter event.[4] Kierkegaard is definitely wrong when he attributes the 'rebirth' of the Apostles to Christ's death on the Cross.[5] The christological theodicy of the New Testament, on the whole, follows the line of Luke 24.26, Acts 2.31ff, or Phil. 2. Even the relevant Johannine passages, such as John 3.14, 12.24, 13.31 and 21.18, 19, if read in their respective contexts, *spirant resurrectionem.*

[1] *Widerstand u. Ergebung*, p. 241. It is to be noted that the main problem of Bonhoeffer concerned the lordship of Christ: 'Wie kann Christus der Herr auch der Religionslosen werden?' (op. cit., p. 179).

[2] Quoted by Zdenka Svobodová, in the *Evangelische Theologie*, 1954, p. 516.

[3] See S. A. Taubes, op. cit., pp. 9ff.

[4] cf. 1 Cor. 15.14, 55.

[5] 'Als Er den Kreuzestod starb und begraben wurde: da wurde es ernst für die Jünger; jede menschliche Hoffnung war nun verloren—und hier liegt ihre Wiedergeburt.' Quoted by Hansen, op. cit., p. 14; cf. Rom. 6.4.

The *status exaltationis* follows, in a sequence of time, the *status exinanitionis*, and the two are not telescoped into one another, as the modern flair for the paradox would require. Hence the lordship of the exalted Christ is not the dialectical counter-proposition of His form as a servant, neither is His humiliation paradoxically identical with His exaltation. Of course, all this raises the great question concerning the New Testament conception of time, and the manner of using the paradox in order to express Christ's sitting on the right of the Father will depend on one's decision on this issue. Those professing an 'axiological' or 'realised' eschatology will probably resort more frequently to the paradoxical manner of speaking than those entertaining a 'futurist' eschatology or the idea of the *Heilsgeschichte*.

Here we come to the crux of the problem. If we hold to a linear conception of time, the tension in the paradox of Christ's lordship is somewhat relaxed—first, by the consideration that the apparent vigour of the 'powers' in this aeon merely indicates that the victory of Christ is still incomplete, and He, as the *rex designatus*, must still fight for His sovereignty. Then, in view of a real antagonism against Christ's lordship—a rebellion which will be quelled only by Christ's victory over His 'last' enemy[1]—we are under no compulsion to explain, in terms of Christ's lordship, the experience of evil in this world. If, however, we abandon the linear conception of time and hold that the old aeon is nothing to reckon with since the unchallenged sovereignty of Christ is already established, then there are only two ways of accounting for the undeniable experience of the evil in the world. Both are ways of the paradox. The first is to affirm that the 'powers', these disarmed enemies of Christ, including the state, actually serve Him and attest his sovereignty. Then we have the state not in spite but because of the fact that Christ reigns. To assert the former is probably a lesser paradox than to affirm the latter (Rev. 13!). Of course, the further question remains whether the state too should be counted among the angelic powers—a problem which will yet give much more work to the biblical scholars.[2]

[1] 1 Cor. 15.26.

[2] See the question in the introductory pamphlet of the Division of Studies, *Welt u. Kirche unter der Herrschaft Christi*, IV, 4: 'Welches Verhältnis besteht zwischen den von Christus besiegten Mächten und den Mächten, die z.B. in Röm. 13.1-7 erwähnt werden?'

Then there is also the second way, the way of the super-paradox, when the 'God-less' aspects of the world, including the observation that 'God is crowded out of the world', are looked upon as the indications that God is with us. Then Christ is our sovereign Lord inasmuch as His royal claim is rejected and His Church rendered poor and weak. Is there not a paradoxical conformity between the Christian faith in the lordship of Christ and the progressive emancipation of the masses from Christian assumptions? Must not we discover an alliance between atheism and the Christian affirmation that in Christ, our Immanuel, God is with us? 'The world that has come of age is more godless and exactly for that reason probably nearer to God than the immature world'—wrote Bonhoeffer. That may be so. But is it also true that atheism is a purification—as Simone Weil suggested?[1]

I take pains not to caricature this negative theodicy, the Evangelical variant of which is so seriously and challengingly set forth in Dietrich Bonhoeffer's posthumously published writings. We must be deeply thankful for this challenge. The paradox may discharge the function of a hyperbole, a stimulating exaggeration which must not be taken at its face value. Bonhoeffer himself—like Kierkegaard—consciously took the risk of making highly vulnerable statements in order to stir up problems of vital importance.[2] There is a Socratic use of the paradox, even in theology, to which no objection should be made.

But we must also realise the imminent danger of confusing the christological paradox with the paradox of existentialism, that is, the attempt to give sense to the alleged non-sense of being. If that confusion takes place, then, in the final analysis, the work of Christ, stripped bare of its mythological and apocalyptic imagery, turns out to be just that: the supreme demonstration that there is no way of giving meaning to the meaningless but the practical way of accepting what is meaning-

[1] Quoted by S. A. Taubes, op. cit., p. 9. Compare Bonhoeffer's statement above with a similar thought in S. Weil's *Le Pesanteur et la Grâce*, 1948, p. 132, 'Zwischen zwei Menschen, welche die Erfahrung Gottes nicht besitzen, ist ihm vielleicht derjenige näher, der ihn bestreitet', translated and quoted by Z. Svobodová, *Ev. Theol.* 1955, p. 516. In this case Simone Weil is perhaps less paradoxical than Bonhoeffer. His statement is from *Widerstand u. Ergebung*, p. 246.

[2] 'Wir müssen es auch riskieren, anfechtbare Dinge zu sagen, wenn dadurch nur lebenswichtige Fragen aufgerührt werden' (*Widerstand u. Ergebung*, p. 257).

less. The way to security is to accept insecurity. And that would be the ultimate meaning of taking upon ourselves and bearing our crosses—as symbolised, in a timeless manner, by the Cross of Calvary. But is this still the Gospel of the Bible? Does not it in fact savour of the hoary wisdom of the saying: *Fata volentem ferunt, nolentem trahunt*? Nevertheless, there are theologians who do not hesitate to reduce the meaning of salvation to the primary paradox of existentialism. This is done most explicitly, as far as I know, by Fritz Buri, when he equates salvation (*Erlösung*) with a willing acceptance of our fate ('Ja- und Amen-Sagen zum eigenen Verhängnis').[1] This act then releases the energies of love which thus issue from the *amor fati* ('Folge des *amor fati*').[2]

It is this trend of contemporary thinking of which we must be aware when we discuss today the lordship of Christ.

We must welcome the choice of the new Main Theme [i.e. *The Lordship of Christ* for the World Council of Churches]. Our occupation with the lordship of Christ over the Church and the world is not a search for an avenue of intellectual escape, nor an attempt to rationalise our plight, as Churches, in a society of apparently dwindling Christian substance. It is really the matter of rediscovering and recovering the great biblical message that the realm of our Lord is not co-terminous with His Church, and that He is Lord over the sacred as well as over the secular. The paradoxes we by necessity employ in order to press home this message may voice our joy of seeing the invisible glory of the Lord. The Gospel of Christ's lordship is a great message of comfort to the *ecclesia pressa* and a message of repentance to the self-complacent and introverted Church. But we must take pains to distinguish the biblically rooted paradox from the paradox which achieves its sparkling effects by its appeal to the philosophical mood of our time.

I hope that the foregoing remarks may have some bearing on the problems formulated in the introductory brochure issued by the Division of Studies of the World Council of Churches.

[1] Quoted by F. Flückiger in his discussion of Buri's book *Kreuz und Ring* in the *Kirchenblatt für die reformierte Schweiz*, 1948, p. 51.

[2] ibid. As to Buri's conception of the *Heil*: 'Entgegen der Berufung auf ein sog. Heilsfaktum, das sich ein für allemal in der Geschichte ereignet haben soll, halten wir dafür, dass das wahre und wirkliche Heil sich je in unserem Selbstverständnis zu seiner Eigentlichkeit gelangt' ('Philosophie u. Theologie', *Theol. Zeitschrift*, 1952, p. 131).

To give just one example, I take the question: 'In what sense must the Church be "unworldly"?'[1] I would not quarrel with the man who would insist on giving priority to the other question: how could we induce the attitude of true 'worldliness' in the Church? There is indeed a 'worldliness' that comes from the realisation that Jesus Christ is the saving Lord of the secular. Then 'worldliness' is but another word for the loving and saving self-identification which was exemplified by Jesus Christ. If we, to any extent, accept the diagnosis that the Church of today has become a 'bourgeois ghetto' of religious introversion, then we must certainly obey the commands of open-mindedness, unselfishness, responsible action and humility which are implicit in the paradox of Christ's lordship over the Church and the world. But the difficulty is that 'worldliness' may also have the accents, even in devotional writings,[2] of the paradox of existential decision, and then the resulting 'worldliness' of the Church may develop in some into a 'Pathos für Profanität'[3] and give rise to the illusion that, by the *via negativa* of the *Entmythologisierung*, *Entgeschichtlichung*,[4] *Entkultung*,[5] *Entkerygmatisierung*[6] etc., we may reach the level of a healthy and neutral *Profanität* on which a non-ideological encounter and fruitful co-operation of believers and non-believers may take place. It is along this line of thought that we meet the super-paradox of Christ's lordship in terms of a radical secularisation. Regin Prenter has issued an impressive warning, with reference to the theological programme of Friedrich Gogarten, to the effect that his theological welcome to the process of secularisation is liable to turn into the 'Gospel of secularisation' or a secularised Gospel.[7] Again, under the same influences, the critical impetus of the Reformation may be rediscovered in the critical impact of radical historical criticism, and I think that Gerhard Ebeling goes too far when he assigns the same service

[1] I, 1, p. 8.

[2] See e.g. the meditation of Ernest Fuchs on Phil. 2.12-18, in *Evangelische Theologie*, 1947, 97f, or the book of sermons by H. W. Bartsch, *Die Anrede Gottes*, 1952.

[3] Tillich's expression (*Religiöse Verwirklichung*, Berlin, 1930, p. 87).

[4] Bultmann, *Theol. des NT*, 1948, p. 25.

[5] G. Harbsmeier, in the *Theol. Rundschau*, 1952, 217ff; 1953, 223ff; 1955, 68ff.

[6] *Kerygma u. Mythos*, II, F. Buri: 'Entmythologisierung oder Entkerygmatisierung der Theologie', 85ff.

[7] 'Das Evangelium der Säkularisierung. Bemerkungen zu Friedrich Gogartens letzten Werken', *Theol. Zeitschrift*, 1956, 605ff.

to historical criticism as that performed in the Reformation by the destruction of the idea of salvation by works. He holds that the uncertainty produced by historical criticism is but the reverse side of the assurance of the *sola fide*.[1] Does this extremely positive assessment of secular criticism spring from the courageous faith in Christ's lordship over the secular, or from a peculiar and time-bound interpretation of historical existence? Then, in political ethics, 'Christocracy' is certainly opposed to the idea of a religious or churchly tutelage over the secular, but according to the logic of the existentialist paradox, even a legitimate concern over the place and influence of the Church in society might appear as priestly arrogance, Pharisaical self-assertion (*Selbstbehauptung*), hankering for the past, the fleshpots of Egypt, that is, the 'Constantinian Epoch'. We also find a kind of 'situation ethics' in which the situation is unconsciously identified with the 'philosophical *kairos*',[2] with its inherent logic and imperatives. Yes, we must have a new 'worldliness' in the Church, but one that is born of faith, the faith in the Lordship of Christ. And one way in which the Church may preserve her 'unworldliness' is also to keep clear, in theology, as far as possible, of the super-paradox inspired by the philosophical mood of the age. I refrain from a further exemplification of my theme on the problems which are so well formulated in the introductory pamphlet of the Division of Studies.[3]

I am writing from a country in which the propagation of existentialism is by no means encouraged, and thus its influence in the Churches—although not negligible—is more of the indirect kind. Now, from this vantage point, it seems that the theologians in Western countries show, in many instances, little awareness of the philosophical climate in which they work. I hasten to assure the reader that my observation

[1] 'Die Bedeutung der historisch-kritischen Methode für die prot. Theologie u. Kirche', *Zeitschrift für Theologie u. Kirche*, 1950, p. 42. Cf. Otto Michel, *Die Fleischwerdung des Wortes*, *Zeitwende*, 1956, p. 83: 'Vielleicht ist der Protestantismus immer im Gefahr, das kritische Erbe des Wortes Gottes, das in dem Ringen M. Luthers so stark zu Worte kommt, mit der kritischen Aufgabe und Reflexion zu verwechseln, die notwendig in jeder menschlichen Wahrheitsfrage liegen muss und die in der Existenzphilosophie besonders kräftig zu Worte kommt.'

[2] K. Barth's expression in his *Geschenk der Freiheit*, 1953, p. 25.

[3] With regard to the paradox of Christ's lordship I refer particularly to II, 5 (the problem of communication in missionary work); III, 1-4; IV; V, 1-3; VII; VIII, 5.

post is not a balcony and that the problems touched upon in the foregoing exposition are not merely 'academic' questions for the writer, and they may even have a more acute aspect here than elsewhere. Therefore I hope that, in the ensuing work on the Main Theme, under the auspices of the Division of Studies of the World Council of Churches, sufficient care will be taken to distinguish the paradox of Christ's lordship, which is a paradox of God's revealed mysteries, from another paradox, which is our own effort of interpreting the mystery of historical existence.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE PATTERN OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS

by The Rev. ROBERT DAVIDSON

In criticising the Protestantism of the Reformation period, F. R. Barry traces part of its weakness to what he calls 'the still uncritical attitude of the reforming leaders to Scripture' which 'elevated the Jewish sacred books to the same level of status and inspiration as that of the Gospels and Epistles'.[1] There is, he claims, 'little trace in Calvin . . . that the Scripture to which he appeals as authoritative embraces the Sermon on the Mount'.

The validity, or otherwise, of this judgment does not here concern us. It is sufficient to note that Barry and many other recent writers on Christian ethics proceed to redress the balance, till the reader is left wondering whether the Scripture to which they appeal ever contained the Old Testament; or—on the assumption that the existence of the Old Testament is recognised—whether something has not hung an ethical millstone round the neck of the Christian Church.

Thus Dean Inge, after noting that 'there has undoubtedly been a revolt against much of the morality of the Old Testament',[2] excludes the Old Testament entirely from his discussion of *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*. R. C. Mortimer, after invoking the doctrine of creation based on the Old Testament to validate an ultimate distinction between right and wrong, makes far more use of Aristotelian concepts than biblical insights in his approach to Christian Ethics. True, he does make brief reference to Israel, the people of God, and its consummation in the Church, the new Israel, but he uses this solely to insist that Christians ought to be baptised into the Church, ought to participate faithfully in its worship and ought to accept discipline in questions such as fasting.[3] Bishop Henson in his Gifford lectures on *Christian Morality* reveals the same

[1] *The Relevance of Christianity*, p. 24.
[2] *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*, p. 15.
[3] *Christian Ethics*, pp. 7-8, 49-56.

tendency. A chapter on the 'Authority of the New Testament' is followed by a discussion of the 'Jewish Legacy' and the relationship between 'Jesus and Judaism', but nowhere is any attempt made to lay bare the Old Testament approach to ethical questions, nor is it considered that the Old Testament may have an important contribution to make in any assessment of Christian Morality.[1]

Reinhold Niebuhr[2] in *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* utilises the Bible as a whole to substantiate his claim that the distinctive contribution of religion to ethics 'lies in the comprehension of the dimension of depth in life', but he virtually ignores the Old Testament in other respects; his nearest reference to Old Testament ethics being his criticism of orthodox Christianity for 'its premature identification of the transcendent will of God with canonical moral codes, many of which are merely primitive social standards'.[3]

Although there are notable exceptions (e.g. E. Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, and in certain respects P. Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics*), a decidedly Marcionite tendency may be fairly traced in much modern discussion on Christian Ethics. Nor is this tendency confined to scholarly discussion. It may be confidently asserted that many ordinary Christian people, if asked for their opinion on the relationship between the ethical teaching of the Old Testament and the life of the Christian, would reply somewhat as follows: 'There is obviously a great deal written in the Old Testament as divine law which no Christian can regard as binding upon himself unless he ceases to be a Christian.'[4] With this verdict, firmly rooted as it is in the teaching of Jesus ('It hath been said . . . but I say', cf. Matt. 5.38ff), no one would wish to quarrel. What is disturbing, however, is the thought that this may be the sole and final verdict on the relevance of the Old Testament for Christian conduct.

It is probable that part of the blame for the neglect of the Old Testament in this field lies at the door of Old Testament scholarship. Amidst an understandable preoccupation with the assimilation and assessment of the new material presented to us

[1] H. H. Henson, *Christian Morality*, chapters I-III.
[2] *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, p. 15.
[3] op. cit., p. 19.
[4] E. Brunner, *Justice and the Social Order*, p. 113.

by archaeology, in our excitement at the application of new methods of approaching the literature of the Old Testament, in our concern for the rediscovery of the theology of the Old Testament and the essential unity of biblical thought, the study of Old Testament ethics has been a comparatively neglected field.

Much, of course, has been written which is of direct relevance to Old Testament ethics. We have had illuminating studies in the general field of Old Testament culture and society.[1] There is a renewed interest in the place and the value of the cult in Israel,[2] an interest which may yet act as a healthy corrective to a type of moralism which claims the support of the prophetic teaching. A new understanding of Hebrew psychology, its distinctive terminology and assumptions, has been gained,[3] an understanding which points clearly to the unbiblical nature of any ethical dualism based on the body-soul antithesis which Christianity inherited from the classical world. There have been important studies of key ethical words, e.g. righteousness and holiness.[4] Nor must we neglect to mention our increasing knowledge of the genesis, history and interrelation of the various law complexes in the Pentateuch.[5]

There is almost an embarrassment of riches for the student of Old Testament ethics, yet it is many years since the last handbook on the ethics of the Old Testament appeared *in English*.[6] *The Ethics of the Old Testament* by H. G. Mitchell was published in 1913; *The Moral Life of the Hebrews* by J. M. P. Smith in 1923. Neither of these volumes attempted more than the writing of the history of Hebrew morals based on the rearrangement of the books of the Old Testament in the chronological sequence demanded by the scholarship of the day. In neither is there any inquiry as to whether it is possible to speak distinctively of the ethics of the Old Testament, or wherein the unifying principle, or principles, of such an ethic may lie. The chapter on 'Biblical Ethics' by W. F. Lofthouse in *A Companion to the Bible* (ed. T. W. Manson, pp. 348-66),

[1] notably J. Pedersen, *Israel*.
[2] e.g. S. Mowinckel, *Psalmenstudien*.
[3] e.g. A. R. Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel*.
[4] e.g. N. H. Snaith, *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament*.
[5] cf. A. Alt in *Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, pp. 278-332.
[6] There is the important treatment by J. Hempel, 'Das Ethos des Alten Testaments', *B.Z.A.W.*, lxvii, 1938.

concerned in the main with the New Testament, fails to do justice to the Old Testament material.

We wish to focus attention on certain aspects of the thought of the Old Testament which, finding expression in Old Testament ethics, are caught up in the New Testament and ought to have a continuing validity for any Christian ethic which is faithful to the biblical witness.

I

'And Yahweh said unto Moses, "Say to all the congregation of the people of Israel, You shall be holy, for I Yahweh your God am holy" ' (Lev. 19.1, cf. 20.26). This is the keynote of the 'Holiness Code', Lev. 17-26. There is no need at this point to dwell on the meaning of the word 'holy', קדוש, in this context.[1] The important thing to note is that a certain obedience, a certain way of life is demanded from the people because of what is known about God. In other words, the ethical norm is brought into intimate relationship with the revealed character of God. This is an emphasis characteristic of much of the Old Testament. It is reflected in the various complexes of law. Whatever may be the ultimate origin of some of the legislative material in the Torah, be it primitive amoral religious concepts, Canaanite civil law, the law of the desert or what we may describe as basic natural law, it remains true that much of the distinctive character which that material takes in the Old Testament derives from the theological setting into which it is woven. An interesting study of the way in which this may take place is to be found in Professor Daube's *Biblical Law*. Discussing the concept of the גאל, pp. 39-62, he shows that it has a threefold history. 'There is the ancient Hebrew social legislation on redemption; there is the application of the case to Egypt; *and there is the exploitation of this case, thus construed, to provide the basis for the social legislation*' (p. 53 (italics mine); cf. Deut. 15.12-18).

'I am Yahweh your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.' Thus begins the Decalogue, Exod. 20.2, Deut. 5.6. 'To me the people of Israel are servants, they are my servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt, I am Yahweh your God,' echoes the Holiness

[1] N. H. Snaith, op. cit., pp. 21ff.

Code, Lev. 25.15. 'Yahweh your God', 'Yahweh our God', 'Yahweh their God'—the phrases beat like a persistent refrain throughout the law codes of the Old Testament. The fact that many of the occurrences of these phrases are regarded as secondary[1] only serves to underline what the typically Old Testament outlook came to be. The very phrase 'Yahweh your God' would direct the attention of the reader or hearer to certain historical events, notably the Exodus, in which God was believed to have made Himself known; just as surely as the words Jesus Christ take us back to what once happened in Palestine.

What does this imply? It is not merely an indication that the law must be regarded as of divine origin, as is the case in the Code of Hammurabi where, at the top of the diorite stele, the king is depicted as receiving a commission to write the laws from Shamash the Sun God, the God of Justice. Similarly in the Epilogue to the code we read: 'I Hammurabi am the king of justice, to whom Shamash committed law' (reverse XXV, 98, cf. reverse XXIV, 80-90).[2] Within the body of the laws, however, there is no reference to Shamash. Nor is Yahweh introduced simply to guarantee the sanctions of the law. Undoubtedly in the Old Testament the Torah *is* regarded as being of divine origin (cf. Exod. 19ff), and Yahweh *is* thought of as guaranteeing the sanctions of the Torah (cf. Deut. 8.11ff), but the Old Testament steps beyond this. It sets the conduct enjoined by the Torah within the framework of responsive obedience to the self-revealing God; but furthermore, *it demands that the quality of this obedience be brought into line with the now-known character of God.*[3]

In the Covenant Code we find this injunction: 'If ever you take your neighbour's garment in pledge you shall restore it to him before the sun goes down; for that is his only covering, it is the mantle for his body: in what else shall he sleep?' (Exod. 22.26f). It is assumed throughout that the garment has been legally taken in pledge; nevertheless it must be restored at night in order that the neighbour may have the wrap to protect him from the biting night cold. This is not merely an example of enlightened humanitarianism. The reason for the injunction

[1] cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 215.
[2] J. B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, pp. 163b ff (translation by T. J. Meek).
[3] cf. T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus*, p. 290.

becomes explicit in the closing words of verse 27: 'if he cries to me, I [i.e. Yahweh] will hear, for I am compassionate' (חנון). And because Yahweh is thus compassionate, His people must show a like compassion. In the Covenant Code (Exod. 22.21), in Deuteronomy (27.19) and in the Holiness Code (Lev. 19.33f), there are regulations governing the attitude of the people toward the strangers in their midst. In each case, in our present text, there is attached to the regulation a reference to the time when the children of Israel were themselves 'strangers' in Egypt. Thus Lev. 19.33f: 'When a stranger sojourns with you in your land you shall do him no wrong. The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as a native among you, and you shall love him as yourself: for you were strangers in the land of Egypt; I am Yahweh your God.' The appeal here is not simply to the fact that they themselves had once been strangers, but to the remembrance of how, when they were thus strangers, Yahweh their God had stretched out His hand to succour. So must they stretch out the helping hand to the stranger in their midst.

We have already had occasion to refer to the way in which the concept of the גאל is applied to Yahweh and then becomes a factor in the social legislation. The law of the seventh year release is already part of the Covenant Code (Exod. 21.2ff). Deut. 15.12-18, in addition to providing the custom with a theological reason (v. 15), insists that when a slave is released he must not be sent out empty-handed: 'You shall furnish him liberally out of your flock, out of your threshing floor, and out of your wine press.' Why?—because 'as Yahweh your God has blessed you, you shall give to him' (v. 14), i.e. to a people once empty-handed Yahweh had given much, the product of His blessing; thus must His people give.

If this is one emphasis in the legal portions of the Old Testament—and we claim no more—it is obvious that it is a recurring theme in the prophetic teaching. If the prophet never tires of reiterating the demand for righteousness in the life of the nation, e.g. Amos 5.7, 6.12; Isa. 5.7, 3.10, it is because righteousness is part of the very nature of Yahweh—'The Holy God shows himself holy in righteousness' (Isa. 5.16; cf. 10.22).

Moreover the distinctive connotation of the √ צדק in its

relationship to God leaves an indelible mark on the formulation of the Old Testament ethic. Whatever the etymology of the root, it does not represent in the Old Testament an abstract principle of justice which views men with a blind impartiality. As a recent writer on Old Testament theology has stated[1]: 'l'ancien Testament parle de la justice de Yahweh lorsqu'il montre son action dans l'histoire'. The focal point of that action of God in history is the Exodus where Yahweh bound unto Himself a people by delivering them out of the house of bondage. Thus from an early date righteousness operates within the field of deliverance; cf. Judges 5.11, where צדקים means 'triumphs'. This connexion between righteousness and salvation comes strongly to the fore when Israel again found herself helpless in the dark days of the exile. Deutero-Isaiah sought to instil hope into the hearts of the people by stressing that Yahweh would demonstrate His Righteousness by bringing deliverance to His people. Yahweh is 'a righteous God and a Saviour' (Isa. 45.21).[2]

In the 'mishpatim' of the people of Yahweh there must therefore be reflected not strict justice in the sense of equality of rights before an impartial Law, but the same kind of righteousness which Yahweh has demonstrated, a righteousness bent on salvation. A recurring theme in the ethical teaching of the Old Testament reveals a deliberate bias towards the poor and the needy, the fatherless and the widow, the stranger in the midst. One example will suffice. In the noble 'apologia pro vita sua' which we find in the Book of Job, chapter 31, we read: 'If I have withheld anything that the poor desired, or have caused the eyes of the widow to fail, or have eaten any morsel alone and the fatherless have not eaten of it . . .; if I have seen anyone perish for lack of clothing, or a poor man without covering . . .; if I have raised my hand against the fatherless because I saw help in the gate, then let my shoulder blade fall from my shoulder . . .' (vv. 16-17, 19, 21). Note the implication of verse 21, that even if he could have ensured for himself the backing of the law—the gate being the place where justice was dispensed—nonetheless to afflict the fatherless would still have been wrong. The explanation of this com-

[1] E. Jacob, *Théologie de l'Ancien Testament*, p. 76.
[2] cf. N. H. Snaith, op. cit., pp. 79ff.

passion to the needy is to be found in Ezek. 16, which gives classic expression to the divine mystery of Yahweh's compassion for Israel. Such is *His* righteousness. The quality of obedience demanded from His people is to be consonant with the known character of Yahweh.

Jesus is, therefore, enunciating an Old Testament principle when He challenges in the words, 'You therefore must be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect' (Matt. 5.48; cf. Luke 6.36). The vital question to ask concerning this statement is not: 'What does "perfect" mean?' We must first give heed to the form of the statement 'as your heavenly Father . . ., so you'.[1] Similarly in Matt. 5.43-45 God's indiscriminating love, 'he makes his sun rise on the evil and the good, and sends his rain on the just and the unjust' (v. 45), is made the basis of the injunction to love our enemies.

Brunner well summarises this point when he defines Christian ethics as 'the science of human conduct as it is determined by Divine conduct'.[2]

From whatever sources the Christian ethic may draw certain of its concepts, be these sources Aristotelian, idealist or existentialist, it will remain a Christian ethic only inasmuch as it is basically Christocentric, since Jesus Christ in the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews 'reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of His nature' (Heb. 1.3). To assert that the Christian ethic must be Christocentric is not equivalent to saying that the yardstick for the Christian ethic is the teaching of Jesus as we find it systematised for example in the Sermon on the Mount. Dr Lillie[3] has well reminded us in his recent study in Christian ethics, *The Law of Christ*, that the two chief passages in which St. Paul impresses upon his fellow Christians the need to follow the example of Christ, viz. 2 Cor. 8.9 and Phil. 2.5-8, refer 'not to what Jesus did' (i.e. during His earthly ministry—and we might add 'not to what He said'), 'but to His great act of surrendering His divine glory in order to share our human lot'. The ministry of Jesus in word and deed may then be seen as 'a logical continuation of the great act of self-emptying love by which alone Christ became any sort of man'.[4]

[1] cf. T. W. Manson, *The Sayings of Jesus*, p. 55.
[2] E. Brunner, *The Divine Imperative*, p. 86; cf. P. Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics*, p. 16.
[3] W. Lillie, *The Law of Christ*, p. 15.
[4] P. Ramsey, op. cit., p. 19.

It is the totality of the fact of Christ, incarnation, ministry, death and resurrection, as a revelation of the inmost nature of God which is thus central to the Christian ethic, since here we are shown 'what *kinds* of divine activity should be imitated by men'.[1]

This is the true fulfilment of the Old Testament witness which made the revelation of God in the Exodus event a relevant factor in ethics, and summoned a people to a holy life in the name of a holy God.

II

The Old Testament bids us set our activity in the light of the Divine activity of the self-revealing God, but it is not content merely to say: 'Here is how God acts; this gives you the general direction for your life'. On the contrary the Old Testament is insistent that *this moral directive must find concrete expression in a community life.* If, as a member of the people of Yahweh, you are reminded that Yahweh once 'set his heart in love upon your fathers, and chose their descendants after them' (Deut. 10.15), and out of such remembrance are bidden to love Yahweh your God by keeping 'his charge, his statutes, his ordinances and his commandments always' (Deut. 11.1), then this according to Deuteronomy means *inter alia*:

> You shall not see your brother's ass or his ox fallen down by the way, and withhold your help from them; you shall help him to lift them up again (22.4);
>
> When you build a new house, you shall make a parapet for your roof that you may not bring the guilt of blood upon your house if anyone falls from it (22.8).

Similarly, if in the Holiness Code Yahweh confronts his people with the summons: 'Be ye holy, for I Yahweh your God am holy', this means *inter alia*:

> Do not turn to mediums or to wizards; do not seek them out to be defiled by them (Lev. 19.31);
>
> You shall do no wrong in judgment, in measures of length or weight or quantity. You shall have just balances, just weights, a just ephah and a just hin (Lev. 19.35f).

To such specific injunctions governing human conduct must the ethical norm come.

[1] C. H. Dodd, *Gospel and Law*, p. 41.

One of the results of the critical study of the Pentateuch is that we have become accustomed to distinguish at least seven different complexes of law within the Pentateuch, complexes which differ in date, in provenance, or in both.[1] This multiplicity of codes serves to underline the felt need to state and to restate in specific terms the ethical norm rooted in the known nature of God. If it is one of the tasks of theology to restate in every age, in terms meaningful to that age, the fundamentals of the faith, then the Old Testament through its law codes and its prophetic succession witnesses to the necessity to restate in specific terms meaningful to each successive age the ethical consequences of life together in the people of God. 'The ethics of love cannot *be* an ethic of law,' says John Macmurray, 'but there is room for such an ethic to make use of rules: though they must be relative and changeable.'[2]

That the rules must be relative and changeable may be seen in certain of the tensions and variations in the Old Testament ethic. For example, the change from one social pattern to another may pose problems incapable of solution in terms of the particular ethical rules which have enjoyed currency. In this connexion, it is of interest to consider anew the familiar story of Abraham's intercession for Sodom and Gomorrah, Gen. 18.16ff. Within the close-knit family and tribal group which forms the basis of the nomadic or semi-nomadic life which Abraham and Lot had hitherto been following, the concept of communal responsibility and communal guilt is readily acceptable. A new situation arises, however, whenever Lot decides to settle in Sodom in an alien community, a city community where the bonds which unite are no longer the same. If, in these new circumstances, the Judge of all the earth is to do right, the need arises to make a distinction within the community between the 'innocent' and the 'guilty' and to consider the relationship between them. Daube (op. cit., p. 155) correctly notes that in the upshot Abraham 'replaces communal responsibility, not by individual responsibility, but by what may be called communal merit'. What he does not show with sufficient clarity is that this shift of emphasis is necessitated by the changed social milieu in which Lot now

[1] cf. R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 210.
[2] *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 9, 1956, p. 12.

dwells. It would be possible to trace the influence of the changing social pattern on ethical thinking throughout the Old Testament. It is no surprise that it is in a period of rapid social change that the most virulent prophetic protest is heard.

On the other hand, the prevailing emphasis in theology may be decisive in formulating new ethical standards. During the period in which the people of Israel sought to make good their foothold in Canaan, Yahweh was undoubtedly regarded as the God of the warrior hosts of Israel, though curiously enough the descriptive title יהוה צבאות does not occur in the narrative of Joshua-Judges.[1] The enemies of Israel were the enemies of Yahweh. The extermination of the foe was thus regarded as an act of piety. In the Song of Deborah in Judges 5, we find an impassioned eulogy of Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite:

of tent-dwelling women most blessed.
He [i.e. Sisera] asked for water, and she gave him milk, she brought him curds in a lordly bowl.
She put her hand to the tent peg, and her right hand to the workman's mallet,
She struck Sisera a blow, she crushed his head, she shattered and pierced his temple.
He sank, he fell, he lay still at her feet,
At her feet he sank and fell; where he sank he fell dead. (Judges 5.24-27)

Yet among the 'tent dwellers' such an act against anyone, even an enemy, who had sought and been granted the hospitality of the tent, would have been regarded as a shameless breach of right conduct.[2] The prevailing theology has canonised it.

From age to age, from strand to strand, we may note variation in what the Old Testament regarded as right conduct. Such is the dynamic particularism of the Old Testament ethical outlook which insisted that its ethical norm ever find specific realisation within the life of a community, the people of God.

It is sometimes asserted that we may trace a direct line of deepening ethical insight in the Old Testament from a primitive collectivism, in which the individual as such had no rights, to a goal at which the moral autonomy of the individual is fully recognised. That there is development is undoubted, but,

[1] cf. *B.D.B.*, ed. Driver, 1952.
[2] cf. C. M. Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, I, p. 228; H. R. P. Dickson, *The Arab of the Desert*, p. 190f.

put in such terms, it is a dangerous partial truth. On the one hand, in the earliest strands of the Old Testament what the individual does is of supreme importance,[1] while on the other, the Hebrew always remained conscious that he was never merely an individual, but a member of the people of God. Basic to the Old Testament is the covenant-election theme, Yahweh and his people bound together in חסד by the covenant, once entered into at Sinai and ever being renewed by Yahweh, cf. Amos 3.1-2, Jer. 7.22-24, Ezek. 16.10. Within the framework of this covenant the Hebrew lived his life, and because of this covenant which existed for the glory of Yahweh the nation's life must be ordered to reflect His will. The varying strands of law, the prophetic protest were so many endeavours thus to order the nation's life.

It is a mistake to regard the prophet from the standpoint of an individual of insight in protest against corrupt society. The prophetic criticism was criticism by men who stood within the community they criticised, and who were profoundly influenced by the traditions of that community.[2] If Jeremiah condemns the priests for their mishandling of Torah, e.g. 1.8; if he seems to be the most uncompromising of all the prophets in his denial of value to the cult of his day, e.g. 6.20, 7.21ff, is it not because he was nurtured as the son of one of the priests who were in Anathoth in the land of Benjamin? The 'word' built on his community experience, and was directed to the creation of a new community. When, appalled by the moral debility of a people who knew not how to bring forth the fruit of true repentance, he looks forward to a new covenant based on a law written within the heart, the purpose of the new covenant is made plain: 'I will be their God and they shall be my people' (Jer. 31.31ff; cf. Ezek. 11.19ff, 36.25-27). Correlative to the holiness of Yahweh in the Old Testament, there stands not the morally irreproachable individual, but the holy people. If Yahweh be the God of righteousness, then righteousness must find expression not merely in individual lives of piety but within and throughout a community life. While this placing of ethics within the context of the covenant people could have

[1] A. R. Johnson, op. cit., p. 83, n. 2.

[2] cf. G. Henton Davies, 'The Yahwist Tradition in the Eighth Century Prophets' in *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy, presented to T. H. Robinson*, pp. 37-51.

unfortunate results, witness the intense religious nationalism which, not without protest, dominates the post-exilic scene, it prevented the Old Testament ethic from falling prey to a false type of individualism.

It is as true of the New Testament as it is of the Old that its ethic is a covenant ethic. The Church is the new Israel, 'a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's own people' (1 Pet. 2.9). To be 'in Christ' means to be 'in the body of Christ'.[1] Thus because the Christian ethic is Christocentric, it is at one and the same time inevitably 'Church-centred'. As C. H. Dodd well says[2]: 'The whole ethical life of Christians takes place within a social organism, which is not self-contained or self-complete; a community which is a body only because it is Christ's body, depends upon Him and serves His ends'. The distinctive quality of life together within the new *ecclesia* of God is repeatedly stressed in the early chapters of the Book of Acts. 'And all who believed were together and had all things in common; and they sold their possessions and goods and distributed them to all as any had need. And day by day attending the temple together and breaking bread in their homes they partook of food with glad and generous hearts' (Acts 2.44ff; cf. 3.32). Just as in the Old Testament what is known about God controls the quality of obedience which in severely practical ways is demanded from the people of God, so the Epistles witness to the way in which, from the very beginning, converts to Christianity from paganism were given severely practical instruction in the new way of community life whose quality was rooted and grounded in the God who has made Himself known in Christ.[3]

It is disturbing, therefore, to find—and it is surely striking witness to the extent to which the acids of individualism have corroded our outlook—that in many modern handbooks on Christian ethics there is little or no reference to the Church in this fundamental sense of the *ecclesia* of God within which the Christian lives his life. We look in vain for any reference to the Church in this sense in Niebuhr's *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*. Niebuhr is vitally concerned to explore the problems created for the Christian by the relationship in which he stands

[1] C. H. Dodd, *Gospel and Law*, p. 36f. [2] op. cit., p. 33.
[3] op. cit., pp. 12ff.

to the different forms of community which confront him; but he nowhere indicates that, basic to any interpretation of the Christian ethic, must be the relationship in which the Christian stands to the new God-created community, the Church. Paul Ramsey in his, in many respects, stimulating book *Basic Christian Ethics*, after treating the problems of the Christian ethic from the standpoint of the Christian individual seeking to implement the twofold love commandment, introduces his concluding chapter by the admission that 'There remains one outstanding omission from the foregoing consideration of the main themes of biblical ethics, namely the idea of "covenant" '.[1] The extent of his misunderstanding may be seen by the fact that his interest in the 'Covenant' turns in the main upon a discussion of the differences between the biblical view of contract and that held by Hobbes and Rousseau. It nowhere leads to the Church as being of immediate importance for the Christian ethic. Brunner is assuredly right in his claim that the nature of the Church is 'the decisive question for theology and also for every system of theological ethics'.[2] Its decisiveness is now widely recognised in theology, but the same cannot as yet be said in the field of Christian ethics. Christian ethics must be concerned to discuss, not merely the problems which confront the Christian as an individual facing on the one hand the world with its conflicting demands and duties, what A. D. Lindsay called the ethic of 'my station and its duties', and on the other the challenge to perfection or the morality of grace; but must also seek to reveal to us the inner meaning of that life together to which we are called in Christ. Lindsay himself is aware of this. After stressing the need to take our individual duty seriously he adds: 'But we can also, in the midst of the world, so much of which we must take for granted, be members of a society which shows forth socially—in the relations of its members to one another—what society as a whole ought to be. We can thus give corporate expression to our ideals. Such a society the Church is called to be. . . .'[3] This must become much more central in our thinking about the Christian ethic.

We need not be surprised that, with the failure to take the Church with full seriousness as a basic datum for the Christian

[1] P. Ramsey, op. cit., p. 367. [2] *The Divine Imperative*, p. 523.
[3] *The Two Moralities, our Duty to God and to Society*, p. 86.

ethic, we find ourselves in a situation where on the one hand we hear repeated appeals concerning the need to rediscover the meaning of Christian fellowship, and on the other the Church has by and large lost the sense of corporate discipline.[1]

There is a realm of thought and practice here to be rediscovered by a truly Christian ethic which will seek to lay bare the reality of our 'togetherness' in Christ, e.g. the relationship between corporate worship and conduct, the meaning of a κοινωνία created and sustained by the Holy Spirit, a Church discipline for our age. C. H. Dodd concludes his stimulating study *Gospel and Law* by asserting that the task of the Christian is not to advocate *our* ethic, 'but to bear witness to what the Gospel declares about the eternal nature of God as revealed in Christ out of which all our moral obligations flow'.[2] We would only stress that this witness must be made *within a community life*.

That this is its task, the Christian ethic is reminded by the Old Testament which, setting man firmly within the covenant people, sought so to order his life that he knew what it meant to be bound with others within the people of God, this people of God which the Old Testament, at its deepest level of insight, knew was in the world to declare 'the wonderful deeds of him who called you out of darkness into his marvellous light' (1 Pet. 2.9).

[1] cf. D. Bonhoeffer, *Ethics*, p. 258. [2] op. cit., pp. 82-83.

HIPPOLYTUS' CONCEPTION OF DEIFICATION

Remarks on the Interpretation of Refutation X, 34

by The Rev. Professor DIETRICH RITSCHL

It is true that the theology of Tertullian and Novatian has influenced later trinitarian conceptions much more than Hippolytus has. His ecclesiology and soteriology, however, are an important point of transition from Irenaeus' doctrine of the Church and of Union with Christ towards the later conceptions of a mystical sacramental understanding of Union with Christ. Hippolytus is in many ways responsible for the development of a doctrine of participation in Christ expressed as deification or mystical union. His theological interest is limited to a part of Irenaeus' doctrine of participation: to the *καινὸς ἄνθρωπος*, and hence to the Church as the assembly of the saints, the baptised, the just, who possess the Holy Spirit, and are connected with the apostles through the hierarchical episcopate.

I

Hippolytus' primary interest in the concreteness of the visible Church is shown by his rejection of a naïve chiliasm,[1] which he shares with Tertullian. This does not mean, however, that Hippolytus rejects or under-estimates the promise of the eschatological fulfilment. Quite the contrary: from this hope of fulfilment the Church gains strength in its unworldliness, baptism receives meaning in its effectiveness, the martyr takes courage in his distress, the clergy support in its position, and Church discipline power in its rigorism.[2] Hippolytus is following Irenaeus[3] (his teacher?), but he speaks to a different historical situation and has other opponents than Irenaeus had. The Church in his view is the communion of the just and is realised through baptism,[4] which purifies and is connected with the

[1] Cf. his *Chronicle* (Die griech. christl. Schriftsteller, Vol. 46, Berlin 1955).

[2] A very thorough analysis of Hippolytus' ecclesiology is given in A. Hamel's book *Kirche bei Hipp. von Rom*, 1951. Cf. T. F. Torrance's review in *Scottish Journal of Theology* Vol. 5, 1952, pp. 208ff.

[3] Cf. A. Hamel, op. cit. pp. 19, 36f, 81, 83f, 137, 140, 143, 164, 173, 178f, 203 n, 205ff, 213f. Different, however, pp. 81, 119, 127f, 189.

[4] Cf. G. W. H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*, 1951, pp. 143f; C. M. Edsman, *A Typology of Baptism in Hippolytus*, Studia Patristica II, 1957, pp. 35ff.

regeneration through the Spirit.[1] The Church is the bride and body of Jesus Christ,[2] however, together with the synagogue, as the commentary on the Song of Songs says.[3] The Church expects to come into the 'holy land',[4] to the paradise,[5] which is the original image of the Church and also the image of its perfection.[6] However, the Church may not be identified with the Kingdom of God.

The Church is not only the bride of Christ but also the woman that continuously gives birth to the infant-Christ.[7] This is the work of proclamation which the Church performs. The Church continues the work of Christ, but not as if she were separated from Christ. It is Christ who works in and through the Church. The Church is in Union with Christ. Direct deification in the terms of hellenistic thinking is not mentioned in Hippolytus except in the 'classical' passage Ref. X, 34. A. v. Harnack says at one place[8] that here Hippolytus had connected the rational thought that γνῶσις redeems with the conception that Christ causes the deification through His incarnation. At another place,[9] however, Harnack states that Hippolytus here thought of redemption as *receiving* ἀφθαρσία and as *being* deified; that is, Christ was actually only thought of as law-giver and teacher. It is well known that Harnack and those who followed him have criticised Hippolytus as well as Irenaeus and Athanasius as being 'mechanical' in their (Greek) conception of redemption as gaining ἀφθαρσία. This view has been challenged in recent years. The passage on deification in Ref. X, 34 should not be understood as typical for the whole doctrine of atonement in Hippolytus, for it is rather a kerygmatic or 'sermonic' passage than a dogmatical statement.

It has often been observed that Hippolytus has actually two conceptions of the Church.[10] This dichotomy is in a certain way

[1] Cf. also Interim Report of the Special Commission on Baptism, Church of Scotland, May 1956, pp. 23-29, primarily concerning the Apostolic Tradition.

[2] Comm. on Song of Songs, and gr. Fragm. 26 to Proverbs, and Comm. on Daniel I, 16 (Comm. sur Dan. ed. Maurice Lefèvre, Paris, 1947, p. 100), etc.

[3] Similarly Origen, Athanasius and Ambrose.

[4] Bless. Moses 15, 3 (Gebhardt-Harnack, T.u.U., Vol. 26, 1a, N. Bonwetsch, p. 66).

[5] Comm. on Daniel I, 17 (Lefèvre, p. 103f).

[6] This is a striking similarity to Ep. Diogn. chap. 12.

[7] De Antichr. 61 with reference to the woman in Rev. 12 who is prefigured in the person of Susanna (Comm. on Daniel).

[8] *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*, 1931, p. 135.

[9] *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed. 1909, I, p. 614.

[10] It has even been suggested that two authors are responsible for the works we

similar to the two trends in the theology of Irenaeus. As for Hippolytus, it has been stated that he on the one hand thinks of the Church as the communion of the just who live in holiness, and on the other hand of the Church as being the hierarchical organisation which possesses the truth. A. Hamel's book has shown that N. Bonwetsch has stressed the first conception because he has examined primarily the exegetical writings of Hippolytus, whilst Graf Preysing has based his studies on the *Refutatio* and ends up with the other conception. It is not necessary, according to Hamel's studies, to understand these conceptions as mutually exclusive. Each view must be understood in relation to the historical situation in which Hippolytus found himself. The hierarchical view of the Church was developed in connexion with Hippolytus' attempt to justify his own schismatic decisions against Callistus. If this is related to the *Refutatio*, then some light might be thrown on the interpretation of Ref. X, 34, the direct deification-passage.

Hippolytus' conception of the union between Church and Christ is based on Irenaeus' christology, which has been hardened and moulded towards ecclesiology. It might be possible to summarise Hippolytus' doctrine of the Church in spite of the two aspects, the hierarchical and the spiritual.

(*a*) The *Urbild* or original image of the Church: the heavenly, unworldly Paradise,[1] the assembly of the just,[2] the communion with God, the spiritual house of God, the place of salvation, the status of the society of saints before the fall and after the resurrection. (All these are terms or statements which can find biblical support, but the person of Jesus Christ is bypassed.)

(*b*) The *empirical* Church: it possesses the Spirit,[3] it gives birth to Christ in the same way as the Logos is giving birth to the Church, the apostles and their successors are the recipients of the Holy Spirit and transmit the orthodox doctrine, it is the Holy Spirit Himself who causes orthodoxy (*τὸν λόγον ὀρθόν*), the episcopate connects the Church with the apostolate, the Church possesses and guards the power of the Spirit and therefore has authority.[4] The Church has a hostile attitude towards

ascribe to Hippolytus: Josippus as author of the Refutatio and some other works, and Hippolytus as author of the exegetical works, Apostl. Tradition, de Antichr., etc. (P. Nautin's theory, 1947).

[1] Comm. on Daniel, I, 17.
[2] Comm. on Daniel, I, 14.
[3] Ref. Praef. 5, 6 and 7 (Migne PG 16, 302f).
[4] Cf. Irenaeus, Advs. Haer. III, 4, 1. III, 11, 8. III, 24, 1. IV, 33, 7.

the world ('Babylon'), it hovers so to speak above the world.[1] Those who belong to the Church are already on their way to leave the world behind,[2] the Church is already 'in heaven', in this world the Church is constantly in flight, saves itself in the safe harbour, at the Cross. The journey is safe, the love of Christ is with the Church and his commandments are the Church's 'anchors of iron'.[3] (All this is a peculiar application of Irenaeus' theology of Incarnation.)

(*c*) The Church in *eschatological* perfection: Christ is the κεφαλή of the Church.[4] He, the Logos, carries the Church with His love.[5] His second advent will bring the Kingdom[6] to the saints, they will rule in eternity.[7] Then the new aeon begins, the time of the Church will be over, the time of the βασιλεία will break in.

Participation in the Church requires sinlessness. Hippolytus has a quantitative conception of sin.[8] Baptism is the prefigured eschatological incorporation into the being of the Kingdom of God; it requires sinlessness, but causes it at the same time. The criterion of sinlessness is the obedience to the law. Those who do not keep the commandments, indicate that they do not have the Spirit. The fruits shall prove the righteous man and saint. The πνεῦμα is understood as a material power of God, similar to the view which we find in the liturgy of the eucharist in the *Apostolic Tradition*. It is possible to generalise and say that Hippolytus' theological thoughts are centred upon the destiny, concreteness and future of the Church. His primary interest is in ecclesiology; all other parts of dogmatics are subordinate to it.

II

What can now be said with regard to Hippolytus' doctrine of Union or deification on the basis of the above summary? It must first be said that Hippolytus—as many other early fathers—believes in the special privilege of the martyrs who will receive

[1] Comm. Song of Songs VIII, 2 (Bonwetsch, T.u.U., Vol. 23, 2c, p. 40 and 94, e.g.: '... von allen schlimmen und stürmischen Versuchungen lebt sie also abseits').
[2] Bless. Moses 17, 3 (T.u.U., 26, 1a, p. 70: '... berufen durch das Evangelium, bereit auszugehen aus dieser Welt in eine andere Welt ... die Ruhe der Seligkeit des unverweslichen ewigen Paradieses zu ererben').
[3] De Antichr. 59 (Migne, PG 10, 780).
[4] Bless. Jacob 27, 5 (Text: N. Bonwetsch, T.u.U. 26, 1a, p. 45).
[5] Comm. on Daniel IV, 37 (Lefèvre, p. 338).
[6] Comm. on Daniel IV, 23, 5 (Lefèvre, p. 306).
[7] Comm. on Daniel IV, 10, 1, to Daniel 7, 17-18 (Lefèvre, p. 280).
[8] Ref. X, 12 (?) (Migne PG, 16, 3426).

the heavenly reward immediately after their death.[1] Prophets and apostles have the same fortunate fate even if they were not martyrs.[2] For the Union between Christ and the saints in general Hippolytus uses the following expressions: 'belt' on the body of Christ, members of the body who become the body, co-heirs, and co-rulers. Above all these there is the direct passage about deification in Ref. X which Hippolytus formulated in the language of Irenaeus. If one wants to leave out the *Apostolic Tradition*, because its authorship is not absolutely firmly established, Ref. X, 34 can be considered the only passage on deification (besides the innumerable passages on 'bride and husband' which actually teach Union with Christ and not deification). However, other passages express essentially the same view, especially when thoughts of Irenaeus are employed; but then it is often difficult to make out in how far they are just borrowed from Irenaeus or really represent Hippolytus' own teaching.

The one passage in Ref. X, 34 says that 'orthodoxy' saves and effects deification. This fits well the conception of the Church in the commentaries. It must, however, be emphasised that Hippolytus does not conceive 'orthodoxy' as mere 'knowledge' in the sense of γνῶσις or of 'Christ as a teacher' as Clement of Alexandria sees it. The interpretation of orthodoxy as '*gnosis*', and of Christ as teacher or law-giver, as Harnack formulates, does not embrace the full teaching of Hippolytus. True doctrine is not to be understood as being 'ethical' but as being incorporated into the one apostolic-episcopal Church that possesses the Spirit which enables the saints to 'understand'. The main point to be made here is that Hippolytus does not intend to teach 'deification' separated from 'Union with Christ'. The important passage is this (Ref. X, 34):

1 This is the true doctrine of the Deity, O men, Greeks and Barbarians, Chaldeans. . . .
through this knowledge (ἐπιγνώσεως) you shall escape the approaching threat of fire of judgment. . . .
5 this you shall escape by being instructed (διδαχθείς) about the true God, and you shall have an immortal body and with it an incorruptible soul (ἔξεις δὲ ἀθάνατον τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἅμα ψυχῇ), and you will

[1] Comm. on Daniel II, 37 (Lefèvre, p. 188) and De Antichr. 59.
[2] Martyrs (without laying on of hands) and confessors (after laying on of hands) are honoured as presbyters, in Apostl. Tradition, 10, 1 and 2.

receive the Kingdom of heaven, and you, whilst living the earthly life, have known the heavenly King, and you shall be a companion of God (ὁμιλιτὴς θεοῦ) and a co-heir with Christ (συγκληρονόμος), (you shall) not (any longer) (be) enslaved by lusts or passions or diseases. For you become God (*Γέγονας γὰρ θεός*): for whatever sufferings you have undergone while being a man, (God) gave these, because you are a man; but whatever God has, this God has promised to grant (to you), because (ὅτι, others: ὅτε, Latin: *quia*) you have been deified, you have become immortal (ὅτι ἐθεοποιήθης, ἀθάνατος γεννηθείς). This is the (proverb) 'Know thyself', when you acknowledge (ἐπιγνούς) God, the Creator. For the knowledge of oneself means at the same time (συμβέβηκε) to be known by the one by whom you are called (Lat: *Si quis enim se ipsum cognovit, contigit ei, qui ab illo vocatus est, ut cognosceretur* (sc. *a Deo*)). Do (therefore) not fight with one another, O men, and do not hesitate to run back (? παλινδρομεῖν, Lat. *redire*). For Christ is the God above all, who has decided (arranged) to wash away sin from men, to make a new man of the old man; He, who from the beginning called man His likeness, by an example (διὰ τύπου) (He) has shown his love (στοργήν) to you; if you obey His solemn ordinances and become a good follower of the (one who is) good, then you will be similar (to him) and you will receive honour from Him (ἔσῃ ὅμοιος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τιμηθείς). For God, who has also made you a god (θεὸν ποιήσας) to His own glory, is not as poor as a beggar.

Two things must be noticed. Firstly, the fact that these words conclude the whole of the Refutation; they form the solemn conclusion of all that has been said and they are at the same time an appeal to the reader. We must understand these statements in this context. In fact, there is no new thought introduced with the exception of the Irenaean formula 'you become God' which is in a certain way alien to the thought forms of the *Refutatio*. As Irenaeus in the last chapter of Adv. Haer. and in Praef. V—at important points—Hippolytus also uses pointed and daring formulations, not with the intention to establish theological terms but rather to sum up the whole argument in an unmisunderstandable manner.—Secondly, the use of the second person singular is interesting. It can perhaps be interpreted in connexion with the appeal for repentance and peace.[1] However, those exhortations could have been expressed in plural forms. The only plural forms in the passage are to be found in the address at the beginning; then in the objective statement that God has decided to wash away the sins (ἐξ ἀνθρώπων), and

[1] Cf. the change from plural to singular in Gal. 4, 5, 6 and 7: 'so that *we* might receive adoption as sons. And because you are sons . . . so you are (εἶ) no longer a slave but a son.'

in the admonition to keep peace with one another, which is only logical because more than one person is concerned when peace is in question.

Another observation has to be made before the passage can be interpreted. The end of the previous chapter is a summary of Irenaeus' theology as it was understood by Hippolytus. He speaks there of the true humanity of Christ, i.e. of His participation in our humanity and the result of this, i.e. our participation in Him. Our obedience is participation in His obedience. What He has done in His humanity was done for us:

> . . . in all these (obedient acts) He has offered His own manhood (ἄνθρωπον), so that (ἵνα) you, when you suffer, will not be despairing, but, confessing that you yourself are a man (ἄνθρωπον), can expect to receive also what (God the Father) has granted to this (His Son).[1]

This passage indicates more clearly than many others that here Hippolytus has really understood the heart of Irenaeus' biblical theology. When you are in desperation, look at your own humanity ('confess it'!) and know that Christ shared our humanity! But this is one of the very few passages[2] which show this understanding. It is important to realise that it directly precedes the passage on deification.

On the basis of what has been said about Hippolytus' theology, the following interpretation of Ref. X, 34 can now be attempted. Lines 3-4 speak of the same escape from the world which can be found in general in Hippolytus' writings. The Church is on its way out of the world towards a better place. The world, enslaved by demons, will be destroyed by the fire[3] of judgment. To escape this fate is the genuine meaning and mission of the Church. To understand this requires the orthodox doctrine. Hippolytus says often that the coming end is near, although his Church was more established than Irenaeus'. —It can be said that this conception of the Church which escapes the world contradicts the christology and soteriology on which the ecclesiology is meant to be built.

Lines 5-7 repeat the previous thought and express it more precisely by saying what the goal is that the believers will reach when they have escaped this world. The object[4] of the doctrine

[1] Ref. X, 33 (Migne PG 16, 3451).
[2] Cf. also Contra Noet 17, the whole chapter, ending thus: ἀληθῶς γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος (Migne PG 10, 828). [3] Cf. also De Antichr. 5 (Migne PG 10, 733), etc.
[4] Cf. Ref. IX, 31 (Migne PG 16, 3411).

('knowledge') is the true God (*θεὸν τὸν ὄντα*), not man and not the Church. The goal is the immortal body and with it an incorruptible soul. Hippolytus teaches that the bodies will rise.[1] He mentions the soul besides the body, probably because of the Greek doctrine which says that the soul, but by no means the body, can be united with the Godhead. For Hippolytus body and soul belong inseparably together.

Lines 8-10 show how Hippolytus thinks of the beginning of heavenly life already on this earth: the unification begins here in this earthly life by means of knowing the heavenly King. What the world cannot offer and not understand, this the baptised believer will receive in the Church and especially in the Eucharist. His present life is nothing but an anticipation of the life to come. The real fruits of the work of Christ will only be received in the future. The believer is not yet, but he will become, a 'companion of God'. Companion of God and co-heir with Christ belong together. Hippolytus thus transposed the Union with God in Christ into the eschaton, and he did not feel able to go as far as the Pauline theology and the Johannine tradition. For him inheriting and knowing everything about God are identical. This is the promised salvation.

Lines 11-13 describe the power of the demons which enslave everything that is still living in this earth. Hippolytus names the three main barricades which separate man from the status of complete and blessed union with God. They are the exponents of the life in this fallen world. The fact, that just these three (lusts, passions, diseases) will be abolished at the great day, is such tremendous news that the expression 'you become god' is just strong enough to point to the enormous contrast between this life and the life to come. This radical term is meant to be one short summary of what Hippolytus has already said: the coming glory will be so absolutely new compared with the old aeon, and so new and different from the old world as the heavenly King is different from this world with its suffering. But he wants to avoid a misunderstanding: the suffering the readers of the *Refutatio* have to undergo is not an indication of God's impotence. God knows what he is doing. Hippolytus can say in other passages that the devil has sent diseases and sufferings, but it is clear to him that God is also Lord over devil

[1] e.g. Adv. Graecos II (Migne PG, 10, 800), etc.

and demons. Therefore he can say here in a short statement that it was God who gave the (evil) conditions which are still to be experienced by the believers in this old world.

Lines 14-15 lead back to the subject of Union after the short excursus about the suffering and the justification and the purpose of it. The thesis of Union with God in terms of deification is now generalised. The words θεοποιεῖν and ἀθάνατος are here connected so that one interprets the other. Because of the context it is clear that the deification is an eschatological event. It is, however, prefigured in Jesus Christ, but no further mention of this christological basis is made. The passive form of θεοποιεῖν and the sentence as such make it quite clear that Hippolytus wants to say that deification is an act of grace, i.e a gift. God gives what He has. We would have nothing to complain about Hippolytus if he had said 'God has life, and besides God there is no life; He in His grace is determined to give you His life, because He wants you to be the recipient of His life', or something like this. A strong point can be made that this is actually what Hippolytus wants to express. It is primarily the formulation of the thought which has caused so many to criticise Hippolytus' concept of 'deification'.

Lines 16-21. At the first look it is difficult to see why Hippolytus here quotes the Greek proverb and how far it leads over to a new thought. There is a hidden quotation of 1 Cor. 13.12, and the Greek proverb stretches the meaning of verse 12b: 'then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood' (R.S.V.). The quotation of the Greek proverb becomes clear when we realise in which context it is used: the application is the call for peace. The 'knowledge of God' was mentioned at the beginning of the passage and it is actually the thread through the whole *Refutatio*. The question is now how this knowledge of God relates to the knowledge of men, i.e. to the life of men. This free interpretation and application of 1 Cor. 13.12 is not an apologetic concession to Greek thinking, it is rather an appeal with this logic: those who acknowledge God, must and will understand themselves, i.e. their destiny—later Gen. 1.26 is referred to. There is no logical or chronological order stated. The form συμβέβηκε does not answer our question. This much, however, can be said that the Edinburgh edition of the Ante-Nicene Christian Library does not translate correctly by saying:

'discover God within thyself, for He has formed thee after His own image'. This is an impermissible contraction of this proverb with the later sentence (l. 24) 'who from the beginning called man His likeness' (Gen. 1.26). Hippolytus is not referring to an 'order of creation' which enables him to understand man. On the contrary, he refers to Christ, to the washing away of the sins, to the new over against the old man. He says all this before he refers back to Gen. 1.26.

Lines 21-25. The call for peace is connected with the peculiar verb παλινδρομεῖν[1] which occurs rarely in Greek literature. It must be understood as an action of 'repentance' rather than as 'self-analysis'.The readers of the *Refutatio* are admonished to 'run back' to the 'orthodox knowledge' or true doctrine, referred to in lines 1 and 3. There is no indication that Hippolytus wants to say that his readers should make an effort to return to their original destiny, defined in Gen. 1.26. This work cannot be performed by them, but it has been accomplished by Christ, who is called God.[2] There is a textual difficulty. It is possible to read: 'Christ is the one whom the God over all has ordained to wash away the sin from men'—however, the order of words is against this reading. (Cf. Bunsen's reading in Migne PG, 16, 3453/4, variae lectiones 33.) Of theological interest only is the statement—in either of the readings—that God's plan for salvation can only be understood because of Christ's atoning work. The *imago Dei* becomes visible in Christ. The justification or even deification is grounded in Christ's love; it is anchored in His love as τύπος. This goes together with the teaching of Hippolytus that the Church is kept alive by the love of the Logos as long as the Church lives in this world.

Lines 25-29. The condition 'if[3] you obey . . . then you will . . .' is disappointing. It reminds us of Hippolytus' rigorism in the treatment of the *lapsi* and in general of his attitude towards Callistus in the controversy concerning repentance and confession. But his thinking, in spite of the unfortunate expression of it, is not without biblical support. This condition is surely

[1] Cf. Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 1951, ad loc.

[2] It depends on the translation whether this passage excludes subordinationism (of which Hippolytus is accused), or whether Christ is understood as an 'instrument' used by God for the washing away of sins.

[3] Cf. also holiness as condition for office-bearers, Ref. IX, 12 (Migne PG, 16, 3386), Comm. on Daniel I, 17, etc.

one aspect of the obedient life. We hear soon about the other aspect, namely that it is God in Christ who confers honour to the follower of Christ. The perfection of man (Matt. 5.48) is not man's own work; it is God's mighty act, performed to God's own glory. The promise 'you will be similar (to him)' must be read together with the following phrase *ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τιμηθείς*. This determines in a certain way the translation of the last sentence, which has always been considered to be difficult. *Οὐ γὰρ πτωχεύει Θεὸς καὶ σὲ θεὸν ποιήσας εἰς δόξαν αὐτοῦ*—Non enim mendicus est Deus, qui et te deum fecit ad ipsius gloriam—has been translated by the ANCL: 'For the Deity, (by condescension,) does not diminish aught of the dignity of his divine perfection; having made thee even God unto His glory!' It seems difficult to retrace the thoughts of the translator. The Latin translation is quite correct and no reason can be seen why the ANCL prefers this other translation and refers to only two other alternatives, namely, Bunsen: 'for God acts the beggar towards thee'—and Wordsworth: 'God has a longing for thee'. The verb *πτωχεύειν* means either 'to beg' or 'to be as poor as a beggar'.[1] The latter meaning makes good sense, so that we can read: 'For God, who has also made you a god to His own glory, is not as poor as a beggar'. The emphasis is on the 'also you' and it must be read together with the previous statements about the forgiveness of sin, about the love and the honour. God honours us to His own honour; He can do this because He does not need our honour. He has sufficient honour for Himself. This is the meaning of the statement that He is not a beggar. He can give from what He has; He has honour, He can give honour. What He gives is His, or rather it is He Himself. Therefore: *σὲ θεὸν ποιήσας*.

III

The combination of *θεὸν ποιεῖν, θεοποιεῖν, ὅμοιος, ὁμιλιτὴς θεοῦ, μιμιτής, συγκληρονόμοι, ἀθάνατος*, etc. shows that Hippolytus does not intend to teach a doctrine of 'deification' centred upon a clear terminology. He is using Greek as well as biblical terms. He wants to state that the work of atonement is not men's but Christ's work. The terms of the Bible and of Irenaeus' theology and of other sources are all being used to express this

[1] Cf. Liddell and Scott, p. 1550.

one thought. It must, however, be seen that Hippolytus' doctrine is not as clear and powerful as Irenaeus' soteriology. Hippolytus' thoughts are closely related to his understanding of the Church, whilst Irenaeus tries to formulate his soteriology on the basis of his conception of the humanity of Christ.

Since Hippolytus thinks that the Church does not really live any longer in this world but that it is on its way out of the world, his thoughts have already a slight touch of mysticism which we also find in the liturgies of the third and fourth centuries. The believers are not any longer under the real power of the demons of this world; therefore they are to live an obedient life of purity and perfection. Worship and sacraments lead them nearer and nearer to their heavenly Lord. The *Apostolic Tradition*, which is most probably Hippolytus' own work, and many liturgies which were influenced by his thoughts illustrate this very clearly. Hippolytus projects salvation into the eschaton and the eschatological perfection into the time of the Church.

It can be said that Hippolytus' conception of 'deification', as it is expressed in Ref. X, 34, is actually in its origins a doctrine of participation in the (human) obedience of Christ with the promised reward of participation in God's honour. However, the way in which this is expressed, is moulded by the anti-gnostic controversy on the one hand and the episcopal and sacramental understanding of the Church on the other hand. It has therefore opened the door to sacramental mysticism which teaches that the holy group of baptised believers is already on its way out of the world to unification with the heavenly King. Irenaeus' conception of the importance of the humanity of Christ was better and more radically understood by Athanasius than by Hippolytus, whose ecclesiology was in many ways separated from christology. This seems to be the reason that Hippolytus did not lay a solid ground for a biblical doctrine of participation but remained rather in the area of the uncertain and ambiguous thoughts of deification. The unbiblical idea of deification can only be replaced by a sound doctrine of Union with Christ if the humanity of the risen Lord is taken seriously in all thinking about the Church and the world.

THE ORDINAL OF THE CHURCH OF SOUTH INDIA[1]

by The Rev. T. S. GARRETT

The revised orders for the ordination of deacons and presbyters and the consecration of bishops were approved by the C.S.I. Synod in January 1958. The author must confess to some delay in writing this account of them; but this tardiness has at least given opportunity to begin with some comment on the essays *Apostolic Succession*, by Bishop Noel Hall, and '*Episcopate' and 'Presbyterate' in the Anglican Ordinal*, by Professor J. M. Barkley, which appeared in Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 1958) of *SJT*. It may be a fruitful line of approach to this liturgical product of C.S.I. to set it beside the Anglican and Presbyterian standpoints concerning ordination, as stated in these essays, and to try and estimate what contribution it makes to the debate.

The impression which these essays leave on a minister of C.S.I. is that neither writer has altogether avoided overstating his case and that we have in this characteristic overstatement on the part of Anglicans and Presbyterians respectively the theological barrier which divides them. This appears to be less true of the carefully balanced thesis of Dr Hall; but although, on the one hand, he gives due consideration to the problems and uncertainties of the pre-Nicene period in the history of the ministry and, on the other, goes as far as he can in admitting the reality and effectiveness of the non-episcopal ministries, he nevertheless finds it 'hard to conceive how the admission can be avoided that the endeavour to discover a doctrine of the Ministry which will not unchurch the non-episcopal Communions logically involves a surrender of . . . principle'. The principle he has in mind is that enunciated by the late Bishop Kenneth Kirk, that 'the Catholic Church cannot be found except as gathered round the apostolic ministry: the apostolic ministry cannot exist except in the bosom of the Catholic Church'.

In support of Dr Kirk's position he quotes a passage from *Doctrine in the Church of England* (an Anglican doctrinal report published in 1938), but perhaps fails to note all the implications

[1] Published by the Oxford University Press in India.

in two sentences of this passage: 'The Ministry does not exist apart from the Body nor the Body apart from the Ministry,' and 'The commission to exercise Ministry is bestowed through those who already hold it, but it comes from the Risen, Reigning and Present Lord Himself.' In their context these statements are part of an argument justifying the historic episcopate as the ministerial organ of the Church succeeding the apostolate which Christ appointed. As an ex-Anglican in C.S.I., I believe that episcopalians are right in their assertion of this double authority that is given to the Church's ministry: (1) the authority of the succession going back in a pattern of discernible continuity to our Lord's commission to his Apostles, however dark and devious the 'tunnels' may be in its history[1]; (2) the present authority of the risen Christ in his Body the Church. Whether we call the former strand of authority the 'historic' or the 'apostolic' succession depends on what we think of the tunnels; but in either case the succession is a concrete symbol of the age-long continuity of the Church and is the foundation for the moderate episcopalian position that episcopacy is of the *plene esse* of the Church. Its eschatological importance proves to be equivocal, i.e. we may see in the continuity of the ministry the symbol of the oneness of the Church to the end of the age, or we may apply to every Church order the oft-repeated dictum in J. E. Fison's *The Christian Hope*: 'The End will be a surprise to all.'

The point, however, at which the stricter episcopalian position needs to be called in question is the greater importance which it appears to attach to the former strand of continuity as compared with the latter strand of authority which rests on the present power of Christ in his Church. It may be reasonable to assert that both strands are necessary for the fulness of the Church's life and unity; but to deny that the living Christ through the Spirit can 'give gifts to men' and create ministries in His Church which are not necessarily continuous with the historic ministry is surely to ignore the resurrection and ascension which, as Eph. 4 declares to us, are the starting point of all ministry. In the words of the preface ('General Principles') of the C.S.I. Ordinal: 'The Church as a whole is a priestly body, since it is the body of Christ the great High Priest. All its

[1] Presbyterians, of course, also assert this with a different emphasis.

members, according to the measure of the gift of Christ, share in its priestly nature. Yet from the beginning God has entrusted particular ministries to particular persons within it and these have, through the Church, received the commission of Christ.' And we go on to say: 'The ordained Ministry of the Church of South India consists of Bishops, Presbyters and Deacons. In accepting this ministry the Church of South India desires to maintain continuity with the historic ministry of the Church as it has come down to us from early times through the uniting Churches.'

There can be no doubt here whence we believe the authority of the ministry is primarily derived, and yet continuity has its place, and there is no question of our underestimating its importance.

It is not difficult to find what we may take exception to as overstatement in Professor Barkley's essay. His assumption that the concept of a bishop, as only a presbyter who has been given episcopal office, is the Western catholic tradition pure and simple ignores the ordination prayer for priests in the Roman pontifical which speaks of them as *sequentis ordinis viros et secundae dignitatis*. This description of priests is as old as the Leonine Sacramentary. The use of the word 'orders' in the plural to denote the different ministries, instead of, as in Tertullian, in the singular to denote the ministry as a whole, may have come in after the Church had begun to receive imperial patronage, when the notion arose of assimilating the grades of ministry to the political *cursus honorum*. The word 'order', therefore, has an unsatisfactory history, and C.S.I. has refrained from its use. But we can trace the concept of the episcopate in the Western tradition as a form of ministry distinct from the presbyterate behind the notion of 'orders' and back to the ordination prayers of the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus which show signs of very ancient origin. The phrase *primatus sacerdotii* found there in the prayer for a bishop is not very different in meaning from the petition in the later pontificals, usually printed in capitals as the operative formula of the consecration prayer: COMPLE IN SACERDOTE TUO MINISTERII TUI SUMMAM. Also in Hippolytus' prayer for the ordination of presbyters comparison is made to the elders whom God gave Moses, presumably as his assistants.

We may not endorse all the notions implied in these quotations; but they imply that in at least one thread of Western tradition, and that the one which gave the predominant pattern to the ministry, the episcopate is regarded as the supreme ministry and other ministries are thought of as fulfilled in it. We need not deny the existence of a 'presbyterian' tradition also in Western catholicism. It is well enough documented and backed by high theological authority, though rather by way of justifying occasional exception than as establishing the general pattern. The most that we can say is that Western tradition has been in two minds about the matter and that the reagent of the Reformation resolved this double-mindedness into the rival episcopal and presbyteral orders of the reformed Churches.

Professor Barkley's examination of the Anglican Ordinal of the sixteenth century and the changes made in 1661 may indicate that the earlier Anglican divines intended to leave the door half open for a presbyteral order and that the Church of England of the seventeenth century had moved away from this towards a more rigid and exclusive episcopal order. But the fact remains that, whatever intentions may be deduced from these liturgical changes, and whatever concessions Anglicans for the first century after the Reformation may have made to non-episcopal ministries, the Church of England retained the pattern of the threefold ministry throughout. The changes in the Ordinal made little difference to the concrete life of the Church, and conjectures from these changes as to the status of the ministry before or after their date are almost bound to be fallacious.

In any case, Anglican priests have always been associated with their bishops in the laying on of hands in ordination of men to their own ministry, as in the ancient heritage of East and West. No doubt the Irish Presbyterian attempt to deny the status of presbyter to Anglican priests, because they were not given the power to ordain, was in part actuated by antagonism to Anglican claims. Perhaps C.S.I. has gone some way to resolve this controversy by associating presbyters with the consecration of bishops, as well as with the ordination to the presbyterate, and by leaving the door open for ministers of non-episcopal Churches to enter and exercise their ministry, while adhering itself to the episcopal pattern.

This brief critique of the current conversations between Anglicans and Presbyterians in the United Kingdom and of their respective positions as represented in the essays we have examined should serve to show where C.S.I. stands in respect of both and perhaps to indicate its mode of union as a signpost towards the union contemplated between the Church of England and presbyterians in Britain. It is here that the interest of the new C.S.I. Ordinal lies, an interest which is enhanced by its history and composition.

The Ordinal which was approved by the Negotiating Committee of C.S.I. before union and used for all ordinations during the first ten years of the united Church was largely a revision of the Anglican Ordinal, retaining its imperative formula, 'Receive the Holy Ghost . . .', addressed to the ordinands in separation from the ordination prayer, though there was the addition of the giving of the right hand of fellowship to each after the laying on of hands. Perhaps this predominance of the Anglican heritage was inevitable at a time when the liturgical tradition of the uniting Church was not yet formed. It also had the advantage of making C.S.I. ordinations readily acceptable to Anglicans, at a time when relations between the Anglican Communion and C.S.I. were still uncertain. In accordance with our usual procedure of revising our liturgical formulae after a period of experimental use, the C.S.I. Synod of 1954 instructed its Liturgy Committee to undertake the revision of the Ordinal. This task might have been entered upon at an earlier date, but had been delayed owing to the priority given to work in respect of other orders of public worship.

At about the same time, the Liturgical Sub-committee of the Negotiating Committee of the proposed union in North India and Pakistan had begun to work on proposed services of ordination to be used at the consecration of bishops at the inauguration of union and at subsequent ordinations of presbyters. The first tentative drafts of these were constructed after the Anglican pattern and were very similar to those which had been in use in South India; but the Sub-committee, though it was prepared to let the proposed order for the consecration of bishops stand for the time being, was not satisfied with the draft for the ordination of presbyters and directed that a new

draft should be prepared on the basis of the Form and Order for the Ordination of Ministers in *The Ordinal and Service Book* of the Church of Scotland.

An *ad hoc* drafting group was appointed in December 1955, which included a member of the C.S.I. Liturgy Committee who happened at that time to be staying in North India. The result was an order which consisted mainly of the fusion of Scottish and Anglican elements, the latter as mediated through the C.S.I. Ordinal. The most important contribution of the Scottish Ordinal was the ordination prayer itself, with its laying on of hands taking place during the course of the prayer and the words which accompany it being part of the prayer addressed to God and not a separate formula addressed to the candidate, as in the Anglican Ordinal. Liturgists are agreed that the Anglican mode of ordination is a late medieval accretion to the Western rite and that Cranmer and his associates were deceived by the biblical character of the words 'Receive the Holy Ghost . . .' into thinking that they were the proper formula of ordination and, therefore, ignoring the laying on of hands which precedes (though it doubtless originally accompanied, as in the East) the ordination prayer in the Western pontifical. The Scottish Ordinal, therefore, linked, as it is, with the general tradition of the Reformed Churches, is a salutary return to the most primitive tradition of ordination by laying on of hands *with prayer*, and it is well that North India and Pakistan took the initiative in following this exemplar.

The South Indian Committee had proceeded with its work in 1955 and at its September meeting had adopted provisionally a conservative revision which retained the ordination formula in separation from the ordination prayer, though changing it from the imperative to the precatory form, as in the order for ordination in the *Book of Common Order* of the United Church of Canada: 'May the Lord pour upon thee the Holy Spirit. . . .' After varying opinions of this had been expressed, it was submitted in April 1956 to the Theological Commission of C.S.I. for scrutiny. Meanwhile the draft prepared in North India had been accepted with some improvements by the North Indian Liturgical Sub-committee, and the two drafts were side by side before the C.S.I. Theological Commission, whose members voted unanimously for the North Indian draft and commended

it to the C.S.I. Liturgy committee as the basis to be preferred for further revisory work.

So far this draft consisted only of the order for the ordination of presbyters, and work was immediately started to prepare drafts of orders for the consecration of bishops and the ordination of deacons with the same basic structure. All three drafts underwent careful scrutiny and considerable revision by the Liturgy Committee in September 1956 and were then circulated both to the diocesan liturgy committees of C.S.I. and to a number of competent advisers in other parts of the world. The general approval which they received encouraged the Committee to leave them largely as they stood with only a few minor amendments in September 1957. The Synod finally approved them with only two amendments in January 1958.

The work of the C.S.I. Committee has not been without its effect in North India and Pakistan. As well as adopting some of South India's amendments to the draft which originally came from them, the Northern negotiators were emboldened to revise their proposed order for the consecration of bishops to bring its mode of consecration into accord with that for the ordination of presbyters. So far they have not published an order for the ordination of deacons. The two orders are published in the booklet, *Services Proposed for Use at the Inauguration of the Church of North India and the Church of Pakistan* (Christian Literature Society, India, 1957). Comparison of them with the C.S.I. Ordinal will reveal that revision has proceeded independently in the North and South since the adoption of the original draft common to both. But there has been some liaison between the two committees, and the similarities are more significant than the differences. When union is finally achieved in the North, it will doubtless be an important symbol of the fellowship between these united Churches in the great Indian sub-continent that they have substantially the same rites of ordination. A few of the points at which we diverge will be noted below.

As has already been observed, the three orders are closely similar in general structure. This does not necessarily imply a doctrine of 'parity of ministries', though it might be taken by some who hold this doctrine in C.S.I. to be a symbol of it. For our purpose, however, it means that in giving an account

of the orders we need only deal with one in detail and content ourselves with reference to a few distinctive characteristics of the other orders. For obvious reasons we must choose to describe the ordination of presbyters.

Ordination takes place in the course of a celebration of the Eucharist. The preparatory part of the *Order for the Lord's Supper* (to the declaration of forgiveness) has been read before the candidates are presented to the Bishop by a person duly appointed. The Bishop calls for the reading of the authority for their ordination (usually a resolution of the ministerial committee of the diocese) and then presents them to the assembled congregation, giving the latter opportunity to show any reason why any of them should not be ordained. If no objection is raised at this point, a dialogue follows:

BISHOP: We are not sufficient of ourselves: our sufficiency is from God. Do you trust that these persons are, by God's grace, worthy to be ordained?

PEOPLE: We trust that they are worthy. To God be the glory.

This is an adaptation of the ancient cry of acceptance (*axios estin—dignus est*) by the people of their bishop-designate. Its purpose is to give liturgical expression to the truth that it is the priestly people of God who choose their own ministers from their own number. At the close of the ordination rite, after the Bishop has declared the completion of the ordination to the people, they respond: 'Amen. Thanks be to God,' and a doxology is sung. Thus one of the distinctive characteristics of these orders for ordination is that the whole action takes place within the framework of the assent and thanksgiving of the people.

The collect, lections, sermon and creed follow—the declaration of the Word of God which is both the beginning and the end of the ministry. No doubt these lections will be studied as indications of what scriptural passages C.S.I. considers important for the interpretation of the ministry, and if we had had Professor Barkley's analysis of the Anglican lections and their interpretation (in the essay referred to above) before us, we might have devoted longer consideration to our choice with greater awareness of its consequences. As they stand, the Gospel for presbyters (John 10.1-16) and the Old Testament lesson for bishops (Ezek. 34.11-16) declare that both ministers

are called to be shepherds, while the Old Testament lesson for presbyters (Ezek. 33.1-9) and the Epistle for bishops (Acts 20.28-35) would seem to suggest that both are called to be watchmen. It is particularly difficult to follow Dr Barkley in his conjectural interpretation of Anglican intention in respect to this last lection. If it is assigned to presbyters' ordination it may imply that presbyters are also bishops: if it is assigned to bishops' consecration it may be taken to mean that bishops are only presbyters. And if we adopt the historical approach and reflect that these names for ministers had not yet become technical terms and that the functions associated with them have undergone transformation in course of time, we may be led to ask whether Paul addressing the assembled presbyter-bishops of Ephesus most resembles a bishop conducting a visitation of his clergy or a moderator addressing his presbytery. Perhaps the Epistle for presbyters (1 Pet. 5.1-11) with Peter's styling of himself as 'fellow elder' might be regarded as supporting the latter view; but the Gospel for bishops (John 20.19-23) with its apostolic commission would seem to support the former, until we reflect that this is the passage quoted in the Anglican formula for the ordination of priests and implied in our ordination prayer for presbyters. Altogether Scripture in this matter of interpretation appears to be very much a two-edged sword. At both the ordination of presbyters and the consecration of bishops the Proper Preface is 'Through Jesus Christ our Lord, who gave authority to his disciples, saying, As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.'

The examination of the candidates is prefaced by the address, 'In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the King and Head of the Church . . .', which is adapted from the Scottish Ordinal. Here the North Indian rite has undergone less rewriting than the South Indian and is closer to the original. There is some divergence between the rites of the two areas in the form of the questions, though both substantially cover the same ground. The South Indian questions may be classified as follows:

1. Two questions, one concerning call and the other concerning motive, the latter being one well known to Scottish ministers:

'Are zeal for the glory of God, love for our Lord Jesus

Christ, and a desire for the salvation of men, so far as you know your own heart, your chief motives for entering into this ministry?'

2. Questions concerning the acceptance of the Scriptures 'as the supreme and decisive standard of faith', of the Creeds as 'witnessing to and safe-guarding' that faith and a question eliciting a promise to read and study the Scriptures.

3. Questions concerning the minister's call to evangelise, to exercise the ministry of the Word and Sacraments among his people, to shepherd his flock, maintaining peace and love among them, bringing sinners to repentance, visiting the sick, caring for the needy and helping his people 'to be good stewards of the manifold gifts of God'.

4. A question concerning self-discipline on the part of the minister and his family, if he has one, and a final inquiry concerning obedience to authority in the Church.

It is in this extended dialogue between bishop and ordinand that the nature of the ministry to which the latter is being ordained is most clearly surveyed and defined. To understand the relation between presbyter and bishop we must, therefore, compare these questions with those put by the moderator (or his deputy) to a bishop-elect. The first difference that strikes us is that in the address preparatory to the questions emphasis is laid on the intention to consecrate the candidate 'Bishop in the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church'. This is, of course, true also of the ordination to the presbyterate and diaconate; but whereas presbyters and deacons are predominantly ministers of the local Church, it is of the essential nature of the bishop's office that he should represent the universal Church to the local Church and the local Church to the universal Church. This concept sets the tone of the questions in the bishop's examination. His diligent study of the Scriptures will enable him 'to feed his people with the Bread of Life . . . and to withstand and convince false teachers'. This call to teach and to guard against heresy is declared again when, after the laying on of hands, he is presented with a Bible. Other questions imply that the bishop should lead his people in evangelism, ensure that their worship is 'worthy of God's

majesty and love', and promote the unity and peace of his own Church and of the whole Church of God. Although he is not necessarily the officiant in baptism and confirmation, he has a special concern to see that they are duly and regularly administered; although presbyters are associated with him in ordination and the consecration of other bishops, it is particularly laid upon him that he should be 'faithful and discreet in ordaining men to the sacred ministry'. In short, while nothing is said either for or against the view that the episcopate is a distinct order in the Church, and the close similarity of the prayer of ordination to the presbyterate and the prayer of consecration to the episcopate might be interpreted to the contrary, the general trend of definition in the two liturgical orders distinguishes the bishop as a minister with a pastoral charge which is more than local and a responsibility to be a minister to ministers.

To return to the order for the ordination of presbyters, which, as we have said, is generally of the same pattern as the other orders, the dialogue concludes with a precatory blessing: 'Almighty God, our heavenly Father, who has given you the will to do all these things, grant you also grace to perform them. Faithful is he that calleth you, who also will do it.' The bishop then calls the people to silent prayer which is followed by the *Veni Creator* or, in the Indian languages, by some other hymn of prayer for the Holy Spirit. The bishop then stands together with the presbyters who are assisting him in the ordination and begins the ordination prayer.

The prefatory part of this prayer is a thanksgiving for the choice of the people of God to be a royal priesthood and a holy nation, for Christ's great High Priesthood, for his death, resurrection and ascension by which the gifts of the ministry have been given to the Church. Then bishop and presbyters lay hands together on each ordinand in turn and the bishop repeats for each: 'Send down thy Holy Spirit upon thy servant . . . whom we, in thy name, and in obedience to thy most blessed will, do now ordain presbyter in thy Church, committing unto him authority to minister thy Word and Sacraments, to declare thy forgiveness to penitent sinners, and to shepherd thy flock.'

The conclusion of the prayer which is said by the bishop for

all together,[1] includes prayer for grace 'to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to thee' and that the newly ordained may be 'watchful and loving guardians' over God's flock. The whole prayer is in fact an adaptation of the prayer in the Scottish ordinal, though it does not adhere so closely to the original as does the prayer approved in North India. The prayer for the consecration of a bishop has exactly the same prefatory section as the above and the formula said at the laying on of hands only differs in the name of the office conferred and in the omission of any specific definition of its authority.

In the last paragraph of the North Indian prayer for bishops the corresponding Anglican prayer is followed closely, whereas the South Indian prayer at this point is largely a new composition. Some may regret that the latter has not included the free Anglican rendering of the magnificently Gallican (and scriptural) *sint speciosi munere tuo pedes ejus ad evangelizandum pacem, ad evangelizandum bona tua* from the Roman rite; but South India has instead a petition that the new bishop may be 'a faithful ambassador of Christ to the world'. Adherents, if there be any in South India, of Gregory Dix's theory concerning episcopacy are at liberty to follow him in interpreting the Pauline 'ambassador' as the equivalent of the *shaliach/apostolos*; but the interpretation preferable is that bishops, like other ministers, are most truly apostolic when they are concerned with the preaching of the Gospel. The prayer for the consecration of a bishop in Hippolytus, which is a source often cited in modern presentations of the doctrine of the apostolic succession, makes it clear that the primary function of Apostles is to 'establish the Church in each place'. It is only after this petition for the spirit of ambassadorship that the South Indian prayer can go on to request grace 'to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to thee [repeated from presbyters' ordination], to feed and govern thy flock as a true shepherd, and to promote love and unity among all thy people'. It was a C.S.I. bishop, doubtless aware of the spiritual dangers of his office, who introduced the petition, 'Deliver him from all assaults of the devil.'

[1] There is a slight awkwardness in ordaining more than one candidate at a time by this form of ordination. It suits best the practice which prevails in some parts of C.S.I., as in Scotland, of ordaining a man in the congregation to which he has been called.

Somehow this did not get into the other ordination prayers, as it ought to have done.

The bishop (or moderator) then delivers a copy of the Bible to the newly ordained or consecrated with the words: 'Take this, a token of the authority you have received. . . .' This vestige of the *porrectio instrumentorum* thus declares that all ministerial authority is derived from the revelation of God in Christ of which the Bible is the record.

The giving of the right hand of fellowship follows, as in the Scottish and other reformed rites. It has scriptural basis in Gal. 2.9, though it is interesting also to compare it with the embrace, given in the Roman order for the consecration of a bishop, by the new bishop to the bishops who have consecrated him, at the end of the Mass. There it is the new bishop who takes the initiative in expressing his brotherly love for his fellow bishops, rather than, as with us, the ordaining bishop welcoming the newly ordained into the fellowship of the ministry. The newly consecrated bishop also receives a pastoral staff with the words, 'Be to the flock of Christ a shepherd, not a wolf . . .'—the Anglican free rendering of the Roman charge at this point. There is a final declaration of ordination, as in the Scottish and, somewhat differently, in the Eastern rites, to which the people respond resoundingly with a doxology. The Order for the Lord's Supper then proceeds, beginning at the Litany of Intercession which includes special petitions for the newly ordained. North India has its intercessions at an earlier point in the service before the ordination.

We have already quoted the Proper Preface for presbyters and bishops. That for the ordination of deacons is: 'Through Jesus Christ our Lord, who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.' The prefatory section of the ordination prayer similarly dwells on Christ's taking of the form of a servant in an extended quotation from Phil. 2. The deacon, in fact, is called to service after the pattern of the service of Christ.

C.S.I. shares the uncertainty of the rest of Christendom concerning the diaconate, and there has been a revolt in some sections of the Church against the traditional practice of ordaining men to the diaconate merely as a stepping stone to the presbyterate, though those who object to this would still wish

to retain the diaconate as a permanent form of ministry. The only consideration which weighs in favour of tradition here is that it shows forth the truth that all Christian ministry is in the first place service and that the minister can only become the true shepherd and guardian of the flock by being primarily its servant. One may hope that C.S.I. may never forget this, though there is always the danger that ambitious individuals may be more concerned with the power and position of their office than with its humble duties. An anecdote of one of our conversations with the Lutherans may serve as a fitting conclusion to our reflections on the nature of the ministry. The time was after lunch when most of those taking part in the conversations were relaxing for half an hour before the afternoon session; but two prominent C.S.I. bishops were observed with the sweat of a tropical noon upon their brows, one dictating a statement which they had drafted together for presentation to the meeting, while the other typed it at a speed which might well have won him prizes. A German professor, perhaps the most distinguished theologian in that particular Lutheran delegation, turned to some of us who were standing by, and remarked: 'There you see how *episkope* means *diakonia*.'

BOOK REVIEWS

Christ and the Christian by Nels F. S. Ferré. Harper & Brothers, New York. Pp. 253. $3.75; and Collins, London, 1958. 12s. 6d.

This important new work from the pen of Nels Ferré contains a Christology, a Soteriology, and a doctrine of the Trinity. I have space only to indicate the outline of the Christology, and to raise two questions concerning it.

Ferré speaks of two human natures, our 'ordinary, actual human nature', and 'human nature perfected by its right relation to God' (76). The latter represents the fulfilment of the divine purpose for man. Jesus made the transition, for the first time in history, from actual to perfected humanity; He 'is the human being who first conclusively fulfils the conditions of [perfected] humanity, namely, to be organically united to God and fulfilled by the coinherence of God' (73). Being thus the first perfectly human being, Jesus was the first Godman. In him, God and man coinhere. 'In a decisive sense the Son of Man is the Son of God. Only he among men who is genuinely Son of Man can be Son of God' (74). Jesus' achievement of the status of perfected humanity was not, then, an act of ordinary human nature contriving to rise above itself. Rather, 'The Son of man acquired such a [perfected] humanity by accepting the Son of God. Yet even before such acceptance was possible, God the Son had Himself come to Jesus and by His presence and calling had made possible the Son of Man who became "the pioneer and perfecter of our faith" ' (85). Again, 'The Son of Man becomes so only in relation to God as Son, the Word of God, the eternally pre-existent personal Spirit who becomes enacted in man' (74). Accordingly, 'We need to see in Jesus a real human being, fulfilled by God to the point where God was the consummating co-Subject along with an accepting human subject, but both within a truly united and genuine personality' (79).

It is thus Ferré's view that in the personality of Jesus two natures were united, the nature of a man and the nature of the external, personal divine Logos. In discussing this union of natures, Ferré employs the contrasting categories of encounter and *perichoresis* or coinherence. He suggests that there was in the life of Jesus both an interpenetration of the divine and human natures, and an encounter of the divine and human persons. Jesus' 'personality is actually the Godman, the *perichoresis* of God and man, maintaining distinction on the level of encounter . . . while also, at the same time, effecting a metaphysical union without division or separation of spirits . . . '

(133). In further elucidation of the notion of coinherence, which is so central to his Christology, Ferré says: 'The fundamental fact is that God is of such a nature, and man is, too, that they can co-exist without there being two egos . . . Since personalities are unique and at inmost are non-congruent, the one personal God remains forever transcendent, uniquely Himself, even while becoming incarnate by co-inherence, or interpenetration, as Spirit' (191). This coinherence is such as not to infringe the freedom of the human ego. The divine aspect of the incarnate Son continuously offered itself to the 'depth nature of the human personality of Jesus for His active response. . . . The presence of God became enmanned as the controlling reality through freedom, thus unifying and making more real the human personality of Jesus' (195).

Ferré's conception of the divine-human coinherence is such that one can properly ask: At what point in Jesus' life did this coinherence, or hypostatic union, commence? Ferré's tentative answer is that it occurred at some time prior to Jesus' baptism. He believes, however, that a proper doctrine of *enhypostasia*, giving unqualified recognition to Jesus' real humanity, entails that the divine-human coinherence was never complete during the earthly life of Jesus, but that His human nature was always under a necessity to struggle to respond to His divine nature. Indeed even after Jesus' death and resurrection the struggle may have continued. 'The basic union [between God and man] could last eternally, with victory now assured, and with companionship and participation in God beyond our understanding, and still leave room for further growth in the eternal disciplines and discipleships of God' (115). This unusual doctrine is connected with Ferré's view that Jesus was 'made sin for us' in the sense that He shared directly in the basic human sin of anxiety. 'Jesus knew sin, in some sense, as a minimal but real experience within His own life' (113).

It is a further central feature of Ferré's thought that the divine-human coinherence achieved in Jesus is to be extended to all men. 'Humanity became full in Jesus as the representative Head of a new humanity. Jesus enmanned not only a new single man, but a new man generically, potentially and representatively' (85). Ferré stresses repeatedly that man can only find perfect self-fulfilment when his life is interpenetrated by the divine life, when there is, indeed, divine-human *perichoresis*. This new human nature, in which God and man coinhere, is created and offered by God in Christ. 'God became the Godman in Jesus Christ that He might make us Godmen eternally' (140). Again, as Ferré expresses it in his preface, 'the historic Incarnation involves all mankind, whose proper, potential relation to God is incarnation' (9).

This is a bare and necessarily inadequate outline of Ferré's Christology, but it suffices, I hope, to show that Ferré grapples with the ancient problems with an intellectual honesty, and a determination to arrive at intelligible solutions, which one could wish were less rare in theological work. The traditionally received Christological formulae have proved so useful largely because of their studious generality. 'Very God and very man' affirms much but explains nothing. Ferré re-affirms this central Christian position, but seeks also (and herein lies the great value of his book) to explain it. To suggest that he succeeds only partially is but to say that he is human.

There are two queries which I should like to raise. The first concerns the notion, central to Ferré's Christology, of a coinherence of the divine and human natures, combined with a distinction or encounter of the divine and human persons. 'Personalities', says Ferré, 'do not overlap [or coinhere] as personalities' (123); but on the other hand, 'the very nature of Spirit is to co-inhere' (132). This distinction between 'nature' and 'personality' may well create as well as solve problems. When it is said, as it is by many theologians, that the divine nature is personal and that such qualities as love, justice, goodness and wisdom are attributes of God's nature as personal, one can understand what is being said. But when Ferré sunders the divine character as personal, including presumably the divine love, justice, wisdom, etc., from the divine nature, I for one no longer understand what is meant by 'nature'. When all personal qualities are shorn from it, the divine nature becomes some kind of impersonal substratum; and it is this, according to the logic of Ferré's argument, that coinheres with human nature in the Incarnation. But this is a quite different picture from that offered by Ferré in another chapter, of 'the Word of God, the eternally pre-existent personal Spirit who becomes enacted in man' (74). A parallel difficulty arises with regard to human nature. What is man's nature in abstraction from his being and qualities as a person? Are we not left with just that *an*hypostasis, or impersonal humanity, which Ferré rejects? 'There is', he says, 'no impersonal humanity that is "very man"! Such a notion is just as inadequate, on the other side, as an impersonal Word entering into the union, becoming personal in Jesus' (99). But it is not clear that Ferré's Christology does not rest precisely upon the idea of impersonal divine and human natures interpenetrating in Jesus.

My second query concerns the uniqueness of Christ. Despite a section of nearly twenty pages in which the issue is circumnavigated more than once, it seems clear that on Ferré's view Christ's uniqueness consists in His being the (chronologically) *first* Godman, the first specimen of the new human kind into which all men are eventually

to be transformed. Certainly, to be the first member of a temporal series is to occupy an unique position; but equally certainly such an uniqueness is very different from that which the ecumenical creeds intend to assign to Christ. It would have been valuable to have at this point in Ferré's discussion an explicit statement of the case for withdrawing the traditional claim that the uniqueness of Christ is not merely chronological, nor a uniqueness in degree, but in kind. The problem is immensely difficult, much more difficult than most orthodox writers allow themselves to recognise, and Ferré has opened it up again for us all. I only wish that having opened it up, he had more challengingly focused attention upon it, instead of quietly covering it up again.

But the last word must be one of appreciation and gratitude for what is in some ways the finest in the notable series of Dr Ferré's works.

JOHN H. HICK

Corpus Christi by GEDDES MACGREGOR. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London, 1959. Pp. 302. 30s.; *The Reality of the Church* by CLAUDE WELCH. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958. Pp. 254. $3.95.

'WE believe in Jesus Christ our Lord, who loved the Church and gave Himself for it, and has brought the Church into an abiding union with Himself. Because we believe in Jesus Christ we believe also in the Church as the Body of Christ.' That quotation from the Report of the Third World Conference on Faith and Order at Lund in 1952 shows the fresh seriousness and significance given to the Pauline figure of the Body of Christ as a result of the revival of Biblical theology in the divided churches. It has been a marked feature of recent theology to give far greater consideration to the Body of Christ idea, within the New Testament. Geddes Macgregor's and Claude Welch's books are both notable contributions to this current theological discussion, and it is not surprising to find in each work a chapter entitled 'The Body of Christ'.

'The image of the "body of Christ" is without doubt one of the most tantalising of all the figures which in the New Testament are applied to the church . . . Yet it would be a grave error to take this image in isolation from other figures, or to assume that this is the one concept to which all others must be subordinated and in terms of which they must be interpreted.' One welcomes this word of criticism and caution in Welch's book as he enters upon this particular theological discussion. Some theologians are presently in danger of simply by-passing the difficulties of the phrase, by employing it in explanation of other biblical figures for the Church, before it has itself been adequately examined, understood and explained. When it is suggested that 'the body of Christ' is not used

metaphorically but literally and realistically in the New Testament, there may be timely relevance in Welch's comment that 'one may suspect that much of the insistence that this term is to be taken 'ontologically' or 'realistically' is simply a confused and confusing way of saying that this is a particularly important and revealing description of the Church'.

Welch attaches the basic significance of the body of Christ figure to the problem of the Church's unity, and he works this out in a very helpful description of the Church in terms of 'the stress on the tone and inescapable sociality of the Church as membership in Christ and in one another'. Here, as throughout his book, he keeps his exposition of the Church close to the humanity of Jesus Christ, thus emphasising human fellowship among the members of the Church, a corrective to certain misleading 'mystical body' teaching. 'The pattern of union in the Church is the pattern of the humanity of Jesus Christ, who was the most complete and perfect individuality just in His being most completely and perfectly related to God and man.'

Dr MacGregor discerns a different emphasis in the Pauline conception of the Church as the body of Christ, taking it to mean that 'the Church is a divine mystery', and interpreting it as the assertion of the Headship and Lordship of Jesus Christ within the body. 'If our exposition of the nature of the Church according to Reformed tradition has demonstrated anything at all,' he writes, 'it has demonstrated that the Reformation was essentially an attempt to recover the Headship of Christ in the Body.' Aware of the particular associations and atmosphere of the Latin version of this phrase, one is a little surprised at the author's choice of *Corpus Christi* as title for his book, in view of its sub-title, *The Nature of the Church according to The Reformed Tradition.*

At the same time, Dr MacGregor is correcting the wrong impression that the Latin *Corpus Christi* makes upon our minds, as he goes on to point out that, in biblical usage, body of Christ refers interchangeably to the Church and to the Eucharist. 'The Headship of Christ is a reality without which the notion of the Church would be deprived of all the importance he (Calvin) attaches to it. The language, though biblical, is figurative; nevertheless, Calvin used it with an eye to the ontological fact of the relation of being that exists between Christ and the Church. . . . It is not for nothing or by accident that the same figure, *Corpus Christi*, is used of both Church and Eucharist; nor is it by accident, in Calvin's view, that the figure had been in both cases radically distorted in the Middle Ages.' There is a very valuable chapter on 'The Eucharist in the Reformed Church', revealing a sacramental emphasis in the Reformed chur-

ches not always sufficiently realised. The conclusion eventually reached is that 'the Eucharist must be sacrificial in some sense, if Christ is, as the Reformers continually remind us, the High Priest. If the Church is the Body of Christ, it must in some sense offer itself in the very act of being what it is, and this must be particularly true of the Church as it engages in eucharistic worship.'

In his *The Reality of the Church*, Claude Welch makes a most impressive effort to keep closely linked in thought and treatment the 'idea' of the Church to be derived from the Word of God, and the fact of the Church in the world with all its very human characteristics. He is right to challenge any over-facile distinction between the visible Church and the invisible Church, a distinction which has often allowed Protestants simply to evade the tension between the Church's holiness and its sinfulness. The real humanity of Jesus is the deep theological ground for facing up to the actuality of the Church in its sinfulness which is there side by side with its divine life. 'As Christ is not only to be *viewed* as God and man, but *is* truly God and truly man, so the Church *is* both the Body of Christ and a religious institution, both holy and sinful, and the believer *is* both sinner and a new being.'

Nevertheless, the ultimate 'abstractness' of this book is a weakness, perhaps inevitable, but making the reader long to have more of its excellent material related to real Church situations. The very emphasis on the human character of the Church as it actually exists is developed in terms of an 'idea' rather than in terms of an embodied situation. Admittedly this is an 'essay on the ontology of the Church', and certainly, within its own set limits, it is a most impressive contribution.

Again, in contrast to much recent Body of Christ theologising, *The Reality of the Church* gives full and adequate place to a treatment of the Holy Spirit in the Church. At the conclusion of his carefully presented argument, Claude Welch writes: 'The nature and task of the Church, as the people of God, as the Body of Christ, and equally as the community of the Spirit, are existence as response to what God has done in Jesus Christ, in acknowledgment of the One who now exercises his lordship over the world, and in the openness of waiting. Only in this wholeness of its relation to the triune God can the reality of the Church be described.' There we have a timely reminder that the Church's theology waits for more adequate treatment of the doctrine of the Church in relation to God the Holy Trinity.

In contrast to the abstractness just referred to, Dr Geddes MacGregor's presentation of the doctrine of the Church, being a treatment of the Genevan and Reformed tradition, is a thoroughly embodied treatment, and contains much useful material about the

Reformed Churches generally and the *Ecclesia Scoticana* in particular. This book is a helpful contribution to Scottish Presbyterianism's understanding of itself, especially in the discussions that have followed the issue of the Joint Report on *Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches*. The examination of one's own confessional origins is an important part of the present-day ecumenical confrontation, just as important as the questions which are addressed to separated communions on the other side of confessional gulfs.

A great deal of valuable source material for Anglican-Presbyterian discussion is to be found here. In his opening chapter, moreover, the author has included a most competent analysis of the varying types of ecclesiology, Lutheran, Anglican, Separatist and Reformed. The differences between the last two, Congregationalist or Independent churchmanship on the one hand, and Presbyterian or Reformed churchmanship on the other, are traditionally more radical than Scottish Presbyterians always realise, especially where they are uninformed about their origins in the Calvinist Reformation. How many recognise as extraneous and alien certain Separatist elements in Scottish Presbyterianism which derive wholly from English Puritanism and Independancy, the 'curse of Cromwell' upon the Scottish Church? A helpful contribution to such an understanding of Separatist churchmanship is also found in Claude Welch's opening chapter on 'The Enigma of the Church'.

No serious student of the doctrine of the Church can afford to miss these two significant books. *The Reality of the Church* is an important contribution to biblical theology, and is essentially 'reformed' in outlook, a penetrating analysis of the *ecclesia semper reformanda.*

Corpus Christi will be found, along with other usefulness, a valuable source book in relation to the Reformed Churches' doctrine of the Church. In the second appendix there are found quoted *in extenso* the parts concerning the Church from all the Reformed Confessions issued between 1528 and 1647, while the bibliography at the end is most exhaustive, being a comprehensive list of modern books on the nature of the Church, in the compilation of which Dr Geddes MacGregor acknowledges his indebtedness to Professor George Johnston for help.

R. Stuart Louden

At Sundry Times by R. C. Zaehner. Faber and Faber, London. 1958. Pp. 230. 21s. net.

The Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at the University of Oxford in this book gives a brilliant study in comparative religion, dealing boldly with the problem of the extent of pre-revelation to the Christian faith in some of the great religions of Asia, particularly in India and in Iran.

The substance of the book was delivered as lectures at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, last year.

The study is all the more welcome in that it deals with living religions which have a highly developed philosophical and theological outlook. Professor Zaehner rightly points out that the comparative study of religions in this country has been largely the comparative study of primitive religions to the neglect of the higher religions.

An Appendix on the 'Qur'an and Christ' draws attention to the way in which biblical Christianity is taken as an absolute standard against which all religions may be judged, as with Dr Kraemer. But the Muslim also has his divine norm by which to judge and condemn the religions of which Christianity is only one. This is the Qur'an with Islam as the one and only true faith.

The main chapters, however, are concerned with the Indian religious contribution in its Hindu and Buddhist manifestations in contrast with the prophetic type of religion, as in Judaism and Christianity where a transcendental God is experienced by prophets as an objective fact.

The Indian type of religion he maintains is primarily concerned with the eternal as experienced as a *state* within the human soul. To assist his explanation of this 'self' of the Upanishads, he gives a lengthy exposition of Proust and how he came to his 'feeling of certain immortality', a theme he has developed in his earlier work on 'Mysticism, Sacred and Profane'. It may be doubted whether this use of Proust and other Western mystical references does clarify the problem of the Indian searchers who were obliged to interpret their experiences against, or even with, the Brahmanical background of the gods and the sacrifices.

Nevertheless, Professor Zaehner shows successfully that this philosophic and empiricist quest does not end in the belief in a personal God who is self-revealing. It is only with the Bhagavad-Gita that there is a definite presentation of a God manifesting himself to the inquiring Arjun. Till then Hinduism had tried many ways in seeking to work out a concept of a deity as being both transcendent and immanent, the problem of the Brahman-Atman relationship.

Professor Zaehner says: 'In none of these trends did we find anything at all comparable to the Old Testament idea of an intensely personal God operating in and through his people in history. The Old Testament is revelation in the strictest sense.'

This contrast of two types of religion means that we are 'faced with two chosen peoples, not one, who see religion in an entirely different way'.

Within the Indian contribution the Buddha presents a special

problem for he 'offers deathlessness and peace independent of any God or Absolute'.

By contrast to these Indian views Professor Zaehner turns to his 'Prophets outside Israel' to give a fascinating account of Zoroaster (Zarathustra) of Iran whom he describes as a 'prophetic figure similar in all respects to the prophets of Israel'. While this might be questioned particularly as to how the Old Testament prophets are concerned with God expressing His nature and will in history, the author's interest in Zoroaster makes him give a special place to Zoroaster over against the Indian and the Israel tradition when he speaks of the 'Good Mind'. 'This', he says, 'is the Prophet Zoroaster's great theme, the core of the revelation he claims to have received from God, a message that we find neither in India nor in Israel. God is not only Righteousness and Truth: He is also Good. "There is none good, but one, that is God" Christ was to say later: and in this He takes up the teaching of the Iranian Prophet rather than that of the Hebrew prophets.' This reference to Matt. 19.17 whether taken in the A.V. translation or that of the R.S.V. surely admits of a Hebrew interpretation as the reference is to deeds done that are good, and the good deeds of men are done in keeping the commandments as Christ did since they were the declared will of the Lord.

Muhammad is of course one of the 'prophets outside', and 'for us Christians Muhammad is, perhaps, the greatest stumbling block to our faith'. Though the presentation of Christ in the Qur'an concedes much, yet Muhammad's view of the absolute transcendence and 'otherness' of God makes it impossible for the Incarnation and Crucifixion to be accepted as in orthodox Christianity. The stumbling block too is, that, 'whatever we may think of Islam, it is *the* prophetic religion *par excellence*'. Muhammad, of course, claimed to be the 'seal of the prophets'.

Professor Zaehner's concluding chapter is entitled 'Consummatum Est' and aims at showing how the mystical religion of India, as finally expressed in the Bhagavad-Gita and the Boddisattva doctrine (of the Buddhist), and the hopes of Zoroaster, are fulfilled in Christianity . . . for 'Christ fulfils both the law and the prophets in Israel and the "gospel according to the Gentiles" as it was preached in India and Iran'.

One paragraph of this section introduces the dogma of the Assumption of our Lady to show that whatever views are held of the relation of matter and spirit, body and soul in the contributions of other religions, matter is, through her, sanctified. 'The definition of this dogma is the assertion in the clearest possible tones that Christ's incarnation closes once and for all the gap that existed between soul and body and kept the latter in perpetual subjection to death.'

This is the first time in the study of comparative religion that this modern dogma has been considered in this connexion, and one questions whether it was necessary to introduce it at all.

Nevertheless Professor Zaehner's Christian outlook makes this book an outstanding contribution to the relationship of the great religions of today. R. A. BARCLAY

An Outline of Old Testament Theology by TH. C. VRIEZEN. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1958. Pp. 388. 42s.

THIS is the decade of Theologies of the Old Testament. For that, curiously enough, we have to thank Hitler. He it was who compelled the Church in Germany, and in those countries which came under Hitler's shadow, to rethink the significance of the Old Testament and its relation to the Gospel. The German Church found that the Old Testament contains the story of God's dealings with His chosen people in the midst of a historical situation comparable with events in Europe after 1930. It was from the white heat of Israel's sufferings in Egypt that God 'called his son out of Egypt'; and it was out of the pain and bewilderment of the Exile that so much of Israel's interpretation of God's dealings with her as a nation was born. So in our time, once the historical situation had brought about the rediscovery of the Old Testament, scholars began to see in it again theological ideas that demanded to be studied alongside of the theological conceptions of the New Testament—again, indeed, because a century ago, before the rise of historical criticism, such a study had already begun. But with the application of the conception of evolution to religion and to the religious ideas to be found in the Old Testament, as to so much else in man's thought and experience, fifty years ago it was the elucidation of the order of growth of Israel's thought that primarily attracted the attention of Old Testament scholarship. But now the pendulum has swung again, and Continental scholars in particular have sought to establish the outlines of the Theology of the Old Testament, now that the Church has come back to the discovery that the Old Testament is the veritable Word of God, even though it also contains developing ideas about the God it proclaims.

In his book, *An Outline of Old Testament Theology*, Vriezen thinks it worth while to occupy his first 120 pages with a discussion of the nature of what he is attempting to do. He is faced with the challenge that any Old Testament scholar must meet in this realm of study, viz. that of presenting the religious ideas of the Old Testament in some kind of logical sequence. But at the same time, as a Christian, he is also challenged to see those ideas in the light of their fulfilment

of Christ. One of the first Old Testament scholars to react to the challenge of Hitlerism in his interpretation of the Old Testament was W. Vischer, who, in the original German edition of his *The Witness of the Old Testament to Christ*, back in 1933, asserted that it must be the New Testament's interpretation of God's ways that is to be accepted as normative for the understanding of the Old Testament, so that the Old Testament is to be understood as but pointing to the work of Christ Himself in Old Testament times. Vischer has been a most valuable catalyst in these matters. Eichrodt, G. von Rad, Zimmerli, Baumgaertel, Weiser, Wolff, N. W. Porteous, and others, have since carried on a highly productive debate on the relationship between the Testaments and the nature of the Old Testament revelation; and Vriezen has entered into this debate himself as no mean contestant.

This volume of his appeared originally in Dutch in 1949. It saw six years of this debate before appearing again in a new edition in 1955. Thus it is that the English translation of his work, an exact rendering of the second Dutch edition, incorporates within it Vriezen's mature thought on this vital subject as it has emerged from the international debate.

The second part of this book Vriezen entitles 'The Content of Old Testament Theology'. In this section he travels the path of those who recognise that the living God revealed Himself to Israel, not in a set of propositions about Himself, but in and through historical situations which Israel had then to assess and seek to understand. Thus, knowledge of God, he believes, became essentially a communion with God, and then an assessing of that experience. Vriezen's headings from this point will speak for themselves: God; Man; The intercourse between God and Man; The intercourse between man and man (ethics); God, Man and the World in the present and the future.

The reviewer believes that this is quite the most satisfactory Theology of the Old Testament yet to appear, and commends it heartily. Yet he would suggest that there is an aspect of Old Testament Theology that is lacking in this work, excellent as it is. God's intercourse was not just with man as such, it was with Israel, that people which was called to be God's Servant, the Son who was made in the image of the Father, the Bride espoused at Sinai of whom Hosea speaks. The uniqueness of that peculiar relationship, a relationship which itself finds its End in Christ, is surely at least as important an area of study as those so well set forth in this attractive and easily read volume.

Vriezen's Theology is well indexed; at the end of each chapter there are suggestions for further reading; and footnotes to almost

every page offer guidance for an understanding of the whole range of Vriezen's subject. GEORGE A. F. KNIGHT

An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament. By ALAN RICHARDSON. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. Pp. 423. 30s.

THIS is an important book, and not least for the methodology employed. Because of this the reviewer cannot limit his task simply to giving an account of its contents together with some criticism of their presentation; he must also consider the validity of the author's approach. He must therefore raise the question: what is New Testament theology? Only when this has been answered, can he go on to express an opinion as to how far Professor Richardson has succeeded in formulating it.

'Biblical theology', as understood from the seventeenth century onwards, has been largely a historical discipline; its main concern was to establish the historic facts. New Testament theology was therefore a history of New Testament theology, that is to say it was an account of the various kinds of theology ordered in historical succession—the teaching of Paul, the teaching of John, and so on. This approach carried with it the rejection of dogmatic influences and the abandonment of any quest for theological unity—such unity as there was being regarded as only one of development. This position, however, is scarcely satisfactory. Like any historical work the study of the New Testament is not independent of the student's standpoint; his conception of the Christian faith, which in its general structure is of a dogmatic kind, inevitably influences his conclusions; so, for example, the work of F. C. Bauer and of R. Bultmann owes not a little to the Hegelianism of the former and the Existentialism of the latter. Moreover, uniformity is not the sole basis of unity; it is possible to have unity in variety. Granted the differences between the biblical writers—differences that are to be expected if they are not regarded as mere secretaries or pens in the divine hand—these differences may be but individual ways of looking at the same things; the authors may share a common position and yet present it in a variety of ways.

Accepting these criticisms, the biblical theologian today, in words taken from an illuminating article on the subject by G. Ebeling ('The Meaning of "Biblical Theology" ', *J.T.S.*, VI, 1955, p. 224), has to 'give an account of his understanding of the Bible as a whole, that is, above all the theological problems that arise from the variety of the biblical witness considered in relation to its inner unity'. But to achieve this the theologian must adopt a standpoint; he must accept an interpreting clue which will enable him to present an overall picture of this multiplicity in unity. This is precisely

what Professor Richardson has attempted to do in this work, and in the reviewer's opinion he is quite justified. His key category or hypothesis is that 'Jesus himself is the author of the brilliant reinterpretation of the Old Testament scheme of salvation which is found in the New Testament, and that the events of the life, "signs", passion and resurrection of Jesus, as attested by the apostolic witness, can account for the "data" of the New Testament better than any other hypothesis current today' (p. 12). A similar approach is of course to be found in F. V. Filson's *Jesus Christ, the Risen Lord*, 1956, although his 'organising fact' is the resurrection of Christ. These two positions are, however, complementary; they are but different ways of affirming the christocentric note of New Testament theology, conceived not as the photographic reproduction of the New Testament records but as the elucidation of their message, which is not a system of ideas but the story of God's dealings with mankind.

In strict accord with his hypothesis, Professor Richardson consistently rejects the influence of Gnostic ideas, supporting a welcome counter-thesis to the views of Bultmann, and provides a very thorough account of the Hebraic thought-forms, which, in his view and probably rightly, are the primary background for an understanding of New Testament theology. He is equally sceptical of any Hellenistic influence, although the reviewer himself would hesitate to affirm the complete absence of traces of Philo's teaching.

Since one's understanding of the New Testament implies a particular understanding of the Christian faith and the importance for it of the Bible, Professor Richardson begins his survey with an inquiry into the meaning of faith and its relation to repentance and obedience. This last concept issues in knowledge which, together with revelation, is next considered. This knowledge is not theoretical contemplation but personal communion in response to the divine act; it has therefore been made available through God's revelation in Christ. The stage is now set for the consideration of the divine power, salvation, the Kingdom of God, the Holy Spirit, Messiahship, Christology and the life of Christ; then on to the atonement, the Church, its ministry and its worship. Throughout his exposition Professor Richardson is mindful of the eschatological dimension. 'The basic reality about being a Christian', he says, 'is not a moral but an eschatological truth' (p. 36), and he proceeds to demonstrate this clearly in relation to every aspect of New Testament theology. The treatment is on the whole admirable—although there are occasional omissions, e.g. there is surprisingly no reference to 2 Macc. 2.8 in his discussion of the Transfiguration—and *inter alia* mention may be made of the balanced surveys of

justification in relation to baptism (p. 236f), of infant baptism (pp. 358ff), and of the priesthood of the laity (pp. 301ff).

Nevertheless in a study of this nature it is to be expected that there would be statements that will not command universal assent. Thus the argument that the title of 'Son of man' was derived by Jesus from Ezekiel is not entirely convincing (p. 144f). The author's treatment of the Holy Spirit accepts a confusion between Him and Christ in the thought of the New Testament writers which, to the reviewer, is by no means self-evident. So the statement, concerning the fourth Gospel, that 'the action of the Spirit is the action of the Risen Christ Himself, who comes to his disciples in the coming of the Paraclete' (p. 109), is to be questioned on the grounds that in speaking of His coming Christ was referring to His resurrection when He would bestow the Spirit; i.e. the coming of Christ and the coming of the Spirit are intimately connected, the one involving the other, yet they are not identical. Again the assertion that it is the life-giving Spirit of the Risen Christ who is received in the Eucharist (p. 372) is to endorse what to many would seem a patristic aberration fortunately affected by few.

There are further to be noted a number of apparent inconsistencies in method and interpretation, e.g. why accept an exorcism (p. 338) and the putting on of white robes (p. 344) as primitive baptismal ceremonies, and yet reject unction (p. 357)? The evidence for the last is no less definite than for the first two, even if it is not greater. Why deny that to see the Risen Lord was a qualification for apostleship because the appearance to the five hundred did not make them apostles (p. 322)? It is equally tenable that to see the Lord was a qualification, but not the only one, i.e. commissioning was also required. There is also to be noted one surprising contradiction—'the view that *Auct. Heb.* teaches that Christ in heaven is continually offering himself (or his blood) to God is based on a falsely Platonising tendency. . . . Christ is seated . . . not standing in the posture and place of the suppliant' (p. 202), but the Eucharist 'is the means whereby the Church on earth takes part in Christ's offering in heaven, where even now he appears before the face of God for us (Heb. 9.24)' (p. 383). The reviewer would endorse the second statement and avoid any contradiction by denying the first on the grounds that (*a*) 'sitting' is a metaphor which is not to be pressed, and (*b*) Christ's intercessory activity (ἔντευξις) has a basis, like any other plea (cf. Acts 25.24, 27; Rom. 11.2), and this basis is His death, His advocacy finding its justification in His sacrifice, and this would seem to mean that Christ still pleads His sacrifice in heaven and therefore continues to offer Himself to the Father.

It would be carping criticism to continue this list further, but it has been necessary in order to sound a note of caution. Professor Richardson is emphatic that this work is not 'an academic exercise' but is intended to assist the preaching of the Gospel and therefore every student of it. But the student, with considerably less knowledge than that of the author, may be misled, by a slightly over-confident formulation of conclusions and a failure to indicate alternative interpretations, into allowing his critical faculties to be lulled. So, for example, there is the acceptance, without question, of the substantial accuracy of the apostolic *kerygma*; there is the statement that 'there is no reason to doubt that in his summary of Paul's preaching on the Areopagus St. Luke has given us a faithful account of the kind of approach which St. Paul was accustomed to make to an audience of educated Greeks' (p. 52); and there is the minor but significant pronouncement: 'St. Luke (11.20), doubtless in the interests of his typology, alters the expression (in Matt. 12.28) to "by the finger of God" ' (p. 107). Yet many, not unreasonable critics, would feel bound to question the truth of these positions, and, in relation to the last instance, one might well ask: is it not possible that St. Matthew changed the saying and that St. Luke has preserved the original form?

To sum up—the expert will find this a stimulating book, not only as regards its methodology but because of numerous fresh and original interpretations. The student will certainly be assisted to develop a sense of perspective, a capacity to see the wood for the trees, as long as he reads this as critically as any other fruit of scholarship. For the understanding of the Bible message and its explication in contemporary terms can never be finalised; *the* New Testament Theology will never be written because it requires restatement in every age as each age has its own individual and therefore theological standpoint. For this very reason we may welcome this volume for what it professes to be—*An Introduction*.

J. G. Davies

The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings. By Harald Riesenfeld. A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., London. 1957. 2s. 6d.

This pamphlet is a reprint of the address given by Professor Riesenfeld at the opening session of the congress on 'The Four Gospels in 1957' held at Oxford in September of that year. Its contents are no less important than the occasion on which it was delivered, for in it Professor Riesenfeld not only criticises the theory about the origins and development of the Gospel tradition which is associated with the 'Form-Critics' but also outlines a new theory of his own.

The existence of the four Gospels in their differing forms has made

it inevitable that there should be attempts to reconstruct the process of development which the tradition underwent from the time of the beginning of Jesus' ministry to the composition of the Gospels in their present form. Perhaps the biggest advance in the history of this activity of conjectural reconstruction was made by Form-criticism when it offered a plausible account of the way in which tradition (largely oral) has moulded the forms of the synoptic narrative—a theory of development, but not of origins. In the work of the German Form-critics this theory of development was joined to a theory of origins, the so-called theory of the *Sitz im Leben*,[1] which, in its most popular form, advanced the hypothesis that much of what we now have in the Gospels derives both form and content from the needs—evangelistic, instructional, and apologetic—of the primitive Church.

Professor Riesenfeld charges full tilt at both these theories. He is of course willing to concede that both have a measure of value in them (one of the troubles in this whole business is that everyone tries to ride his own theory too hard, forgetting that most mounts can take us somewhere, and no single one can take us everywhere); but he only concedes them a limited usefulness. He examines two forms of the *Sitz im Leben* theory; the theory that mission preaching was one of the main sources from which the Gospel tradition derived, and the theory that communal instruction within the earliest Church was such a source. Both of these he finds unproven. The first depends to a large extent on such work as that of C. H. Dodd in *The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments*, which has unearthed from Acts and the Epistles the probable forms of such early missionary preaching. It then proceeds to infer, from such similarities of form as can be seen between, e.g. Acts 10.36-39 and the structure of Mark, that the Gospels are in fact expanded sermons, or the end result of a process of consolidation and elaboration of such sermon material. But, says Professor Riesenfeld, '*Data* are wholly wanting to support such a process of expansion and there is certainly nothing in our Gospels, especially if we compare the three Synoptics with the Fourth Gospel, which gives the slightest basis for such an hypothesis' (p. 13). On this it is perhaps legitimate to comment that data of the kind which Riesenfeld appears to be looking for are certainly lacking; there are no explicit indications of origin, but indirect hints and suggestions are all that any theory, including his own, can rely on in this field.

The second theory—that instruction within the Church formed the basis of the Gospel tradition—he dismisses mainly on the ground

[1] See e.g. T. W. Manson in *The Background of the NT and its Eschatology*, pp. 212ff.

that it cannot explain the absence of direct quotations of Jesus' own words in the Epistles. Why do the exhortations, and indeed the Christological passages, in the Epistles never quote the *logia Jesu* if these very passages are the origin (or representative of the origin) of the Gospel tradition in which we find these *logia* embodied? 'There can be only one explanation of this strange fact, namely, that the primitive Christian letter-writers, and among them Paul, took express pains to avoid citing the sayings of Jesus in the context of their original utterance' (p. 14: this statement ignores, perhaps rightly, the once-popular view that these writers do not cite the sayings of Jesus because they knew little of them or were not particularly interested in them). This explanation offered by Riesenfeld is connected with an important part of his positive theory, namely that the tradition of Jesus' words and deeds constituted a 'Holy Word' not to be lightly repeated but only recited on certain solemn occasions. Riesenfeld's objection to the 'Church-instruction' theory of Gospel origins stands or falls to a large extent with the success or failure of this positive theory. But it can in any case be admitted that the absence of quotations from Jesus' own words throughout the Epistles is a perplexing fact which has not often been sufficiently taken into account in dealing with Gospel origins.

Now for the positive theory. This is that 'the Gospel tradition belongs to a category which is *sui generis* and, to put the matter concisely, it has its own *Sitz im Leben*' (p. 16). 'The words and deeds of Jesus are a holy Word, comparable with that of the Old Testament, and the handing down of their precious material is entrusted to special persons' (p. 20). Because it was holy, it was not to be lightly mentioned in missionary preaching or even in community instruction—hence the silence of the Epistles. On the other hand, it was not the strict preserve of an esoteric sect; its guardians were the Apostles, and this was one of their most distinctive functions, but it could of course be communicated—at the community's gatherings—to the whole body of believers. The need to preserve this holy Word has produced our Gospels.

Finally, this tradition is holy Word, according to Riesenfeld, not because the earliest Church made it so, but because Jesus Himself proclaimed and inaugurated it as such. Knowing Himself to be the Messiah, He instructed His disciples, making them learn much by heart, and indeed acting as well as speaking in such a manner that the tradition of His words and deeds would be most firmly impressed on those who heard and saw Him. (Riesenfeld makes much of Mark 14.9 in this connexion, accepting it as a genuine Dominical saying.) 'I therefore make bold to conjecture', he concludes, 'that Jesus reckoned with what we may call the recital of the Gospel

tradition in the epoch between His death and the parousia' (p. 27).

Such in barest outline is Riesenfeld's theory. This last feature of it, which sees the origin of the Gospel tradition, both in form and content, to lie substantially with Jesus Himself, is clearly one that could be rejected while the remainder of the theory is held; but if it can be justified the theory as a whole is greatly strengthened. As the author himself remarks, the problem of the Messianic self-consciousness 'is the central question and the point at which the ways divide' (p. 28).

Those who, on other grounds, hold Riesenfeld's view about the Messianic self-consciousness of Jesus will certainly be attracted to the theory which he here sets forth. It is a theory which gives promise of a genuinely critical understanding of the process by which our Gospels came to take their present form without divorcing the historical Jesus from the Christ of faith. Nor would it be fair to the author to criticise points of detail when a large book would obviously be needed to justify the position which he has here been compelled to set forth in very brief compass. But certain comments suggest themselves.

(1) Riesenfeld lays great stress on the parallel provided by the Jewish tradition as it existed in Jesus' time, and the method by which it was handed on from teacher to pupil. Jesus certainly was regarded by many in His day as a rabbi, although by no means a conventional and certainly not a duly ordained rabbi (cf. D. Daube, *The N.T. and Rabbinic Judaism*, p. 217). A fuller examination of this parallel would do much to strengthen (or weaken) Riesenfeld's argument. The end results of the two traditions—*Pirke Aboth* and the Gospels—are certainly very different from one another in literary form.

(2) Riesenfeld's hypothesis suggests an original, fixed tradition which has diverged to some extent with the differing needs and emphases of different sections of the Church, and the varied theological understandings of the Gospel writers or their predecessors. (He suggests in passing, however, that the Fourth Gospel stems from a parallel tradition to the synoptic, which had its origin in Jesus' discourses and 'meditations' in the circle of His disciples.) But there is also much to be said, both historically and theologically, for the view that from the beginning there is both variety of tradition and variety of interpretation of the significance of that Jesus of Nazareth who as Christ is bigger than any man's understanding of Him, yet only to be known through such human interpretations. This is not to call the whole hypothesis in question, but only to ask whether Riesenfeld has not overstated his case at certain points, and whether he takes enough account of theological divergences between the Synoptic Gospels themselves.

(3) The author could hardly be said to have proved his point that an important, if not the most important, part of the Apostles' function was to be guardians of the tradition of the words and deeds of Jesus. Nor is it clear that his preliminary arguments have really disposed of the 'mission-preaching' and 'church-instruction' theories of Gospel origins. Apart from detailed and exegetical questions which cannot be raised here, it may be commented that we ought above all to be on our guard against unjustifiably sharp distinctions between the activities of missionary preaching, communal instruction, and the recital of the holy tradition of Jesus' words and deeds. Riesenfeld makes much (and no doubt rightly) of the technical terminology of tradition in the New Testament (especially *paradosis* and *paralambanein*); but in 1 Corinthians at least Paul uses this terminology in 'mission-preaching' and 'church-instruction' contexts (11.23-25; 15.3).

(4) The theory here set forth appears to fit the words of Jesus better than His deeds, although it is (and indeed for Riesenfeld's purposes must be) applied to both. It is hard, for example, to see how any of the miracle-stories can have taken their *literary* form from Jesus Himself. (We can except the Passion narrative from this criticism, as Riesenfeld himself does; also the Baptism and Temptation narratives, if they are regarded as based on Jesus' own reports.)

(5) It seems doubtful whether the theory as here stated takes sufficient account of variants in the synoptic tradition which seem to go back to very early days. The Lord's Prayer, for example, and the Beatitudes exist in differing forms in Matthew and Luke; here if anywhere one would expect to see the tradition transmitted most exactly and carefully as holy Word. Is this variation in early tradition, or did Jesus Himself use differing forms of words on different occasions?

Other criticisms could be made. But they are all questionings rather than criticisms—requests that this theory will be set forth more fully; for if there was ever any danger of deadlock in the progress of studies on this question, Professor Riesenfeld has certainly removed it. He has raised again, not only all the questions concerning Gospel origins, but many of those concerning Jesus Himself. Who was He and what did He believe Himself to be? What did He believe about the *parousia* of the Son of Man and what provision, if any, did He make for the 'time of the Church'? Professor Riesenfeld's thesis raises all these questions. I hazard the guess that it will prove to have given new and much-needed light on them; but that, in its present form, it will be found too simple to account for all the evidence.

R. S. Barbour

The Gospel according to St. Luke. By A. R. C. Leaney. Black's New Testament Commentaries. A. & C. Black, London, 1958. Pp. xii + 300. 25s.

This book 'attempts to assess the character and value of Luke both as theologian and historian', a subject surely for a monograph rather than a commentary. This particular angle of approach, however, is not unduly pressed, and the bulk of the work is a straightforward commentary on the Gospel. In Leaney's view, 'we can vindicate Luke's sincerity and conscientiousness but not the claim—which he would perhaps have found difficult to conceive—that he wrote with scientific objectivity'. The Gospel is 'unmistakably composite', but 'unified in a masterly manner under the dominating influence of a theology thoroughly understood and held with fervent conviction'.

Seventy-five pages are devoted to introduction, some seventy more to the translation, with the result that the notes are sometimes laconic in their brevity. And some things which might have been expected in a commentary are missing. The Proto-Luke theory is dismissed in half-a-dozen lines (the index lists only an even briefer reference on another page), and there is no mention at all of the theory that the Infancy Narratives may be based on a source deriving from 'baptist' circles. On the former subject, Leaney argues that the non-Marcan material in the Passion Narrative may be reduced to comparatively small compass, and that Luke has recast Mark under the combined influence of his special material and his own theology. In regard to the Infancy Narratives, he offers a two-source theory of his own. On the other hand, he deals faithfully with Farrer's proposal to dispense with Q, which (in the reviewer's opinion rightly) he rejects.

In a special note on the Lucan text of the Lord's Prayer, Leaney admits that Streeter 'may well have been mistaken' in his attempt to establish two independent versions in M and L, but urges that the reading of Gregory of Nyssa may none the less be authentic. Another note defends the shorter text of the Institution of the Eucharist, while the section on the Resurrection Narratives seeks to develop further the suggestion of J. N. Sanders that the authors of the Third and Fourth Gospels had access independently to the same tradition. In the commentary proper some notes are quite excellent, but others (at least to the reviewer) are somewhat disappointing. On 2.34, 20.17f, for example, some reference might have been made to the use of the 'stone' testimonia elsewhere in the New Testament—but there are limits to what can be included.

The translation is 'an attempt to represent the Greek in a manner faithful to the original', and 'will have little value for an English audience desiring to be left unaware of the difficulties of translating

the original New Testament'. At some points it is so faithful as to be scarcely English (e.g. 12.28). Again, some of the sections are too long for convenient comparison of the commentary and the text.

With Leaney's general position many would probably agree, but there is ample room for difference of opinion on points of detail. Even where one must disagree, however, one is forced to think, and for this stimulus, as for his positive contribution to the study of the Gospel, we are indebted to the author. R. McL. Wilson

The Jesus of St. John. By J. Ernest Davey. Lutterworth Press, London. Pp. 191. 25s.

Dr Davey (Principal of the Presbyterian College, Belfast) begins by stating his critical presuppositions (chapters 1-3). He believes, in general, that John records some genuine historical material which is not in the Synoptic Gospels, and, in particular, that references to the temptations of Jesus can be traced in chapter 6. 'It is true that much in John is not history; but my contention is that in Ephesus an independent tradition of Christ's ministry lived on, resting on some apostolic figure, e.g. John Mark or some other Jerusalem disciple, and that John sometimes embodies this genuine, independent evangelic tradition' (p. 55).

However, the core of Dr Davey's thesis is theological, as is clear from chapter 4. He wants to show that John, in spite of his emphasis upon Christ's divinity, represents Him as a thoroughly human figure. The key to Christ's humanity is His *dependence* on the Father. In chapter 5 (pp. 90-154) Dr Davey, by a thorough examination of the text, demonstrates that the Johannine Christ is dependent on God for His power, His knowledge, His message, His authority, His love —in short, for every aspect of His person and work. Furthermore, the Son is dependent on the Father in His divine, as well as in His human, nature, as is indicated by the statement that 'the Father is greater than I' (14.28).

Dr Davey has made good his case against those (if any there be) who regard the Johannine Christ as 'a demi-god stalking through life' (p. 12). Yet Dr Davey's book suffers from some serious defects of which I select three.

1. While the Johannine Christ is undoubtedly human (and, therefore, 'dependent'), we must consult the Synoptic Gospels and the Epistle to the Hebrews for many of the concrete, vivid, details of His humanity. The Fourth Gospel does not record the temptations of Jesus (*pace* Dr Davey's conjecture), His confession of ignorance concerning the 'day and hour' of His Parousia, the prayer in Gethsemane, the cry of dereliction from the Cross. Dr Davey himself states that John shows 'a tendency to dehumanise Christ' (p. 89)

and that his portrait is 'far less real than that of the other gospels' (p. 184). I do not mean to endorse these statements which, in fact, I would dispute. I cite them merely to suggest that they are highly damaging to Dr Davey's thesis.

2. Dr Davey contrasts two views of Christ. According to the first, Christ is a human person whose will is perfectly obedient to the will of God; according to the second, He is the eternal Logos who assumed human flesh. Dr Davey labels the first view 'the ethico-mystical or historical theory', and the second 'the Logos or metaphysical fiction theory' (pp. 80, 88-89, 95-96, 101, 131, 154). If I understand Dr Davey's somewhat diffuse argument aright, he holds that John normally presupposes the first theory, although sometimes, through the influence of his philosophical background, he lets himself be contaminated by the second. On this contrast I would remark, firstly, that it forces Dr Davey to give an emaciated exegesis of Logos in the prologue, and to posit a false distinction between Christ the Logos and Christ the Son (pp. 88 and 185); secondly that it ignores the fact that dependence (in the later sense of 'eternal generation') is implied by the assertion that the Son is the Father's pre-existent Word, or Utterance; thirdly, that the contrast would have been unintelligible to John—if, indeed, it would have been intelligible to any thinker before Kant.

3. Any hopes that Dr Davey may arrive at a more satisfying viewpoint in his concluding chapter are sadly disappointed. He dismisses the Chalcedonian formula as 'psychologically a piece of nonsense' (p. 166), which is a little hard, in view of the fact that the formula does not claim to be a psychological statement at all. On the other hand, he commends 'the valuable new (*sic*) approach of Hegel and his followers' (p. 161), presumably because this approach interprets the Trinity in terms of 'a growing richness and progress in God's self-expression' (p. 171).

Few readers are likely to challenge the data that Dr Davey has assembled to prove Christ's 'dependence', for clearly the Son derives, not less, but infinitely more, than we do from the Father; but, equally, few readers are likely to accept an interpretation of these data that impales John on the horns of a Ritschlian dilemma.

H. P. Owen

L'Épître de saint Paul aux Romains. By F. J. Leenhardt. Commentaire du Nouveau Testament VI. Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel and Paris, 1957. 12 fr.

If it is the ambition of the actor to play Hamlet, it must be the ambition of the New Testament scholar to write a commentary on Romans. Certainly few books have received greater attention; and

rightly so, for it is one of the fundamental documents of the Christian faith. No series of commentaries on the New Testament can possibly be considered complete without a volume devoted to this letter. The present work, however, is not merely one of a series, but in its own right a genuine contribution to the study of the epistle.

The plan of the book is that already familiar from other volumes of the *Commentaire*: a short introduction, a translation, and an exposition in the form of a running commentary, with footnotes to deal with points of grammar and textual criticism. If the translation seems at times to be more a paraphrase, that is perhaps inevitable, although one might question the rendering of *dikaiosune* now by 'jugement favorable', now by 'justice'. On p. 51 a footnote says it is not necessary to make Rom. 2.21-23 interrogative, with Nestle, while the translation opposite does so. Again, those who wish to read the translation in sections, rather than verse by verse, are doomed to much turning of pages. 'Hellenistica' is three times misspelt (pp. 29, 32, 203), W. D. Davies is given a wrong initial (p. 82), and a criticism of Dodd on p. 75 seems to rest on a misunderstanding. Finally, the statement (p. 76) 'Paul ne rattache pas la justification à la mort de Christ!' ought surely to have had some elucidation, instead of lurking in a footnote.

Nevertheless this is a book to be commended. It is thorough; it is up-to-date (even to Vol. VI of Kittel's *Wörterbuch*); and if one does not always agree one is still forced to think. It has been said that the test of a theology is whether it will preach, and one reader at least would like to hear the author preach on a text from Romans.

Space does not permit of detailed discussion, but some points may be noted. 2.1ff refers to all men, not to the Jews alone (p. 44). On 7.7ff Leenhardt rejects both traditional interpretations and finds the clue in Genesis: the passage portrays not Paul's own experience but the situation of mankind in Adam. Perhaps the most interesting suggestion concerns the purpose of the letter (pp. 9ff). The key lies not in the situation of the Roman community (no signs of heresy, faction, or rebellion against Paul's authority), but in that of Paul himself. Nor is it a dogmatic treatise. With his mission in the East behind him, the apostle takes advantage of the lull to survey both past and future, and review the missionary task of the Church. Leenhardt admits the paradox of suggesting as the central idea of the letter the problem of the Church, when the word *ecclesia* never occurs except in the suspect sixteenth chapter, but claims that if the word is never used the concept is presupposed throughout.

For full-scale critical treatment one must look elsewhere. As a stimulating and thought-provoking study this book has much to offer.

R. McL. Wilson

The Apocalypse of John. By CHARLES C. TORREY. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1958. Pp. xvi+210. 40s.

THE name of C. C. Torrey is closely associated with the insistence upon the importance of the study of Aramaic for the understanding of the New Testament, and with his vigorous advocacy of the view that all four gospels are translations into Greek of earlier Aramaic documents, and that they can be dated as early as A.D. 50. In this newly published book on 'The Apocalypse of John', he confidently affirms that this book also was originally written in Aramaic, and only later translated into Greek. Its date is fixed with certainty at A.D. 68, during the brief reign of Galba.

Not only does the author deny that the Apocalypse was first written in Greek, but equally insists that it does not go back to an original in Hebrew. The original was Aramaic, and he indicates innumerable points where the original Aramaic obtrudes through the Greek rendering. The clearest evidence of this is found in misunderstandings of the Aramaic word 'd^e' which in different contexts may be equivalent to the Greek ὅτι, ἵνα, or the relative pronoun. Other clues are also named, as for instance when a feminine gender in Greek takes the place of an expected neuter, since in Aramaic the neuter is represented by the feminine.

The well-known solecisms in the Greek grammar of the Apocalypse are explained as due not to a lack of skill in the use of Greek by the translator (who is claimed to be expert in the Greek language), but to his deliberate preference for retaining even in Greek the original Aramaic constructions in order to 'mirror faithfully every word and phrase of the sacred original'. 'The irregularity simply means: "See the original text".' The less radical theory that the author was 'thinking in Semitic while writing in Greek' is denounced as 'a mere delusion which ought to be buried and never resurrected'. One cannot help feeling, however, that the 'sacred original' might sometimes have been better served by less violently ungrammatical Greek constructions.

Professor Torrey insists that Aramaic was in far wider use than is usually conceded, and an inscription is cited to show that in the early part of the first century A.D. even the western coast of Asia Minor was bilingual, familiar equally with Aramaic and Greek. It is claimed also that 'Aramaic was insisted on as the official language of the Christian Church'.

Whether or not an original Aramaic document lay behind our present Greek text is of importance if it enables us to understand the meaning of the text better. The question of its date, however, is of wider interest. It has come to be regarded as almost current orthodoxy to date it in the reign of Domitian in the last decade of

the first century. This Professor Torrey scornfully repudiates. The Beast whose number is 666 is Nero, for 'the numbers represented by the Aramaic letters NRWN QSR, Nero Caesar, make up exactly the required sum'. He denies that the form for Caesar would be QYSR (as Swete and Charles claim). Nero is counted as the fifth emperor (since counting starts with Augustus and not Julius), and so Galba is the one reigning when the book is written, as 17.10 clearly indicates. Since Galba reigned only a few months the date of the book is in A.D. 68. The 'other who is not yet come' is Nero Redivivus, and Tacitus is quoted to prove that one claiming to be pseudo-Nero raised a band of insurgents in Asia and Greece and sailed for Rome in A.D. 69.

This early date compels Torrey to reject as erroneous Irenaeus's account of the long residence of the aged apostle John in Ephesus. The fact that Matthew is echoed in the Apocalypse presents no obstacles, because Matthew is dated *c.* A.D. 50. The opinion that the Pauline epistles are also echoed in it is not discussed, but it would be difficult to believe that Paul's letters were already collected in A.D. 68.

There are 70 pages of 'Critical Notes', indicating where the acceptance of an Aramaic original enables the reader to derive a better meaning from the Greek text, and the book concludes with Torrey's own translation of the Apocalypse based on his understanding of the original Aramaic.

Aramaic scholars will have to pass their judgment on the reliability of Torrey's explanations and arguments, and all students of the New Testament will have to take account of this plea for the earlier date of the Apocalypse.

We record with regret that, though the author was able to complete his MS in 1956, he did not live to arrange for its publication. This has been supervised by his daughter, with the help of several friends.

C. L. MITTON

Statistik des neutestamentlichen Wortschatzes. By ROBERT MORGENTHALER. Gotthelf-Verlag, Zürich and Frankfurt-am-Main, 1958. Pp. 188 and end-paper.

DR MORGENTHALER is already well known to New Testament students for his studies in the Lukan literature. Here he has put his colleagues further in his debt by presenting them in tabular form with a statistical analysis of the New Testament vocabulary.

The main part of the book (91 pages) is devoted to an alphabetical list of all the New Testament words (even including the definite article) with an explicit statement of the number of times each occurs in each New Testament book, and an indication of their

frequency in the Septuagint. In order to profit properly by the information in this table the student should use it along with Moulton-Geden or a similar concordance. Then we are given statistical information on the relative frequency of the several inflected forms of certain selected words (especially pronouns), on the use of prepositions with various cases of nouns and in composition with verbs, on the use of other prefixes, on loanwords and the like, and on the frequency of the several parts of speech in the twenty-seven books. Other frequency-tables follow, and much of the information is presented in graph form on an end-paper.

The New Testament student, then, who wishes to consider questions of authorship and so forth in the light of the statistical evidence has much of his work already done for him in this book. Dr Morgenthaler gives a helpful introduction to his tables, and makes no excessive claims for his work. Nowadays this kind of work is being increasingly entrusted to an electronic computer, but a scholar can still give us explanations and answers to questions which are beyond the province of a machine.

Since New Testament students are best acquainted with this kind of statistical analysis in relation to the problem of the Pastoral Epistles (thanks to P. N. Harrison), it is of special interest to see Dr Morgenthaler's remark: 'If the Pastoral Epistles are genuine, a biographical development is indicated here . . . in the Pauline letters. The farther Paul moved away theologically from Judaism, the more he conformed to the Gentile usage in his language. Thus we find fewer Septuagintal words and more Hellenistic expressions in the Pastoral Epistles than in his principal epistles' (p. 47).

In thanking Dr Morgenthaler for his time-consuming and painstaking labours, we might advise anyone who proceeds to draw conclusions from these statistical tables to read first of all Professor Bruce Metzger's article 'A Reconsideration of Certain Arguments against the Pauline Authorship of the Pastoral Epistles' in the *Expository Times* for December 1958; this article has a relevance far beyond the particular problem mentioned in its title.

F. F. Bruce

The Apocrypha of the Old Testament. Revised Standard Version. T. Nelson and Sons Ltd., Edinburgh, 1958. 18s. net.

It is a great pity that so many Church people know very little about the Apocrypha. For this collection of writings contains so much in stirring narrative, in poetic rhythm, in practical wisdom, as well as in true religion. The prejudice against it in Protestant circles has been over-strong, while lack of knowledge of its contents must have made many readers of English literature, both prose and poetry,

not to mention our hymns, miss not a few interesting and illuminating references.

So it is to be hoped that the publication of the R.S.V. of the Apocrypha will turn new readers to this book and will deepen the understanding and enjoyment of old readers. The translation is in the same style as the R.S.V. of the Bible, based on the Authorised Version but taking into account the Revised Version and especially the results of the best and most recent scholarship. Thus the Hebrew fragments of Ben Sirach, and the portions found in the Papyri, have been used. The result is a very accurate and readable translation, one valuable feature being the footnotes which contain many varied readings. There is no introduction, but there are several up-to-date books that can help the interested reader to a fuller understanding and appreciation of these 'significant documents of a most important era in religious history'.

JOHN A. LAMB

An Introduction to the Apocrypha. By BRUCE M. METZGER. Oxford University Press, New York, 1957. Pp. xii + 274. $4.00.

PROFESSOR METZGER of Princeton Theological Seminary sets out to give in non-technical language a concise, yet comprehensive account of the Apocryphal books using as his text for study the R.S.V. Apocrypha.

Though he does not regard the Apocryphal books as part of the Bible, he is convinced that they 'have moral and religious insights of permanent value'. Dr Metzger unfortunately does not bring these out in any systematic manner, nor does he make any comparison of the Apocryphal books with each other in connexion with these 'insights'.

His Introduction discusses the meaning and the use of the term 'Apocrypha' and the growth of the Hebrew Canon. Each of the Apocryphal books is then described in clear and unaffected language so that it is possible to become aware of their content and atmosphere without referring to the R.S.V. text, though relevant quotations are set out occasionally in well-arranged type. Critical questions are deftly and succinctly handled giving him an opportunity to consider the growth of some of the books into their present form.

As is to be expected from a Professor of New Testament, there is a most useful chapter on the Apocrypha and the New Testament concluding with a pertinent quotation from a newly discovered essay left by J. H. Newman in which the Cardinal says: 'without . . . denying that God's supernatural hand is in the Apocrypha, yet,

knowing that it was not included in that Canon which Christ sanctions . . . we do not see our way clear to receive it as canonical'.

A further chapter gives a brief history of the Apocrypha in the Christian Church, and a final chapter describes 'The Pervasive Influence of the Apocrypha' in English Literature, in Music, in Art, and includes such interesting notes as to the influence exerted by the Second Book of Esdras on such different gentlemen as Christopher Columbus, William Whiston and John Ruskin.

Two Appendices give summary information on 'Current English Translations of the Apocrypha' and the 'New Testament Apocrypha'.

R. A. BARCLAY

The Council of Florence. By JOSEPH GILL. Cambridge University Press, 1959. Pp. xviii + 453. 47s. 6d.

A FULL and scholarly account of the Council of Florence was certainly needed, and no one is better qualified to produce it than Professor Gill of the Pontifical Oriental Institute, who worked with Hofmann on the edition of the sources and has also written several substantial preparatory studies. In particular he has edited the Greek Acts and analysed them into their three major components. Now he tells the story of the Council in considerable, but welcome, detail; this must be the standard narrative for a long time. I am not competent to estimate its accuracy as a narrative, though Fr Gill's careful scholarship instils confidence. Enough to echo, by way of caution, what the author himself allows, that he sometimes had to use uncheckable material from the 'not self-evidently truthful' *Memoirs* of Syropoulos and that the relative value of these *Memoirs* and John Plousiadenus' *Description* remains open to discussion. Hence a different evaluation might alter the story in some places.

Fr Gill's standpoint is sympathetic to the Papacy, but not uncritical. Perhaps he is rather hard on the Council of Basel; at least he provides a salutary check upon Protestant tendencies to romanticise the conciliar movement. Perhaps he is rather tender to Eugenius IV; another, without denying the Pope's sincere desire for unity, might stress his manifest intention to exercise in the East all the powers which he possessed in the West. Perhaps the Greeks' difficulties might be probed more tenderly. But beyond question we have here a first-class account of the Council which will guide future study.

And such study cannot be of academic interest only. No one concerned for the modern ecumenical movement can read this book without being moved—amused, puzzled, exasperated, saddened, shocked. Parallels, perhaps only superficial, come to mind. The Greek habit of raising endless points of procedure before allowing

discussion of substance reminds one that Russia is the heir of Byzantium; their first intention only to state, and not discuss, traditional doctrine is no surprise to anyone who was at Lund or Evanston. The rivalry of Pope and Council for the prestige of achieving unity with the Greeks suggests—I do not say this very seriously—a problem which may confront the World Council of Churches in the near future. Some things, we may hope, are by now impossible, as when the Latins, with the best intentions, forged letters from the Duke of Burgundy to placate the Greek emperor, or when lots were drawn to decide between two candidates for the patriarchal throne of Constantinople in 1440, the one for, the other against, the union.

Among minor matters I note the trouble caused by defective scholarship: arguments from Dionysius Areopagiticus as a pupil of St. Paul, from the spurious Donation of Constantine and the Forged Decretals (by one of which Bessarion was shaken), Rome's denial of any knowledge of its former use of Sardican canons as Nicene, the muddle about the authentic text of several Greek Fathers. To turn to more serious matters, it seems impossible to determine how much disinterested desire there was for unity, and how far the Latins were moved by thirst for dominion, the Greeks by fear of the Turks. It is quite clear that, however motivated, the movement had not penetrated to the grass roots, so that when western military help was inadequate there was no strong drive from the East for unity *per se*; clear also that the movement was too predominantly Constantinopolitan, too centralised, so that the other patriarchates, little prepared for change, speedily rejected it. At the Council itself there was little personal confidence between the negotiators. The Greeks felt that they were held at the point of a pistol, the Latins drove home every advantage and demanded very little less than complete submission.

I remain astonished that the *Filioque* could have caused so much commotion. Surely that could not have kept apart churches which genuinely wanted to be one body? Surely it was the focus of many hostilities, open and latent? Yet one must confess that the theologians went at it as though it were the crucial point—and so Professor Gill treats it. It is equally astonishing to me that the papal supremacy played so small a part in the discussions. Did the Greeks not realise what Rome would make of the Decree of Union? We know, for instance, that Eugenius intended to control episcopal appointments in the East. Or did they intend to take refuge behind the clause reserving all the rights of the patriarchal sees? If so, the union would soon have collapsed, humanly speaking. The Turkish conquests quickly put a melancholy end to the tangled story. As

we read it in the present account, we may not be greatly encouraged, but we ought to be considerably instructed.

S. L. Greenslade

Western Asceticism. Edited by Owen Chadwick. The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. xii. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. Pp. 368. 35s.

No serious student of Christian sources can fail to admire this notable series of splendidly-presented books, and to express gratitude at the appearance of each new volume. It is almost equally inevitable that any reviewer shall have some private regret at the omission from the series of this or that treasure of patristics or of medieval Christian letters; and the present reviewer's private grievance concerns the omission from the eight patristic volumes of St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom.

But even though in a volume on sources for Christian ascetics one might have expected some Basil, the title 'Western Asceticism' sufficiently excludes him, and it would be graceless to withhold praise from this latest volume, which includes three early medieval sources of the very highest importance. These are *The Sayings of the Fathers* (or *Adhortationes Patrum*), *The Conferences of Cassian* and *The Rule of St. Benedict.* The first two of these, occupying three quarters of the total bulk of the volume, are virtually Egyptian sources: the *Sayings* come from a Latin translation, *c.* A.D. 550, of a lost Greek collection of sayings attributed to the Egyptian hermits, while the *Conferences* are taken from the sophisticated Latin of the Egyptian trained Gallic abbot, Cassian, who was writing towards 430. But it is the Latin development rather than the Greek to which attention is drawn in this book, and the very clear dependence of the historic Benedictine Rule on the two earlier documents makes this the natural pattern to have adopted for this purpose.

Dr Chadwick provides an excellent General Introduction as well as specific brief introductions to each work, and the three texts are followed by an Appendix of variant readings relevant to the *Sayings* and a Bibliography relevant to all three.

The book is described as 'Selected Translations': the limitation applies only to the *Sayings*, in which Dr Chadwick has translated Parts 1 to 17 of the 21 parts in Rosweyde's 1615 edition, comparing it at all points with the earliest available manuscripts. A word of special praise must be given to the translation itself, which is always graceful and natural, and combines dignity with vitality to make an exceedingly readable text.

The reader will be left with a clear impression of the comprehensiveness and perspicacity of the Egyptian teaching, as well as of

its influence on later monasticism. It is excellent that so generous a 'selection' of the *Sayings* has been here preserved, because one of its charms (like that of Basil's Rules, Longer or Shorter) is the wonderful inconsequence with which trivia and profundities are thrown together section by section. The more sober and systematic material of the *Conferences* leads happily from the primitive Apophthegmata towards the precision and clarity of the Benedictine Rule. Altogether the book makes not only a valuable and readable source, but also a very happy composition. In no aspect could the work have been better done, and the editor and publishers are to be highly congratulated on the whole work.

ERIK ROUTLEY

Thomas Cranmer, Theologian. By G. W. BROMILEY. Lutterworth Press, London, 1956. Pp. xviii + 108. 12s. 6d.

IT is both a sign of the greatness of the Church of England and also a possible sign of her weakness that this Church has triumphantly asserted her right to a position distinct from Roman Catholicism and from continental Protestantism. But this position of splendid isolation involves the danger for some of assuming that it is possible to write the history of the Church of England during the Reformation as though continental influences deriving from Wittenberg, Zürich or Geneva were minimal, extraneous and indeed wholly undesirable. In the work of writers taking this approach, Cranmer may appear as a weak erastian, ill-found theologically; a liturgical scholar lost and bewildered amid the ruthless irreligion of a Cromwell or a Warwick; and, most pejoratively, a Zwinglian in the doctrine of the Eucharist. Dr Bromiley rightly rejects this attitude to Cranmer: on the contrary he puts Cranmer forward as a Reformer, and discusses him in terms of the sixteenth-century Reformation, that is, he does not use him as a lay figure to be draped in nineteenth- or twentieth-century fashions of ecclesiastical interpretation.

Dr Bromiley begins with an Introduction in which Cranmer's life as a Reformer is briefly and usefully surveyed. Here he calls attention, among other significant points, to Cranmer's friendship with Peter Martyr whose theology he found congenial; and suggests that Cranmer in Bible, Prayer Book, and Confession of Faith did more to change the English Church than the political enactments of her sovereign heads. Throughout his book Dr Bromiley shows himself free of the usual tendency to show Cranmer trailing behind the marches and counter-marches of the politicians: he discusses him as a theologian, and as a theologian in his own right, not merely as the epigone of greater men. He emphasises that to understand Cranmer we must remember that he was a scholar who never lost sight of his

scholarship—Patristic and Liturgical as well as Biblical—in all his labours for the Church of England. Dr Bromiley's subjects are ably chosen to show Cranmer's range and emphases: Scripture and Tradition, Justification, the Church and the Ministry, Holy Baptism, the Eucharistic Presence and the Eucharistic Work, and he ends the book with an illuminating concluding estimate. Since no book has yet been produced on Cranmer as a theologian, it is obvious how useful Bromiley's work is. It is particularly useful because, unlike so much discussion on Cranmer which is about other men's views on what Cranmer is thought to have thought, it takes us through Cranmer's own writings for continual reference and quotation. Since the basis of defence of the Church of England is usually regarded as being set forth by Richard Hooker who affirmed that this Church rests upon the threefold authority of Scripture, the Fathers, and right reason, it is important to see that Cranmer (like Bishop Jewel after him) himself in effect makes appeal to these three sources of authority. In view of the denigration of Cranmer for making the Church subservient to the state, it is well to be reminded by Dr Bromiley, writing of the tension in Cranmer's mind between his loyalty to Prince and to Church: 'Neither Calvin on the one hand nor Queen Mary on the other felt the difficulty with quite the same poignancy as Cranmer.' Nevertheless, because of its supreme importance in the history of the Reformation in England, and not least for Cranmer and the manner of his dying, it is to be regretted that Dr Bromiley has not given an adequate account of the doctrine of the 'Godly Prince' as this was interpreted by Cranmer. Again, it is surprising in an Anglican author to find so little reference to the Prayer Books of Cranmer. (Bromiley's justification for this is, first, that the Book of Common Prayer is far too much regarded as a source for theology in the Church of England, and secondly, that *lex credendi* should control *lex orandi*. While this is a legitimate defence yet it is worth remembering that in the sixteenth century liturgical writing was a significant expression of belief—therefore, Cranmer's Prayer Books are surely a suitable source for his thought.) One last criticism is offered tentatively: the book seems to this reviewer to have been written with haste—a haste leading to occasional flatness and, rarely, to plain slackness of style. In view of Dr Bromiley's other commitments this may readily be forgiven him, particularly when we recollect that no other book of comparable size was produced for the quater-centenary of Cranmer, save a wretched performance by a Roman Catholic publicist which does not deserve to be mentioned beside the lucid, just and well-informed study under review.

Basil Hall

John Wesley and the Catholic Church. By JOHN M. TODD. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1958. Pp. 195. 15s.

THIS is a most interesting and attractive interpretation of the tradition of one Christian communion by a member of another. The author is a Roman Catholic layman, who has already revealed the breadth of his sympathies in a little book entitled *Catholicism and the Ecumenical Movement.* In the present volume he seeks to understand the essential inspiration of Wesley and his Methodism, and to discover how far it is identical with 'the inner force of the Catholic faith'. Nearly half the book is taken up with an account of Wesley's spiritual development, which is depicted as in harmony with the teaching of St. John of the Cross, while the remaining chapters contain a rapid survey of his theological outlook, which is represented as truly Catholic so far as it goes. Unlike the Continental Reformers, who began well by reasserting neglected Catholic truth, but then fell into heresy and schism, Wesley continued as well as he began, and was not even guilty of the 'enthusiasm' with which Ronald Knox and others have charged him. Despite his strictures on 'popery' (which are excused on the ground that he never really had the opportunity to learn the truth about Catholicism), Wesley ought not, it seems, to be regarded essentially as a Protestant. His well-known (but thoroughly fallacious) criticism of Luther is quoted with approval as entirely Catholic; the part played by Luther in his (and his brother's) conversion is ignored, and the influence of the Moravians is minimised; and while a passage where he appears to censure the Reformers' 'avowed separation' from the Church is noted, another in which he explains that they were 'thrust out', and lays the blame at the door of the Church, is overlooked. It seems, moreover, that the Protestant principle of *sola fide, sola gratia* can now be regarded as good Roman doctrine, though the same is not claimed for that of *sola scriptura*, which Wesley, for all his Anglican interest in the Fathers, quite certainly shared with the Reformers. He may be Catholic as far as he goes, but it is more than questionable whether his understanding of 'Scriptural Christianity' would have allowed him to go as much further as Rome, even in his own day, let alone in ours, would demand. His doctrine of the Church is nowhere fully expounded by him, but it is less vague and more decidedly of a Protestant character than Mr Todd's account of it suggests. He believed his own Church to be the best there was, but he never wished to claim that it was the only true Church, nor could he possibly admit such a claim on the part of any denomination. The 'Catholic Spirit' which he expounds in one of his finest sermons, cannot quite be equated with the 'Spirit of Catholicism'. But it can and should be exhibited by Christians of every denomination—as

Mr Todd exhibits it in this book. For when all the necessary question marks have been set against his treatment of the subject, it must still be said that such a book as he has given us is most warmly to be welcomed. It is marked by a breadth of charity and a degree of insight that make any criticism of it seem almost ungenerous, and one-sided though it is, it furnishes an admirable example of the temper in which ecumenical discussion ought to be conducted.

P. S. WATSON

The Riddle of the Scrolls. By H. E. DEL MEDICO. Burke Publishing Co., London, 1958. Pp. 432. 25s.

AT an earlier stage of the study of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Dr Teicher claimed these documents as Jewish-Christian, while Dr Zeitlin continues to assert that they are medieval. Most scholars, however, seem now to have accepted the view that the Scrolls are the library of a group of an Essene type, and the main debate recently has centred on the question of the possible influence of this group on early Christianity. Some hold that the Essenes anticipated the Church in everything but survival, others that the connexion is no more than one of a common background in the Old Testament and a common environment in first-century Judaism.

Now del Medico pronounces a robustly Shakespearean 'A plague o' both your houses!' The documents were not part of a library, but came from *genizoth*, repositories for apocryphal, heretical or defective manuscripts condemned to oblivion. The caves have no connexion with the so-called Essene monastery. Indeed the Essenes never existed—they are a figment of Philo's imagination, and Philo's account was copied and embroidered by Pliny. The references in Josephus are due to interpolations of the third and fourth centuries, borrowed from Hippolytus—who was describing not the Essenes but the Jews in general.

This is iconoclasm with a vengeance! It is hardly to be expected that the author's views will command widespread assent, but it must be said that he raises some important questions to which perhaps sufficient attention has not yet been paid. Could a sect intent on purity have lived in such close proximity to a cemetery? Was the region in the first century capable of supporting such a community, or even suitable for continuous habitation over any length of time? Could a pottery and a smelting-furnace have been operated, in close proximity to other buildings (including dwellings) in that region? And is it not possible that scholars have been too ready to assume a connexion between the buildings and the caves? These and other questions are advanced with extensive learning and a considerable show of humour, as in the comments on the 'hypothetical rodents'

which were so selective in their diet as to devour some parts of Scripture almost wholesale but leave the Isaiah roll untouched.

Del Medico's own theory must, however, be considered highly speculative. The buildings at Qumran had a long history, but those still extant were constructed for purposes connected with the cemetery, not vice versa. The pottery was a piece of stage property intended to identify the cemetery with the potter's field of Matt. 27.2-10, the smelting-furnace being added for the benefit of those who checked their quotations from the LXX of Zechariah. Having seen a soldier's travel-diary which included a photograph of the grove where Abraham met Hercules on his return from defeating the Philistines, the reviewer declines to be surprised. But when did the invention of relics and the manufacturing of sites begin?

The author appears to have access to information about first-century Judaism denied to other scholars, and this enables him to identify and date the fragments contained in the Scrolls. The word commonly rendered 'the many' is here translated 'the rabbis'; those usually taken to refer to priests and levites are frequently understood to mean the proper names Cohen and Levi. The Habakkuk Commentary reflects the war of A.D. 70, while the Manual and the War Scroll are both composite. But would memoranda notes for the use of a rabbinic school be copied on leather rolls? If del Medico is correct, it is difficult to see why the compiler acted as he did.

180 pages are given to translations of various documents, with commentary, but sometimes the commentary does not match with the translation; and the author seems unduly concerned to discover allusions to the eruption of Vesuvius. One's confidence is not increased by sundry misprints (which may, however, be the fault of the translator; e.g. *Dux Manuscripts hébreaux*; the editor of Philo is wrongly named Magney), nor by the fact that the author does not seem to know either the Cohn-Wendland edition of Philo or Wendland's edition of Hippolytus in the Berlin Corpus. The English translation on the whole runs smoothly, but sometimes adheres too closely to French idiom, and the grammar is sometimes shaky.

Detailed criticism is impossible. The author's learning is not in question, and he has said some things that demand consideration, but the reader would be well advised to take much of this book *cum grano salis*.

R. McL. Wilson

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